

F25-022 / C25-066

OMBUDS CLOSING REPORT

**POLICY AND PROCEDURES REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS**



**OFFICE OF THE
POLICE OMBUDS**
INDEPENDENT CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

This report was authored by Bart Logue, Police Ombuds, and George Perezvelez, Deputy Police Ombuds. The Office of the Police Ombuds (OPO) presented this report to the Office of the Police Ombuds Commission on July 21, 2026.

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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

After Action Report (AAR): A post-incident review that documents the operation, significant decisions, outcomes, and lessons identified by command or participating personnel.

Area denial: The use of a munition or other tool to influence crowd movement or discourage access to a location rather than to strike a particular person.

Bean bag round: A less lethal impact munition designed to deliver blunt impact.

Blue Nose round: A 40mm less lethal impact munition used by SPD during the June 11 response.

Body Worn Camera (BWC): A camera worn by law enforcement personnel that records audio and video from the wearer's location and perspective.

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD): The electronic dispatch system used to document calls, unit activity, operational updates, requests, authorizations, and other time-stamped information.

CS: 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile, a synthetic chemical irritant commonly referred to as tear gas.

De-escalation: Actions intended to reduce the intensity of an encounter, increase time or distance, improve communication, or reduce the need for force when reasonably possible.

Dialogue Team: Specially identified personnel assigned to communicate with event organizers, participants, and community members; explain police actions and expectations; gather information; and relay relevant information to command.

Direct impact: The intentional use of an impact munition against a particular person rather than toward the ground or an unoccupied area.

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI): A federal law enforcement component of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Incident Command System (ICS): A standardized structure for managing command, operations, planning, logistics, documentation, and coordination during an incident.

Internal Affairs (IA): The SPD function responsible for receiving, investigating, documenting, and reviewing complaints involving department personnel.

Mutual aid: Assistance provided by another law enforcement agency during an incident or operation.

OC: Oleoresin capsicum, a pepper-based chemical irritant.

Office of the Police Ombuds (OPO): The City of Spokane office responsible for independent civilian oversight of SPD complaint investigations and for making systemic policy, training, and practice recommendations.

Office of the Police Ombuds Commission (OPOC): The commission that provides oversight of the OPO and performs duties established by the Spokane Municipal Code.

PAVA: Pelargonic acid vanillylamide, a synthetic capsaicinoid irritant commonly associated with pepper-based products.

Pepper ball: A projectile containing an irritant agent that may be used for area denial or direct impact, depending on the circumstances and intended application.

Reportable force: Force that must be documented under applicable SPD policy.

Reviewable force: Conduct or force requiring supervisory or other formal review under applicable SPD policy, even when the reporting requirements may differ.

Spokane County Sheriff's Office (SCSO): The county law enforcement agency that provided mutual aid during the June 11 response.

Spokane Police Department (SPD): The City of Spokane law enforcement agency whose response and internal reviews are evaluated in this report.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT): Specially trained personnel and resources primarily assigned to high-risk tactical operations.

Tactical Team (TAC): SPD personnel trained for tactical and crowd management operations. In this report, TAC/Crowd Management refers to the team's public order and demonstration management functions.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE): The federal agency whose personnel and immigration facility were involved in the events underlying the June 11 protest.

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): A remotely operated aircraft, commonly called a drone, together with its supporting equipment and operating systems.

Use of Force: Physical force or the use of a force tool by law enforcement personnel, as governed by law and SPD policy.

Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB): The SPD review body that evaluates qualifying uses of force and may identify policy, training, equipment, supervision, or documentation concerns.

Executive Summary

On June 11, 2025, the Spokane Police Department (SPD) responded to a protest at and around 411 W. Cataldo Avenue, the location of a federal immigration facility. The protest began after community members learned that individuals had been detained by federal immigration authorities and were believed to be inside the facility.¹ Community members gathered to protest the detentions and, in some instances, to prevent federal agents, detainees, or transport vehicles from leaving the area.

The event began as a protest involving a relatively small number of participants and developed into a large, dynamic, multi-agency public safety operation. During the afternoon and evening, SPD personnel monitored the protest, activated tactical resources, established command operations, communicated with federal agencies and coordinated with county law enforcement personnel. SPD later declared an unlawful assembly, issued dispersal and Use of Force warnings, made arrests, and used smoke, OC/PAVA² irritants, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, and other less lethal tools.³ SPD later assisted in the movement of people from the building after command concluded that local public safety concerns required police action.⁴ The response occurred in a dense urban area near Riverfront Park, local businesses, public sidewalks and streets, and One Spokane Stadium, where a professional soccer game was underway.⁵

Following the event, the Office of the Police Ombuds (OPO) and SPD received numerous community complaints and concerns.⁶ Complainants raised issues involving SPD's role in relation to federal immigration enforcement, the clarity and audibility of dispersal orders, and the perceived lack of meaningful de-escalation or dialogue. They also raised concerns about the use of smoke and less lethal munitions, crowd movement and compression, arrests, officer demeanor, property handling, medical care, impacts on uninvolved people and stadium attendees, mutual aid identification, and public trust.

SPD's Internal Affairs process addressed complaint allegations and uses of force through separate reviews. The Use of Force review addressed ordered force, OC, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, force associated with arrests, medical care, decontamination, Body Worn Camera (BWC) issues, and reporting issues.⁷ The complaint review addressed individual officer concerns and broader complaint themes involving communication, demeanor, arrests, property handling, medical care, and other issues raised by complainants.

¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

² OC refers to oleoresin capsicum. PAVA refers to pelargonic acid vanillylamide. Both are irritant agents commonly associated with pepper-based products.

³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–9 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴ *Id.* at 9–11.

⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁷ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

This report evaluates the complaint and Use of Force records to identify policy, training, supervision, communication, documentation, and operational issues raised by SPD's response to the June 11 protest. It recognizes practices that should be preserved, identifies areas where clearer guidance would improve future protest responses, and makes recommendations intended to strengthen public safety, First Amendment demonstration facilitation, accountability, and public trust.

The record shows that SPD command faced a complex operational environment. Command personnel were required to balance First Amendment activity, public safety, and Washington law relating to immigration enforcement. They also had to consider requests for assistance from federal personnel, the safety of people inside the federal facility, respond to obstructed vehicles and exits, officer safety, mutual aid coordination, and the presence of uninvolved community members nearby. SPD command recognized several of these issues in real time. Command initially limited SPD involvement after reviewing RCW 43.17.425⁸ and consulting City legal. Command did not initially clear the crowd simply because federal personnel requested assistance.⁹ Command also repeatedly limited the available force options, including repeated computer aided dispatch (CAD) entries that 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) tear gas was not authorized.¹⁰

At the same time, many community members experienced the police response as confusing, frightening, escalating, and difficult to comply with.¹¹ Several complainants reported that they did not hear or understand dispersal orders or know where they were allowed to stand. Others did not understand the legal basis for the unlawful assembly declaration, were unsure how to safely leave, or felt compressed between police lines, other demonstrators, buildings, vehicles, or other physical obstacles. Others described concern that smoke or irritants affected bystanders or stadium attendees who were not part of the protest. The review also identified concerns during the extended dispersal operation. As the announcements continued, the language, timing, and stated consequences became less consistent. Dispersal orders were also combined at times with movement commands, force warnings, and curfew information. Several complainants believed SPD's actions functionally assisted federal immigration enforcement, even though SPD's stated mission was public safety, removal of unlawful obstructions, and evacuation of people from the building.

To assist with drafting this report, the OPO met with SPD Tactical Team (TAC)/Crowd Management leaders in June 2026 to obtain additional operational context.¹² That discussion supplemented the command post record and provided additional field context regarding issues

⁸ RCW 43.17.425, "Immigration and citizenship status — State agency restrictions," <https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=43.17.425>.

⁹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

¹⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6, 9 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

¹¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹² OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026). The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion is considered as one part of the overall review record and does not replace CAD, the After Action Report, IA materials, BWC, drone footage, UOFRB discussion, or chain of command review.

not fully addressed in the After Action Report. TAC leaders described the response as involving SPD TAC, SPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), Spokane County resources, and SPD patrol personnel operating with different missions, different training models, and overlapping field leadership. They also described field command limitations, equipment and callout realities, the distinction between TAC/Crowd Management and SWAT functions, the importance of early dialogue, and improvements made after the incident.

That additional context is important because the June 11 response should be understood as a crowd management and command structure event. The response involved overlapping missions: protection of First Amendment activity, enforcement of local law, response to obstructed exits and vehicles, movement of people from a federal building, communication with federal personnel, coordination with SCSO, and management of impacts on stadium attendees and other uninvolved people.

The OPO recognizes several commendable practices in the June 11 record. SPD command identified and considered the immigration enforcement legal issue before acting and sought legal guidance. Command also restricted certain force options, issued repeated warnings before broad deployment of munitions, documented significant portions of the event, conducted substantial internal review, and identified policy and training concerns through the chain of command. The record also includes examples of calm communication, clear instructions, arrestee wellness checks, and professional demeanor by SPD personnel.

The principal policy and practice issues identified in this report involve mission clarity, immigration enforcement response protocols, dialogue and communication, dispersal orders and safe egress. They also include reviewable and reportable force, munitions inventory and documentation, smoke classification and tracking, medical and decontamination planning, and impacts on stadium attendees and other uninvolved people. The report further addresses mutual aid coordination, agency and individual officer identification, BWC and report organization, property procedures for protest arrests, field command authority, UAS safeguards, and After Action review structure.

The final recommendations are intended to move SPD toward a more integrated crowd management framework. That framework should connect First Amendment facilitation, de-escalation, dialogue, unlawful assembly, dispersal, targeted enforcement, safe egress, and force authorization. It should also integrate less lethal tools, smoke, medical care, mutual aid, tactical deployment, UAS use, BWC, documentation, complaint theme analysis, arrestee processing, property handling, After Action review, and public-facing explanation into a coherent policy and training package.¹³

¹³ See Issues One through Nine, Final Recommendations, and Summary of Recommendations, below.

Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Create an immigration enforcement response protocol.

Recommendation 2: Require documented mission statements and mission change updates during major First Amendment or crowd management events.

Recommendation 3: Revise Policy 461 to establish a facilitation-first crowd management framework.

Recommendation 4: Integrate Policy 300 de-escalation requirements into First Amendment assembly and crowd management operations.

Recommendation 5: Require targeted enforcement analysis before broad dispersal or crowd-wide force when feasible.

Recommendation 6: Develop a layered protest communication and dialogue plan.

Recommendation 7: Standardize dispersal order content, delivery, and documentation.

Recommendation 8: Clarify Policy 301 and 308 standards for area denial, direct impact, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm, bean bag rounds, and related tools.

Recommendation 9: Create an event-level munitions log and crowd event force supplement.

Recommendation 10: Create a supervisory review mechanism for dynamic takedowns and other significant physical control tactics used during First Amendment assemblies or crowd management events.

Recommendation 11: Develop a medical and decontamination plan for crowd events.

Recommendation 12: Create a major event documentation protocol.

Recommendation 13: Develop event-specific BWC and scalable review procedures.

Recommendation 14: Require a full internal After Action review from both command post and field command perspectives after major protest, First Amendment, or crowd management events.

Recommendation 15: Create a systemic complaint theme analysis process.

Recommendation 16: Develop public-facing After Action summaries.

Recommendation 17: Require third-party impact and venue notification planning.

Recommendation 18: Standardize mutual aid briefings and rules of engagement.

Recommendation 19: Require mutual aid reporting before clearing.

Recommendation 20: Require visible agency and individual identifiers.

Recommendation 21: Create protest arrest property and collection point procedures.

Recommendation 22: Develop a crowd event command checklist.

Recommendation 23: Conduct department-wide recurring scenario-based crowd management training.

Recommendation 24: Establish UAS documentation and public safety justification during First Amendment events.

Recommendation 25: Clarify tactical deployment thresholds and TAC/Crowd Management, SWAT, patrol, mutual aid, and command post roles during crowd management events.

Recommendation 26: Integrate the relevant policies, SOPs, training, checklists, and review processes into a unified crowd management policy package.

Staff Information

Bart Logue, *Police Ombuds*

Bart Logue began serving in this capacity in September 2016, after serving as the Interim Police Ombuds. Bart also serves as a Commissioner on the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission and as a Board Member at Large for the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE). Bart is a Certified Practitioner of Oversight (CPO) through NACOLE. Bart has a Master of Forensic Sciences from National University and a Master of National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. Bart is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, Session 239, and is also a certified Advanced Force Science Specialist.

George Perezvelez, *Deputy Police Ombuds*

George Perezvelez began serving as Deputy Police Ombuds for the City of Spokane in 2026. He has more than 18 years of experience in civilian oversight, law enforcement accountability, and policy development. He previously served as a Police Commissioner in Berkeley, California and continues his service as a Civilian Review Board member for the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Police Department. He currently serves as Vice President of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE). George is a NACOLE Certified Practitioner of Oversight (CPO) and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Clark University.

Christina Coty, *Administrative Specialist*

Christina began working at the City of Spokane in 2015 for the ITSD department in contract procurement and joined the Office of the Police Ombuds in 2018. Christina is a Certified Practitioner of Oversight through NACOLE. Prior to her work in the City of Spokane, she worked for Sony Electronics as a Regional Sales Manager managing the retail store operations in Southern California.

Tim Szambelan, *OPO Attorney*

Tim works in the Civil Division of the City Attorney's Office and currently represents the Office of the Police Ombuds and other departments within the City of Spokane. Tim is licensed to practice law in Washington and Arizona.

Attestation

This document was reviewed by the City Attorney's Office as to form prior to publishing and reviewed by the Spokane Police Guild pursuant to the requirements provided in Article 27 of the Agreement between the City of Spokane and the Spokane Police Guild (2023-2026).

The Office of the Police Ombuds reviewed the materials available in this matter, including SPD reports, Internal Affairs documents, chain of command reviews, Use of Force materials, Use of Force Review Board materials, CAD records, complaint materials, interview transcripts, Body Worn Camera (BWC) footage, the After Action Report, public reporting, public records, and relevant policy and best practice materials. The OPO also had discussions with City Administration personnel, SPD personnel, community members, and other stakeholders. The OPO's review was conducted for the purpose of assessing the complaint investigation, identifying policy and practice issues, and making recommendations for systemic improvement.

The OPO's review is limited by the materials available at the time of drafting. This report does not purport to include every fact contained in every record reviewed. Rather, it summarizes the facts and issues most relevant to the OPO's review, analysis, and recommendations.

Mission, Authority, and Purpose

The Office of the Police Ombuds exists to promote public confidence in the professionalism and accountability of the members of the Spokane Police Department (SPD) by providing independent review of police actions, thoughtful policy recommendations, and ongoing community outreach.

The OPO does so by providing independent and thorough oversight of matters that affect the community and the department. We seek to help bridge the gap between the community and SPD by publishing closing reports on matters of public concern. These reports increase accountability and transparency and may lead to recommendations for improving police policies or practices. Our goal is to reduce the likelihood of similar concerns arising in the future. We also seek to highlight effective police practices and help the community understand why those practices were used, subject to the limitations contained in the 2023-2026 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Spokane Municipal Code (SMC) §04.32.030 and the CBA provide authority for the OPO to publish closing reports on a case once it has been certified by the Police Ombuds or Deputy Police Ombuds and the Chief of Police has made a final determination in the matter. The OPO can also publish policy and procedure reports regarding cases the OPO reviews during a review board process. The OPO's recommendations will not concern discipline in specific cases or officers and shall not be used in disciplinary proceedings of bargaining unit employees. Reports are solely meant to further discussion on aspects of incidents that may be improved upon.

Reports also provide opportunities for policy and procedure recommendations that can result in improved police performance through their eventual implementation. Writing a report allows the OPO to provide a more thorough review of what occurred in an incident to offer recommendations for improving the quality of police investigations and practices, including the Internal Affairs (IA) investigative process, policies, and training or any other related matter.

The OPO may also recommend mediation to the Chief of Police at any time prior to certifying a case. Should all parties agree and the officer(s) participate in good faith, the OPO may publish a report following mediation including any agreements reached between parties. Mediations are governed by the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 7.07.070 and are considered confidential. The content of the mediation may not be used by the City or any other party in any criminal or disciplinary process.

Required Disclosures

Under Article 27 of the current CBA between the City of Spokane and the Spokane Police Guild, this report must provide the following disclosures:

1. Any closing report from an IA investigation shall clearly state the information expressed within the report is the perspective of the OPO, that the OPO does not speak for the City on the matter, and the report is not an official determination of what occurred.
2. The report will include the current policy practice, policy, and/or training as applicable and shall expressly state the policy recommendations that follow reflect the OPO's opinion on modifications that may assist the department in reducing the likelihood of harm in the future; they do not reflect an opinion on individual job performance under the current policy, practice, or training.
3. A report shall not comment on discipline of an officer(s). This prohibition includes a prohibition on writing in a report whether the OPO or OPOC agrees with or differs from the Chief's findings, whether the officer acted properly, whether the officer's actions were acceptable, or whether the officer's actions were in compliance with training or policy. Additionally, no report will criticize an officer or witness or include a statement on the OPO or OPOC's opinion on the veracity or credibility of an officer or witness.
4. The OPO's closing report shall not be used by the City as a basis to open or re-open complaints against any bargaining unit employees, or to reconsider any decision(s) previously made concerning discipline.
5. The report may not be used in disciplinary proceedings or other tangible adverse employment actions against bargaining unit employees, including but not limited to decisions regarding defense and indemnification of an officer.
6. The names of officers or witnesses may not be disclosed.¹⁴

Additional information and records regarding this matter are available through the City Clerk's Office by [Public Records Requests](#).

¹⁴ In addition to not mentioning officer or witness names, every effort was made to remove identifying pronouns throughout this report. The same standard was used for the other involved people.

F25-022/C25-066

Procedural History

This closing report is intended to provide the reader with a chronological and procedural framework for SPD's response to the June 11, 2025, protest at and around 411 W. Cataldo Avenue in Spokane, Washington and the subsequent complaint and review processes. The purpose of this report is to:

- summarize the incident and complaint concerns;
- identify the principal issues raised by the record;
- evaluate the review process and systemic implications;
- identify policy, training, communication, supervision, equipment, and documentation concerns; and
- make recommendations intended to improve future SPD responses to protests and demonstrations.

On June 13, 2025, the mayor and Chief of Police requested that the OPO conduct a Sentinel Event Review of the demonstration at and around 411 W. Cataldo on June 11, 2025. That request specifically called for a review of relevant SPD policy, as well as command-level operations and decisions.¹⁵ The requested review of apparent or actual departures from policy was not possible due to limitations within the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreements with the Spokane Police Guild and the Lieutenants and Captains Association. Those agreements do allow for a Closing Report, which is the final format that the City agreed to for this review.

Before the Closing Report could begin, several actions needed to be completed. SPD Commander C made the final determinations regarding the uses of force on January 2, 2026.¹⁶ SPD Commander C made the final findings regarding the complaints associated with this incident on January 16, 2026.¹⁷ The uses of force were also reviewed by the Use of Force Review Board on April 16, 2026.¹⁸

The OPO's summary of facts is based upon a careful review of reports, BWC footage, chain of command reviews, and participation in the complaint process, the Use of Force Review Board, and additional conversations for context. This closing report analyzes issues identified through the chain of command review and review board processes and provides the basis for policy and procedure recommendations.

¹⁵ Letter from Lisa Brown and Kevin Hall to Mr. Logue, dated June 13, 2025.

¹⁶ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026). Under the agreements between the City, the Police Guild, and the Lieutenants and Captains Association in the current CBAs, the OPO is prohibited from stating whether the officer(s) acted properly, whether an officer's actions were acceptable, or whether an officer's actions were in compliance with training or policy. As such, this report states when the final determination occurred, but does not state the substance of the final determination made by the chain of command.

¹⁷ Blue Team Report Sequence, C25-066, entry dated Jan. 16, 2026.

¹⁸ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

This report is written with several important limitations:

- The OPO does not determine whether criminal charges were supported, whether pending or resolved criminal cases were properly handled, or whether a court should accept or reject any factual assertion made in those proceedings.
- The OPO does not determine whether federal immigration authorities acted lawfully.
- The OPO's jurisdiction is limited solely to SPD and SPD personnel. As such, the actions of other law enforcement agencies or personnel are not evaluated.
- The OPO does not issue discipline or substitute its judgment for the Chief of Police regarding disciplinary findings. However, this report may identify policy or practice concerns even where SPD found no individual policy violation.
- This report does not make credibility determinations regarding complainants, officers, witnesses, or community members. Where accounts differ, this report describes the relevant records and identifies whether the difference suggests a policy, training, communication, or documentation issue.

OPO Summary of Facts

Public Background and Initial Protest Activity

Public reporting indicates that the June 11, 2025, protest began after community members learned that two individuals had been detained at the federal immigration facility at 411 W. Cataldo Avenue. RANGE Media reported that Community Member A sent an action alert during the early afternoon calling for people to come to the ICE office after Community Member B was detained during an appointment. RANGE reported that Community Member A and other community members believed the detained individuals had been participating in immigration processes and objected to their transfer to Tacoma. RANGE also reported that approximately 20 protesters and members of the media arrived shortly after the alert, that a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) van was parked in front of the office, and that Community Member A had spoken to the press and stated an intent to remain in front of the van.¹⁹

Public reporting and SPD records both indicate that the protest involved people who intended to physically prevent transport vehicles or federal personnel from leaving. RANGE reported that protest participants discussed willingness to be arrested, that some people sat near or in front of the transport van, and that additional vehicles later boxed in the transport vehicle.²⁰ SPD's complaint summary similarly described the protest as beginning in the mid-afternoon and continuing into the evening, with some protesters opposing the perceived unlawful detention of

¹⁹ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

²⁰ *Id.*

two men and others engaging in conduct intended to stop ICE from leaving the facility with them.²¹

At approximately 2:28 p.m., SPD CAD records show a narrative entry from an associated call stating that a Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agent reported protesters causing issues outside and spray-painting the bus. At approximately 2:30 p.m., CAD recorded an estimated 20 to 40 people and reported that the bus windshield was being spray-painted. CAD also recorded that media was on scene and that federal personnel requested law enforcement assistance with the crowd.²²

City Statement and Command Awareness

At approximately 3:20 p.m., SPD Commander D reported being briefed by SPD Commander B that the protest was occurring, that Community Member A had organized the protest after a young adult ward of his was detained by ICE, that protesters had spray-painted the front windshield of the ICE transport bus, and that drone units, undercover detectives, and a dialogue team were being deployed. During this time, Community Member A was in contact with the mayor regarding why people were gathering, the concerns about the federal detention and possible transport of the detained individuals, and the stated purpose of the protest. The mayor took two actions with this information. First, she relayed what she knew to the Chief of Police and also stated that there would likely be acts of civil disobedience, but they would also likely not be oriented against police or property. The Chief stated that he relayed that information to the Incident Commander.²³ Second, she contacted the State Attorney General's Office to see if there was anything that could legally be done and was told that there was nothing that could be done regarding federal immigration enforcement actions.²⁴

SPD Commander D later reported learning that City Administration had been in contact with Community Member A, but that this information had not been shared with him at the Incident Commander level. He identified this as a lesson learned because protester state of mind and intent may have been useful for communication and de-escalation opportunities once SPD was required to uphold the law.²⁵

At approximately 3:31 p.m., SPD Commander D reported responding to the command post at the Gardner building. While en route, he drove past the location of the protest and observed approximately 20 to 30 individuals holding signs around the property and sidewalks. He reported that he did not observe acts of violence or property damage at that time and that protesters did not approach his vehicle or direct anger toward his presence.²⁶

²¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²² CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²³ OPO Conversation with Mayor Brown (July 2026); OPO Conversation with Chief Hall (July 2026).

²⁴ OPO Conversation with Mayor Brown (July 2026).

²⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁶ *Id.* at 1–2.

At 4:37 p.m., the mayor issued a public statement acknowledging the protest outside the federal ICE office. The statement recognized the right to free speech and the right to be on public property, stated that the City continued to uphold the Keep Washington Working Act, and stated that SPD would address violations of the Spokane Municipal Code.²⁷ The mayor stated her objectives were to maintain public safety but also ensure that the protest response was local and did not expand to National Guard deployments, which had been occurring in other cities.²⁸

Initial Legal Concerns and Mission Limitation

The After Action Report states that when SPD Commander D arrived at the command post, he learned that an ICE supervisor was asking SPD to clear the crowd so detainees could be moved to the transport bus. SPD Commander D reported that TAC resources, including the described dialogue team, were being staged; that a drone was up and conducting surveillance; and that undercover units were watching the event. He also reported that drone units advised there were protesters crawling under the transport bus and that he was in communication with the ICE supervisor and told them they would need to wait while SPD confirmed their legal authorities.²⁹

At that point, SPD Commander D reviewed RCW 43.17.425³⁰, which defines agency restrictions regarding immigration and citizenship. He was concerned that deploying the Dialogue Team or using physical crowd control at that stage could be viewed as assisting ICE with detainee transport. At approximately 3:46 p.m., he contacted SPD Commander B and described those concerns. SPD Commander B reportedly supported his position. At approximately 4:18 p.m., SPD Commander D sought guidance from the City Attorney's Office and reported that City legal shared his concern.³¹

At approximately 4:19 p.m., SPD Commander D spoke with the ICE supervisor, who reported that there were detainees and staff members inside the building and again requested that SPD clear the crowd so detainees could be placed on the transport bus. SPD Commander D reported explaining SPD's legal concerns and suggesting that ICE consider the bus unsafe because of the spray-painted windshield and protesters near or under it. The ICE supervisor reportedly agreed to develop a different transport plan.³²

The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion added field context to this early period. TAC leaders described an initial expectation that dialogue resources could be deployed early but also described the operational effect of being told to stage or stand by while command evaluated the legal issue. The discussion reflects that the early staffing request did not involve an

²⁷ City of Spokane, "Mayor Brown Statement on Protest Outside of ICE Office," June 11, 2025, 4:37 p.m., <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/releases/2025/06/11/mayor-brown-statement-on-protest-outside-of-ice-office/>.

²⁸ OPO Conversation with Mayor Brown (July 2026).

²⁹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³⁰ RCW 43.17.425, "Immigration and citizenship status — State agency restrictions," <https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=43.17.425>.

³¹ *Id.* at 2–3.

³² *Id.* at 3.

immediate full TAC team deployment. Rather, it involved a smaller dialogue and arrest team concept that evolved as the incident grew. Because a full TAC team callout was not initially made, TAC personnel were not immediately available. Some personnel were off duty, had family or other obligations, and needed to retrieve equipment from the TAC shop before deploying.³³

The records indicate that the initial response was not a full TAC team deployment; that deployment was delayed while the legal issues were being discussed. Once public safety concerns were observed and the rules of engagement changed, all available patrol were dispatched, followed by a full TAC and full SWAT callout, and then a department-wide callout to respond to the event.

This context shows that the early operational posture was shaped by several factors at the same time: command's immigration enforcement legal concerns, the developing nature of the protest, and the type of resources initially requested.³⁴ It was also shaped by the evolving need for additional resources and equipment and explains the sequence of deployment.³⁵

Operational Complications and Resource Staging

The After Action Report identified two contributing complications that affected the incident: a professional soccer game scheduled to begin at 7:00 p.m. at One Spokane Stadium, located at 501 W. Gardner Avenue, and a planned 6:00 p.m. protest and march at the Red Wagon in Riverfront Park.³⁶ Incident Command became concerned that the planned protest may join in support of the active protest on Cataldo.

At approximately 4:06 p.m., the Spokane County Sheriff's Office (SCSO) contacted SPD Commander D and offered to assist. SPD Commander D requested that SCSO stage resources in case SPD needed to move in to uphold the law. The After Action Report later identified a concern that SCSO appeared to have separate communication with ICE regarding separate requests for assistance and stated that earlier face-to-face communication with SCSO at the command post would have resolved the concern sooner.³⁷

The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion also identified operational complications in how resources were staged and how equipment decisions were made. TAC leaders explained that many TAC members did not yet have take-home vehicles at the time of the incident and that equipment was stored at the TAC building. As a result, personnel often needed to respond in personal vehicles, retrieve equipment, and then deploy.³⁸ TAC leaders later reported that TAC

³³ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

³⁴ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³⁵ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

³⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³⁷ *Id.* at 3–4.

³⁸ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

members received take-home vehicles after June 11, reducing response time from approximately 90 minutes to approximately 30 to 40 minutes.³⁹

TAC leaders also described a request for bicycles that was not approved because command believed the plan would be implemented soon. From the field perspective, the denial became more significant when the operation did not occur immediately, and the delay continued. TAC leaders explained that bicycles would have allowed officers to create lines or manage movement with fewer personnel, while the absence of bicycles required more personnel shoulder to shoulder.⁴⁰

Mission Change and Development of Safety Corridor Plan

The After Action Report states that ICE developed an alternative transport plan involving a Border Patrol van and ICE vehicles parked in the secure lot. SPD Commander D asked that ICE coordinate timing through him in case protest behavior rose to the level requiring SPD response.⁴¹

SPD Commander D reported that when ICE agents approached the parking gate and the gate opened, approximately 20 to 30 protesters moved to the gate and blocked the exit. He characterized this conduct as unlawful imprisonment and pedestrian interference in progress. Based on this conduct, he directed SWAT to be called out and formally requested mutual aid from SCSO.⁴²

SPD Commander D later reported that protesters began barricading parking structures and the exits to the ICE facility with people and accessible objects, including Lime scooters and park benches. After consultation with SPD Commander A, SPD Commander D concluded that SPD's rules of engagement had changed and that SPD now needed to take action to create a safe exit.⁴³

The TAC/Crowd Management discussion provided additional context regarding this transition. TAC leaders stated that, from their perspective in the field observing the events unfold, the event involved other unlawful behavior before the gate blocking incident, including the spray-painted transport vehicle, vehicles pinned in, and conduct obstructing movement.⁴⁴

The After Action Report states that SPD Commander D requested a plan to create a safety corridor at an identified exit. This plan later changed from the green door to the south entrance.⁴⁵ The plan described in the After Action Report involved vehicles blocking north and south traffic, SCSO creating one skirmish line of the safety corridor, SPD creating a second one,

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴² *Id.* at 4–5.

⁴³ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 5–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁴ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁴⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 5–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD Supervisor A's BWC at 21:55.

and jail transport vehicles responding to load and move the building occupants. SPD Commander D reported that the plan was ready to be deployed at approximately 6:00 p.m. but was delayed.⁴⁶

The TAC discussion supplemented this portion of the After Action Report. TAC leaders stated that, from their field perspective, the plan described in the After Action Report did not unfold in precisely the manner described. That difference does not require the report to resolve the After Action Report and TAC perspectives as competing factual findings. Instead, it demonstrates why major event after action reviews should include both command post and field perspectives before final operational lessons are adopted.⁴⁷

Police Arrival, Crowd Movement, and Early Arrest Activity

CAD records show TAC moving at approximately 6:22 p.m. At approximately 6:24 p.m., CAD recorded traffic shutdown at Boone and Washington, the convoy approaching, and units arriving. At approximately 6:25 p.m., CAD recorded officers stacking at the door. At approximately 6:26 p.m., CAD recorded “start PAs (Public Announcements), it’s going to be loud” and “loud crowd.”⁴⁸

CAD then recorded that officers were being surrounded, county assistance was being called, protesters were barricading the van, and protesters were sitting around it. CAD also recorded that federal personnel would not bring anyone down until the area was secure and that officers did not appear able to secure the van because it was surrounded.⁴⁹

The IA timeline records a person under arrest at approximately 6:46 p.m. CAD recorded another person in custody at approximately 6:48 p.m. CAD recorded officers pushing the crowd south, two skirmish lines, a slow push, and one person in custody in a van.⁵⁰

The TAC discussion provided additional field context for this period. TAC leaders described a mixture of SPD SWAT, SPD TAC, County TAC, and SPD patrol personnel, with different leaders, different training backgrounds, and different mission assumptions. TAC leaders stated that this created a fragmented environment, with crowd management personnel, SWAT personnel, patrol personnel, and county personnel intermixed. They described the primary mission as creating enough space to safely get people out of the building but characterized that mission as principally a crowd management operation rather than a traditional SWAT or hostage rescue operation.⁵¹

TAC leaders further explained that the presence of people inside the building did not automatically make the operation a traditional hostage rescue mission. From their perspective, the people inside the building were not being held at gunpoint, the building was not on fire, and

⁴⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 5–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁷ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁴⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 3–4.

⁵⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵¹ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

the operational problem was a large crowd surrounding a building and vehicles. Therefore, the response required crowd management planning before extraction could occur.⁵²

Unlawful Assembly Declaration and Dispersal Orders

At approximately 7:08 p.m., CAD recorded that unlawful assembly was approved. The IA timeline likewise states that the command post approved unlawful assembly at approximately 7:08 p.m. At approximately 7:12 p.m., CAD recorded that a PA announcement was being given from the Bearcat. The IA timeline records a public safety order to disperse from the Bearcat, followed by repeated dispersal announcements in five-minute intervals. At approximately 7:13 p.m., the IA timeline records an announcement that people had until 7:18 p.m. to disperse southbound on Washington.⁵³

SPD Supervisor A's BWC captures events immediately preceding the unlawful assembly announcements, including an arrest near the red van, crowd reaction to that arrest, officer efforts to explain the arrest, additional movement near the arrest scene, and the beginning of announcements from the Bearcat. The BWC shows an SPD officer taking a juvenile to the ground after the juvenile attempted to flee following the slashing of the red van's tires. The crowd reacted immediately, with multiple people shouting that the person was a child. Several SPD officers moved into the street, and SPD Supervisor A attempted to explain why the arrest was being made. During this exchange, a protester attempted to walk past officers near the arrest scene, was pushed back, attempted to move through again, and was pushed to the ground. Shortly afterward, announcements from the Bearcat can be heard, and officers began telling the crowd that the assembly had been declared unlawful.⁵⁴

CAD and IA records document repeated dispersal, arrest, and force warnings over the next hour. CAD also recorded that announcements were being made every few minutes, but that it was very loud. The IA timeline records additional dispersal or force warnings at approximately 7:20 p.m., 7:21 p.m., 7:25 p.m., 7:29 p.m., 7:32 p.m., and 7:33 p.m.⁵⁵ These announcements are clearly heard on BWC footage from officers near the Bearcat.

Even though the warnings were given, the crowd as a whole did not immediately comply. The complaint records later showed that many community members disputed whether they heard the orders, understood what legal status had changed, knew where to go, or believed they had a safe and realistic path to leave. Some complainants reported that warnings were not audible

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁴ SPD Supervisor A's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:59:30 – 01:01:45.

⁵⁵ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

from their location; others reported confusion about curfew versus dispersal; and others described being unsure whether they were allowed to stand in certain locations.⁵⁶

The TAC discussion also addressed the need to document the basis for unlawful assembly and the availability of less intrusive alternatives. During the TAC discussion, the OPO and TAC leaders discussed the importance of incident command documenting the specific conduct supporting an unlawful assembly declaration, whether the conduct is isolated or collective, and whether targeted enforcement, continued dialogue, or other alternatives are feasible. The discussion connected this issue to basic Incident Command System (ICS)⁵⁷ practices and the need to capture key decisions more clearly because the available records did not describe how several significant decisions were made.⁵⁸

Munitions Requests, Authorization Limits, and Deployment

CAD records show that CS tear gas was requested but not authorized. Pursuant to RCW 10.116.030,⁵⁹ SPD command consulted with the mayor regarding chemical munitions and a decision was made not to deploy CS tear gas at that time.⁶⁰ At approximately 7:40 p.m., CAD recorded “NOT auth to use CS,” and another entry repeated that officers were not authorized to use CS gas. At approximately 7:52 p.m., CAD recorded a request to use smoke and OC mix to begin moving the crowd. The IA timeline records that SPD Supervisor A requested smoke and pepper ball approval at approximately 7:52 p.m., which was approved and relayed to the field that it was authorized after one more dispersal order was given.⁶¹

At approximately 7:55 p.m., CAD recorded that one more dispersal order would be given and then pepper ball was approved. At approximately 7:59 p.m., the IA timeline records that the command post authorized pepper ball as needed. At approximately 8:01 p.m., CAD and the IA timeline record authorization for smoke as needed. At approximately 8:04 p.m., the IA timeline records pepper ball beginning to be fired on the ground for area denial purposes. At approximately 8:11 p.m., the IA timeline records smoke first seen.⁶²

The TAC discussion added context regarding munitions and crowd management decision-making. TAC leaders described a modern crowd management model used by SPD that attempts to identify and address specific unlawful actors where feasible, uses strategic arrests when possible, and uses dispersal and munitions only when targeted enforcement is no longer feasible or when

⁵⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant D / Complainant M, at 2–6; Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 14–17.

⁵⁷ A standardized structure for managing command, operations, planning, logistics, and coordination during major incidents.

⁵⁸ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁵⁹ RCW 10.116.030(1)–(3), (4)(b), “Use of tear gas,” <https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.116.030>.

⁶⁰ OPO Conversation with Mayor Brown (July 2026); OPO Conversation with Chief Hall (July 2026).

⁶¹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6–7 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁶² CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 7–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

the crowd environment has exceeded available manpower and safety options. TAC leaders described a progressive approach beginning with less intrusive area denial tools before escalating.⁶³

The TAC discussion also distinguished crowd management munitions from SWAT or indoor tactical applications. TAC leaders explained that outdoor crowd management environments involve different governmental interests, subject behavior, distance, movement, bystanders, and First Amendment concerns than high-risk SWAT missions in confined spaces. This distinction is relevant to later policy analysis regarding pepper ball, 40mm, smoke, and area denial tools.⁶⁴

The TAC discussion also addressed the observed effect of smoke deployment. TAC leaders stated that, after this incident, TAC adjusted tactics so that certain smoke canisters would no longer be used as the initial deployment because protesters could pick them up and throw them back, creating additional force decisions.⁶⁵ Force reviewers discussed protesters throwing smoke canisters back toward officers as a basis for subsequent force decisions.

Curfew, Extraction, and Continued Operations

At approximately 8:24 p.m., CAD recorded that the mayor had initiated a curfew from 9:30 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. At approximately 8:25 p.m., CAD recorded that a curfew order and dispersal order had been issued. The mayor stated that the curfew was limited by geography and time to allow for a cooling off period and that she did not want a new protest to pop up during the night if at all possible. CAD recorded repeated curfew and dispersal announcements over the following minutes. At approximately 8:28 p.m., CAD again recorded “CS NOT AUTH” and “ONLY OC and SMOKE.”⁶⁶

CAD records provide further detail about how the curfew was communicated to officers. At approximately 8:43 p.m., CAD recorded that CodeRED⁶⁷ had been launched, stating that the mayor had issued a curfew for downtown and surrounding areas from 9:30 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and instructing people to stay out of the area. The City’s public curfew statement identified the curfew area as Boone Avenue to Spokane Falls Boulevard and Howard Street to Division Street, as well as Riverfront Park.⁶⁸

CAD records show that officers developed a plan to use smoke to create space for the movement of people and vehicles from the building. The plan called for smoke to be deployed immediately before the movement began and, if people pushed past the police line as the vehicles exited, for

⁶³ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 9–10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁶⁷ A text message sent from dispatch to the community, similar to an Amber Alert.

⁶⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); City of Spokane, “Mayor Brown Announces Curfew,” June 11, 2025, <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/statements/2025/06/11/mayor-brown-announces-curfew/>.

officers to deploy additional smoke and pull back. The 12 detainees were to be transported in the red van, while the 14 federal personnel were to leave in the SCSO Bearcat or another police vehicle.⁶⁹ CAD also recorded that CS was not authorized and that only OC and smoke could be used.

At approximately 8:44 p.m., CAD recorded “deploy” and “starting exit now.” Between approximately 8:45 p.m. and 8:51 p.m., CAD recorded people coming out, more people coming down the elevator, transport vans moving, and all 26 people accounted for. At approximately 8:48 p.m., CAD recorded that the soccer game was letting out and 1,800 people were leaving. At approximately 9:09 p.m., CAD recorded that subjects from both vans had been transferred to U.S. Marshals custody.⁷⁰

SPD Supervisor B’s BWC⁷¹ captures this sequence, including SPD communication with federal personnel during the movement of people from the building and associated vehicle movement. Smoke was used during the movement from the building, and vehicles were used to move 12 detainees and 14 federal personnel away from the immediate area, ending that portion of the operation.⁷² SPD command identified local public safety concerns, including blocked exits, obstructed vehicles, and the need to move people from the building, as the basis for the mission change. At the same time, the practical effect of SPD’s response was to assist federal personnel, detainees, and vehicles in leaving the facility. That practical effect, regardless of SPD’s stated legal rationale, is central to the community concern that SPD appeared to assist federal immigration enforcement.

The TAC discussion provided additional context regarding the extraction phase. TAC leaders described communication with federal personnel as indirect and fragmented at points, with information passing through multiple people rather than one clear operational channel. They stated that when the extraction eventually occurred, the ability to speak directly with the federal personnel involved helped clarify the plan and move the operation forward. TAC leaders also stated that delay in starting that phase of the mission allowed more people to arrive and made the crowd management problem more difficult.⁷³

Arrests, Charging, and Public Statements after the Event

Public reporting immediately after June 11 described at least 30 arrests,⁷⁴ a large multi-agency police response, and the curfew following the protest. Later reporting based on released SPD

⁶⁹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 9–10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD Supervisor B’s BWC Video 2025-06-11, beginning at 02:09:10 and at 02:30:40.

⁷⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 10–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁷¹ SPD Supervisor B’s BWC Video 2025-06-11, beginning at 02:09:10.

⁷² *Id.* at 02:30:40.

⁷³ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁷⁴ Emmalee Appel, Amanda Roley, and Connor McEvoy, “Protesters Rally at Spokane ICE After Detainment of Asylum Seeker,” KREM 2 News, June 11, 2025, updated June 13, 2025, <https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/spokane-ice-office-protest/293-d20b0d49-25b1-4ea3-882e-90a2707dc006>.

records identified 30 arrests.⁷⁵ RANGE reported that the mayor held a late-night press conference and explained local law enforcement's role as enforcing municipal code provisions regarding rights of way rather than assisting immigration enforcement. RANGE also reported that SPD Commander A stated SPD deployed white smoke and fired pepper balls at demonstrators' feet and that SPD did not use rubber bullets, while noting that other agencies were present.⁷⁶

Public reporting also later described federal arrests and court proceedings connected to the June 11 protest. Those proceedings are referenced only as public context for the continued attention surrounding the event and are not evaluated in this report.⁷⁷

Complaint Intake and IA Assignment

After June 11, the OPO and SPD received multiple complaints and concerns from community members. SPD's complaint summary divided the complaints into general or systemic concerns and officer-specific allegations involving demeanor, arrests, Use of Force, unreported injuries, and property handling. The complaints raised recurring themes regarding perceived assistance to ICE, lack of de-escalation, unclear or inaudible dispersal orders, inability to leave, crowd compression, use of smoke and munitions, stadium impact, officer demeanor, arrests, medical care, and property handling.⁷⁸

SPD IA identified physical evidence including officer BWC, scene photographs, police reports, CAD, drone video, complainant emails, voicemail, interviews, intakes, and complainant photographs or videos. The complaint review therefore involved both officer-specific allegations and broader systemic concerns.⁷⁹

Complaint Chain of Command Review

SPD Commander F completed a chain of command review of C25-066, addressing broad complaint categories and specific allegations on January 13, 2026. SPD Commander F noted the large volume of attachments and BWC, the number of complaints and allegations, the audibility

⁷⁵ Amanda Roley, "Spokane Police Reports Reveal New Details from June ICE Protest," KREM 2 News, Aug. 5, 2025, <https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/protests/spokane-police-reports-reveal-new-details-from-june-ice-protest/293-c81a6728-e348-47dc-9239-9f72acbff8af>.

⁷⁶ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

⁷⁷ Luke Baumgarten, Erin Sellers, and Aaron Hedge, "9 Spokanites Arrested by Federal Agents in Connection to ICE Protests," RANGE Media, July 15, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/spokane-activists-arrested-federal-agents-ice-protests/>; Aaron Hedge, "All 9 Spokane Protesters Plead Not Guilty to Federal Charges," RANGE Media, July 16, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/spokane-ice-protesters-plead-not-guilty/>; Emmalee Appel and Amanda Roley, "'I Accept Full Responsibility': Former Spokane City Council President Ben Stuckart Pleads Guilty to ICE Protest Charge," KREM, Dec. 8, 2025, <https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/ben-stuckart-spokane-pleads-guilty-ice-protest/293-42309d65-6616-41c2-ad1f-1b1e4ded73a7>.

⁷⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 1–13.

and communication concerns, and the difference between officer-specific allegations and systemic review issues.⁸⁰ SPD Commander C completed the final chain of command review of the complaint allegations, including a property handling issue addressed in the review on January 16, 2026. SPD Commander C recommended improved dispersal orders, embedded medics at arrestee collection points, and better communication with surrounding spectator events in the final determination.⁸¹

Use of Force Review

SPD opened a separate Use of Force review under F25-022. SPD Reviewer B stated that he was assigned on July 7, 2025, to review force used during the June 11 protest. The review identified officers who used or directed force through reports, BWC footage, drone video, and photographs. The review addressed command-ordered force and individual force involving OC, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, arrest-related force, medical care, decontamination, BWC issues, and reporting issues.⁸²

On November 26, 2025, SPD Commander E completed a supervisor review that clarified force counting and documentation issues and recommended policy and training improvements. On January 2, 2026, SPD Commander C reviewed the Use of Force matter and issued final command findings. The UOFRB reviewed the Use of Force matter on April 16, 2026, and discussed systemic issues including smoke as reportable force, Policy 308 clarity, protest communication and demeanor, BWC labeling, Use of Force report writing, BWC activation, and review capacity for large events.⁸³

Supplemental TAC/Crowd Management Review Discussion

After the initial drafting of this report, the OPO met with TAC/Crowd Management leaders to obtain additional operational context regarding the June 11 response. The discussion provided a field perspective that was not fully developed in the After Action Report, particularly regarding command authority, unit roles, dialogue, callout and equipment limitations, and tactical decision-making.⁸⁴ The discussion also identified lessons involving training, UAS, munitions, and After Action review. Those subjects are addressed in greater detail in the supplemental discussion and issue sections below.

⁸⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

⁸¹ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 16, 2026).

⁸² SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁸³ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁸⁴ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

Procedural History Summary

The procedural record shows that SPD faced a complex and fast-changing incident involving First Amendment activity, federal immigration concerns, local law enforcement concerns, public safety, mutual aid, tactical resources, a nearby stadium event, and substantial public scrutiny. SPD command initially recognized the legal sensitivity of the event and limited involvement after consulting command and legal resources. The mission later changed after command concluded that protesters were obstructing exits and vehicles and engaging in conduct requiring SPD action. Command then approved an unlawful assembly declaration.⁸⁵

SPD issued repeated warnings, limited certain force options, and conducted substantial reviews after the incident. The complaint record, Use of Force review, UOFRB discussion, and supplemental TAC discussion identify important policy, training, documentation, communication, and command practice issues for future consideration.

Summary of Complaint Themes

The OPO and SPD received complaints or concerns from 24 complainants following the June 11 protest response.⁸⁶ The complaints came through several sources, including OPO complaint forms, emails, voicemail messages, OPOC public comments, interviews, and materials submitted by complainants. Some complainants were arrested. Others were present as protesters, observers, family members, stadium attendees, or community members who reviewed the public record after the event.

The complaints raised both officer-specific allegations and broader event-level concerns. Officer-specific allegations included Use of Force, force associated with arrests, officer demeanor, failure to identify, failure to provide medical care, property handling, arrest processing, and arrest-related documentation. Broader event-level concerns included SPD's perceived role in assisting federal immigration enforcement, the clarity and audibility of dispersal orders, the timing and visibility of dialogue or de-escalation efforts, crowd movement and compression, the use of smoke and less-lethal munitions, impacts on stadium attendees and other uninvolved people, mutual aid and agency identification confusion, and the effect of the response on public trust.⁸⁷

The complaint themes are summarized below to provide context for the issue analysis that follows. This summary does not make credibility findings regarding complainants, officers, or witnesses. It identifies recurring concerns raised in the complaint record and explains how those concerns relate to the policy, training, communication, documentation, supervision, and review issues addressed later in the report.

⁸⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁸⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–50 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁸⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

Perception that SPD Assisted Federal Immigration Enforcement

A recurring complaint theme is the perception that SPD's response functionally assisted federal immigration enforcement. Several complainants believed SPD cleared or moved protesters so that federal personnel, detainees, agents, or vehicles could leave the facility. Some complainants connected this concern to Washington's restrictions on state and local involvement in civil immigration enforcement and questioned whether SPD's actions were consistent with the Keep Washington Working Act.⁸⁸ This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Community Member A, Complainant A, Complainant B, Complainant C, Complainant D, Complainant E, Complainant F, Complainant G, and Complainant H.⁸⁹

SPD command records show that command personnel recognized this issue during the incident. SPD Commander D reported reviewing RCW 43.17.425, consulting command staff, and seeking City legal guidance before taking enforcement action. SPD's internal records also reflect that command later identified separate local law and public safety concerns as the basis for the mission change.⁹⁰ The complaint theme remains important because even when SPD identifies a lawful local mission, the public may experience the operation differently if the police action allows federal immigration activity to proceed. SPD attempted broader communication about the Department's reasons for action through public announcements, media releases, and press conferences.

Perception that SPD Escalated Rather than De-Escalated

Several complainants described the arrival of law enforcement as the point when the event changed from a protest into a more fearful or volatile situation. Complainants described a large police presence, armored vehicles, tactical gear, gas masks, skirmish lines, less-lethal tools, and multiple agencies as creating a "show of force," "war zone," or intimidating atmosphere. Some stated they expected SPD to de-escalate, negotiate, or protect community members, but instead perceived SPD's posture as aggressive, militarized, or aligned against protesters.⁹¹ BWC captured the same concern as it was expressed during the event when a woman observing the police movement stated, "This is not de-escalation."⁹²

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant I, Complainant C, Complainant G, Complainant D, Complainant J, Complainant K, Complainant E, Complainant L, Complainant M, and Complainant H.⁹³ Other complainants or records identified personnel who communicated calmly, explained consequences, or attempted to de-escalate.

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 3–11.

⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁰ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁹¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 3–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁹² SPD Supervisor A's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:35:21.

⁹³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 3–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

SPD Reviewer B's Use of Force review identified examples of officers using clear directives and professional communication.⁹⁴ A crowd response can include many individual examples of calm communication while still being experienced by many participants as escalating if the command posture, equipment, tactics, or communication strategy are not understood. The complaint theme supports review of the difference between individual officer communication and a coordinated dialogue or de-escalation strategy.

Dialogue, Communication, and De-Escalation

Many complaints raised concerns about the absence, timing, or visibility of dialogue and de-escalation. Some complainants believed SPD should have deployed a community relations officer or Dialogue Team earlier in the afternoon, before the protest grew larger and more emotionally charged. Others stated they did not see officers trying to communicate with the crowd in a way that explained SPD's mission, the legal basis for the response, or what people could do to avoid arrest or force.⁹⁵

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant C, Complainant D, Complainant E, Complainant G, Complainant J, Complainant H, Complainant N, Complainant O, Complainant P, and Complainant L.⁹⁶ Complainants also described inconsistent or confusing officer-level communication. Some reported being told to move without understanding where they were permitted to go. Others reported trying to ask officers about curfew, dispersal, or safe locations but receiving no response or unclear direction.⁹⁷ The complaint record also includes examples of officers providing warnings, explaining potential consequences, and communicating directly with individuals.⁹⁸ The issue is whether communication was sufficiently early, layered, visible, consistent, and connected to the command plan.

Dispersal Orders, Warnings, and Ability to Understand Police Directions

One of the strongest recurring complaint themes involved dispersal orders and warnings. Several complainants reported that they did not hear an order to disperse, did not understand that the assembly had been declared unlawful, did not know that police action could occur before the 9:30 p.m. curfew, or learned about the curfew from other protesters rather than police.⁹⁹ Others reported hearing some warnings but did not understand what they were being directed to do or where they were supposed to go.¹⁰⁰

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant N, Complainant C, Complainant X, Complainant R, Complainant S, Complainant D, Complainant G, Complainant P,

⁹⁴ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 16–18, 70–71 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁹⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁹⁶ *Id.*

⁹⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–24 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁹⁸ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 16–18, 70–71 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁹⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13, 24–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

Complainant O, Complainant H, Complainant T, Complainant U, Complainant B, and Complainant Q.¹⁰¹ The complaint record also reflects location-specific concerns. Some complainants stated that announcements may have been audible on Washington Street but were not audible or understandable from the south lawn, parking lots, near Bark Rescue Pub, near Riverfront Park, or other areas around the building. Others reported that crowd noise, chanting, police vehicles, distance, and movement made announcements difficult to understand. IA noted that the crowd could be heard attempting to drown out PA announcements and that there was doubt that the notices from the PA were effective beyond an undetermined point in the crowd.¹⁰²

SPD records show that announcements and warnings were made repeatedly and were heard on BWC regularly. However, those officers were all closer to the announcements being made. CAD and the IA timeline document multiple dispersal, arrest, and force warnings over the course of the event.¹⁰³ The complaint theme does not negate that record. Instead, it raises a separate question: whether warnings were reasonably capable of being heard, understood, and acted upon by people in different parts of the crowd due to location, crowd noise, physical barriers, movement, timing, and other operational factors.

Communicating with a large and moving crowd is inherently difficult, particularly when announcements must compete with chanting, traffic, vehicle noise, physical obstructions, and the distance between the speaker system and different parts of the crowd. SPD later sought to purchase two Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRADs) to improve the range and clarity of public safety announcements. The proposed purchase drew community and City Council concern regarding potential hearing effects, the devices' warning-tone capability, First Amendment implications, and the need for clear policies governing their use. The proposal was removed from the City Council consent agenda. The controversy does not diminish the need for more effective crowd communication. Instead, it demonstrates that any enhanced communication system should be governed by clear policies that distinguish amplified speech from warning tones, limit volume and duration, require trained operators, document deployment, and provide appropriate First Amendment safeguards.¹⁰⁴

Safe Egress, Crowd Compression, and Ability to Comply

Several complainants described confusion about where to go and whether they could safely leave. Some reported that they were told not to cross police lines or were being pushed toward other protesters. Others described buildings, vehicles, benches, police lines, and crowd density as barriers to leaving. Some were also unsure whether moving in a particular direction would result in arrest. Others stated that they linked arms or stayed within the crowd because they feared

¹⁰¹ *Id.*

¹⁰² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 24–26 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁰³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁰⁴ Aaron Hedge, Erin Sellers, and Valerie Osier, “Proposed Purchase of Crowd Control Noise Device to Draw Protest,” RANGE Media, Nov. 10, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/long-range-acoustical-device-spokane-city-council/>.

being knocked down, trampled, isolated, or arrested if they moved alone.¹⁰⁵ This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant G, Complainant W, Complainant J, Complainant H, Complainant N, Complainant P, Complainant O, Complainant Q, Complainant R, and Complainant C.¹⁰⁶

SPD's internal review identified BWC footage showing space available in certain areas and at certain times.¹⁰⁷ While that evidence is relevant, the complaint theme raises an important crowd management issue: perceived or practical ability to comply may differ depending on location, crowd density, police line placement, announcements, obstacles, lighting, smoke, and the person's understanding of what police are directing them to do.

Use of Smoke, OC/PAVA, Pepper Ball, 40mm, Bean Bag Rounds, and Other Less-Lethal Tools

Many complaints raised concerns about smoke, irritants, pepper ball, 40mm rounds, bean bag rounds, or other less-lethal tools. Complainants used different terminology, including "gas," "tear gas," "chemical agents," "pepper spray," "pepper balls," "rubber bullets," and "less-lethal rounds." Some reported burning eyes, coughing, panic, visible smoke or irritants, bruising, welts, or other injuries. Others described fear when officers donned gas masks or when munitions were deployed.¹⁰⁸

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant N, Complainant T, Complainant U, Complainant B, Complainant I, Complainant C, Complainant X, Complainant R, Complainant S, Complainant G, Complainant O, Complainant P, Complainant Q, Complainant K, and Complainant H.¹⁰⁹ Several complaints also raised questions about whether less-lethal tools were used before curfew, whether sufficient warnings were given, whether people had a realistic opportunity to leave before deployment, whether some cars were trapped in the adjacent parking lot and unable to leave, whether munitions affected uninvolved people, and whether smoke or irritants drifted toward uninvolved people.¹¹⁰

SPD records distinguish between CS tear gas, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, and bean bag rounds. SPD records also repeatedly state that CS was not authorized.¹¹¹ The complaint theme remains significant because members of the public may describe tools based on their perceptions or how they experienced them, not based on technical terminology.

¹⁰⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–24, 38–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

¹⁰⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–24, 38–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 3–17, 24–38, 43–50.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

¹¹⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 3–17, 24–38, 43–50 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); OPO Online Complaint Form, Complainant O, Aug. 20, 2025 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 2, 2025); Photo from Complainant O, IMG_4637 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

¹¹¹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6–10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

Third-Party Impact and Stadium Exposure

A separate complaint theme involved impacts on people who were not part of the protest crowd. The most prominent concern involved One Spokane Stadium, where a professional soccer game was underway. Complaints described smoke or irritants drifting into the stadium area, people coughing, children covering their faces, and a lack of public announcement or clear instruction inside the stadium.¹¹²

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant T, Complainant U, Complainant N, Complainant G, Complainant R, and others who described smoke or irritant movement beyond the immediate police line.¹¹³ Crowd management operations can affect people beyond the protest area. Venue coordination, public messaging, medical access, and documentation of impacts on uninvolved people become especially important when police activity occurs near stadiums, parks, businesses, transit routes, or public gathering spaces.

Officer Demeanor, Professionalism, and Public Trust

Several complainants raised officer demeanor concerns. Some described officers as dismissive, hostile, silent, cold, or unwilling to answer questions. Others described specific comments they perceived as disrespectful or inconsistent with public service expectations. Some complainants contrasted officers who appeared calm or communicative with others who appeared nervous, aggressive, or unwilling to engage.

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant G, Complainant T, Complainant Q, Complainant M, Complainant H, Complainant J, and Complainant D.¹¹⁴ The complaint record also includes accounts of officers who communicated clearly, warned people about consequences, attempted to persuade people to leave before arrest, or otherwise used professional communication.¹¹⁵ The range of accounts matters because demeanor is often experienced at the individual level, while public trust is affected by the overall operation.

Demeanor concerns also appeared in contexts where people were confused about police action. When people do not understand why police are acting, where they are allowed to go, or how to avoid arrest or force, officer demeanor may carry greater weight. Even brief comments can shape whether people perceive the police response as lawful, fair, respectful, or punitive. A broad multi-agency response involving personnel with different levels of crowd management training further reinforces the need for SPD's continued emphasis on dialogue and de-escalation.

¹¹² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹¹³ *Id.*

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

¹¹⁵ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 16–18, 70–71 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

Arrests, Force Associated with Arrests, and Dynamic Physical Control Tactics

Several complaints involved arrests or force associated with arrests. Complainants described people being tackled, pulled by the hair, pushed, thrown to the ground, pinned, placed in prone handcuffing positions, or subjected to force while trying to move, sit, stand, comply, or avoid being trampled. Some complaints involved SPD officers; others involved other agencies or uncertainty about which agency was involved.¹¹⁶

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant V, Complainant G, Complainant Q, Complainant O, Complainant P, Complainant W, Complainant M, Complainant J, Complainant H, Complainant E, Complainant X, and Complainant L.¹¹⁷

Medical Care, Injury, and Decontamination Concerns

Several complainants raised medical or injury concerns. These included reported exposure to smoke or irritants, coughing or burning sensations, reported bruising or impact injuries, facial injury during arrest, reported injuries from physical control tactics, alleged failure to provide medical care, and concern that arrestees were held in or near areas affected by smoke or irritants.¹¹⁸ This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant T, Complainant N, Complainant U, Complainant S, Complainant Q, Complainant P, Complainant O, Complainant H, Complainant W, and Complainant X.¹¹⁹

The complaint record raised questions about when medical care or decontamination should be offered, how medical complaints should be documented, and whether medics should be available at arrestee collection points. These concerns are significant because injuries or irritant exposure may not be immediately apparent. SPD Commander C emphasized this issue by recommending embedded medics at arrestee collection points.¹²⁰ These are broader planning concerns, not questions that depend solely on whether a specific officer violated policy. They point to the need for SPD to have a plan in place to provide medical care during a crowd management event, especially after using options that may negatively affect a person.

Property Handling, Phones, and Personal Effects

Property handling was a recurring concern and was addressed in the complaint review. Complainants raised concerns about personal property being removed or separated during arrest, phones being seized or retained, identification being lost, and difficulties recovering property or records after arrest.¹²¹ Complainant P raised property and phone-related concerns in

¹¹⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 6–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

¹¹⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 14–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

¹²⁰ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 16, 2026).

¹²¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 27–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

the complaint and IA interview record.¹²² Complainant Q also raised concerns regarding arrest documentation, records, and related follow-up communication.¹²³

The property issue is significant because protest arrests often occur in chaotic environments. People may be carrying bags, phones, signs, masks, medical items, identification, keys, recording devices, or other personal property. Officers may be working in protective equipment, under time pressure, in crowds, or while assigned to skirmish line duties. Those conditions make clear property procedures more important, not less.

Mutual Aid, Agency Identification, and Complaint Routing

This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant H, Complainant M, Complainant D, Complainant T, Complainant W, Complainant Q, and Complainant G.¹²⁴

Several complainants reported difficulty distinguishing SPD officers from SCSO deputies, federal personnel, or other law enforcement personnel. Complaints referenced black uniforms, green uniforms, tactical gear, armored vehicles, deputies, federal agents, “unidentified armed men,” and officers or deputies whose agency or identity was unclear. Some complainants attributed conduct to SPD when the record later suggested another agency’s involvement, while others were unsure which agency acted.¹²⁵ Since the protest, SPD has procured “Spokane Police” back identification panels instead of the previously used “Police” panels worn on the back of officer uniforms.

This theme is important because the public often experiences a multi-agency response as a single police operation. If agencies operate together in the same area, unclear identification can complicate complaint routing, public understanding, force review, arrest review, and public trust. The complaint records also raised concerns about whether mutual aid partners were operating under consistent expectations regarding force, arrest processing, property, reporting, identification, and complaint review.¹²⁶

Public Trust and Perceived Legitimacy

Across the complaint record, many complainants described a loss of trust in SPD or local government. Some believed SPD acted as an arm of federal immigration enforcement. Others believed SPD escalated a peaceful protest, failed to communicate clearly, used force unnecessarily, failed to protect First Amendment rights, or did not adequately account for uninvolved people.¹²⁷ This theme appeared in complaints or concerns from Complainant I,

¹²² IA Interview of Complainant P, transcript, Oct. 14, 2025 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

¹²³ Email exchange between Complainant Q and SPD Reviewer A, Sept. 28 to Oct. 3, 2025 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 3, 2025).

¹²⁴ *Id.*

¹²⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 17–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹²⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 17–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹²⁷ *Id.* at 3–11, 38–43.

Complainant D, Complainant E, Complainant J, Complainant K, Complainant H, Complainant C, Complainant G, Complainant T, Complainant A, and Complainant B.¹²⁸

Public trust concerns do not require the department to accept every factual assertion in every complaint. They do require recognition that public perception was a significant consequence of the June 11 response. The complaints show that many community members evaluated the response not only by whether individual officers complied with policy, but by whether the overall operation appeared lawful, fair, restrained, understandable, and accountable.

Observations

SPD's IA and Use of Force reviews addressed specific incidents through the applicable review process.¹²⁹ The broader theme is that protest arrests can be difficult to evaluate after the fact when multiple officers, agencies, BWC angles, public video, crowd movement, force tools, and arrest teams are involved. The complaint record supports the need to distinguish and evaluate individual force findings from event-level questions about dynamic takedowns, arrest control tactics, documentation, and supervisory review.

The issue sections that follow use these complaint themes, together with CAD, BWC, drone footage, IA documents, chain of command reviews, TAC/Crowd Management discussion, and public records, to evaluate the principal policy and practice issues raised by the June 11 response.¹³⁰

Supplemental TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Discussions

After the initial complaint and Use of Force reviews, the OPO met with TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue leaders and team members to obtain additional operational context regarding the June 11 response. The purpose of this supplemental review was to better understand the field command perspective, identify tactical and command issues that were not fully apparent from the command post record alone, and improve the accuracy and usefulness of the OPO's closing report.¹³¹ The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management review does not replace CAD, the After Action Report, the IA timeline, the complaint review, the Use of Force review, the chain of command review, or the UOFRB record. It provides additional operational context that should be considered with those sources.¹³²

¹²⁸ *Id.*

¹²⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 6–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

¹³⁰ See sources cited in Summary of Complaint Themes, above.

¹³¹ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

¹³² *Id.*; CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

TAC leaders provided additional field perspective regarding command structure, tactical planning, resource deployment, dialogue integration, equipment limitations, and improvements made after the incident.¹³³ Where TAC leaders described differences between the command post record and field experience, this report treats those differences as operational context relevant to policy, training, documentation, and After Action review, rather than as a final factual determination that one account is correct and another is incorrect.

Command Structure and Field Command Authority

TAC leaders described the June 11 response as involving overlapping leadership, mixed units, and different mission assumptions. SPD TAC, SPD SWAT, County TAC, and SPD patrol personnel were all involved in the field response. TAC leaders explained that those groups brought different training models and different operational assumptions to the event, which is a common feature of a complex multi-agency response. They described the result as less fluid than a normal crowd management response and identified a need for a clearer tactical lead structure during future crowd management events.¹³⁴

TAC leaders also stated that field command did not feel like true field command during this incident because tactical decisions had to be requested from the command post.¹³⁵ BWC also reflected changing field direction and planning discussion during the late-evening response, including discussion of a late-night plan, a different plan shortly afterward, and reference to receiving a “seven-part directive.”¹³⁶ Further training would help department supervisors develop greater familiarity with how authority and decision-making operate during complex incidents.

TAC, SWAT, Patrol, and Mutual Aid Role Clarity

TAC leaders distinguished between a crowd management mission and a traditional SWAT or hostage rescue mission. Although people inside the federal facility needed to be safely moved out, TAC leaders described the primary operational problem from their perspective as a crowd management problem: creating sufficient space to safely extract people and vehicles while managing First Amendment activity and unlawful conduct.¹³⁷ They explained that SWAT personnel are trained primarily for high-risk tactical missions, while TAC/Crowd Management personnel are trained for public order and demonstration events.¹³⁸

The supplemental review supports a recommendation that future crowd management plans define when TAC/Crowd Management is the tactical lead and when SWAT is in support, when SWAT becomes the lead and TAC is in support, how patrol personnel are integrated, and how mutual aid resources will operate under SPD’s crowd management expectations. This is especially

¹³³ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ *Id.*

¹³⁶ SPD Supervisor A’s BWC Video 2025-06-11, at 03:28:08, 03:32:00, and 03:33:55.

¹³⁷ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

¹³⁸ *Id.*

important in Spokane when SPD, SCSO, federal personnel, and other resources operate in the same area, and community members cannot easily distinguish among agencies, uniforms, or roles.¹³⁹

Dialogue Team Timing and Integration

SPD began developing its dialogue policing approach in early 2025 as part of a broader effort to use communication and facilitation during demonstrations. In March 2025, the Chief sent three members of SPD's Tactical Team to Ohio to study the dialogue model used by the Columbus Division of Police. After returning, SPD began deploying specially identified dialogue officers at local demonstrations. The officers were intended to engage organizers and participants, build rapport, explain police actions, and relay information to command while supporting the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights.¹⁴⁰

SPD expanded and formalized that approach later in 2025. In October, SPD and Gonzaga University hosted a 40-hour course developed by the Columbus Division of Police for Spokane officers and personnel from surrounding agencies. The course addressed communication, collaboration, de-escalation, crowd psychology, and the perspectives of activists and members of the media.¹⁴¹ SPD's internal training materials further describe dialogue as a 70/20/10 model, with approximately 70 percent of the work occurring before an event, 20 percent during the event, and 10 percent afterward. The model emphasizes early relationship building, understanding group objectives, communicating expectations, assessing changing conditions, and providing command with information about the crowd's purpose and likely response.¹⁴²

TAC leaders emphasized that dialogue is most effective when it begins before an event becomes heated and is supported by established community relationships. On June 11, dialogue resources were initially contemplated but were not deployed to the protest in that role.¹⁴³ BWC captured a conversation between a Dialogue Team member and a person who described involvement in organizing the protest. The officer stated that earlier contact might have allowed the parties to connect before the event developed further. The community member responded that dialogue would not have ended the protest because participants intended to remain unless the detainees were released.¹⁴⁴ The exchange illustrates both the value and limits of dialogue. Earlier contact may improve information sharing and reduce misunderstanding even when it does not resolve the underlying dispute. Future policy should place dialogue within the crowd management

¹³⁹ *Id.*

¹⁴⁰ Alexandra Duggan, "'It's OK to Have These Conversations': Wash. PD Retools Protest Response," *The Spokesman-Review*, Apr. 11, 2025, republished by Police1, <https://www.police1.com/community-relations/its-ok-to-have-these-conversations-wash-pd-retools-protest-response>.

¹⁴¹ Daniel Strassenberg, "Spokane Police Department and Gonzaga University Co-host Weeklong Dialogue Policing Training," Spokane Police Department, Oct. 15, 2025, <https://my.spokanecity.org/police/news/2025/10/15/spokane-police-and-gu-co-host-weeklong-dialogue-policing-training/>.

¹⁴² SPD 70/20/10 Dialogue Training, at 2–16, 21.

¹⁴³ *Id.*

¹⁴⁴ SPD Officer B's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:15:45.

command structure and establish how dialogue personnel are deployed, how they communicate with field command, and how their information is documented and used.

TAC Callout and Equipment

TAC leaders explained that the early resource request did not appear to be a full TAC team activation. It appeared to involve a smaller dialogue and arrest team concept that evolved as the incident grew.¹⁴⁵ TAC leaders also described a request to use bicycles as part of the crowd management response. They explained that bicycles could have helped officers form lines, manage movement, and create space with fewer personnel. The request was initially denied because command believed the operation would begin soon, but the delay continued and the absence of bicycles required more officers to stand shoulder to shoulder. BWC shows officers using bicycles to establish a visible boundary and discourage movement across a police line.¹⁴⁶ This does not establish that earlier bicycle use would have resolved the crowd management problems, but it supports the operational value described by TAC leaders. This difference between the command post and field perspectives illustrates the importance of timely equipment decisions and clear communication during evolving crowd events.

The supplemental review indicates that response time was affected by the callout structure, available vehicles, equipment access, and the fact that early planning did not initially treat the event as requiring full TAC deployment.¹⁴⁷ TAC leaders reported that, after June 11, all TAC members received take-home vehicles, reducing average response times from approximately 90 minutes to approximately 30 to 40 minutes.¹⁴⁸

After Action Report Limitation and Need for Inclusive After Action Review

The After Action Report provided an important command post perspective, but TAC leaders stated that it did not fully capture the field command perspective or field assessment. They raised concerns regarding the characterization of TAC urgency, the bicycle request, field command radio tone, and field leadership.¹⁴⁹ They also emphasized that a complete After Action review should include the field commanders and personnel involved in planning and executing the operation, not only the Incident Commander's perspective.¹⁵⁰

Future After Action Reports for major protest responses should include input from Incident Command, field command, TAC/Crowd Management, SWAT where involved, patrol supervisors, mutual aid supervisors, communications personnel, and relevant review or oversight personnel.

¹⁴⁵ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

¹⁴⁶ SPD Officer T's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 03:43:51.

¹⁴⁷ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*

The goal is not to reduce senior command accountability, but to ensure that final lessons learned reflect both command post and field realities.¹⁵¹

Operational Improvements after the Incident

TAC leaders identified several improvements after the incident, including additional dialogue training, greater operational development on tactical response, take-home vehicles for TAC members, improved response time, foundational TAC Academy training, recurring monthly training, regular debriefs, and integration of lessons learned into future training.¹⁵²

The operational improvements identified by TAC leadership are also consistent with the Spokane Police Department's adopted strategic direction. The Spokane Police Department Strategic Plan¹⁵³ identifies continued development of evidence-based dialogue policing and the ENABLE Dialogue Program as a strategic objective supporting modern public-order operations. These initiatives reinforce the value of formalizing the operational improvements identified after the June 11 incident through policy, SOPs, command training, and recurring exercises.

In addition, the Spokane Police Department has documented continued implementation of this strategy through expansion of the Dialogue Team, completion of the Columbus Division of Police's evidence-based Dialogue Policing course, and development of in-house Dialogue instructors with the goal of hosting regional dialogue training in Spokane. The January 2026 Public Safety Committee briefing¹⁵⁴ further states that Professor Clifford Stott, the architect of the Evidence-Based Policing dialogue model, conducted command-level training for SPD leadership in Spokane and was scheduled to provide additional training in 2026.

Action Items Identified During Supplemental Review

The TAC discussion identified several follow-up steps for this report and future SPD practice. These included incorporating the field perspective into the report, clarifying how a lawful protest can transition into unlawful activity, and using consistent terminology for crowd events. TAC leaders also identified the need to define command and field authority more clearly, update the applicable SOPs, and preserve relevant training and operational materials for future use.¹⁵⁵

Detailed Chronology of Key Events

The following chronology integrates public reporting, City public statements, SPD CAD entries, the IA complaint timeline, SPD command documentation, UOFRB materials, and TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue review information. Where sources use different terminology or describe

¹⁵¹ *Id.*

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ Spokane Police Department, *2025–2026 Strategic Plan*.

¹⁵⁴ Spokane Police Department, Public Safety Committee Briefing, Jan. 2026, at 5.

¹⁵⁵ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

the same event from different perspectives, the chronology identifies the source rather than resolving factual disputes. Times are listed as precisely as the source permits. CAD times are treated as the most precise time-stamped operational record. Public-source times are included where they add context or describe events not captured in CAD.

This chronology is limited to the protest, SPD's response, public communications directly related to SPD's response, complaint intake, review activity, and later oversight or administrative review milestones. It does not summarize later criminal proceedings, federal case outcomes, or court determinations involving protesters because those matters are outside the scope of this report. The OPO's focus is SPD's response, SPD's review process, and the policy, training, supervision, documentation, and command issues raised by the record.

Source Key

For ease of reference, the chronology uses the following short source labels:

CAD: SPD Computer Aided Dispatch View for Incident 2025-20116445.¹⁵⁶

AAR: SPD After Action Report, SPD Commander D, W. 411 Cataldo, June 11, 2025.¹⁵⁷

IA Timeline: SPD Internal Affairs Reviewer A timeline.¹⁵⁸

IA Summary: SPD Internal Affairs Reviewer A complaint synopsis and complaint summaries.¹⁵⁹

UOF Review: SPD Use of Force IA Additional by SPD Reviewer B.¹⁶⁰

UOFRB Minutes: Use of Force Review Board Special Meeting Minutes, April 16, 2026.¹⁶¹

City Statement: City of Spokane statement on Protest Outside of ICE Office, June 11, 2025.¹⁶²

City Curfew: City of Spokane, Public Announcement on the Curfew, June 11, 2025.¹⁶³

City OPO Review Request: City of Spokane media release regarding Independent Review by the OPO, June 13, 2025.¹⁶⁴

RANGE Timeline: RANGE Media, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests."¹⁶⁵

RANGE Q&A: RANGE Media, Interview with SPD command regarding ICE and the protests.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁶ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

¹⁵⁷ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

¹⁵⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁵⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–11, 24–50 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁶⁰ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

¹⁶¹ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

¹⁶² City of Spokane, "Mayor Brown Statement on Protest Outside of ICE Office," June 11, 2025, 4:37 p.m., <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/releases/2025/06/11/mayor-brown-statement-on-protest-outside-of-ice-office/>.

¹⁶³ City of Spokane, "Mayor Brown Announces Curfew," June 11, 2025, <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/statements/2025/06/11/mayor-brown-announces-curfew/>.

¹⁶⁴ City of Spokane, "Mayor Brown, Police Chief Hall Ask for Independent Review by the OPO," June 13, 2025, <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/releases/2025/06/13/mayor-brown-police-chief-hall-ask-for-independent-review-by-the-opo/>.

¹⁶⁵ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

¹⁶⁶ Luke Baumgarten and Valerie Osier, "Q&A with SPD Chief Kevin Hall on ICE and the Protests," RANGE Media, July 28, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/qa-with-spd-chief-kevin-hall-on-ice-and-the-protests/>.

RANGE Phones: RANGE Media reporting concerning phones and property held after protest arrests.¹⁶⁷

KREM OPOC: KREM reporting regarding OPO complaint intake and public concerns raised after the June 11 protest.¹⁶⁸

TAC Discussion: OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion, June 2026.¹⁶⁹

June 11, 2025: Pre-Police Deployment and Initial Protest

Time	Event	Source(s)
1:56 p.m.	RANGE reported that a young man in a separate immigration matter entered the ICE office for a scheduled appointment, that a translator was denied access, and that shortly afterward approximately 20 protesters and media members arrived. RANGE reported that an ICE bus was parked in front of the office and that Community Member A and representatives from Latinos en Spokane spoke to press.	RANGE Timeline.
Early afternoon	Public reporting indicates the protest was sparked by the detention of two individuals believed by protesters to be legally present and complying with immigration processes. Some participants intended to prevent transport to Tacoma.	RANGE Timeline.
2:28:43 p.m.	CAD narrative from associated call stated that an HSI agent reported protesters causing issues outside and spray-painting the bus.	CAD, p. 1.
2:29:41 p.m.	CAD call CFS 5413 was created for a demonstration/protest at 411 W. Cataldo Avenue.	CAD, p. 1.
2:30:05 p.m.	CAD recorded approximately 20–25 subjects, possibly 30–40, with the bus windshield being spray painted.	CAD, p. 1.
2:30 p.m.	RANGE reported that someone wearing a mask rode up on a bicycle, spray-painted the windshield of the ICE transport bus, and rode away. RANGE reported that protest leaders communicated the incident to city and state officials and reiterated that the group intended to remain nonviolent.	RANGE Timeline.
2:31:02 p.m.	CAD recorded that the person who spray-painted the bus may have left on a bicycle, dressed in black, westbound on Joe Albi.	CAD, p. 2.
2:31 p.m.	RANGE reported that Community Member D parked a red car in front of the ICE transport bus, boxing it in from the front.	RANGE Timeline.
2:32:12 p.m.	CAD recorded that Federal Personnel A requested law enforcement assistance with the crowd.	CAD, p. 2.

¹⁶⁷ Aaron Hedge, “Where Are the Protesters’ Phones?,” RANGE Media, June 20, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/protesters-phones-police-custody/>.

¹⁶⁸ Connor McEvoy, “Spokane Protestor Urges More Voices in Police Investigation,” KREM, Aug. 19, 2025, <https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/spokane-protestor-urges-more-voices-in-police-investigation/293-c6a247db-1959-49d5-81b9-992d105867bd>.

¹⁶⁹ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

2:33–2:34 p.m.	CAD recorded approximately 30–40 people. RANGE reported that two people believed to be ICE agents exited the building and told a protester sitting in front of the bus that protesters blocking the bus would be arrested.	CAD, p. 2; RANGE Timeline.
2:35–2:40 p.m.	CAD recorded multiple communications from federal personnel requesting contact with SPD and reporting that the crowd had grown to approximately 60 people.	CAD, p. 2.
2:43 p.m.	RANGE reported that ICE personnel filmed from the building windows as protesters chanted and that the group blocking the bus grew to approximately 12 people.	RANGE Timeline.
Approx. 2:51–3:00 p.m.	TAC resources were reportedly paged or requested during this period, with the initial request described as limited dialogue support and arrest-team standby rather than a full TAC deployment.	TAC Discussion.
3:01 p.m.	RANGE reported that a second car arrived and boxed in the ICE bus from the rear.	RANGE Timeline.
3:02 p.m.	CAD recorded a caller stating there were no weapons seen and nothing new to report, but wanting to ensure law enforcement was aware.	CAD, p. 2.
3:15 p.m.	RANGE reported that a second crowd began forming south of the building after protesters noticed a second ICE vehicle preparing to leave; RANGE estimated 75–100 people spread between exits.	RANGE Timeline.
3:20 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported being briefed by SPD Commander B that the protest was occurring, that Community Member A had organized it after a young adult ward of his was detained by ICE, that the transport bus windshield had been spray painted, and that drones, undercover detectives, and a dialogue team were being deployed.	AAR, p. 1.
3:30 p.m.	CAD recorded that two drones were coming in.	CAD, p. 2.
3:31 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported responding to the command post at the Gardner building. While en route, he drove past the scene and observed approximately 20 to 30 individuals holding signs around the property and sidewalks, with no observed violence or property damage at that moment.	AAR, pp. 1–2.
Approx. 3:35 p.m.	A TAC leader later reported contacting a federal representative inside the building, advising that SPD resources were staging nearby, and asking how federal personnel felt about standing by. The TAC leader reported that the federal representative was	TAC Discussion.

	willing to wait but did not want the situation to remain unresolved for an extended period.	
3:46 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported contacting SPD Commander B to discuss concerns that dialogue deployment or physical crowd control action could be interpreted as assisting ICE transport in violation of RCW 43.17.425; SPD Commander B reportedly supported the Incident Commander's position.	AAR, p. 2.
3:49 p.m.	RANGE reported that protesters willing to be arrested huddled to discuss strategy and community norms.	RANGE Timeline.
3:51 p.m.	RANGE reported that community members began forming a donated supply area with snacks, sunscreen, electrolyte powder, and water.	RANGE Timeline.
3:55 p.m.	RANGE reported that Community Member A told the crowd that the mayor and SPD Commander A were in contact with ICE trying to negotiate release of the detained individuals. RANGE reported that the mayor later denied this and that SPD Commander A said the office had contact with ICE, though the purpose was unclear.	RANGE Timeline.
4:06 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported that SCSO contacted him and offered assistance. He asked SCSO to stage support in case SPD needed to move in to uphold the law.	AAR, p. 3.
4:18 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported contacting the City Attorney's Office for legal guidance regarding RCW 43.17.425. He reported that City legal agreed with his concern that SPD involvement at that point would violate the cited RCW.	AAR, pp. 2–3.
4:19 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported speaking with Federal Personnel B, who stated there were 11 detainees and seven staff in the building and requested that SPD clear the crowd so detainees could be placed on the transport bus. The Incident Commander reported advising that the bus appeared unsafe and that ICE should develop a different transport plan.	AAR, p. 3.
4:22 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported speaking with SPD Commander A, briefing him on the incident and his concerns regarding RCW 43.17.425. SPD Commander A reportedly supported the Incident Commander's position at that time.	AAR, p. 3.
Approx. 4:34 p.m.	A TAC leader later reported that protesters approached and surrounded his unmarked black F-150, blocked his ability to leave, and moved only after he activated lights and used the air horn.	TAC Discussion.
4:37 p.m.	The mayor released a public statement recognizing the protest outside the ICE office, stating that the City respected First Amendment rights and the right to be on public property,	City Statement.

continued to uphold the Keep Washington Working Act, and that SPD would address violations of the Spokane Municipal Code.

June 11, 2025: Escalating Operational Concerns and Staging

Time	Event	Source(s)
5:02 p.m.	RANGE reported that immigration lawyers from Manzanita House were working to identify a legal basis to argue for release of the detained individuals and that one lawyer had spoken to ICE through the callbox and offered representation.	RANGE Timeline.
Approx. 5:05 p.m.	A TAC leader later reported being advised at approximately 5:05 p.m. to start all patrol and TAC resources.	TAC Discussion.
5:08 p.m.	RANGE reported that the national anthem from the nearby soccer match at The Podium / One Spokane Stadium could be heard faintly from the protest area.	RANGE Timeline.
5:20 p.m.	RANGE reported that protesters at the south exit shouted for backup as they saw an ICE transport begin to leave.	RANGE Timeline.
5:22 p.m.	CAD recorded an “All Tac meeting” at Boone and Normandie.	CAD, p. 2.
5:24 p.m.	RANGE reported that a reporter arrived at the open south gate as protesters lined up in front of the exit to stop federal personnel from leaving and that ICE agents and men with no uniforms shoved protesters and the RANGE reporter.	RANGE Timeline.
5:42 p.m.	CAD recorded that subjects had stacked metal benches and poles outside the secure gate.	CAD, p. 2.
5:48 p.m.	CAD recorded that Fire was staging at North Central High School.	CAD, p. 2.
Late afternoon	The Incident Commander reported that ICE developed an alternative transport plan using a Border Patrol van and ICE vehicles from the secure lot. He requested coordination through him in case SPD needed to respond.	AAR, pp. 3–4.
Late afternoon	The Incident Commander reported that when ICE agents approached the parking structure gate, approximately 20–30 protesters moved to the gate and blocked the exit. He characterized this as in-progress unlawful imprisonment and pedestrian interference.	AAR, pp. 4–5.
Late afternoon	The Incident Commander reported directing a SWAT callout and formally requesting mutual aid from SCSO based on the observed conduct.	AAR, p. 5.
Late afternoon	The Incident Commander reported that ICE agents moved vehicles back, the automatic gate closed, and agents re-entered the building without observing impeding behavior or threats during that movement.	AAR, p. 5.

Late afternoon / early evening	The Incident Commander reported concluding, after discussion with SPD Commander A, that SPD's rules of engagement had changed because protesters continued barricading exits with people and objects.	AAR, pp. 5–6.
Late afternoon / early evening	The AAR stated that TAC delayed deployment by beginning to respond to TAC headquarters to get bicycles and that the request was denied because time had become a factor. TAC leaders later stated that the bicycle request was made before the safety-corridor plan was executed.	AAR, pp. 5–6; TAC Discussion.
Approx. 6:00 p.m.	The Incident Commander reported that a plan to create a safety corridor was ready to deploy. The plan involved vehicles blocking traffic, SCSO and SPD skirmish lines, and jail transport vehicles to load and move building occupants.	AAR, p. 6.
6:02 p.m.	CAD recorded that a unit was leaving, and TAC units were standing by.	CAD, p. 2.
6:03–6:04 p.m.	CAD recorded that bikes were approved, officers were to pick them up quickly, and bike personnel then returned.	CAD, p. 2.
6:05 p.m.	CAD recorded "ready in 5 min."	CAD, p. 3.
6:20 p.m.	CAD recorded that the team was stacked and ready to move.	CAD, p. 3.
6:21 p.m.	CAD recorded "TAC cameras on."	CAD, p. 3.
6:22 p.m.	CAD recorded "TAC moving."	CAD, p. 3.

June 11, 2025: Police Deployment, Crowd Movement, and Arrests

Time	Event	Source(s)
6:24 p.m.	CAD recorded traffic shutdown at Boone and Washington, the convoy approaching, the convoy crossing Boone southbound, the curb lane clear, and units arriving. RANGE likewise reported police arrival around 6:24 p.m.	CAD, p. 3; RANGE Timeline.
6:25 p.m.	CAD recorded officers' arrival. RANGE reported that at least ten vehicles and a red ICE transport van shut down Washington Street.	CAD, p. 3; RANGE Timeline.
6:26 p.m.	CAD recorded "start PAs, it's going to be loud" and "loud crowd." RANGE reported that SPD tactical officers quickly cleared a path from the sidewalk into the building to the red transport van and that protesters began coalescing around the red van.	CAD, p. 3; RANGE Timeline.
6:28 p.m.	CAD recorded that officers were "starting to [be] swarmed," county assistance was being called, the van was being barricaded, and protesters were sitting around it.	CAD, p. 3.

6:30–6:32 p.m.	CAD recorded that federal personnel were not going to bring anyone down based on crowd size; that the area needed to be made safe with arrests if necessary; and that officers did not appear able to secure the van because it was completely surrounded.	CAD, p. 3.
6:34 p.m.	CAD recorded county TAC on scene.	CAD, p. 3.
6:36 p.m.	RANGE reported that County Sheriff’s deputies arrived, increasing the police presence.	RANGE Timeline.
6:40 p.m.	CAD recorded “starting out with lots of verbals.”	CAD, p. 3.
6:41 p.m.	CAD recorded that two skirmish lines had formed.	CAD, p. 4.
6:45–6:46 p.m.	RANGE reported that a RANGE reporter began livestreaming around 6:45 p.m. IA Timeline records someone under arrest at 6:46 p.m.	RANGE Timeline; IA Timeline, p. 12.
6:48–6:49 p.m.	CAD recorded detainment vans positioned, mixed SCSO and city teams of five, and one arrestee requiring transfer of custody.	CAD, p. 4.
6:52–6:58 p.m.	CAD recorded reports of a male armed on the north/back side near the van, carrying a flag and with a gun in the right front pocket. CAD also recorded questions about alternate doors or an alternate van.	CAD, p. 4.
6:55 p.m.	CAD recorded “pushing crowd to the south.”	CAD, p. 4.
6:56 p.m.	CAD recorded the group at the Red Wagon was calm. IA Timeline records Complainant G being contacted by SPD Supervisor A and asked to move back.	CAD, p. 4; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:04 p.m.	CAD recorded “starting a slow push” and all incoming TAC to rally around the red van.	CAD, p. 4.
7:05 p.m.	CAD recorded SWAT en route and one person in custody in van 1.	CAD, p. 4.
7:06–7:07 p.m.	CAD recorded crowd mood as chanting with no assault yet, argumentative but uncooperative, Bearcat on scene, and benches being moved.	CAD, p. 4.
7:08 p.m.	CAD recorded approval for unlawful assembly. IA Timeline records the command post approved unlawful assembly at 7:08 p.m.	CAD, p. 4; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:09 p.m.	IA Timeline records an onsite sergeant meeting to discuss plans involving SPD Supervisor A, SPD Supervisor D, and SPD Supervisor E. CAD also recorded directions to leave a lane open for quick ingress and egress.	IA Timeline, p. 12; CAD, p. 5.

7:12 p.m.	CAD recorded PA being given from the Bearcat. IA Timeline records a public safety order to disperse from the Bearcat, with five minutes to disperse.	CAD, p. 5; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:13 p.m.	IA Timeline records a Bearcat announcement that people had until 7:18 p.m. to disperse southbound on Washington and that SPD Supervisor C's BWC captured the public safety order. CAD also recorded arrest team planning for a person tying items to a patrol car and a report of a person with a gun in a waistband.	IA Timeline, p. 12; CAD, p. 5.
7:14–7:15 p.m.	CAD recorded the soccer game was going on; an inquiry about pushing west to tape off the area; and command directions to SWAT to arrest a person in flower shorts for probable cause of pedestrian interference, malicious mischief, and unlawful imprisonment.	CAD, p. 5.
7:17 p.m.	CAD recorded 300 or more people at the Red Wagon, peaceful for the moment.	CAD, p. 5.
7:19 p.m.	CAD recorded that dispersal orders had been given at 7:13 p.m. with a five-minute window. IA Timeline records SPD Supervisor D telling command that the time had come and lapsed on the dispersal order.	CAD, p. 5; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:20 p.m.	CAD recorded inquiry about one more PA. IA Timeline records a public announcement with dispersal and arrest warning from the Bearcat / SPD Officer E. IA Timeline also records Complainant W and people in the van being told they were subject to arrest.	CAD, p. 5; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:21 p.m.	IA Timeline records a public safety order / unlawful assembly announcement, direction to disperse southbound on Washington, and a force warning.	IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:22–7:23 p.m.	CAD recorded another PA order, direction to head southbound, a Use of Force warning, and another group with masks coming down.	CAD, p. 5.
7:23 p.m.	IA Timeline records SPD Supervisor D providing information on a safer place for media to film.	IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:24–7:25 p.m.	CAD recorded one person in custody with a BB gun in the waistband, TAC running out of cuffs, and flex cuffs being obtained. IA Timeline records sergeants meeting to discuss how to move the crowd and another dispersal / arrest order from the Bearcat / SPD Officer E.	CAD, p. 5; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:27–7:29 p.m.	CAD recorded three detainees with SPD Supervisor B, transport at Boone and Washington, another person in custody, and 300 or more people from the Red Wagon marching north. IA Timeline records a dispersal order and force warning at 7:29 p.m.	CAD, p. 5; IA Timeline, p. 12.

7:30–7:34 p.m.	CAD recorded the crowd from the Red Wagon stopped marching, movement to arrest a person, a second person in custody, announcements given every few minutes but “very loud down here,” and Community Member D in custody. IA Timeline records another dispersal order / force warning at 7:32 p.m. and another at 7:33 p.m. referencing chemical munitions / CS gas.	CAD, p. 6; IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:35–7:36 p.m.	CAD recorded more announcements and that people were yelling back that they would not follow instructions, including “F’you nazis.” CAD also recorded the Red Wagon group westbound on Spokane Falls.	CAD, p. 6.
7:38 p.m.	CAD recorded that approximately 300 more people were about 10 minutes away, northbound on the Howard Bridge.	CAD, p. 6.
7:39–7:41 p.m.	CAD recorded a caller wanting to know why people were being arrested; another caller stating law enforcement was assisting ICE and breaking the law; that CS was not authorized; that people were starting to arm themselves with cones and other items and refusing to leave after announcements; and a request for authorization to use CS because of the 300-person group approaching.	CAD, p. 6.
7:41 p.m.	IA Timeline records Complainant N being seen on SPD Supervisor C’s BWC being given a dispersal order explanation and SPD Officer A addressing a protester at the back of the van while a clear and loud unlawful-assembly order could be heard.	IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:43–7:46 p.m.	CAD recorded a second transport to jail because the first was full; the 300-person group was over the water on the bridge; the dispersal PA was being met with a negative reaction; the door was secured; and the van was going to be the problem.	CAD, p. 6.
7:45 p.m.	IA Timeline records an arrestee being carried to a van by officers.	IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:48–7:50 p.m.	CAD recorded transport van 1 en route to jail, more TAC heading in, and direction to make sure MRAD (Munitions Response and Delivery) was ready. CAD also recorded a question about whether to get the people out immediately and the answer “no,” because 300 or more people were headed that way.	CAD, p. 7.
7:48–7:49 p.m.	IA Timeline records arrestees at the back of the van on multiple BWC recordings, SPD Officer B’s video captured an arrest, and the van clear according to SPD Officer B.	IA Timeline, p. 12.
7:52 p.m.	CAD recorded a request to use smoke and OC mix to start moving the crowd. IA Timeline records SPD Supervisor A asking the command post for smoke / pepper ball approval.	CAD, p. 7; IA Timeline, p. 12.

7:53 p.m.	CAD recorded 1,800 or more people at Stadium One and an inquiry about whether the stadium was evacuating.	CAD, p. 7.
7:54–7:55 p.m.	CAD recorded pepper ball ready. Command recorded “one more dispersal, then pepper ball approved” and “be prepared and have a plan for it 1st.”	CAD, p. 7.
7:57 p.m.	CAD recorded that the Bearcat would handle the final announcement.	CAD, p. 7.
7:59 p.m.	CAD recorded authorization for pepper ball if needed. IA Timeline records command post authorization of pepper ball as needed.	CAD, p. 7; IA Timeline, p. 12.
8:00 p.m.	CAD recorded four arrestees being moved to the north and staged at Joe Albi / Washington. CAD also recorded officers pushing south and meeting a wall of people.	CAD, p. 7.
8:01 p.m.	CAD recorded “Looks like we will need to push them to the East” and authorization for smoke as well. IA Timeline records command post authorization of smoke as needed.	CAD, p. 7; IA Timeline, p. 12.
8:02 p.m.	CAD recorded more dispersal orders and that everyone was saying they were peaceful and would not move.	CAD, p. 7;
8:03–8:05 p.m.	CAD recorded multiple people being arrested, pepper ball deployed onto the ground, a group pushing back toward officers, and “crowd much more hostile.” IA Timeline records pepper ball beginning on the ground at 8:04 p.m.	CAD, p. 8; IA Timeline, p. 13.
8:06–8:11 p.m.	CAD recorded development of a coordinated plan before smoke; inquiry about OC if the crowd became more hostile; direction to TAC/SWAT to come up with a plan and throw smoke if people pushed past the line; SWAT deployment; and the crowd moving south. IA Timeline records smoke first seen at 8:11 p.m.	CAD, p. 8; IA Timeline, p. 13.
8:13–8:17 p.m.	CAD recorded eight arrestees needing jail transport, transport at least 10 minutes away, readiness to move prisoners to the van, flat tires on the van, notification to Providence / Fire / ambulance staging, OC deployed, and direction for officers with smoke exposure to step behind the second line.	CAD, p. 8.
8:18–8:23 p.m.	CAD recorded direction that if people tried to push past the line while the van exited, officers should “drop the smoke and pull back”; [plan was to transport] 12 detainees ... in the red van and agents ... in the Bearcat or a patrol vehicle; that the plan was to deploy smoke right before loading the van; and that detainees would be in the arrest vehicle and agents in the SCSO Bearcat.	CAD, p. 9.
8:24 p.m.	CAD recorded that the mayor had initiated a curfew from 9:30 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.	CAD, p. 9.

8:25–8:31 p.m.	CAD recorded curfew and dispersal orders being issued repeatedly, that 26 total people needed to be removed from the building, that some people were putting on welder’s gloves and gas masks and picking up umbrellas, that CS was not authorized, and that only OC and smoke were authorized.	CAD, p. 9.
8:29 p.m.	The City issued a public curfew statement stating that the curfew would begin at 9:30 p.m. and last until 5:00 a.m., covering Boone Avenue to Spokane Falls Boulevard, Howard Street to Division Street, and Riverfront Park, with limited exceptions.	City Curfew.
8:34–8:43 p.m.	CAD recorded additional announcements about curfew and dispersal, that 26 people needed to be removed from the building, that people might be preparing to flank officers, emergency traffic only, and launch of a CodeRED message announcing the curfew and telling people to stay out of the area.	CAD, pp. 9–10.
8:43 p.m.	IA Timeline records SPD Officer C deploying smoke as the second volley of smoke began.	IA Timeline, p. 13.
8:43–8:44 p.m.	CAD recorded “deploy” and “starting exit now.”	CAD, p. 10.
8:45–8:51 p.m.	CAD recorded people coming out, more people coming down the elevator, [12 detainees out], 14 agents coming out, everyone out, transport vans moving, and all 26 people accounted for. RANGE reported that by approximately 8:45 p.m. chemical munitions had been deployed, including smoke affecting media and nearby stadium attendees.	CAD, p. 10; RANGE Timeline.
8:46 p.m.	CAD recorded one arrest at Joe Albi / Washington for obstructing.	CAD, p. 10.
8:48 p.m.	CAD recorded the soccer game letting out and 1,800 people leaving.	CAD, p. 10.
8:49 p.m.	IA Timeline records SPD Supervisor C telling officers they needed to get arrestees out, needed transport vans, and that the jail was on red light.	IA Timeline, p. 13.
8:53–8:55 p.m.	CAD recorded three unassigned officers beginning arrestee transports, one female transported to jail from the ICE building, and one officer’s body camera dying at 8:54 p.m.	CAD, p. 11.
9:00–9:08 p.m.	CAD recorded readiness for towing, personnel checks and hydration, a plan to collect spent munitions, and PA announcements with curfew made every few minutes.	CAD, p. 11.
9:08 p.m.	CAD recorded that PIO / City Hall would be making statements / announcements.	CAD, p. 11.
9:09 p.m.	CAD recorded that subjects [detainees] from both vans had been turned over to U.S. Marshals.	CAD, p. 11.

9:30 p.m.	City curfew began.	City Curfew; CAD, p. 9.
Approx. 10:00 p.m.	RANGE reported that the mayor held a press conference and defended law enforcement's role as enforcing municipal code and right-of-way laws rather than assisting immigration enforcement. RANGE also reported that SPD Commander A stated SPD deployed white smoke and pepper balls and did not use rubber bullets, while noting that other agencies were present.	RANGE Timeline.

June 12 and Later: Complaint Review, Public Records, and Related Proceedings

Date / Time	Event	Source(s)
June 13, 2025	The City announced that the mayor and SPD Commander A requested an independent OPO review of law enforcement actions during the June 11 response, including relevant SPD policy, apparent or actual policy departures, command operations, and command decisions.	City Review Request.
After June 11	The OPO and SPD received multiple complaints and concerns. SPD IA later grouped the complaints into general or systemic concerns and officer-specific allegations involving demeanor, arrests, Use of Force, unreported injuries, and property handling.	IA Summary, pp. 1–11.
June 20, 2025	RANGE reported public concerns regarding phones and personal property after protest arrests, including uncertainty among some protesters about where phones were or when they would be returned.	RANGE Phones.
July 7, 2025	SPD Reviewer B was assigned to review force used during the protest. The review identified officers who used or directed force and reviewed reports, BWC footage, drone video, and photographs.	UOF Review, p. 1.
July 28, 2025	RANGE published a Q&A with SPD Commander A addressing questions about SPD's role, Keep Washington Working, mutual aid, force reporting, and the tools used during the protest response.	RANGE Q&A.
August 19, 2025	KREM reported on public concerns raised during the OPOC process and noted that the OPO was investigating police actions during the June anti-ICE protests following community complaints.	KREM OPOC.

September– October 2025	IA and the OPO conducted or documented complainant contacts and interviews as part of the complaint review process.	IA Summary; complaint and interview records.
January 2, 2026	SPD Commander C made the final determinations regarding the uses of force associated with F25-022.	Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, pp. 1–3.
January 13, 2026	SPD Commander F completed the chain of command review of C25-066, addressing broad complaint categories and specific allegations.	SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, pp. 1–3.
January 16, 2026	SPD Commander C made the final findings regarding the complaints associated with C25-066.	Blue Team Report Sequence, C25-066, Jan. 16, 2026, entry.
April 16, 2026	The Use of Force Review Board held a special meeting to review F25-022 and discussed systemic issues including smoke as reportable force, Policy 308 clarity, protest communication and demeanor, BWC labeling, Use of Force report writing, BWC activation, and review capacity for large events. OPO Closing Report process commenced.	UOFRB Minutes, pp. 5–8.

Chronology Summary

The chronology shows that the June 11, 2025, protest began as a relatively small gathering outside the federal immigration facility at 411 W. Cataldo Avenue and developed over several hours into a large, multi-agency law enforcement response. Public reporting and CAD records show that protesters gathered after learning that individuals had been detained by federal immigration authorities, that some participants intended to engage in acts of civil disobedience

to prevent transport vehicles or federal personnel from leaving, and that the number of people at and around the facility increased throughout the afternoon.¹⁷⁰

The chronology also shows that SPD command initially treated the event as legally sensitive because of the relationship between local police action and federal immigration enforcement. The AAR states that command reviewed RCW 43.17.425, consulted SPD leadership and City legal, and initially limited SPD involvement because immediate crowd control action could be interpreted as assisting federal immigration transport.¹⁷¹

The operational environment changed during the late afternoon and evening. CAD, the AAR, IA materials, and public reporting describe blocked vehicles, obstructed exits, barricading activity, a nearby stadium event, a second protest group moving from Riverfront Park, mutual aid involvement, and increasing crowd size. SPD command records state that command concluded the mission changed once protesters were believed to be obstructing exits, vehicles, and movement in a manner requiring SPD action.¹⁷²

The timeline reflects that SPD moved tactical resources into the area shortly after 6:20 p.m., declared an unlawful assembly at approximately 7:08 p.m., issued repeated dispersal and force warnings, made arrests, requested and received authorization for certain less-lethal tools. CS tear gas was never authorized. CAD and IA records show pepper ball authorization and deployment, smoke authorization and deployment, curfew announcements, and extraction of 12 detainees and 14 agents from the building.¹⁷³

The post-incident chronology is limited to events relevant to SPD's response and review process. It shows that the City requested an independent OPO review, that the OPO and SPD received multiple complaints, that IA opened complaint and Use of Force reviews, that public concerns about property and phone recovery continued after the arrests, that OPOC-related public concerns remained active, and that the UOFRB later reviewed the Use of Force matter.¹⁷⁴ Once this was finalized, the OPO closing report could commence.

¹⁷⁰ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemediaco.com/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>; CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPRO on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPRO on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁷¹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPRO on Jul. 7, 2025).

¹⁷² CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPRO on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–6 (uploaded to IAPRO on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPRO on Dec. 22, 2025); Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemediaco.com/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

¹⁷³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 3–11 (uploaded to IAPRO on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPRO on Dec. 22, 2025).

¹⁷⁴ City of Spokane, "Mayor Brown, Police Chief Hall Ask for Independent Review by the OPO," June 13, 2025, <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/releases/2025/06/13/mayor-brown-police-chief-hall-ask-for-independent-review-by-the-opo/>; SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPRO on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA

Framework: When a Protest Becomes Unlawful

This framework is included to provide a neutral reference point for the analysis that follows. It is not a separate finding that the June 11 protest was lawful or unlawful at any specific moment. This section explains the general principles that help distinguish protected protest activity, individual unlawful conduct, and broader crowd conditions that may justify dispersal or enforcement.

First Amendment assemblies do not become unlawful because they are controversial, disruptive, angry, inconvenient, critical of government, or difficult for law enforcement to manage. Public protest often involves emotion, noise, crowding, criticism of police or government officials, and some disruption to ordinary public activity. Those features may create operational challenges, but they do not by themselves remove constitutional protection.¹⁷⁵

The more difficult question is when a protected protest includes enough unlawful conduct or public safety risk that police may lawfully order dispersal, make arrests, or move from crowd management to crowd control. Recent protest response reports and policy reforms generally approach that question as a conduct-based assessment.¹⁷⁶ The focus is not the viewpoint of the protest, the identity of the participants, or the fact that the crowd may be hostile to police. The focus is whether specific conduct within the group is creating a substantial and articulable risk to people, property, access, movement, or public safety, and whether that risk can reasonably be addressed through communication, targeted enforcement, or other less intrusive options before broader dispersal becomes necessary.¹⁷⁷

Washington law provides an important starting point. RCW 9A.84.020¹⁷⁸ defines failure to disperse in terms of a person congregating with a group of three or more other people where acts or conduct within that group create a substantial risk of injury to any person or substantial

Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Aaron Hedge, “Where are the Protesters’ Phones?,” RANGE Media, June 20, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/protesters-phones-police-custody/>; Connor McEvoy, “Spokane Protestor Urges More Voices in Police Investigation,” KREM, Aug. 19, 2025, <https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/spokane-protestor-urges-more-voices-in-police-investigation/293-c6a247db-1959-49d5-81b9-992d105867bd>; UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

¹⁷⁵ *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); *NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.*, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); *Collins v. Jordan*, 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997).

¹⁷⁶ Police Executive Research Forum, *Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations*, 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022; Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland’s 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022; Seattle Office of Inspector General, *Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle*, 2021.

¹⁷⁷ Police Executive Research Forum, *Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations*, 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022; California Governor’s Policing Advisors, *Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations*, 2020; Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland’s 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022.

¹⁷⁸ RCW 9A.84.020, “Failure to disperse,” <https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9A.84.020>.

harm to property, and the person then refuses or fails to disperse after being ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law.¹⁷⁹ That statutory language connects dispersal authority to conduct and risk. It does not treat the mere presence of a crowd, the expression of unpopular views, or criticism of police as enough.

First Amendment case law points in the same direction. The Supreme Court has protected peaceful assembly and rejected punishment of demonstrators where there was no violence or threat of violence by the demonstrators.¹⁸⁰ The Court has also recognized that unlawful or violent conduct by some participants does not automatically strip all peaceful participants of First Amendment protection.¹⁸¹ These principles do not prevent police from addressing violence, property damage, obstruction, or other unlawful conduct. However, they do require care when moving from enforcement against specific individuals to action affecting the broader assembly.¹⁸²

Recent protest response reviews reinforce that distinction. The Major Cities Chiefs Association described protest events as falling into different categories including lawful and peaceful protest, unlawful but nonviolent civil disobedience, and protest-related violence.¹⁸³ That distinction is useful because not all unlawful protest conduct presents the same public safety issue. A person sitting in a roadway, a group blocking a vehicle, a person damaging property, a crowd throwing objects, and a crowd assaulting officers or others may all require police attention, but they do not necessarily require the same response. The appropriate response depends on the conduct, risk, location, available alternatives, and feasibility of targeted enforcement.¹⁸⁴

A protest may move toward unlawful assembly or dispersal when conduct within the group creates a substantial risk of injury, substantial harm to property, or a significant interference with public safety that cannot reasonably be addressed through continued facilitation alone. Examples may include assaults, credible threats of violence, fires, property destruction, attempts to breach a secure facility, use of weapons, dangerous crowd movement, blocked emergency access, interference with emergency response, blocking people from leaving a building or area, or blocking vehicles in a manner that creates an immediate safety risk. The presence of one or more of these factors does not automatically answer the question. Command still must consider what is happening, where it is happening, whether the conduct is isolated or spreading, whether

¹⁷⁹ RCW 9A.84.020, <https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.84.020>.

¹⁸⁰ *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/372/229/>.

¹⁸¹ *NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.*, 458 U.S. 886 (1982), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/886/>.

¹⁸² *Collins v. Jordan*, 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997), <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/110/1363/527029/>.

¹⁸³ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest*, 2020, <https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf>.

¹⁸⁴ Major Cities Chiefs Association, *Report on the 2020 Protests and Civil Unrest*, 2020, <https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf>; California Governor's Policing Advisors, *Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations*, 2020, <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Policing-and-Protests-Recommendations.pdf>.

specific individuals can be addressed, and whether broader dispersal is reasonably necessary to restore safety.¹⁸⁵

The distinction between individual unlawful conduct and crowd-wide unlawful conditions is especially important. Protest response reviews from Portland, Seattle, Denver, Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles repeatedly identify the same general concern: when police respond to a crowd as a single unit, peaceful participants, observers, media, and bystanders may experience police action directed at others as action against the entire protest.¹⁸⁶ That does not mean crowd-wide action is never justified. It means the decision to move from targeted enforcement to broader dispersal should be based on articulable conditions showing that the overall crowd situation, not only isolated individual conduct, has created a safety concern that cannot reasonably be handled through narrower means.¹⁸⁷

Contemporary policy reforms also distinguish crowd management from crowd control. Crowd management focuses on facilitating lawful assembly, communicating expectations, monitoring conditions, protecting people and property, and addressing specific unlawful conduct where feasible. Crowd control involves stronger police action after the event has become unlawful, violent, or unsafe, including dispersal, arrests, tactical movement, or force options.¹⁸⁸ San Francisco's revised DGO 8.03, Portland Directive 0635.10, and Seattle Policy 14.090 reflect this broader distinction by separating facilitation and management of public assemblies from intervention, dispersal, or crowd control action when conditions change.¹⁸⁹

The timing of the transition matters. A protest may remain predominantly lawful despite isolated misconduct, regain order after a disturbance, or develop into broader unsafe conditions. Command should reassess the event as circumstances change rather than treating the first

¹⁸⁵ RCW 9A.84.020, <https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.84.020>; Police Executive Research Forum, *Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations*, 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022.

¹⁸⁶ Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022; Seattle Office of Inspector General, *Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle*, 2021; Denver Office of the Independent Monitor, *The Police Response to the 2020 George Floyd Protests in Denver*, 2020; Philadelphia Office of the Controller, *Independent Investigation into the City of Philadelphia's Response to Civil Unrest*, 2021; New York City Department of Investigation, *Investigation into NYPD Response to the George Floyd Protests*, 2020.

¹⁸⁷ Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022; Seattle Office of Inspector General, *Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle*, 2021; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022.

¹⁸⁸ Police Executive Research Forum, *Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations*, 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022.

¹⁸⁹ San Francisco Police Department, Department General Order 8.03, *Crowd Control*, revised Jan. 15, 2025, effective Mar. 21, 2025, <https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/your-sfpd/policies/general-orders/8-03>; Portland Police Bureau Directive 0635.10, *Portland Police Bureau Response to Public Order Events*, <https://www.portland.gov/policies/police-directives/field-operations-0600/063510-portland-police-bureau-response-public>; Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, *Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control*, <https://public.powerdms.com/Sea4550/documents/2042767>.

unlawful act as permanently altering the status of the entire assembly. That assessment should focus on the scope and severity of the conduct, its effect on public safety and movement, whether communication remains workable, and whether targeted enforcement can address the problem without broader action.

Dispersal communication is part of that assessment. Contemporary guidance emphasizes that people should be given clear, practical information when feasible: what conduct is creating the public safety concern, what area is affected, what people are being directed to do, where they may go, and what may happen if they do not comply.¹⁹⁰ These are best understood as future template considerations, not as a rigid checklist that will fit every event. Clear communication supports officer safety, public safety, voluntary compliance, and later review. It also helps distinguish between people who are refusing to comply and people who did not hear, did not understand, or did not have a practical route to leave.¹⁹¹

Safe egress is closely related. A dispersal order is more meaningful when people have a realistic way to comply. From a command or video perspective, an open route may appear available. From within the crowd, that same route may be unclear or practically unavailable because of police lines, vehicles, physical barriers, crowd density, fear of arrest, smoke or irritants, noise, or conflicting instructions.¹⁹² Recent protest response reviews emphasize the value of considering egress before and during dispersal, particularly where police lines or force options may move a crowd into a confined space or toward uninvolved people.¹⁹³

In a protest related to immigration enforcement, the same principles apply, but the communication burden is higher. Local police may have independent authority to address local law or public safety concerns, but the public may still perceive police action as assisting federal immigration activity. For that reason, the transition from protest management to enforcement should be documented and communicated as clearly as feasible.

¹⁹⁰ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022; Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#).

¹⁹¹ Police Executive Research Forum, *Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations*, 2022, <https://www.policeforum.org/assets/ResponseMassDemonstrations.pdf>; Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022, <https://www.portland.gov/sites/default/files/2022/Protest%20Lessons%20Learned.pdf>; California Governor's Policing Advisors, *Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations*, 2020, <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Policing-and-Protests-Recommendations.pdf>.

¹⁹² Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#); Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022.

¹⁹³ Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#); Portland Independent Police Review, *Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations*, 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022.

Framework: Contemporary Crowd Management and Policy Reform

Overview

The preceding section addressed when protected protest activity may become subject to enforcement. This section provides the broader crowd management principles used throughout the issues analysis. The June 11, 2025, protest response did not occur in a policy vacuum. It involved a First Amendment assembly, a federal immigration facility, a request involving federal personnel and detainee movement, crowd movement, dispersal orders, tactical resources, mutual aid, smoke, OC/PAVA, less-lethal munitions, arrests, public complaints, body worn camera review, drone video, property concerns, and After Action analysis. Those issues are specific to this incident, but they also sit within a broader national conversation about how law enforcement agencies should manage demonstrations while protecting constitutional rights, public safety, officer safety, and public trust.

Research conducted for this report reviewed national guidance, post-2020 protest response reviews, municipal policy reforms, international standards, and constitutional authorities relevant to First Amendment assemblies and crowd management operations. The sources reviewed included guidance and reports from the Police Executive Research Forum, the U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office, the National Policing Institute, the California Governor's Policing Advisors, Portland's Independent Police Review, Seattle's Office of Inspector General, Amnesty International USA, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and comparable municipal policy frameworks from jurisdictions including San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Berkeley, Columbus, and Louisville.¹⁹⁴

This framework provides context for the incident-specific analysis that follows. It does not replace the facts of the June 11 record, SPD policy, or the chain of command reviews. Instead, it helps identify the policy questions raised by the response: whether SPD's framework clearly prioritized lawful assembly; whether de-escalation and dialogue were embedded into crowd operations; whether enforcement was targeted when feasible; whether dispersal orders were clear and actionable; whether less-lethal tools were governed by crowd-specific standards; whether tactical posture was calibrated to the threat; whether mutual aid agencies operated under consistent

¹⁹⁴ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022; California Governor's Policing Advisors, [Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations](#), 2020; Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022; Seattle Office of Inspector General, [Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle](#), 2021; Amnesty International USA, [Best Practices for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations](#), 2020; International Association of Chiefs of Police, [National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force](#), updated 2020; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials](#), 1990.

expectations; whether documentation was sufficient for review; and whether SPD's policies functioned together as a unified crowd management system.

Since the nationwide demonstrations of 2020, independent reviews have identified substantial convergence regarding the shortcomings of traditional crowd control practices. Those reviews repeatedly identified concerns involving early escalation, broad dispersal orders, unclear communication, militarized posture, indiscriminate or poorly documented use of less-lethal tools, inconsistent mutual aid practices, inadequate body worn camera and report documentation, insufficient supervisory intervention, and weak After Action review.¹⁹⁵ The reform direction emerging from those sources moved away from generalized crowd suppression and toward a facilitation-first model emphasizing lawful assembly, de-escalation, communication, targeted enforcement, proportionality, accountability, and structured review.¹⁹⁶

Crowd Management and Crowd Control

Modern protest response guidance increasingly distinguishes between “crowd management” and “crowd control.” Crowd management is built around facilitation. It focuses on protecting lawful assembly, communicating police intent, identifying risks early, engaging organizers or informal leaders when possible, and addressing specific unlawful conduct without unnecessarily interfering with the broader crowd. Crowd control, by contrast, has historically been associated with suppression, dispersal, and enforcement directed at or affecting the crowd as a whole.¹⁹⁷

That distinction matters because a crowd is rarely a single actor. A crowd may include peaceful demonstrators, organizers, observers, journalists, legal observers, bystanders, people attempting to leave, people arriving late, people confused about police orders, and individuals engaged in unlawful conduct. A policy framework that treats the crowd as one undifferentiated threat risks collective enforcement against people who are not engaged in the conduct requiring police action.

Post-2020 guidance therefore emphasizes targeted enforcement whenever feasible. The California Governor's Policing Advisors recommended an “identify, isolate, and remove” model

¹⁹⁵ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022; California Governor's Policing Advisors, [Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations](#), 2020; Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022; Seattle Office of Inspector General, [Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle](#), 2021.

¹⁹⁶ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022.

¹⁹⁷ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022.

when specific individuals are engaged in unlawful conduct.¹⁹⁸ International standards similarly emphasize that enforcement actions in assembly settings should be directed at people engaged in unlawful conduct and should remain necessary and proportionate.¹⁹⁹

This distinction means that broader dispersal, area denial, and crowd-wide enforcement should be treated as later-stage tools requiring clear justification, rather than default responses to disorder, hostility, inconvenience, or criticism of government.

Facilitation as the Starting Point

A facilitation-first model begins with the premise that public assembly is a protected activity, not a problem to be cleared. Protest activity may be loud, disruptive, emotional, inconvenient, or critical of government. Those features may require planning and public safety management, but they do not themselves justify enforcement.²⁰⁰

Facilitation means that police should, when feasible, help people exercise First Amendment rights while protecting public safety and addressing specific unlawful conduct. That may include communication with organizers, traffic management, route planning, public information, protection from counter-protesters, identification of emergency access routes, and targeted enforcement when specific conduct creates risk.²⁰¹

Facilitation also supports legitimacy. When community members see police as helping protect lawful expression, they are more likely to understand later enforcement as connected to specific conduct rather than viewpoint, criticism, or generalized crowd control. When police begin with a suppression posture, enforcement may appear punitive even when public safety concerns are real.

For SPD, this principle supports a policy framework that begins with lawful assembly, dialogue, communication, and targeted enforcement before moving to dispersal, area denial, munitions, or force. It also supports clearer documentation of the point at which command concludes that the mission has shifted from facilitation to enforcement.

De-Escalation and Dialogue

Modern crowd management guidance treats communication as an operational tool, not only a public relations function. PERF recommends engagement with community members before

¹⁹⁸ California Governor's Policing Advisors, [Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations](#), 2020, at 7–9.

¹⁹⁹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials](#), 1990, Principles 9–14.

²⁰⁰ [Edwards v. South Carolina](#), 372 U.S. 229 (1963); [NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.](#), 458 U.S. 886 (1982); [Collins v. Jordan](#), 110 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997).

²⁰¹ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022.

demonstrations, training community mediators or co-responders, and using communication strategies to reduce conflict.²⁰² The COPS Office and National Policing Institute emphasize legitimacy, procedural justice, communication, and community trust as core parts of 21st century protest response.²⁰³

Dialogue is part of the same framework. Effective dialogue is not limited to dispersal announcements after a tactical decision has already been made. It includes pre-event outreach, liaison communication, relationship building, identification of organizers or informal leaders, communication of expectations, explanation of legal limits, and real-time feedback from the crowd to command. Dialogue can help command understand whether people are attempting to comply, whether orders are audible, whether a route is actually available, whether protester intent is changing, and whether targeted enforcement could avoid broader escalation.

The broader policy point is that de-escalation and dialogue should be embedded into the crowd management framework. They should not exist only as general values in separate policies. SPD Policy 300 contains de-escalation principles, and SPD has developed dialogue-related training and practice. The policy issue is whether those principles are sufficiently incorporated into Policy 461 and related policies governing First Amendment assemblies, Use of Force, control devices, mutual aid, documentation, and After Action review.

Targeted Enforcement and Collective Treatment

Another major reform principle is targeted enforcement. National reviews increasingly recommend that police identify, isolate, and address individuals engaged in unlawful conduct when feasible, rather than using broad dispersal or force against a larger crowd.²⁰⁴ This approach reflects both practical and constitutional concerns. Broad enforcement can escalate tension, affect uninvolved people, complicate egress, and undermine legitimacy. It can also risk treating peaceful participants as responsible for the unlawful conduct of others.

The California Governor's Policing Advisors recommended individualized enforcement strategies and limiting broad dispersal where less intrusive alternatives remain available.²⁰⁵ OHCHR standards similarly emphasize that force in assemblies should be used only when necessary and proportionate and should be directed toward people engaged in unlawful conduct.²⁰⁶

²⁰² Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022, at 29–36.

²⁰³ National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022, at 20–31.

²⁰⁴ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; California Governor's Policing Advisors, [Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations](#), 2020, at 7–9.

²⁰⁵ California Governor's Policing Advisors, [Recommendations to Improve Police Response to Protests and Demonstrations](#), 2020, at 7–9.

²⁰⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials](#), 1990, Principles 9–14.

Targeted enforcement is not always possible. There may be circumstances where collective crowd conduct, violence, obstruction, or public safety risk makes broader intervention necessary. But modern crowd management doctrine generally treats broad dispersal and crowd-wide force as later-stage tools requiring clear justification, rather than default tactics.

This principle informs several parts of the June 11 review. It applies to the unlawful assembly declaration, dispersal communication, dynamic takedowns, less-lethal deployments, protest arrests, and public perception. It also supports the recommendation that SPD's policies more clearly distinguish targeted enforcement, area denial, direct impact force, arrest control, and broader crowd dispersal.

Less-Lethal Tools and Indiscriminate Force

The use of chemical agents, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, impact munitions, and other less-lethal tools has been one of the most scrutinized areas of post-2020 protest review. Comparative materials consistently warn that tools affecting broad areas may impact peaceful demonstrators, bystanders, journalists, legal observers, medical personnel, people attempting to leave, and nearby uninvolved people. These tools may also escalate crowd tension, create panic, interfere with egress, or affect nearby venues and uninvolved people.²⁰⁷

PERF warned that chemical agents can escalate crowd hostility rather than restore order.²⁰⁸ Amnesty International USA similarly criticized indiscriminate crowd force and emphasized that force should be narrowly targeted and used only as a last resort.²⁰⁹ OHCHR standards emphasize necessity, proportionality, and minimum force.²¹⁰ Constitutional force standards under *Graham v. Connor* and *Tennessee v. Garner* require force to be objectively reasonable and tied to legitimate governmental interests and safety concerns.²¹¹

The policy direction emerging from those reviews is not simply to prohibit every less-lethal tool in every protest setting. Rather, the direction is to require clearer thresholds, supervisory authorization, documented necessity, proportionality, warnings, safe egress, medical planning, and post-deployment review. It also requires agencies to distinguish between area denial use and direct impact use because those uses present different risks and require different justification.

The June 11 record makes this issue concrete. SPD records distinguish among smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, and CS, and CAD repeatedly documented that CS was not authorized. At the same time, complainants and public reporting often used

²⁰⁷ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022, at 41–48; Amnesty International USA, [Best Practices for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations](#), 2020; Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022.

²⁰⁸ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022, at 41–48.

²⁰⁹ Amnesty International USA, [Best Practices for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations](#), 2020.

²¹⁰ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials](#), 1990, Principles 9–14.

²¹¹ [Graham v. Connor](#), 490 U.S. 386 (1989); [Tennessee v. Garner](#), 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

broader terms such as “tear gas,” “gas,” or “chemical agents.” The report should preserve accurate technical distinctions while also recognizing that uninvolved or affected people may experience these tools as force or exposure regardless of terminology.

Dispersal Orders, Legal Basis, and Egress

Dispersal communication is one of the most important bridges between lawful assembly and enforcement. Modern guidance emphasizes that dispersal orders should not be treated as formalities before force. They should communicate what has changed, what conduct is creating the public safety concern, what area is affected, where people may go, what time they have to comply when feasible, and what may happen if they do not comply.²¹²

The legal basis for dispersal should be documented. Washington’s failure to disperse statute ties dispersal to acts or conduct within a group that create a substantial risk of injury to any person or substantial harm to property, followed by refusal or failure to disperse after an order by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law.²¹³ That statutory structure reinforces the need to document the conduct and risk supporting a dispersal order.

Safe egress is closely related. A dispersal order is meaningful only if people understand how to comply and have a practical route to do so. From a command or BWC perspective, a route may appear open. From within a crowd, that same route may appear blocked by police lines, vehicles, buildings, other people, smoke, fear of arrest, or conflicting directions.²¹⁴

Effective dispersal practice also requires consistency after the initial announcement. Additional warnings should reinforce the same core instruction unless conditions require a change. Any change in the affected area, route, deadline, or authorized force options should be stated clearly. Ongoing announcements should not become so frequent or varied that people are uncertain about what they are being directed to do. Agencies should also reassess the order when the crowd moves or when the announced route is no longer practical.

For SPD, the policy implication is that dispersal orders should be standardized enough to promote clarity, but flexible enough for dynamic events. Policy should require consideration of audible announcements, repeated warnings when feasible, route-specific instructions, safe egress, documentation of the legal basis, and later review of whether the warning was likely to be heard and understood from different locations.

²¹² Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022; Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#).

²¹³ [RCW 9A.84.020](#).

²¹⁴ Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#); Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland’s 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022.

Tactical Posture and Militarized Appearance

Post-2020 reviews also identified concern that tactical posture can affect crowd behavior and public perception. Protective gear, armored vehicles, long guns, munitions launchers, helmets, gas masks, and skirmish lines may be necessary in some circumstances. They may also communicate escalation, fear, or hostility to people who do not understand the threat assessment or command rationale.²¹⁵

This means tactical posture should be calibrated to the actual threat, mission, and environment. A visible SWAT or tactical posture may be appropriate when there are credible threats, weapons, violence, trapped people, or high-risk extraction concerns. But when tactical resources are used in a First Amendment environment, policy should require command to consider whether the posture is necessary, whether a lower-profile option is feasible, and how the posture may affect crowd behavior and public trust.

The June 11 record included both crowd management and tactical elements. SPD had to address blocked exits, trapped personnel, federal facility concerns, mutual aid, and a growing crowd. At the same time, complainants and public reporting described fear and confusion regarding armored vehicles, munitions, gas masks, and agency identification. The framework for future events should help command distinguish between the need for tactical support and the need for crowd management leadership.

Press, Legal Observers, and Recording Activity

Modern protest guidance also recognizes the importance of media, legal observers, and recording activity. Journalists and observers help document public events, provide information to the public, and support accountability. People in public places generally have an important interest in recording police activity, subject to lawful time, place, and manner restrictions and lawful orders during unsafe conditions.

Amnesty International USA's guidance emphasizes that law enforcement officials should be identifiable during public order operations and that complaints and uses of force should be subject to review.²¹⁶ Modern municipal crowd management policies also commonly address media and observer access, recording activity, and safer observation areas.²¹⁷

This does not mean media, legal observers, or people recording may remain anywhere during an unsafe event. It does mean that crowd management policy should identify how police will

²¹⁵ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; Amnesty International USA, [Best Practices for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations](#), 2020; Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022.

²¹⁶ Amnesty International USA, [Best Practices for Law Enforcement Officials Policing Demonstrations](#), 2020.

²¹⁷ San Francisco Police Department, Department General Order 8.03, [Crowd Control](#), revised Jan. 15, 2025, effective Mar. 21, 2025; Portland Police Bureau Directive 0635.10, [Portland Police Bureau Response to Public Order Events](#); Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#).

communicate lawful locations, safer observation areas, movement routes, dispersal obligations, and changes in safety conditions when feasible.

For SPD, this framework supports clearer policy language on media and observer communication during protest responses. It also supports BWC and reporting practices that document when media or observers are given directions, when a safer location is identified, and when conditions change.

Mutual Aid and Unified Standards

Mutual aid can be essential during large demonstrations, but post-2020 reviews repeatedly identified inconsistent mutual aid practices as a risk. Different agencies may have different training, policies, force thresholds, munitions, BWC systems, report requirements, and identification practices. When those agencies operate together, the public may experience the response as one law enforcement action even if accountability systems remain separate.²¹⁸

Modern crowd management policy should include mutual aid expectations before deployment. Those expectations should address mission, command structure, legal constraints, rules of engagement, authorized and prohibited tools, visible agency and individual identification, force reporting, arrest reporting, medical and decontamination expectations, complaint routing, and clearing procedures.

For SPD, this principle is especially important when mutual aid occurs in a legally sensitive event involving First Amendment activity and federal immigration enforcement concerns. Assisting agencies need to understand SPD's mission boundaries, what SPD is and is not doing, and how force, arrests, and complaints will be documented.

Documentation, Review, and Accountability

Documentation and review are central to modern crowd management. Large protests may generate hundreds of hours of BWC, drone video, public video, CAD entries, munitions deployments, force reports, arrest records, property issues, complaints, and public records requests. Without structured documentation, later review becomes fragmented and dependent on after-the-fact reconstruction.

PERF recommends robust review of police responses to demonstrations, including debriefings and longer-term review of large events.²¹⁹ Seattle's Sentinel Event Review model is designed to examine systems and contributing factors rather than focus only on individual blame.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022; Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022; Seattle Office of Inspector General, [Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle](#), 2021.

²¹⁹ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022.

²²⁰ Seattle Office of Inspector General, [Sentinel Event Review of Police Response to 2020 Protests in Seattle](#), 2021.

Portland's protest review likewise emphasized the need to learn from systemic issues after large-scale protest responses.²²¹

For SPD, the policy implication is that major protest responses should have documentation protocols before the next event occurs. Those protocols should include command decision logs, warning documentation, munitions logs, force collection, BWC labels and markers, drone footage indexing, arrest and property logs, medical and decontamination records, mutual aid reporting, complaint theme analysis, and After Action review.

UAS, Surveillance, and First Amendment Sensitivity

Unmanned aerial systems can support public safety during crowd events, but they also raise First Amendment concerns. UAS may help command understand crowd size, movement, blocked exits, medical emergencies, traffic risks, safe routes, or specific threats. UAS may also be perceived as surveillance of lawful political activity if deployed without clear purpose, limits, or explanation.

A crowd management framework should distinguish public safety use from generalized monitoring. UAS deployment during First Amendment activity should have a documented purpose, operational limits, supervisory approval, retention rules, and safeguards against using footage to track lawful expression unrelated to public safety or criminal conduct.

For SPD, this principle connects Policy 604 to Policy 461, Policy 300, Policy 301, Policy 308, and After Action review. UAS should be integrated into the crowd management framework as a tool that can reduce unnecessary enforcement when used carefully, but also as a tool requiring First Amendment safeguards.

Medical Access and Decontamination

Medical access and decontamination are recurring themes in modern protest review. Less-lethal tools, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, physical control tactics, crowd compression, panic, and arrests can create medical needs for protesters, officers, arrestees, media, observers, and uninvolved people.

International standards emphasize minimizing injury, providing aid at the earliest possible moment, and ensuring accountability for the Use of Force.²²² Modern municipal policies and protest response reviews also emphasize medical planning, decontamination, EMS access, and documentation when chemical irritants or impact munitions are used.²²³

²²¹ Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022.

²²² Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials](#), 1990, Principles 5 and 9–14.

²²³ National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022; Seattle Police

For SPD, the policy implication is that medical and decontamination planning should be built into crowd event planning, not added after force is used. Plans should address arrestee collection points, medical staging, decontamination information, affected uninvolved people, documentation of refusals or inability to assess, and post-event follow-up.

Policy Integration

The most important policy reform lesson is integration. Crowd management cannot function well if First Amendment policy, de-escalation policy, Use of Force policy, control devices policy, mutual aid policy, UAS policy, medical aid policy, complaint policy, BWC practice, and After Action review operate as separate systems.

A unified crowd management framework should connect the policies governing assembly, dialogue, mission documentation, unlawful assembly, dispersal, and safe egress. It should also address targeted enforcement, force authorization, less lethal tools, medical planning, mutual aid, identification, UAS, BWC, arrest processing, property handling, complaint analysis, and After Action review.

Comparable municipal policies increasingly reflect this integrated approach. San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle have updated or maintained crowd management frameworks that distinguish facilitation, intervention, and crowd control; define command responsibilities; address dispersal; and regulate force tools in crowd settings.²²⁴

For SPD, integration means that Policy 461²²⁵ should not stand alone. It should be connected to Policies 300,²²⁶ 301,²²⁷ 308,²²⁸ 352,²²⁹ 408,²³⁰ 463,²³¹ 604,²³² 1020,²³³ and 1046,²³⁴ as well as SOPs, checklists, training, BWC practices, munitions logs, arrest procedures, and After Action review.

Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#); Portland Independent Police Review, [Lessons Learned from Portland's 2020 Demonstrations](#), 2022.

²²⁴ San Francisco Police Department, Department General Order 8.03, [Crowd Control](#), revised Jan. 15, 2025, effective Mar. 21, 2025; Portland Police Bureau Directive 0635.10, [Portland Police Bureau Response to Public Order Events](#); Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, [Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control](#).

²²⁵ First Amendment Assemblies.

²²⁶ De-Escalation Tactics.

²²⁷ Use of Force.

²²⁸ Control Devices and Techniques.

²²⁹ Mutual Aid and Outside Agency Assistance.

²³⁰ Tactical Response Teams.

²³¹ Medical Aid and Response.

²³² Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Operations.

²³³ Personnel Complaints.

²³⁴ Uniform Regulations.

Application to This Report

This framework informs the incident-specific issues and recommendations in this report. It does not dictate the answer to every June 11 question. The facts of the event, SPD policy, command decisions, BWC, CAD, IA materials, chain of command review, UOFRB discussion, complaint materials, and supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion remain the core record.

The framework identifies the policy direction that should guide SPD's next steps. June 11 showed the need for clearer protocols governing immigration enforcement, mission documentation, dialogue, dispersal, and safe egress. It also highlighted gaps involving munitions, smoke, force reporting, medical planning, venue impacts, mutual aid, identification, arrest and property procedures, UAS safeguards, and scalable After Action review.

The purpose of the framework is not to import another city's policy wholesale. Spokane's policies must fit Spokane's laws, staffing, geography, collective bargaining structure, mutual aid relationships, community expectations, and operational realities. The purpose is to use the national and comparative reform direction to identify where SPD's existing framework should be strengthened so future protest responses are clearer, safer, more accountable, and easier to explain. The issues that follow apply these legal and operational principles to SPD's June 11 response, beginning with the Department's mission, legal authority, and command decisions.

Issue One: SPD Mission, Command Decision-Making, and Immigration Enforcement Concerns

Summary

The June 11 protest occurred because community members opposed federal immigration detention activity at 411 W. Cataldo Avenue.²³⁵ Because of this, SPD's presence and actions cannot be evaluated only as a conventional crowd management response. From the beginning, the event involved overlapping public safety, First Amendment activity, immigration enforcement, intergovernmental coordination, mutual aid, and public trust issues.

The materials reviewed show that SPD command recognized those issues in real time. SPD Commander D reported that he did not initially treat the federal request for assistance as automatically authorizing SPD to clear the crowd.²³⁶ Instead, he reviewed RCW 43.17.425, consulted SPD Commander B, contacted City legal, and initially limited SPD involvement because

²³⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

²³⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

of concern that crowd control action or dialogue deployment could be interpreted as assisting ICE with detainee transport.²³⁷

That early restraint should be recognized. SPD command did not initially clear the crowd simply because federal personnel requested assistance. Instead, SPD Commander D explained SPD's legal concerns to the ICE supervisor, raised safety concerns about the transport bus, and suggested that ICE develop an alternative transport plan.²³⁸

The incident later changed. SPD Commander D reported that Incident Command concluded the rules of engagement changed after protesters blocked exits, moved toward the secure gate, used objects to obstruct access, and prevented people or vehicles from leaving the facility.²³⁹ He characterized the concern as involving local law and public safety issues, including unlawful imprisonment and pedestrian interference.²⁴⁰

The central issue is whether SPD sufficiently distinguished, documented, and communicated its role during a protest related to immigration enforcement. SPD command identified a legal concern under RCW 43.17.425 and initially limited SPD involvement. Once command concluded that protester conduct created independent local law and public safety concerns, SPD needed a clear way to document the mission change, define the legal basis for action, coordinate with assisting agencies, and explain the distinction to officers, protesters, observers, media, and the public.

As such, SPD command identified the immigration enforcement issue, sought legal guidance, and initially limited SPD's role.²⁴¹ At the same time, SPD did not have a preexisting operational protocol for a protest at or near a federal immigration facility, a federal transport request, or a mission change from limited involvement to local law enforcement action. That placed substantial responsibility on the Incident Commander to define the mission, obtain legal guidance, communicate with federal and county personnel, manage evolving public safety concerns, and communicate the distinction between assisting immigration enforcement and responding to independent local law concerns in real time. While many of these aspects are clearly established, communication strategies, both internal and external, could be enhanced.

Future incidents involving federal immigration facilities or protests related to immigration enforcement would benefit from a clearer policy framework. That framework should help SPD document the legal basis for its involvement, define mission limits, identify when the mission changes, clarify City-to-Incident Command communication, coordinate with outside agencies, and communicate the purpose of police action to officers, assisting agencies, protesters, observers, media, and the public.

²³⁷ *Id.* at 2–3.

²³⁸ *Id.* at 3.

²³⁹ *Id.* at 4–6.

²⁴⁰ *Id.* at 4–5.

²⁴¹ *Id.* at 2–3.

SPD's Initial Legal Concern and Limited Mission

When SPD Commander D reached the command post, he learned that an ICE supervisor had asked SPD to clear the crowd so detainees could be moved to the transport bus.²⁴² SPD Commander D reported that TAC resources, including the Dialogue Team, were being staged; that a drone was up and conducting surveillance; and that undercover units were watching the event.²⁴³ He also reported that drone units advised there were protesters crawling under the transport bus.²⁴⁴

At that point, SPD Commander D reviewed RCW 43.17.425. He reported concern that action taken by SPD at that time, including Dialogue Team response or physical crowd control, could be interpreted as assisting ICE with the transport of detainees.²⁴⁵ As summarized above, command consulted SPD leadership and City legal before broadening SPD's mission.

There were clear pressure points, both internally and externally, urging swift action and these precautions could have easily been ignored. This sequence also shows why a preexisting protocol would be useful. SPD Commander D had to identify the immigration enforcement issue, seek guidance, define the mission, and communicate SPD's limits while the event was evolving. A written protocol would not remove the need for command judgment, but it would give future Incident Commanders a clearer framework for responding to federal immigration facilities, federal transport requests, and protests related to immigration enforcement.

Contact With ICE and Alternative Transport Planning

ICE's renewed request and development of an alternative transport plan sharpened the central mission issue. SPD had to determine when it could respond to local public safety concerns without functioning as an extension of federal immigration enforcement. That distinction became increasingly important as conditions changed and command considered whether obstructed exits, blocked vehicles, and the safety of people inside the facility justified a separate local law enforcement response.²⁴⁶

The After Action Report later states that the ICE supervisor developed an alternative transport plan involving a Border Patrol van and ICE vehicles parked in the secure lot.²⁴⁷ SPD Commander D asked that timing be coordinated through him in case protest conduct rose to a level requiring SPD response.²⁴⁸

²⁴² After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁴³ *Id.*

²⁴⁴ *Id.*

²⁴⁵ *Id.* at 2–3.

²⁴⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁴⁷ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁴⁸ *Id.*

This language reflects an intermediate posture. It is clear that SPD did not clear the crowd solely because ICE requested movement of detainees. However, SPD was monitoring whether protest conduct created independent grounds for police action. That distinction was important to command, but it was not necessarily visible or communicated to protesters, observers, media, or the broader public or clearly articulated to officers in the field.

The same period also involved coordination challenges. SPD Commander D later learned that SCSO had been in contact with the ICE supervisor and that the ICE supervisor had requested that the SCSO bring armor and help federal personnel exit.²⁴⁹ SPD Commander D recontacted the ICE supervisor and advised that he was the primary contact and that any and all coordination needed to go through him.²⁵⁰ He later identified earlier face-to-face SCSO coordination at the command post as a lesson learned.²⁵¹

For future events, SPD would benefit from a clear and unified command and communication structure when mutual aid partners and legally sensitive missions can overlap. That structure should identify the Incident Commander, the mutual aid coordination process, and the legal or operational limits on what SPD and assisting agencies are being asked to do and are legally able to do. Because SPD and the SCSO have overlapping jurisdictional boundaries, this structure should clearly communicate the responsible agencies within City boundaries.

City Administration Communication and Early Information Flow

The After Action Report identified a communication gap between City Administration and Incident Command.²⁵² Although the information was relayed, it was not documented in a way that made the timing, substance or operational use of the communication clear.

This is a significant command issue. Public reporting described Community Member A and other participants as communicating protest goals, including opposition to transport and a willingness by some participants to risk arrest.²⁵³ Information about protester intent, available contacts, negotiation possibilities, or potential off-ramps could have assisted with planning. The available record indicates that information was relayed through SPD Commander A and that, once the Command Post was established, the mayor assigned a member of her administration there for direct communication. The remaining concern is whether the information was sufficiently documented, emphasized, and/or incorporated into operational planning.

The record does not show that dialogue alone would have resolved the incident, but it does show that earlier information sharing and clearer communication may have created more

²⁴⁹ *Id.* at 4.

²⁵⁰ *Id.*

²⁵¹ *Id.* at 3–4.

²⁵² *Id.* at 1–2.

²⁵³ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, “Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests,” RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

opportunities for voluntary compliance before tactical deployment. SPD Commander D's After Action observation supports a recommendation that City-to-Incident Command communication protocols be strengthened.²⁵⁴

Change in Rules of Engagement

SPD's posture changed when command concluded that protester conduct created independent local law and safety concerns. SPD Commander D reported that ICE agents developed an alternate plan to access vehicles from the secure lot.²⁵⁵ During this time, the ICE supervisor called SPD Commander D and "demanded" that SPD move the protesters.²⁵⁶ When the gate opened, approximately 20 to 30 protesters moved to the gate and blocked the exit.²⁵⁷

SPD Commander D characterized the reported conduct as unlawful imprisonment and pedestrian interference and, after consultation with SPD Commander A, directed a SWAT callout and formally requested mutual aid.²⁵⁸ This change matters because it is the point at which SPD command distinguished between assisting federal immigration transport and responding to independent local law or public safety concerns. The materials reviewed indicate that command viewed blocked exits, barricaded access, objects used to obstruct movement, and people preventing movement from the facility as the facts that changed SPD's role.²⁵⁹

A protest may begin as protected First Amendment activity and still require police response when specific conduct creates public safety risks, blocks exits, interferes with movement, damages property, or prevents people from leaving. The challenge for SPD was communicating and documenting that transition clearly enough for officers, assisting agencies, protesters, observers, and the public to understand the basis for police action.

The materials reviewed show that the transition was clear to command in concept, but not fully clear in documentation or public understanding. The After Action Report identified command's reasoning, but the broader record does not show a written mission statement or Commander's Intent, mission change update, or public-facing explanation at the time that clearly separated SPD's local law enforcement rationale from the immigration enforcement context.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁴ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁵⁵ *Id.* at 3–4.

²⁵⁶ SPD Commander D, Supplemental Police Report 2025-20116445, June 11, 2025, at 6.

²⁵⁷ *Id.* at 4–5.

²⁵⁸ *Id.*

²⁵⁹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 4–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 3–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁶⁰ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 4–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

Mission Clarity and Operational Communication

The June 11 record shows several overlapping mission descriptions. CAD records show federal personnel requesting assistance, SPD units staging, TAC movement, unlawful assembly approval, dispersal announcements, force warnings, arrests, curfew announcements, smoke and OC limitations, and extraction activity.²⁶¹ The After Action Report describes the command decision-making process, legal concerns, SCSO staging, alternative transport planning, the safety-corridor concept, and the change in rules of engagement.²⁶² The IA timeline identifies key moments involving unlawful assembly, dispersal warnings, force warnings, pepper ball authorization, smoke authorization, and deployment activity.²⁶³

Those overlapping mission descriptions were understandable given the complexity of the event, but they also created risk. Officers in the field, SCSO personnel, federal personnel, protesters, media, and uninvolved community members could reasonably understand the mission differently depending on what they saw or heard. However, a person watching SPD clear a path for federal personnel or vehicles could perceive SPD as assisting ICE, even if SPD command believed the legal basis for action had shifted to independent local law enforcement concerns. Facilitating the movement of federal personnel and the detainees was already clearly a primary mission. The public safety and local law concerns behind that mission was facilitated through consultation with city legal. However, it is unclear and was not articulated how the deployment of dialogue teams in de-escalatory capacities could have been seen as violating state law.

Future responses would benefit from a mission statement, commander's intent, or command briefing that can be updated as conditions change but could be clearly articulated to the public through officers on scene and through media releases. The deployment of dialogue teams would have been value added to that mission. That briefing should identify the legal basis for SPD action, what SPD is not doing, what conduct has changed the mission, and what outside agencies are authorized or expected to do. It could also include who has operational command, what force options are authorized or prohibited, how dialogue and public messaging will occur, and what information will be provided to the public as soon as operationally feasible.

Public Perception and Trust

Public perception was central to June 11 because the protest was about immigration detention and transport. Many community members did not experience SPD's response as a neutral local law intervention. Several perceived SPD's actions as helping ICE complete its mission, even if SPD command understood the mission differently. Complaint materials repeatedly raised concerns that SPD assisted federal immigration enforcement, escalated the event, failed to communicate clearly, or acted in a way that allowed federal personnel or detainees to leave after

²⁶¹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁶² After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁶³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

police intervention.²⁶⁴ BWC captured that perception during the event when a protester described the operation as a “federal thing” and accused SPD of assisting or shielding ICE.²⁶⁵

Public perception does not determine whether SPD had legal authority to act. It also does not mean SPD should avoid responding to local law or public safety concerns because the event involves federal immigration activity. But perception matters because legitimacy, trust, and voluntary compliance depend on whether people understand the purpose and limits of police action.

The materials reviewed show why this was difficult. From command’s perspective, SPD initially declined to clear the crowd for ICE and later acted only after local law and safety concerns developed.²⁶⁶ From the public’s perspective, the practical result of police action was that federal personnel, vehicles, or detainees were able to leave after the crowd was moved.²⁶⁷ That gap between command intent and public perception is exactly why future incidents require clearer mission documentation and public communication.

Issue Two: Communication, Dialogue, and De-Escalation

Summary

Communication was a central issue during the June 11 protest response. The event occurred at a federal immigration facility, involved a protest about detention and possible transport, developed quickly, included a mission change, involved multiple SPD units and outside agency resources, and later included dispersal orders, arrests, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, and other force options. In that environment, communication was not limited to public address announcements. It included command communication, City-to-Incident Command information flow and vice versa, dialogue and liaison efforts, communication between officers and protesters, warnings, route information, public messaging, and communication with nearby uninvolved people.

The materials reviewed show that SPD communicated throughout the event. BWC footage, CAD and IA materials document repeated public address announcements, dispersal orders, arrest warnings, and force warnings before broader munitions deployment.²⁶⁸ SPD Commander F’s review also recognized that SPD issued warnings and later identified equipment and audibility limitations.²⁶⁹ SPD Reviewer B’s Use of Force review identified some individual officers who communicated calmly and professionally under difficult circumstances.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁶⁵ SPD Officer V’s BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:18:34–00:18:45.

²⁶⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁶⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁶⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁶⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

²⁷⁰ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 16–18, 70–71 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

Those efforts should be acknowledged. At the same time, the complaint materials show that many people did not hear, understand, or know how to act on the information being provided.²⁷¹ Several complainants reported that they did not hear dispersal orders, did not understand where they were allowed to stand, did not know how to leave safely, confused dispersal orders with the later curfew, or did not perceive a visible dialogue or de-escalation function.²⁷²

The central communication issue is whether communication was sufficiently layered, coordinated, audible, visible, location specific, and actionable for the scale, geography, speed, and legal sensitivity of the event. SPD communicated repeatedly, but the record shows a gap between communication being issued and communication being received, understood, and capable of guiding voluntary compliance. SPD later pursued the purchase of an LRAD with manufacturer disabled capabilities to improve the reach and clarity of public safety announcements, but it was not voted upon. The lesson learned is that improved equipment options must be paired with clear safeguards that meet community expectations for use.²⁷³ RCW 10.116.040 prohibits law enforcement agencies from acquiring or using “long range acoustic hailing devices,” which the statute classifies as military equipment. The statute separately identifies public address systems as permissible equipment. Any acoustic communication system considered by SPD should therefore be limited to public address functions and evaluated to ensure that it does not qualify as a prohibited long range acoustic hailing device.²⁷⁴

The June 11 materials also show that communication challenges were not limited to police and protesters. Communication existed between City Administration and Incident Command, between Incident Command and outside agencies, between command personnel and field resources, between police and media or observers, and between police operations and nearby uninvolved people at One Spokane Stadium. Future protest responses would benefit from a communication plan that addresses each of those audiences.

Communication as a Command Function

The June 11 response demonstrates that protest communication must be treated as a command function, not only as a task assigned to officers with a PA system or to individual officers interacting with people in the crowd. Command communication includes defining the mission, explaining when the mission changes, identifying the legal or public safety basis for police action, coordinating with City officials and outside agencies, providing information to field supervisors, supporting dialogue or liaison resources, and preparing public-facing messages.

²⁷¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁷² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant N, at 2–8; Interview Transcript, Complainant D / Complainant M, at 2–6; Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5; Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 14–17.

²⁷³ Aaron Hedge, Erin Sellers, and Valerie Osier, “Proposed Purchase of Crowd Control Noise Device to Draw Protest,” *RANGE Media*, Nov. 10, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/long-range-acoustical-device-spokane-city-council/>.

²⁷⁴ RCW 10.116.040(1), (3)(a), (4), “Military equipment,” <https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=10.116.040>.

A Public Information Officer (PIO) should be assigned to the command post whenever the scale and public impact of an event make that practicable. The PIO can help ensure that public messaging remains timely, accurate, and consistent with changing operational decisions. The command post should also maintain a dedicated scribe or equivalent documentation function throughout the event. In this instance, a scribe was assigned for part of the response but was later moved to other duties, after which documentation of command decisions became sparse. The available records do not capture command post activity in sufficient detail throughout the event. That gap creates avoidable uncertainty during later reviews, particularly when participants cannot recall or will not describe with specificity how significant decisions were made.²⁷⁵

Once SPD command determined that the mission had shifted from limited involvement to local law and public safety enforcement, that change needed to be communicated to multiple audiences. Officers needed to understand the mission and limits. Outside agencies needed to understand SPD's expectations and rules of engagement. Protesters and observers needed to understand what conduct was creating the public safety concern and what they could do to comply. Media and the public needed to understand why local police were acting at a federal immigration facility.

Communication planning should account for that gap between command reasoning and public perception. Future crowd management policy should therefore treat communication as part of the command plan. A communication plan should identify the mission statement, the public safety basis for police action, who is responsible for communicating with the crowd, who is responsible for communicating with City Administration, who communicates with outside agencies, who communicates with media or nearby venues, and how mission changes will be documented and shared.

City Administration Communication and Dialogue Coordination

The practical issue is documentation. Early protest related information existed outside the command post, but the available record does not clearly show when it reached Incident Command, how it was evaluated, or whether it informed the communication plan.²⁷⁶

The Dialogue Team's June 11 Case Study adds timing context. Those materials document text-message communication from Community Member A to City Administration early in the day, before TAC resources were notified or staged.²⁷⁷ The messages provided information about why

²⁷⁵ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Incident Management System: Basic Guidance for Public Information Officers*, at 1–8 (Dec. 2020); Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Documentation Unit Leader Position Checklist*, ICS Resource Center; Federal Emergency Management Agency, *ICS Form 214, Activity Log*, noting that activity logs document notable events and communications and provide a reference for After Action review.

²⁷⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁷⁷ SPD June 11 Dialogue Training Case Study, at 2, 16.

people were gathering, the concern about federal detention and transport, and the protest's stated purpose.²⁷⁸

This issue should be understood as an information flow issue, not as a criticism of City officials for communicating with a community member. During a protest, City Administration may receive information from community leaders, elected officials, organizers, media, or residents before an incident structure is fully developed. That information may be operationally relevant if it identifies protester intent, possible contact points, safety concerns, public messaging needs, or de-escalation options.

SPD has an intelligence unit that is always on the lookout for open source information. Using hindsight, it is always easier to identify what information would have been helpful. The challenge is assessing separate pieces of information and converting them into meaningful and actionable information before or during an event. The information was passed from the mayor to SPD Commander A, who passed it to the Incident Commander. Greater attention to that information may have assisted planning. Dialogue personnel could have also been deployed earlier with clear guidance permitting communication with protesters without assisting federal immigration enforcement. That contact may have provided the same information and additional insight into protester intent, concerns, and possible communication paths. This is especially important for pop-up events. SPD's dialogue model emphasizes the value of pre-event communication, relationship building, and early information gathering. In a pop-up event, the "before" phase may be compressed into minutes rather than days. Early information from City Administration, community contacts, or organizers may be the only opportunity to identify a communication path before the event becomes primarily enforcement driven.

SPD's Dialogue Model

SPD's dialogue materials describe a 70/20/10 model: approximately 70 percent of the work occurs before an event, 20 percent occurs during an event, and 10 percent occurs afterward.²⁷⁹ The model emphasizes identifying groups, understanding goals, building relationships, communicating expectations, making early contact, conducting dynamic risk assessments, and helping command understand the crowd's purpose, mood, and likely response.²⁸⁰

That model is important because dialogue is not only a de-escalation tool at the edge of a police line, but also an information function for command. Dialogue officers can help identify organizers or informal leaders, explain police concerns, answer questions, identify rumors or misinformation, communicate safe routes, and provide command with information that may support voluntary compliance or targeted enforcement.

June 11 was a difficult setting for that model. Although there was some intelligence available on social media about the possibility of a demonstration a few hours before, this event was not a

²⁷⁸ *Id.*

²⁷⁹ SPD 70/20/10 Dialogue Training, at 2–16, 21.

²⁸⁰ *Id.*

planned march or permitted event with a long pre-event planning period. It occurred at a federal immigration facility, involved legal concerns about local police assistance to federal immigration transport, and developed quickly. Those factors made early dialogue more difficult but also made early dialogue more important.

The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion reinforced the importance of early dialogue. TAC leaders described dialogue as most effective when deployed before an event becomes heated and as dependent on community engagement before a crisis, including contact with community groups, churches, and protest organizers.²⁸¹ TAC leaders also stated that some protest groups now expect or request the Dialogue Team.²⁸² They also described the interaction between ICE and the protesters at the gate as something that added to the demonstrators' concerns, and potentially detracting from the perception of legitimacy of follow-on police activity.

Dialogue Team and Liaison Communication

The materials reviewed show that dialogue was considered, but the record does not show that dialogue was ever fully integrated into a command communication plan or tactical deployment in that function. Dialogue officers were staged but were ultimately deployed in broader crowd management roles rather than in their dialogue function. SPD Commander D's After Action Report states that a dialogue team was being staged early in the event.²⁸³ The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion described an initial expectation that dialogue resources could be deployed early, while also describing the operational effect of being told to stage or stand by while command evaluated the legal issue.²⁸⁴

That legal caution was understandable insofar as SPD could not assist ICE with detainee transport in a way that violated RCW 43.17.425.²⁸⁵ However, the record also reflects that local law and public safety concerns were already developing in public spaces during the early phase of the event, including vandalism to the transport bus, people surrounding the bus, people near or under the bus, and obstruction or safety concerns around vehicles and exits.

Those requirements did not require SPD to justify early dialogue, liaison communication, peacekeeping efforts, and requests for voluntary compliance from the protesters. Even before any later conclusion that the mission had changed because of independent local law and public safety concerns, dialogue could have been used to communicate SPD's role, seek compliance with local law, identify contact points, reduce confusion, and help de-escalate the event before it became more tactical.

²⁸¹ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

²⁸² *Id.*

²⁸³ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁸⁴ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

²⁸⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

This is important because some complainants stated they did not perceive meaningful dialogue or de-escalation.²⁸⁶ Others described confusion about where they were allowed to stand, how to leave safely, or what police wanted them to do.²⁸⁷ Even where some individuals were determined to remain or risk arrest, visible dialogue and liaison communication could have improved public understanding and helped distinguish between people intentionally refusing orders and people who were confused, unable to hear, or unsure where to go.

Future protest responses should identify when dialogue resources are activated, who they report to, what information they are expected to gather, how they communicate command messages, and how field information from dialogue officers to command is documented. Dialogue should not operate separately from the command plan. It should be one of the ways the command plan is communicated and tested in real time.

Public Address Announcements and Audibility

BWC footage, CAD and IA records document repeated public address announcements, dispersal orders, arrest warnings, and force warnings.²⁸⁸ CAD first documents a PA announcement from the Bearcat at approximately 7:12 p.m.²⁸⁹ The IA timeline records a public safety order to disperse from the Bearcat and repeated at five-minute intervals.²⁹⁰ CAD and IA records then document additional dispersal, arrest, and force warnings before broader munitions deployment.²⁹¹

The announcement sequence changed as the operation continued. The original direction called for five-minute intervals. BWC captured several additional announcements before those intervals had passed. Later radio traffic directed that the warnings be given “over and over.” The BWC review identified approximately 54 dispersal-related announcements during about 80 minutes. That figure includes full dispersal orders as well as abbreviated arrest, force, movement, and curfew messages delivered through the same public address system.²⁹²

The later messages did not consistently repeat the original order. Some directed people to leave the area or move south on Washington Street. Others directed people to move back from the Bearcat or leave immediately. Some stated that the five-minute period had expired. Later announcements combined dispersal language with arrest warnings and force warnings.²⁹³ These

²⁸⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁸⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant D / Complainant M, at 4–6.

²⁸⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁸⁹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁹⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁹¹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁹² SPD Officer E’s BWC Video 2025-06-11, beginning at 00:01:42 and continuing through 01:20:18. The review identified approximately 54 dispersal-related announcements during approximately 80 minutes. The count includes full and abbreviated dispersal messages and related arrest, force, movement, and curfew announcements.

²⁹³ SPD Officer E’s BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:10:04–00:24:10 and 00:41:16.

changes made it less clear whether the controlling direction was to leave the entire area, follow a specific route, or create distance from a police vehicle.

Several announcements also warned that CS could be used. CAD records show that CS had not been authorized. Command instead authorized smoke and OC or pepper ball. Later announcements removed the reference to CS.²⁹⁴ A force warning should accurately describe the options that command has approved. An inaccurate warning can affect public understanding and weaken the credibility of later announcements.

SPD Commander F's review recognized that warnings were given and also identified equipment and audibility limitations.²⁹⁵ CAD likewise recorded that announcements were being made every few minutes but that it was "very loud down here."²⁹⁶ BWC also captured discussion that people near the building could not hear the announcement. Personnel discussed repositioning the Bearcat to improve coverage.²⁹⁷

The complaint materials show a different side of the same issue. Some complainants reported that they did not hear dispersal orders, did not understand what had changed legally, or did not know where to go.²⁹⁸ Other complaints described confusion about whether people were being told to leave immediately, wait for curfew, move to a different location, or avoid crossing police lines.²⁹⁹

A warning can be documented as given and still fail to reach or guide the people most affected by it. However, warning effectiveness depends on more than the existence of a PA announcement. It depends on volume, direction, location, crowd noise, distance, buildings, police lines, vehicle positioning, competing sources of information, route clarity, and whether officers in different locations reinforce the same message.

An enhanced communication platform may improve audibility. But equipment alone will not resolve the full communication issue. SPD also needs standardized language, route-specific instructions, visible liaison or dialogue support, documentation from multiple locations, coordination with field supervisors, and a way to confirm whether warnings are reaching the people most affected.

Berkeley's First Amendment assembly policy provides useful guidance. It uses standardized dispersal language and directs that the order be given as close to the crowd as practical. The order should be clearly audible and recorded when practical. Officers may also be positioned around the perimeter to assess whether the message can be heard. The policy permits additional

²⁹⁴ SPD Officer E's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:22:10–00:24:10 and 00:41:16; CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6, 9–10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁹⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

²⁹⁶ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

²⁹⁷ SPD Officer E's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:22:39–00:24:10.

²⁹⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 24–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

²⁹⁹ *Id.*

orders after a reasonable period for compliance but advises against ongoing dispersal orders. It also calls for reassessment when a crowd is encountered in a different location. Seattle uses standardized language that identifies the affected location, available routes, time to comply, and possible consequences.³⁰⁰

These practices recognize that dispersal announcements are operational communications. Their purpose is to provide clear notice and support voluntary compliance before arrest or force becomes necessary. Repetition supports that purpose when it reinforces a stable and accurate message. It becomes less effective with the message changes and people are no longer sure what they are being told to do.

Curfew, Dispersal, and Public Confusion

The June 11 event involved both dispersal orders and a later City curfew impacting a limited geographical area for a limited time. Those are related but distinct concepts. Dispersal orders were tied to the unlawful assembly declaration and directed people to leave a specific area. The curfew was a later emergency measure that restricted presence in a defined area during a defined time period.

Complaint materials suggest that some community members confused the two or did not understand that enforcement could or would occur before the later curfew took effect.³⁰¹ Some people reported uncertainty about whether they were being ordered to leave because of unlawful assembly, curfew, police lines, or general movement of the operation.³⁰² CAD indicates that curfew-related announcements continued later in the evening, including repeated PA announcements after the earlier dispersal and munitions phase.³⁰³

BWC shows that curfew information was added to the continuing dispersal sequence. The resulting announcements combined the existing dispersal order with arrest warnings, force warnings, and the later curfew. One announcement began to describe the curfew before the speaker paused to obtain clarification about its hours. Later announcements stated that the mayor had issued a curfew while also directing people to disperse immediately.³⁰⁴

This created two potential sources of confusion. First, a person could believe that remaining was permitted until the curfew began at 9:30 p.m. even though the earlier dispersal order required immediate movement. Second, a person hearing only part of the announcement might not understand the difference between leaving the protest area and staying outside the larger curfew area later that evening.

³⁰⁰ Berkeley Police Department, Law Enforcement Services Manual, Policy 428, First Amendment Assemblies; Seattle Police Department Manual, Policy 14.090, Crowd Management, Intervention, and Control.

³⁰¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁰² *Id.*

³⁰³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 9–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³⁰⁴ SPD Officer E's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:13:17–01:15:17.

The repeated announcement sequence may have increased that uncertainty. Many similar warnings had been given before enforcement or broader force followed. Some listeners may therefore have had difficulty determining when the message had changed from a continuing warning to imminent enforcement.

Future communication planning should plainly distinguish an unlawful assembly dispersal order from an arrest warning, a force warning, an immediate movement command, and a curfew notice. Each has a different legal basis and practical meaning. When more than one applies, the announcement should identify which requirement is immediately controlling. It should also state the affected area and the time the requirement takes effect.

The Dialogue Team should support this process by assessing whether the message is understood in different parts of the crowd. Dialogue personnel can identify confusion about routes, deadlines, or the distinction between dispersal and curfew. That information should be relayed to field and Incident Command before enforcement begins when feasible.

Location-Specific Communication and Ability to Comply

Several complainants described not knowing where they were allowed to stand, where they could safely move, or how they could depart without moving toward another police line or affected area.³⁰⁵ Complainant D described people arriving later and trying to determine where they were allowed to be, receiving mixed messages, and in some cases standing near media because they believed that would be a safer location.³⁰⁶ Other complainants described unclear instructions, crowd compression, and uncertainty about lawful routes.³⁰⁷

Communication must be location specific when a crowd event covers multiple areas. People on different sides of a building, street, gate, parking structure, police line, or stadium corridor may not hear the same announcement or may not have the same path available.

Future communication planning should include route-specific messaging. When feasible, announcements should identify the area affected, the direction people should move, routes that remain open, and locations where people may safely stand or continue lawful observation. Field officers should receive the same information, so individual officer directions do not conflict with command announcements.

Communication Before Force

Communication remains relevant because warnings and explanations are part of the sequence before force is used. CAD and IA materials document repeated warnings before broader

³⁰⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁰⁶ Interview Transcript, Complainant D / Complainant M, at 4–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

³⁰⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

munitions deployment.³⁰⁸ The complaint materials also show that some people did not hear or understand warnings, did not know where to go, or did not understand what conduct was requiring police action.³⁰⁹

Future protest communication planning should ensure that warnings before force are not treated only as a compliance formality. Warnings should be audible, repeated when feasible, stated in plain language, route specific, and documented. When force tools may affect people beyond the intended area or subject, the communication plan should also address nearby uninvolved people, media, observers, and third-party venues.

Communication with Nearby Stadium and Uninvolved People

Communication challenges were not limited to protesters. The protest response occurred near One Spokane Stadium during a professional soccer game. CAD recorded at approximately 7:53 p.m. that there were 1,800 or more people at Stadium One and asked whether the stadium was evacuating.³¹⁰ CAD recorded at approximately 8:48 p.m. that the soccer game was letting out and 1,800 people were leaving.³¹¹

Complainant T reported that people in the stadium received no warning before smoke or irritants affected spectators.³¹² Complainant T stated that his five-year-old son needed a mask, that people were coughing, that security moved people away from one corner, and that no announcements were made on the stadium intercom.³¹³

The IA complaint summary also recorded Complainant U's concern about failure to warn or communicate the unexpected use of what they perceived as tear gas near the Spokane Velocity soccer match.³¹⁴ SPD Commander C's C25-066 review recognized this issue and recommended clear communication at surrounding spectator events because soccer game attendees had some exposure to chemical irritants.³¹⁵

The communication lesson is straightforward: when police tactics, smoke, irritants, crowd movement, or police lines may affect nearby uninvolved people, communication planning should include venue management, event security, public announcements, shelter or exit guidance, and medical response information. While discussions with SPD Commander A indicate that there was Command Post discussion regarding this scenario, information is limited regarding what the

³⁰⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁰⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³¹⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 7 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³¹¹ *Id.* at 10.

³¹² Interview Transcript, Complainant T, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

³¹³ *Id.*

³¹⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³¹⁵ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

Command Post did to implement that communication strategy.³¹⁶ Protest communication cannot be limited to protesters when the effects of the operation may extend beyond the protest.

Issue Three: Unlawful Assembly, Dispersal, and Safe Egress

Summary

The June 11 event included both protected protest activity and unlawful conduct. The central issue is how SPD identified the point at which the event shifted from protest management to unlawful assembly and dispersal, if and how that transition was communicated to police personnel and community members, and whether people in different locations had a meaningful opportunity to understand and comply with police directions.

SPD declared the June 11 demonstration an unlawful assembly at approximately 7:08 p.m. and began issuing dispersal orders shortly afterward.³¹⁷ CAD and IA entries document repeated dispersal, arrest, and force warnings before pepper ball and smoke were authorized and deployed.³¹⁸ The declaration followed several hours of protest activity and command identified public safety concerns involving blocked exits, blocked vehicles, property damage, refusal to move, and conduct command believed prevented people or vehicles from leaving the federal facility.³¹⁹

Those public safety concerns are important to the analysis. SPD did not begin the event with an unlawful assembly declaration, and SPD's own chronology shows that warnings occurred before broader force options were used.³²⁰ At the same time, complaint summaries and interviews describe people who experienced the dispersal phase as confusing, difficult to hear, and difficult to comply with from their locations.³²¹ Several complainants reported that they did not understand what legal status had changed, where they were supposed to go, whether the later curfew was separate from the dispersal order, or whether a safe route out of the area was practically available.³²²

Both perspectives should be considered together. From SPD's perspective, the unlawful assembly declaration and dispersal orders were connected to escalating public safety concerns and were followed by repeated warnings. From the perspective of some protesters, observers, media, and

³¹⁶ OPO Conversation with Chief Hall (July 2026).

³¹⁷ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³¹⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³¹⁹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³²⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³²¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³²² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 2–15; Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5; Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 3–5, 14–17.

bystanders, the same sequence was difficult to understand and difficult to navigate in a crowded, emotional, noisy, and rapidly changing environment. Adding to the confusion was the willingness and intent by some of the protesters to commit acts of civil disobedience. The dispersal announcement sequence also raised a separate concern because the wording, timing, and stated consequences became less consistent as the operation continued.

This issue focuses on the transition from protest management to unlawful assembly and dispersal. It addresses the basis for the declaration, the relationship between individual conduct, organized civil disobedience and broader crowd conditions, the timing and content of warnings, public understanding, safe egress, curfew confusion, media and observer location issues, and documentation.

Application of the Unlawful Protest Framework to June 11

The framework above provides the reference point for evaluating June 11. A protest does not become unlawful because it is controversial, disruptive, angry, critical of government, or difficult for law enforcement to manage. It becomes subject to dispersal when conduct within the crowd creates a substantial and articulable public safety concern that cannot reasonably be addressed through continued facilitation, communication, targeted enforcement, or other less intrusive options.

The June 11 record shows conduct that SPD command could reasonably view as moving the event toward enforcement. CAD records and public reporting documented blocked vehicles, spray paint on the transport bus, people near or under the bus, vehicles boxing in federal vehicles, and people obstructing movement from the facility.³²³ SPD Commander D reported that ICE agents developed an alternate plan to access vehicles from the secure lot and that, when the gate opened, approximately 20 to 30 protesters moved to the gate and blocked the exit³²⁴ engaging in conduct he described as in-progress unlawful imprisonment and pedestrian interference.³²⁵

The same record also shows why the transition to enforcement required careful communication. The protest began in response to federal immigration detention and possible transport, and many community members viewed obstruction of vehicles or exits as acts of civil disobedience tied to that purpose.³²⁶ That context did not prevent SPD from responding to local law or public safety concerns. It did mean that the public needed clear information about what conduct had

³²³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, “Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests,” RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

³²⁴ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³²⁵ *Id.*

³²⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, “Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests,” RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

changed the event, what legal status had changed, what SPD was ordering people to do, and how people could comply.

Command Basis for the Unlawful Assembly Declaration

SPD's command basis for moving toward enforcement developed over several hours. SPD Commander D reported that he initially limited SPD's role because clearing the crowd or deploying dialogue resources at that stage could be interpreted as assisting ICE with detainee transport.³²⁷ The Command Post changed the rules of engagement after protesters blocked exits, used objects to barricade access, and prevented people or vehicles from leaving.³²⁸

Police movement and crowd control positioning began before the unlawful assembly declaration. The IA timeline records Community Member C under arrest at approximately 6:46 p.m., and CAD recorded one person in custody at approximately 6:48 p.m.³²⁹ CAD documented officers moving the crowd south, the formation of two skirmish lines, slow movement, and one person in custody.³³⁰ At approximately 7:08 p.m., CAD recorded that unlawful assembly was approved, and the IA timeline likewise states that the command post approved unlawful assembly at approximately 7:08 p.m.³³¹

This sequence shows that the unlawful assembly declaration was not the first police action at the scene. It occurred after police deployment, crowd movement, at least one arrest, and command concerns about blocked exits and movement.

Individual Conduct and Broader Crowd Conditions

The June 11 record includes both individual unlawful conduct and broader crowd conditions. Public reporting and SPD records describe people blocking vehicles, boxing in vehicles, obstructing exits, sitting or standing near transport vehicles, spray-painting the bus windshield, and refusing to move.³³² SPD Commander D reported that protesters continued barricading parking structures and exits with people and accessible objects, including Lime scooters and park benches.³³³

³²⁷ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³²⁸ *Id.* at 4–6.

³²⁹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³³⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³³¹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³³² CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 4–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, “Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests,” RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

³³³ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 5–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

The distinction between individual conduct and broader crowd conditions matters. Targeted enforcement may be appropriate when specific individuals are engaged in identifiable unlawful conduct and can be addressed without dispersing the broader assembly. Broader dispersal becomes more justified when the overall crowd condition prevents safe movement, blocks exits, interferes with emergency or public safety needs, or makes targeted enforcement no longer feasible.

The TAC discussion supported a targeted-enforcement approach before broad dispersal or crowd-wide force when feasible. TAC leaders described a model that prioritizes identifying and addressing specific unlawful conduct through dialogue, warnings, or strategic arrests before directing action against the larger crowd. Broad dispersal and crowd-wide force remain available when targeted measures are no longer practical, available personnel cannot safely manage the circumstances, or the conduct of the crowd presents broader public safety concerns.³³⁴

Future documentation should distinguish the specific conduct requiring enforcement from the broader crowd condition supporting dispersal emphasis. In a protest setting, that distinction helps explain why some people may be arrested individually while others are ordered to leave, and why a crowd may be dispersed even though not every person present personally engaged in unlawful conduct.

Warnings and Timing

CAD and IA records document repeated warnings after the unlawful assembly declaration. Formal dispersal announcements from the Bearcat began shortly after 7:12 p.m.³³⁵ The initial direction called for the dispersal announcement to be repeated at five-minute intervals.³³⁶ The next announcement gave the crowd until approximately 7:18 p.m. to move southbound on Washington.³³⁷

CAD and IA records then document additional dispersal, arrest, and force warnings over the next hour.³³⁸ CAD also recorded that announcements were being made every few minutes, but that it was “very loud down here.”³³⁹ CAD and IA records document repeated dispersal, arrest, and force warnings before pepper ball and smoke were authorized.

This timing supports two conclusions. First, SPD did not move immediately from unlawful assembly approval to broader munitions deployment. The record shows warnings before pepper

³³⁴ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

³³⁵ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³³⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³³⁷ *Id.*

³³⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³³⁹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

ball and smoke were used. Second, repeated warnings did not necessarily mean that every person had clear, audible, and actionable notice.

Content of Dispersal Orders

The content of dispersal orders matters because a person cannot comply with an order they do not understand. The IA timeline records that people were told to disperse southbound on Washington at approximately 7:13 p.m.³⁴⁰ That was useful because it provided direction rather than only telling people to leave. However, complaint materials show that some people still reported confusion about where they were allowed to stand, whether they could cross police lines, whether they were being ordered to leave immediately, and whether the later curfew announcements changed the timing of when they had to depart from their perceptions.³⁴¹

SPD Commander F's review recognized communication and audibility issues, including that some people may not have heard the PA clearly because of crowd noise and equipment limitations and that some announcements lacked specific dispersal routes.³⁴² That observation supports a policy improvement rather than a purely event-specific critique. Future dispersal orders should use plain language, identify the area affected, identify the conduct requiring dispersal, state that the assembly has been declared unlawful, identify the direction or routes people should use, distinguish dispersal from curfew, and explain the consequences of noncompliance. The goal is to give command and field supervisors a practical template that improves voluntary compliance, officer safety, public safety, and later review.

Public Understanding and Ability to Comply

Complaint materials show a recurring gap between warnings being issued and warnings being understood. Several complainants reported that they did not hear or understand announcements.³⁴³ Others reported that they did not understand what legal status had changed or where they were supposed to go.³⁴⁴ Some described confusion about whether enforcement could occur before the later curfew took effect.³⁴⁵

Those concerns do not prove that warnings were not given. BWC footage, CAD and IA records show that warnings were given.³⁴⁶ The concerns do show that future reviews should evaluate warning effectiveness from multiple locations and perspectives. A warning may be audible near the Bearcat but not audible behind a building, near a police line, near the stadium, or inside a

³⁴⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁴¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁴² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

³⁴³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁴⁴ *Id.* at 2–11, 18–20.

³⁴⁵ *Id.* at 2–11.

³⁴⁶ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 5–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

compressed crowd. A route may appear open from an officer's BWC perspective while appearing blocked, unsafe, or legally uncertain from inside the crowd.

The practical review question is whether people had a meaningful opportunity to comply. That requires more than asking whether an announcement was made. It requires considering what a person in that location could hear, see, understand, and safely do.

Safe Egress and Crowd Movement

The complaint record contains repeated concerns about whether people had a safe and realistic opportunity to leave. These concerns are distinct from whether some open space existed somewhere in the area. The relevant question is whether a reasonable person in the complainant's location, with the information available at that time, could understand where to go and safely move there.

Complainant G reported being near BARK, being told that she could not cross police lines, having her car and friends on the other side, and having a crowd behind her when officers told her to move back.³⁴⁷ She stated she linked arms with strangers because she feared being pushed down and trampled.³⁴⁸ IA reviewed BWC and concluded that SPD Supervisor A told her at 6:56 p.m. that she needed to leave or be subject to arrest and that some BWC perspectives showed clear space and room to leave.³⁴⁹ IA also acknowledged that her actual line of sight and perspective were unknown.³⁵⁰

Complainant H reported that she was sitting on grass by the van, surrounded by people with nowhere to go, and that during the initial push there appeared to be no clear path for people to turn around and leave.³⁵¹ She also reported confusion about where to be, where to walk, and whether the public space had become unlawful.³⁵² In her intake, she stated she was on Washington Street in the grass area between the van and sidewalk, learned about the curfew from other people, and asked officers about it but received no response.³⁵³

Other complaint materials raise similar safe egress concerns. Complainant R reported standing behind police tape in what he understood to be the safe side, but a smoking munition was fired in that area and it was not clear what police wanted from the crowd.³⁵⁴ Complainant X reported that he was never instructed to disperse and received no instructions from local law enforcement

³⁴⁷ Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 2–7 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept 30, 2025).

³⁴⁸ *Id.*

³⁴⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁵⁰ *Id.*

³⁵¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁵² *Id.*

³⁵³ Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct 19, 2025).

³⁵⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 5 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

at his location.³⁵⁵ Complainant P stated that there was no clear path to disperse and that there were protesters on all sides of him.³⁵⁶

The IA record sometimes contrasts these perceptions with BWC showing open space from an officer's perspective. For example, IA noted that one officer's BWC showed room for Complainant G and others with locked arms to leave and that gaps appeared between people.³⁵⁷ However, IA also recognized that Complainant G's perspective was unknown and that her complaint that she was being pushed from both sides "may be accurate."³⁵⁸

This distinction is important. BWC can show available space from one angle, but it may not capture a participant's sightline, understanding of police lines, fear of arrest if crossing a line, physical pressure from the crowd, or whether the person believed a route was legally open. Additional BWC captures a community member asking where people were expected to move after officers gave a general direction to advance. The person stated that the direction was unclear and that people behind the front of the crowd limited the ability to move.³⁵⁹ Future reviews should evaluate safe egress from both officer and crowd perspectives.

Crowd Compression and Physical Movement

The record shows that officers used physical movement, pushing, skirmish lines, and arrests to move the crowd and create space. CAD recorded officers "pushing crowd to the south" at approximately 6:55 p.m. and "starting a slow push" at approximately 7:04 p.m.³⁶⁰ CAD recorded that officers were pushing south and "meeting a wall of people" around 8:00 p.m.³⁶¹

Several complainants described crowd compression. Complainant G reported being pushed by officers while the crowd behind her pushed her forward and stated that, if she had not linked arms, she would have fallen and been trampled.³⁶² Complainant J reported seeing people who were sitting on the ground get impacted and buried by other people who were shoved back onto them, and people standing being shoved back by officers.³⁶³ Complainant H reported being almost trampled and seeing an elderly male stuck between the crowd and an obstacle while officers continued to push.³⁶⁴

The IA review noted that some protesters locked arms, which was treated as active resistance in some contexts. For example, IA noted that Complainant G was seen locking arms with protesters

³⁵⁵ *Id.* at 4–5.

³⁵⁶ Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 3–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 12, 2025).

³⁵⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 19–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁵⁸ *Id.*

³⁵⁹ SPD Officer B's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:23:30–00:24:07.

³⁶⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

³⁶¹ *Id.* at 7.

³⁶² Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 3–7 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept 30, 2025).

³⁶³ OPOC August Meeting Complainants, Complainant J statement, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct 6, 2025).

³⁶⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

at approximately 7:14 p.m., described as a form of active resistance.³⁶⁵ Complainant G, however, described linking arms as a self-protective response because she feared being knocked down and trampled.³⁶⁶

This difference matters for policy and training. Locking arms may, depending on context, be viewed as resistance to police movement. It may also be a foreseeable reaction when people believe they are being compressed or may fall. BWC captures people with linked arms being directed to move back while a person stated that they were trying to comply. The recording also shows that movement by people at the front depended in part on whether those behind them moved.³⁶⁷ The footage does not establish why each person linked arms, but it illustrates the difficulty of evaluating apparent resistance without considering crowd density and movement throughout the group. Crowd management training should address how fear, density, and movement can cause behaviors that officers interpret as resistance, but participants experience as self-protection. Supervisors should consider crowd density, obstacles, and exit routes before ordering physical pushes.

Curfew and Dispersal Confusion

The unlawful assembly and dispersal orders preceded the curfew. The curfew was announced to begin at 9:30 p.m., while unlawful assembly was approved around 7:08 p.m. Dispersal orders began around 7:12 to 7:13 p.m., pepper ball was authorized around 7:59 p.m., and smoke was first seen around 8:11 p.m.³⁶⁸

The curfew covered a defined downtown area extending from Boone Avenue to Spokane Falls Boulevard and from Howard Street to Division Street, including Riverfront Park.³⁶⁹ As curfew information was added to ongoing dispersal and force warnings, the public received multiple overlapping instructions with different legal consequences and effective times. Complaint materials suggest that some community members confused the curfew with the earlier dispersal orders or did not understand why enforcement could occur before the curfew took effect.³⁷⁰

This confusion is understandable because both measures were communicated during the same event and both required people to leave or remain outside an area. BWC also shows that curfew information was added to the continuing dispersal announcements. Those messages combined immediate dispersal directions with arrest warnings, force warnings, and a curfew that would not

³⁶⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 19 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁶⁶ Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 5–7 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept 30, 2025).

³⁶⁷ SPD Officer C’s BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:28:25.

³⁶⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁶⁹ City of Spokane, “Mayor Brown Announces Curfew,” June 11, 2025, <https://my.spokanecity.org/news/statements/2025/06/11/mayor-brown-announces-curfew/>.

³⁷⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

begin until 9:30 p.m. At one point, the speaker paused to obtain clarification about the curfew hours.³⁷¹

Future announcements should plainly distinguish unlawful assembly dispersal from a later curfew. The public should be told that the assembly has been declared unlawful and that people must leave the identified area immediately. Any later curfew notice should separately identify its start time and geographic boundaries.

Media, Observers, and People Seeking Safe Locations

Dispersal and safe egress issues also affected media, observers, and people trying to determine where they could lawfully stand. The IA timeline records that at approximately 7:23 p.m., SPD Supervisor D provided information on a safer place for media to film.³⁷² That is a useful practice and should be preserved.

Public reporting, however, described media members being corralled into an area with no clear safe exit and experiencing smoke or irritant effects.³⁷³ Complainant D described hearing from a person that wanted to leave after the dispersal order, and believed standing near media would be safe because media would know where to be and police would respect media.³⁷⁴ According to that account, the person still ended up in an area affected by what they perceived as gas or canisters despite believing they were far outside the zone.³⁷⁵

This demonstrates that SPD should identify and communicate locations for media, legal observers, and nonparticipating observers when feasible. Those locations should remain safe from intentional munitions deployment unless conditions change and updated instructions are provided. If a media area or observer area becomes unsafe, officers should communicate that change clearly.

Documentation and Review

The June 11 record includes CAD entries, IA timeline entries, BWC, drone footage, complaint summaries, interview transcripts, Use of Force review materials, command review materials, and the After Action Report. Those materials allow later review, but they also show the need for clearer event-level documentation of unlawful assembly and dispersal decisions. Documentation of Command Post action is a key component of ICS and should be consistently implemented.

³⁷¹ SPD Officer E's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:13:17–01:15:17.

³⁷² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

³⁷³ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

³⁷⁴ Interview Transcript, Complainant D / Complainant M, at 4–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

³⁷⁵ *Id.*

Future documentation should identify the specific conduct supporting an unlawful assembly declaration, whether conduct was isolated or widespread, what alternatives were considered, whether targeted enforcement remained feasible, what routes were available, what warnings were issued, where warnings were issued from, what routes were communicated, when routes changed, what force options were authorized, and how command assessed safe egress.

The TAC discussion reinforced the need to document the conduct supporting an unlawful assembly declaration and the alternatives considered.³⁷⁶ That documentation would improve both future command decision-making and later public explanation.

The June 11 record shows that SPD issued repeated warnings before broader munitions were deployed. It also shows that the announcements became less consistent over time and that safe egress may have differed by location. Future planning should preserve a clear dispersal message, accurately identify authorized force options, distinguish dispersal from curfew information, and reassess whether the announced route remains practical as conditions change.

Issue Four: Use of Force Review by Category

Summary

SPD conducted a separate Use of Force review under F25-022 for force used during the June 11 protest response. The reviewed force included command authorized crowd movement and area denial, OC, PAVA pepper ball, smoke deployment, direct impact pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, arrest related force, takedowns or other significant physical control tactics, and injuries associated with arrests.³⁷⁷ SPD Reviewer B's IA Additional summarized applicable SPD policies, reviewed reports, BWC, drone video, photographs, and other materials, and made recommended findings and recommendations.³⁷⁸ On November 26, 2025, SPD Commander E completed a chain of command review, clarified the number and characterization of several force events, recommended findings for several direct impact deployments, and identified documentation, policy, and training concerns.³⁷⁹ On January 2, 2026, SPD Commander C completed the final chain of command review, resolved the reviewed force determinations, directed training, and forwarded recommendations for UOFRB and executive staff consideration.³⁸⁰

This section does not reopen those officer specific determinations or substitute the OPO's judgment for the chain of command review. It focuses on broader lessons from the completed review, including policy clarity, documentation, event-level force tracking, medical and

³⁷⁶ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

³⁷⁷ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–12, 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

³⁷⁸ *Id.* at 1–91.

³⁷⁹ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

³⁸⁰ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

decontamination planning, BWC organization, takedown review, and force review procedures in a First Amendment crowd environment.

The completed review is useful because it does more than document individual force events. It identifies systemic questions about how force is authorized, categorized, reported, reviewed, and explained during a major crowd event. Those questions include whether smoke should be classified or tracked as reportable force, how area denial should be distinguished from direct impact force, what threshold should apply to 40mm and pepper ball direct impact deployments, how active resistance should be evaluated in a crowd environment, and how medical care, decontamination, BWC, and munitions documentation should be handled when many people and many force tools are involved.³⁸¹

The following chart summarizes the force categories reviewed under F25-022 and the broader policy, documentation, and review issues that emerged from SPD's completed review. It is included to organize the discussion that follows and should not be read as separate officer specific findings by the OPO.³⁸²

Summary of Reviewed Force Categories

Force Category	General Description from the Review	Review Significance
Command authorized crowd movement and area denial	Command authorized certain tools and tactics to support dispersal, crowd movement, and area denial after the unlawful assembly declaration. CAD and IA materials also show that command limited some requested tools, including repeated entries that CS tear gas was not authorized.	Raises event-level questions about command authorization, warnings, documentation, munitions tracking, and how area denial tools are distinguished from direct impact force.
OC / MK-9 deployment	SPD Reviewer B identified OC deployment and reviewed it under Policy 308.9.	Raises questions about crowd event OC documentation, decontamination, medical care, and the distinction between individual subject

³⁸¹ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–12, 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

³⁸² SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–12, 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

		control and broader crowd movement.
PAVA pepper ball area denial	PAVA pepper ball was used during the crowd management response, including as part of area denial and crowd movement.	Raises questions about command authorization, warnings, munitions tracking, exposure, medical and decontamination planning, and documentation of area-based deployments.
Direct impact pepper ball	Some pepper ball deployments were reviewed as direct impact uses against specific individuals.	Raises questions about the relationship between individual conduct, broader crowd conditions, point of aim, point of impact, number of rounds, warnings, and medical follow-up.
Smoke deployment	Smoke was deployed during the incident. SPD Reviewer B recommended classifying smoke as reportable force; SPD Commander E recommended that the Chief's Office determine whether smoke is force and train officers accordingly.	Raises a policy clarity issue because smoke may move a crowd, affect breathing or visibility, create heat or flame concerns, and become part of later force justification even if not formally classified as force.
40mm Blue Nose rounds	The review included 40mm deployments under Policy 308.7, including questions about special impact munitions, target areas, warnings, and subject conduct.	Raises questions about direct impact thresholds, active resistance, assaultive behavior, distance, point of aim, point of impact, injury potential, and medical follow-up.
Bean bag rounds	The review included bean bag round deployments as special impact munitions.	Raises questions about target selection, number of rounds, point of aim, point of impact, observed effect, injury, and documentation.
Takedowns and arrest related force	The review and companion complaint review addressed force associated with arrests, takedowns, physical control tactics, and reported injuries.	Raises questions about significant physical control tactics in a protest environment, especially when arrests occur amid crowd movement, smoke, noise,

		police lines, and multiple agencies.
Medical care and decontamination	The review addressed medical aid and decontamination issues, including people who left before they could be identified or assessed and documentation gaps regarding medical aid or decontamination.	Raises planning and documentation questions for crowd events involving OC/PAVA, smoke, direct impact munitions, arrests, and exposure complaints.
BWC, reporting, and force collection	Reviewers identified issues involving missing or insufficient reports, BWC labeling and markers, force counts, and the need for better force reporting before officers clear from major events.	Raises event-level review questions because force review depends on timely, complete, organized, and searchable documentation.

Broader Issues Identified Through the Completed Force Review

The completed Use of Force review identified several broader issues:

First, the review showed the need to separate force categories more clearly. Area denial, direct impact, smoke, OC, PAVA, 40mm, bean bag rounds, and physical control tactics each raise different policy, documentation, injury, medical, and review questions.

Second, the review showed that smoke requires clearer classification or tracking. Smoke may not fit neatly within ordinary force categories, but the June 11 review shows that it was operationally significant. It was used to move people, affected visibility and breathing, raised heat and flame concerns, and became part of later force analysis when people attempted to cover, move, kick, or throw canisters.³⁸³

Third, the review showed the need to distinguish area denial from direct impact. Area denial focuses on movement, space, exposure, warnings, and crowd effects. Direct impact force focuses on a specific person's conduct, threat or resistance, point of aim, point of impact, number of

³⁸³ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–6 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

rounds, observed effect, injury, and medical follow-up. SPD Commander E and the UOFRB identified the need for clearer policy distinctions between these categories.³⁸⁴

Fourth, the review showed that Policy 308 should more clearly address direct impact thresholds in crowd events. The chain of command discussion and UOFRB discussion both identified questions about active resistance, assaultive behavior, attempts to defeat smoke or PAVA, and whether different criteria should apply to pepper ball, 40mm, and bean bag deployments.³⁸⁵

Fifth, the review showed that force documentation must be more specific in major crowd events. Reports should identify point of aim, point of impact, number of rounds or volleys, reason for force, warnings when feasible, visible injury, medical care, decontamination, reason force stopped, BWC references, and supervisor notification.³⁸⁶

Sixth, the review showed the need for event-level munitions and force tracking. A major crowd event may involve command authorization, multiple officers, multiple tools, multiple volleys, direct impact deployments, area denial deployments, smoke, OC/PAVA, spent munitions, medical complaints, and complaints from people who were not identified at the time. Ordinary individual reports may not be enough to reconstruct the full event.

Seventh, the review showed the need for scalable review procedures. The UOFRB discussion recognized that a project of this size should not depend primarily on one reviewer and that large protest reviews should be divided into manageable parts.³⁸⁷

Scope of the Use of Force Review

SPD Reviewer B's Use of Force review summarized the incident, identified involved officers and force categories, listed applicable policies, reviewed reports, BWC, drone video, photographs, and other evidence, and addressed force events by category.³⁸⁸ The review addressed ordered force, OC, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, arrest related force, injuries, medical care, decontamination, BWC, and reporting issues.³⁸⁹

SPD Commander E's chain of command review then clarified several force counts and documentation issues.³⁹⁰ That review identified concerns involving smoke classification, direct impact munitions, active resistance versus assaultive behavior, report sufficiency, BWC, and the

³⁸⁴ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 6–7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

³⁸⁵ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 6–7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

³⁸⁶ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

³⁸⁷ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

³⁸⁸ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

³⁸⁹ *Id.* at 1–12, 70–91.

³⁹⁰ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

need for policy or training clarification.³⁹¹ SPD Commander C's final review resolved the reviewed force determinations and identified training and policy issues for further consideration.³⁹²

The UOFRB discussed the completed review on April 16, 2026. The Board discussed smoke, direct impact munitions, policy distinctions, BWC labeling, report writing, documentation, the scale of the review, and the need to divide future large reviews into manageable parts.³⁹³

Uses of Force Reviewed

SPD's review addressed force ordered by command and individual deployments by SPD personnel. The reviewed force included OC, pepper ball used for area denial and direct impact, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, 40mm bean bag rounds, and force or reported injury associated with arrests. The summary below identifies the force events reviewed without restating the underlying analysis or the final chain of command determinations.³⁹⁴

SPD's Use of Force review addressed the command authorization and individual force events below:

SPD Commander D. The review addressed force ordered by command during the crowd response.

SPD Officer A. The review addressed an injury associated with an arrest.³⁹⁵

SPD Officer C. The review addressed two pepper ball deployments for area denial, three direct impact pepper ball deployments, and an injury associated with a takedown during an arrest.³⁹⁶

SPD Officer G. The review addressed one application of OC using an MK-9 delivery system.³⁹⁷

SPD Officer H. The review addressed one pepper ball deployment for area denial.³⁹⁸

SPD Officer I. The review addressed two pepper ball deployments for area denial.³⁹⁹

³⁹¹ *Id.*

³⁹² Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

³⁹³ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

³⁹⁴ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–12, 70–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

³⁹⁵ SPD Officer A's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:00:25.

³⁹⁶ SPD Officer C's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:43:35, 01:49:32, 01:49:45–01:49:46, and 01:49:52 and 2:23:20.

³⁹⁷ SPD Officer G's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:49:34.

³⁹⁸ SPD Officer H's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:43:41.

³⁹⁹ SPD Officer I's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:05:19 and 01:09:42.

SPD Officer J. The review addressed one 40mm Blue Nose round.⁴⁰⁰

SPD Officer K. The review addressed two pepper ball deployments involving direct impact or a combination of direct impact and area denial.⁴⁰¹

SPD Officer L. The review addressed four 40mm bean bag rounds deployed during two separate sequences.⁴⁰²

SPD Officer M. The review addressed ten 40mm Blue Nose rounds deployed during four separate sequences.⁴⁰³

SPD Officer N. The review addressed one 40mm bean bag round.⁴⁰⁴

SPD Officer O. The review addressed four direct impact pepper ball deployments.⁴⁰⁵

SPD Officer P. The review addressed five pepper ball deployments involving area denial and direct impact.⁴⁰⁶

SPD Officer Q. The review addressed four pepper ball deployments involving area denial and direct impact.⁴⁰⁷

SPD Officer R. The review addressed two pepper ball deployments for area denial and an injury associated with an arrest.⁴⁰⁸

SPD Officer S. The review addressed one 40mm bean bag round directed at a person attempting to throw a smoke canister toward officers. SPD Officer S estimated the distance at approximately 60 feet and reported aiming at the person's thigh. The available BWC did not establish whether the round struck the person.⁴⁰⁹

[Applicable Force Policies Identified in the Review](#)

SPD Reviewer B identified several policies relevant to the Use of Force review. These included Policy 301, Use of Force; Policy 300, De-escalation; Policy 302, Response to Resistance and

⁴⁰⁰ SPD Officer J's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:38:49.

⁴⁰¹ SPD Officer K's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 02:20:04 and 02:20:26.

⁴⁰² SPD Officer L's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:36:27 and 01:39:47.

⁴⁰³ SPD Officer M's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:01:55, 01:02:00, 01:32:53, and 01:37:32.

⁴⁰⁴ SPD Officer N's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:28:52.

⁴⁰⁵ SPD Officer O's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:29:50, 00:29:53, 00:29:56, and 00:30:00.

⁴⁰⁶ SPD Officer P's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:00:11, 01:02:21, 01:35:18, 01:35:23, and 01:35:48.

⁴⁰⁷ SPD Officer Q's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:20:44–01:20:47.

⁴⁰⁸ SPD Officer R's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:01:30, 01:01:48, and 01:34:20.

⁴⁰⁹ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 62–63 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); SPD Officer S Supplemental Case Report, 6/11/2025 at 2; SPD Officer S's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:33:05.

Significant Force Investigation; Policy 308, Control Devices and Techniques; and other policies related to BWC, reporting, and medical care.⁴¹⁰

Policy 308 was especially important because several reviewed force tools were governed by different subsections. OC was reviewed under Policy 308.9.⁴¹¹ 40mm Blue Nose rounds and bean bag rounds were reviewed as special impact munitions under Policy 308.7.⁴¹² Pepper ball and PAVA deployments raised questions about area denial, direct impact, and the relationship between chemical agent delivery and impact force.⁴¹³

The policy issue is whether the policy language gives officers, supervisors, command staff, and later reviewers enough clarity to distinguish area denial from direct impact, active resistance from assaultive behavior, and individual force events from broader crowd conditions.

Force in a Crowd Management Environment

Force in a crowd management environment differs from force in a single-subject encounter. Officers may be responding to a specific person while also operating within a crowd. A person's conduct may be affected by crowd compression, confusion, fear, smoke, police movement, or unclear egress. At the same time, officers may face property damage, thrown objects, blocked exits, attempts to defeat area denial tools, and crowd movement that creates safety risks.

The June 11 review shows that this complexity affected force analysis. Some deployments were reviewed as part of command authorized area denial. Other deployments were reviewed as direct impact uses against individuals described as active resisters or as attempting to cover, move, or defeat smoke or PAVA area denial tactics.⁴¹⁴ The different review discussions show why policy clarity matters in crowd settings.

A policy framework for crowd event force should identify the difference between event-level authorization and individual officer deployment; area denial and direct impact; chemical exposure and impact force; active resistance and assaultive behavior; individual conduct and broader crowd risk; and force used to move a crowd versus force used to stop a specific threat.

Command Authorized Crowd Movement and Area Denial

SPD Reviewer B identified SPD Commander D as the Incident Commander and noted that he ordered the deployment of smoke and OC.⁴¹⁵ SPD Commander D's report stated that he

⁴¹⁰ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 2–9 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴¹¹ *Id.* at 10.

⁴¹² *Id.* at 88–90.

⁴¹³ *Id.* at 9–13, 85, 90–91; Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴¹⁴ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴¹⁵ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1, 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

authorized OC via PAVA pepper ball and smoke after the larger protest group became increasingly hostile, did not comply with dispersal orders, and command identified crimes including failure to disperse, pedestrian interference, malicious mischief, and unlawful imprisonment.⁴¹⁶

SPD Commander D's Graham statement identified governmental interests including failure to disperse, pedestrian interference, malicious mischief, and unlawful imprisonment.⁴¹⁷ He described the threat as a hostile and emotionally driven crowd refusing commands, access to improvised weapons, violence toward property, personal placement trapping building occupants, and preparation for violence through gas masks, padded clothing, and helmets.⁴¹⁸ He described resistance as refusal of dispersal orders, surrounding transport vehicles, and disabling transport vehicles, and described de-escalation as continual dispersal and Use of Force orders.⁴¹⁹

SPD Reviewer B noted that almost one hour passed between the initial dispersal order and authorization of smoke and less lethal pepper ball, giving protesters time to disperse and leave.⁴²⁰ He also wrote that the initial volley of smoke and PAVA pepper ball moved many protesters back, but that some protesters then threw smoke canisters and, according to some reports, rocks, back at officers.⁴²¹

The command authorization review raises two distinct issues. The first is the force determination made through the chain of command. The second is the policy and documentation framework for command authorized area denial in a First Amendment crowd environment. This report focuses on the second issue. Future policy should require a structured command record identifying the basis for area denial, warnings given, force tools authorized, tools requested but denied, deployment limits, route and egress considerations, medical and decontamination planning, and the point at which authorization ended.

Smoke Deployment

Smoke was deployed during the incident as part of the crowd movement and area denial plan. SPD Reviewer B identified smoke deployment as part of the ordered force and noted that smoke canisters were deployed during the event.⁴²² SPD Reviewer B's summary described an initial volley of smoke and PAVA pepper ball and a second volley of smoke after the mayor declared a state of emergency and implemented a curfew.⁴²³

⁴¹⁶ SPD Commander D's Supplemental Report 2025-20116445 at 7-8, 06/11/2025.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.*

⁴¹⁸ *Id.* at 8.

⁴¹⁹ *Id.*

⁴²⁰ *Id.* at 85.

⁴²¹ *Id.*

⁴²² SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1, 43, 85 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴²³ *Id.* at 85.

Smoke became one of the most important policy questions in the Use of Force review. SPD Reviewer B recommended that deployment of smoke canisters be added as a reportable Use of Force.⁴²⁴ He reasoned that smoke deployment is used to gain compliance and physically move protesters in a designated direction, that smoke can cause discomfort, that the canisters are incendiary devices with exposed flame, that there is injury potential from trampling when people move in response, and that officers used protesters' throwing or kicking of smoke canisters as justification for increased force.⁴²⁵

SPD Commander E approached the issue differently. She did not state that smoke should necessarily be treated as force.⁴²⁶ She wrote that she did not believe smoke qualifies as a Use of Force but believed SPD typically uses it alongside area denial force, mainly pepper ball.⁴²⁷ She observed that some officers included Use of Force justification when using smoke while others did not because smoke had not been deemed force.⁴²⁸ She recommended that the Chief's Office determine whether smoke is a Use of Force and train officers accordingly.⁴²⁹

The UOFRB also considered the smoke issue. The Board discussed smoke's psychological effect, potential to carry chemical agents, heat or flame, possible oxygen displacement, and risk of injury.⁴³⁰ The OPO noted concern with direct impact and showed a still image from BWC of flame from a deployed smoke canister.⁴³¹ The UOFRB also noted SPD Commander E's observation that direct impact munitions were used on subjects displaying active resistance, not assaultive behavior, in connection with subjects attempting to cover or move smoke canisters.⁴³²

The practical issue is clarity. If SPD does not classify smoke as reportable force, smoke may still have force related effects. That makes smoke operationally significant even if SPD does not formally classify it as force. Future policy would benefit from a clear approach. SPD could classify smoke used in crowd events as reportable force. Alternatively, SPD could create a mandatory tracking and review category for smoke used in crowd events, even if smoke is not classified as force. Either approach would provide clearer expectations for authorization, continued use, reporting, documentation, medical considerations, decontamination, and review.

⁴²⁴ *Id.* at 91.

⁴²⁵ *Id.*

⁴²⁶ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴²⁷ *Id.*

⁴²⁸ *Id.*

⁴²⁹ *Id.*

⁴³⁰ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–6 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴³¹ *Id.*

⁴³² *Id.* at 6.

OC, PAVA, and Pepper Ball Area Denial

The review addressed OC and PAVA pepper ball deployments under Policy 308. SPD Reviewer B reviewed an OC / MK9 deployment and also addressed PAVA pepper ball deployments used for area denial and crowd movement.⁴³³

OC / MK9 deployment raises a different issue than PAVA area denial. OC used against a specific person is more easily evaluated as a subject-control force event. PAVA pepper ball used as area denial may affect a broader group, including people who are not specifically targeted, people who leave the area before they can be identified, and nearby uninvolved people.⁴³⁴

The review identified the difficulty of documenting and reviewing area denial. When PAVA or pepper ball is used to move a crowd, later review should identify who authorized the deployment, what warning was given, where the deployment occurred, what route people were expected to use, how many rounds were deployed, whether the rounds were intended as area denial or direct impact, what the observed effect was, whether any person reported injury or exposure, and whether medical care or decontamination was offered or feasible.

This category also connects to impacts on stadium attendees and other uninvolved people. Area denial tools can affect people outside the intended target area, particularly in dense urban settings, near public venues, or where wind, buildings, crowd movement, or police movement affect how smoke or irritants travel. June 11 occurred near One Spokane Stadium during a professional soccer game, and complaint materials raised concerns about smoke or irritant exposure affecting stadium attendees and other uninvolved people.⁴³⁵

Direct Impact Munitions: Pepper Ball, 40mm Blue Nose, and Bean Bag Rounds

Direct impact munitions were a significant part of the June 11 force review. SPD Reviewer B reviewed deployments involving pepper balls, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, and bean bag rounds.⁴³⁶ SPD Commander E later clarified several force counting and documentation issues and recommended different findings for several direct impact deployments.⁴³⁷

The chain of command discussion is important because it reflected different readings of how Policy 308 applies to direct impact force during a broader crowd event. SPD Commander E recommended different treatment for certain deployments involving active resistance, while SPD

⁴³³ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1, 10, 12–13, 85 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴³⁴ *Id.* at 12–13, 85, 90–91; Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴³⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2, 14–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant T, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

⁴³⁶ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 9–12, 88–90 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴³⁷ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

Commander C relied on the broader circumstances of the event and the policy language allowing consideration of other known circumstances or factors.⁴³⁸

The UOFRB discussion identified the same policy issue. The Board discussed whether Policy 308 should more clearly state when direct impact pepper ball may be used on assaultive individuals, whether different criteria should apply to area denial and direct impact, whether various projectiles should be broken out rather than grouped together, and whether policy should better explain what active resistance looks like during civil unrest.⁴³⁹ The Board also discussed the different injury potential of pepper ball and 40mm rounds.⁴⁴⁰

That discussion identifies a policy clarity opportunity. Future policy should distinguish pepper ball area denial from pepper ball direct impact and should separately address 40mm and bean bag rounds because their injury potential and intended uses differ. Policy should also explain what level of resistance or threat is required, how broader crowd circumstances may be considered, and what documentation is required for each deployment.

Direct Impact Force, Slow Compliance, and Active Resistance

One of the most difficult issues in the Use of Force review was how to evaluate direct impact force against people described as active resisters in a crowd setting. The review and UOFRB discussion show that some direct impact deployments were connected to people attempting to cover, move, kick, or throw smoke or PAVA area denial tools.⁴⁴¹

That setting creates a policy problem. A person moving toward, covering, kicking, or throwing a smoke canister may create a safety risk, interfere with area denial, or increase risk to officers or others. The same conduct may also occur in a confusing, smoke-filled, loud, emotionally charged crowd environment where people may be trying to avoid exposure, move the device away from themselves or others, or react impulsively to a hot or smoking object. Policy should help officers and reviewers distinguish those situations.

The issue is especially important because SPD Commander E and the UOFRB identified concerns about active resistance and assaultive behavior.⁴⁴² If policy allows direct impact force based on active resistance plus other known circumstances, the policy should explain what those circumstances are, how they should be documented, and when the injury potential of the tool requires a higher threshold.

⁴³⁸ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

⁴³⁹ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 6–7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴⁴¹ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁴² Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 6–7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

Bean Bag Rounds

SPD Reviewer B identified bean bag deployments by three officers, and SPD Commander E clarified force counting and documentation issues.⁴⁴³ The review included deployments at people described as attempting to pick up what were believed to be rocks to throw at officers, as well as deployments in which the number of people, point of aim, point of impact, injury, and observed effect were not clearly documented.⁴⁴⁴

SPD Commander E's review of one bean bag deployment category identified significant documentation concerns. She noted that the report did not indicate how many protesters were targeted, point of aim, point of impact, any injury, or what happened to the subjects.⁴⁴⁵

The bean bag category illustrates how a force event can be reviewed through the chain of command while still identifying documentation issues that matter for future accountability and learning. Direct impact munitions require specific reporting. The report should identify the subject conduct, threat or resistance, distance, target area, point of aim, point of impact, number of rounds, observed effect, injury assessment, medical follow-up, and BWC reference.

Takedowns and Significant Physical Control Tactics

The complaint record raised concerns about takedowns, people being tackled or pinned, hair pulling, people being pushed or pulled on the ground, and injuries associated with arrest. The Use of Force review and companion complaint review addressed specific incidents through the applicable review processes.⁴⁴⁶ The broader issue is that takedowns and significant physical control tactics can be difficult to evaluate after the fact in a protest environment, especially if they are not documented well. Even though SPD does not implement mandatory review of these types of force without a complaint of an injury, every incident of physical force should be documented in a police report. This can be challenging over a multi-hour event involving a lot of crowd control tactics.

Future policy and training should treat significant physical control tactics in crowd events as a category requiring clear documentation. Reports should identify the reason for the takedown or physical control tactic, the person's conduct, whether the person was subject to arrest, whether warnings were given when feasible, what force was used, whether injury was observed or reported, whether medical care was offered, and what BWC captures the event. Policy should

⁴⁴³ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 90 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1, 4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁴⁴ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 90 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁴⁵ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁴⁶ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–12, 70–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

also mandate reporting these events to a supervisor for tracking purposes prior to leaving the event.

The materials reviewed for this report support a distinction between lower-momentum grounding techniques and higher-momentum takedowns, but do not appear to provide a standardized operational taxonomy for evaluating those techniques in crowd management settings.⁴⁴⁷ That gap matters because a controlled takedown and a dynamic takedown may present different risks, require different documentation, and warrant different levels of supervisory review.

Oversight cannot effectively evaluate what policy does not consistently define. Definitions should be clear in policy. Policy could define a controlled takedown as *a deliberate physical technique used to transition a person from standing to the ground while maintaining continuous control of the person's descent and reducing foreseeable injury. Examples may include a kneeling transition, controlled arm-bar descent, or guided prone positioning.*

Policy could define a dynamic takedown as *a rapid, forceful technique that intentionally uses momentum, leverage, body weight, or rotational force to quickly bring a person to the ground to overcome resistance or prevent an imminent threat. Examples may include a leg sweep with body drive, hip toss, double-leg tackle, body lock throw, football-style tackle, or shoulder drive.*

The distinction is important because each technique presents different implications for injury risk, reporting, review, and policy assessment. A controlled takedown may require review of whether grounding was necessary and reasonably controlled. A dynamic takedown may require additional review of whether the elevated level of force was justified, whether safer alternatives were reasonably available, whether proportionality was maintained, and whether medical care was offered or provided.

Policy could classify dynamic takedowns as a separate reportable Use of Force category, analogous to hard empty-hand techniques, even when no injury is documented. The justification for review would not depend solely on the outcome, but on the foreseeable increase in injury risk created by the deliberate use of momentum and rapid grounding techniques. This approach would align with a risk-based oversight assessment that focuses on the nature of the force used, not only on the injury that results.

SPD could also collect standardized data regarding dynamic takedowns, including the number of deployments, associated injuries to subjects and officers, incidents involving passive resistance, incidents involving people experiencing behavioral health crises, and incidents involving juveniles.⁴⁴⁸ That data would help SPD evaluate whether the tactic is being used consistently,

⁴⁴⁷ Police Executive Research Forum, *Guiding Principles on Use of Force*, 2016; Police Executive Research Forum, *ICAT: Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics Training Guide*, 2016; Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, defensive tactics and control-tactics training materials reviewed by the OPO.

⁴⁴⁸ SPD Supervisor A's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 24:40 shows the first arrest of the evening using a dynamic takedown technique. A second technique is visible at 59:34.

whether injuries are occurring, whether policy thresholds are clear, and whether additional training or supervisory review is needed.

The June 11 materials show that dynamic takedowns and significant physical control tactics used during protest arrests would benefit from clearer definitions, documentation expectations, and supervisory review pathways. A narrow review mechanism would preserve context without converting every minor arrest contact into a full Use of Force investigation. It would also support accountability, officer protection, public explanation, and future training.

Medical Care, Decontamination, and Post-Force Care

Medical care and decontamination were recurring issues in the Use of Force review and complaint record. SPD Reviewer B noted that some people exposed to OC/PAVA or smoke left before they could be identified or assessed.⁴⁴⁹ SPD Commander E identified documentation issues regarding why medical aid or decontamination was not provided in some force narratives.⁴⁵⁰

The complaint record included recurring concerns involving injury, medical assessment, and decontamination. Those concerns included whether medical needs were identified and documented, whether care or decontamination was available when needed, and whether arrestees were held in areas affected by smoke or irritants. The complaints support clearer procedures for addressing medical needs during crowd management operations.⁴⁵¹

The medical issue is broader than any individual force determination. Crowd events involving OC/PAVA, smoke, pepper ball, 40mm, bean bag rounds, arrests, and physical control tactics require planning for medical assessment, decontamination, documentation, arrestee collection points, and impacts on uninvolved people. When people leave before officers can identify them, SPD should still document the likely exposure area, tool used, warnings, observed effects, available medical resources, and any known complaints.

Future crowd event planning should include a medical and decontamination plan. That plan should address how medical concerns will be identified, where exposed people can seek assistance, how arrestees will be assessed, how officers will document refusals or inability to assess, and how information will be shared after the event.

⁴⁴⁹ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴⁵⁰ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁵¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 14–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant T, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

Documentation, BWC, and Force Collection

Documentation, BWC, and force collection were among the strongest themes in the completed review. SPD Commander E identified missing or insufficient force reports, incomplete narratives, unclear force counts, and the need for better documentation.⁴⁵² The UOFRB also discussed report writing, BWC labeling, BWC markers, and missing or incomplete reports.⁴⁵³ BWC captured an officer expressing uncertainty about how to document involvement in numerous arrests involving several possible offenses.⁴⁵⁴ That contemporaneous comment illustrates the reporting burden created when officers perform overlapping crowd management, arrest, and support functions during a major event. The documentation issue is not simply administrative. It affects accountability, officer protection, public explanation, policy learning, and the ability to distinguish individual force findings from systemic issues.

Future crowd event policy should require an event-specific force reporting supplement. That supplement should be used in addition to ordinary Use of Force reports when a major protest response includes multiple munitions, multiple officers, multiple force categories, area denial tools, or mass arrests. It should help supervisors collect information before officers clear and help later reviewers organize the evidence.

Event-Level Munitions and Force Tracking

June 11 shows the need for event-level munitions and force tracking. Individual reports may identify some deployments, but they may not provide an event-wide picture of what was authorized, what was deployed, where it was deployed, how many rounds or canisters were used, whether the use was area denial or direct impact, what warnings preceded deployment, and what medical or decontamination issues followed.

A major event munitions log should document the approving command authority, the tool authorized, the time and location of authorization, the deployment location, the officer or unit deploying, the purpose of the deployment, whether it was area denial or direct impact, number of rounds, volleys, or canisters, warnings given, observed effect, known injuries, medical or decontamination response, and when authorization ended.

This type of log would help command, supervisors, IA reviewers, UOFRB, OPO, public records staff, and the public understand the force sequence without relying solely on fragmented reports, BWC, CAD entries, and later recollection.

⁴⁵² Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁵³ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁵⁴ SPD Officer U's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 02:13:29.

Event-Level Force Analysis

The completed review resolved individual force determinations through the chain of command, but the June 11 record also supports event-level force analysis. Event-level analysis asks different questions than individual force review. It asks whether force authorization was documented clearly, whether force categories were defined, whether direct impact and area denial were distinguished, whether medical care and decontamination were planned, whether munitions were tracked, whether warnings were effective, and whether the event created impacts on uninvolved people.

This type of analysis is especially important in First Amendment crowd events. A force event may be individually reviewed, but the public may experience the response as an event-wide police action. Event-level analysis helps explain why force was used, how it was controlled, what limits command imposed, what worked, what did not work, and what policy or training changes should follow.

The June 11 Use of Force review, chain of command review, and UOFRB discussion all support this approach.⁴⁵⁵ The record shows a substantial review effort but also shows that large protest responses need a scalable structure for organizing force categories, evidence, reviewer responsibilities, and systemic lessons.

Issue Five: Documentation, BWC, and Review Structure

Summary

The June 11 protest response generated an unusually large amount of evidence and review material. The record included CAD entries, officer reports, body worn camera video, drone video, photographs, complainant videos, interviews, emails, voicemail, arrest documentation, Use of Force reports, supervisory reviews, chain of command reviews, public reporting, and Use of Force Review Board discussion. SPD Commander F's complaint review noted that C25-066 involved 153 attachments, including videos, photographs, recordings, emails, interviews, and police reports, and that there were hundreds of hours of BWC.⁴⁵⁶ SPD Reviewer B's Use of Force review similarly described reviewing police reports, BWC, drone video, and photographs, while explaining that portions of BWC and drone footage were fast-forwarded when they did not involve force or decision-making information important to the force review.⁴⁵⁷

SPD conducted a significant post-incident review. SPD Reviewer A summarized the complaint record, SPD Reviewer B completed an extensive Use of Force review, the chain of command

⁴⁵⁵ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁵⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

⁴⁵⁷ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

reviewed the force and complaint matters, and the UOFRB held a special meeting to discuss policy, training, BWC, reporting, and review issues.⁴⁵⁸

SPD's ordinary documentation and review structure was strained by the scale of the event. Reviewers identified missing or insufficient reports, late reports, incomplete Use of Force narratives, BWC labeling and marker issues, force count questions, munitions tracking issues, medical and decontamination documentation gaps, and workload concerns created by the volume of evidence.⁴⁵⁹

Documentation determines whether SPD, the OPO, OPOC, complainants, public records staff, media, and the public can later reconstruct what happened. In a major protest response, the key question is whether the overall record can answer basic event-level questions: who authorized action, what warnings were given, what tools were authorized, what tools were not authorized, what tools were deployed, where force occurred, who was arrested, whether medical care or decontamination was provided, what BWC captures the event, and what lessons should be carried forward.

The central issue is whether SPD's documentation and review structure is designed for a major First Amendment crowd event. June 11 shows the need for a major event documentation protocol that connects CAD, officer reports, BWC, drone footage, munitions logs, Use of Force reports, arrest records, complaint themes, medical and decontamination information, public records, and After Action reviews into a single reviewable structure.

Scope and Volume of the Record

The June 11 record was unusually large. SPD Commander F wrote that C25-066 involved 153 attachments and hundreds of hours of BWC.⁴⁶⁰ SPD Reviewer B's Use of Force review similarly stated that he reviewed reports, BWC, drone video, and photographs, and that his summary covered important portions of each category but should not replace review of the attachments.⁴⁶¹

That volume created predictable review challenges. A major protest response may produce hundreds of hours of BWC, multiple drone video files, public video, media footage, social media video, CAD entries, officer reports, force reports, arrest paperwork, photographs, interviews, emails, voicemail, property records, and public records requests. If those materials are not

⁴⁵⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁵⁹ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁶⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

⁴⁶¹ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

organized by time, location, issue, officer, unit, force type, arrest, and complaint theme, the review process becomes dependent on after-the-fact reconstruction.

This does not mean every reviewer must watch every minute of every video. It means SPD should have a major event review plan that identifies what evidence exists, how it is organized, who is responsible for reviewing each category, what time blocks or locations are most important, what BWC or drone files correspond to key events, and how individual findings and systemic issues will be integrated.

Officer Reports and Event-Wide Reporting Expectations

The UOFRB discussion identified missing or late reports as a review issue. SPD Reviewer B explained that many officers did not initially write reports and that he had to ask for reports after the fact.⁴⁶² He also explained that there were many videos to review and that a review of this size was too much for one person.⁴⁶³

Ordinary reporting expectations may not be sufficient during a major protest response. In a smaller event, the involved officer, supervisor, or specialty unit report may be enough to reconstruct the relevant conduct.

Future major event documentation should include event-wide reporting expectations before personnel clear. Every officer does not need to write the same type of report. But every involved officer or unit should provide enough information to document assignment, location, role, significant observations, force used or witnessed, arrests, property handling, medical or decontamination issues, BWC availability, and whether additional reporting is required.

This expectation should apply across specialty and non-specialty units. June 11 involved patrol officers, SPD TAC, SPD SWAT, Spokane County resources, mutual aid, and an all-available-officer callout.⁴⁶⁴ A mixed response makes force collection and event documentation more difficult because not every officer may share the same specialty team reporting expectations or understand how information should be routed before clearing the scene.

Use of Force Report Detail

Use of Force report detail was a recurring concern in the completed review. SPD Commander E identified several narratives that did not adequately document key facts, including the number of rounds fired, the intended and actual point of impact, observed injuries, medical or decontamination response, and when or why the force ended.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶² UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁶³ *Id.* at 5–8.

⁴⁶⁴ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁴⁶⁵ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

Those omissions limit later review, especially during a complex crowd event involving movement, smoke, noise, overlapping commands, and multiple agencies. Rather than lowering documentation expectations, those conditions support using a structured crowd event Use of Force supplement. The supplement should capture the subject's conduct, the force used, whether it was intended for area denial or direct impact, command authorization when applicable, the number of rounds or volleys, the observed effect, any injury or complaint of pain, the medical response, the reason force stopped, and the relevant BWC reference.

Volleys, Rounds, and Munitions Logs

The June 11 review demonstrated how difficult it can be to reconstruct munitions use after a major crowd event. SPD Commander E clarified several force-counting issues and identified gaps in the documentation,⁴⁶⁶ while the UOFRB discussed related reporting, training, equipment, and policy concerns.⁴⁶⁷

An event-level munitions log would provide a reliable record of what was authorized and deployed. It should capture the type and purpose of the munition, the time and location of use, the deploying officer or unit, whether the use was area denial or direct impact, the number of rounds or canisters, known effects or injuries, and any medical or decontamination response. This would improve supervisory review, After Action analysis, and later public explanation.

Body Worn Camera Activation, Battery, Labeling, and Markers

BWC was essential to the June 11 review, but the record also shows that ordinary BWC practices were not sufficient for an event of this size. SPD Commander E identified BWC labeling and markers as documentation issues.⁴⁶⁸ The UOFRB discussed BWC labeling, markers, report writing, activation, battery, and review workload.⁴⁶⁹ CAD also documented at least one camera battery issue late in the event.⁴⁷⁰

BWC is especially important during a protest response because it may provide the clearest record of what officers and community members could hear, see, and do at a particular location. Its value is limited, however, when footage is difficult to locate, poorly labeled, or incomplete.

Future major event procedures should require consistent labeling and markers for significant activity, together with practical planning for prolonged operations. Supervisors should also identify and document missing or incomplete footage after the event so reviewers can understand where the record is limited.

⁴⁶⁶ *Id.* at 1–4.

⁴⁶⁷ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 1–2, 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁶⁸ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁶⁹ UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁷⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

BWC and Competing Perspectives

BWC is important, but it does not eliminate all factual uncertainty. The June 11 complaint record included several situations where BWC showed one perspective and complainants described another.⁴⁷¹ For example, a camera may show open space from an officer's angle, while a complainant may have perceived police lines, crowd pressure, fear of arrest, smoke, noise, or confusion about where they were allowed to go.

That does not mean BWC is unreliable. It means BWC should be interpreted as one perspective within the broader record. BWC can show what an officer saw, heard, or did from the camera angle. It may not show what a person in the crowd could see, whether an announcement was audible from another location, whether a route appeared legally open, or what was happening behind the camera.

Future review templates should account for competing perspectives. When the issue involves warning audibility, safe egress, crowd compression, Use of Force, arrest communication, or medical care, reviewers should identify the relevant BWC angle, other available video, CAD entries, drone footage, officer reports, complainant statements, and physical location. That approach improves accuracy and helps avoid overreliance on a single camera angle.

Drone Video and Aerial Evidence

Drone video was an important source in the June 11 review. SPD Reviewer B described reviewing drone video and photographs as part of the Use of Force review.⁴⁷² The After Action Report also described drone units as providing surveillance information early in the incident, including information about protesters near or under the transport bus.⁴⁷³

Aerial evidence can be especially useful in crowd events because it may show crowd movement, police lines, vehicle positions, blocked exits, dispersal routes, smoke movement, or the overall relationship between groups. It can help identify conditions that are difficult to see from the ground.

However, drone video also has limitations. It doesn't capture audio, individual officer communication, ground-level crowd pressure, whether a person heard a warning, whether a route seemed safe from within the crowd, or whether an individual subject understood commands. Like BWC, drone video should be indexed, preserved, and integrated into the review record, but not treated as the only perspective. Our drone footage is not time stamped making it extremely difficult to review in a logical manner.

⁴⁷¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁴⁷² SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴⁷³ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

Future major event review should identify what drone footage exists, the time span covered, camera angle, location, whether audio exists, what key events are captured, and how drone footage corresponds to CAD, BWC, officer reports, and complaint issues.

Supervisory Notification and Force Collection

Supervisory notification and force collection require a crowd-event-specific process. SPD Reviewer B recommended that a sergeant from each specialty team report all uses of force to the Incident Commander before clearing and that a non-specialty sergeant be designated to collect uses of force from other units during civil unrest.⁴⁷⁴ SPD Commander E adopted similar recommendations, stating that each specialty team sergeant should report all force used by the team to the Incident Commander before clearing and that a designated sergeant should collect and report uses of force by non-specialty units.⁴⁷⁵ Force used by mutual aid partners should also be reported.

That recommendation should be formalized. In major crowd events, supervisor notification cannot depend solely on individual officers locating a supervisor after each force event. The response may involve multiple units, multiple locations, mutual aid, shifting assignments, arrests, and officers clearing at different times.

A major event force collection process should include unit-level force logs, specialty team sergeant reporting, non-specialty reporting, munitions inventory, BWC markers, arrest related force summaries, medical and decontamination notes, and command-level confirmation before personnel clear. The goal is to preserve the information needed for accurate review after a large, complex response.

Complaint Integration and Systemic Review

The June 11 complaint review divided concerns into general or systemic issues and officer specific allegations. SPD Reviewer A explained that general concerns regarding department policy or department-wide decisions are inquiries and not personnel complaints, while officer specific concerns were investigated as potential policy violations.⁴⁷⁶

That distinction is understandable under Policy 1020, but the June 11 record shows why systemic complaint analysis is necessary. Many of the most important lessons emerged from repeated community concerns that did not fit neatly into an officer specific misconduct allegation. Those concerns included unclear dispersal orders, difficulty hearing PA announcements, confusion about curfew, perceived assistance to ICE, lack of visible dialogue, stadium exposure, crowd compression, medical and decontamination concerns, and uncertainty about where to go.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁴ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁴⁷⁵ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁴⁷⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁴⁷⁷ *Id.* at 2–11.

SPD Commander C's final complaint review included systemic recommendations even though the report could not and should not convert every broad community concern into an individual officer finding.⁴⁷⁸ That approach should be formalized. When a major protest generates multiple complaints, SPD should produce a systemic complaint theme analysis separate from individual officer findings. That analysis should be reviewed by command, training, policy staff, and the OPO.

A complaint theme analysis would help SPD identify patterns that may not be visible in isolated complaint dispositions. It would also help explain which issues are officer-specific, which are command or policy issues, which are training issues, which are communication issues, and which require broader After Action review.

Multi-Level After Action Review and Supervisory Access

After Action review should occur at multiple levels. Incident Command should evaluate the overall mission, command decisions, coordination, and operational outcomes. Field commanders and unit supervisors should separately assess how the plan worked in practice, including communication, deployment, equipment, tactics, and team performance. Those perspectives should then be brought together before final lessons learned and corrective actions are adopted.

Supervisors also need access to the materials necessary to conduct a meaningful review of their teams. That should include relevant BWC, reports, CAD information, and other available video or documentation. Current policy does not provide supervisors with sufficient access to review BWC for this purpose. As a result, supervisors may be expected to identify lessons learned without being able to examine the most complete record of what their personnel encountered or how the operation unfolded.

The June 11 review illustrates the practical effect of that limitation. TAC supervisors reported that they had not reviewed the relevant BWC, completed Use of Force and complaint reviews, or the After Action Report. Their operational debriefing therefore occurred without access to materials that later identified concerns involving command structure, communication, equipment, force, and documentation.⁴⁷⁹

Completed reviews should also be shared with the supervisors and units responsible for implementing the lessons identified. Use of Force, complaint, and After Action processes serve different purposes, but the systemic information developed through those reviews should not remain isolated within separate channels. Appropriate cross sharing would allow supervisors, training personnel, policy staff, and command to compare findings, make timely adjustments, and track whether identified concerns have been addressed.

⁴⁷⁸ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

⁴⁷⁹ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

Public Records and Transparency Implications

Documentation issues also affect public transparency. Public reporting after June 11 relied on a combination of reporter observations, community video, police statements, court filings, and public records materials. RANGE's coverage described conflicting perceptions regarding smoke, munitions, media impact, and SPD's role in relation to ICE.⁴⁸⁰ RANGE later published a Q&A with SPD Commander A addressing public questions about SPD's role, Keep Washington Working, mutual aid, force reporting, and tools used during the protest response.⁴⁸¹

When SPD records are incomplete, unlabeled, or difficult to match to specific incidents, public understanding depends more heavily on partial video clips, competing narratives, and later litigation. Better documentation does not guarantee agreement, but it improves the ability of SPD, the OPO, complainants, media, and the public to evaluate what happened.

A public-facing after action summary, supported by a structured internal documentation record, would help address public trust. Such a summary could explain the timeline, legal basis for major decisions, warnings given, tools authorized and not authorized, number of arrests, number and type of munitions, known injuries, medical response, property issues, and lessons learned, while respecting privacy, pending cases, and public records limits.

Review Structure and Workload

The UOFRB discussion was candid about the difficulty of reviewing an event of this scale. SPD Reviewer B stated that the review was large and too much for one person.⁴⁸² He explained that many officers had not written reports, that he had to ask for reports after the fact, and that there were too many videos for one reviewer to watch everything.⁴⁸³ The UOFRB discussed breaking future large-scale reviews into pieces and assigning different reviewers to different parts of the event.⁴⁸⁴

SPD Commander F's complaint review also illustrates this limitation. He wrote that there were hundreds of hours of BWC and that he attempted to review relevant evidence identified by SPD Reviewer A's investigation.⁴⁸⁵ SPD Reviewer A similarly summarized the complaint record and

⁴⁸⁰ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

⁴⁸¹ Luke Baumgarten and Valerie Osier, "Q&A with SPD Chief Kevin Hall on ICE and the Protests," RANGE Media, July 28, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/qa-with-spd-chief-kevin-hall-on-ice-and-the-protests/>.

⁴⁸² UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁴⁸³ *Id.* at 5–8.

⁴⁸⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁸⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026).

identified relevant issues rather than suggesting that every minute of every record was independently reviewed in the same way.⁴⁸⁶

This approach may be reasonable under existing resource constraints, but it should be formalized. A large event should have a review plan that identifies categories, reviewers, time blocks, locations, evidence sources, and cross-checking methods. For example, one reviewer could handle dispersal announcements, another munitions, another arrests, another complaint-specific BWC, another mutual aid issues, and another property or medical issues. A lead reviewer could then integrate findings using a common matrix.

A structured review plan would improve accuracy and efficiency. It would also reduce the risk that important issues are missed because one reviewer is expected to reconstruct an entire multi-hour, multi-location, multi-agency event from hundreds of hours of video and many separate attachments.

Issue Six: Third-Party Impact and Nearby Venue Coordination

Summary

The June 11 protest response did not affect only protesters and police. It occurred near One Spokane Stadium during a professional soccer game and in an area where residents, employees, media, observers, passersby, and other uninvolved members of the public could be affected by police movement, crowd movement, smoke, irritants, traffic changes, arrests, and emergency activity.⁴⁸⁷

That setting created a separate public safety consideration. A protest response may be directed at a specific crowd, but the effects of the response can extend beyond the protest area. When police tactics, dispersal orders, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, or crowd movement may affect nearby uninvolved people, SPD would benefit from a plan for venue notification, public communication, medical coordination, traffic management, and post-event review.

CAD entries show that the soccer game at One Spokane Stadium was occurring while the protest response was underway. CAD recorded concern about approximately 1,800 people at the stadium and later recorded that the game was letting out while police activity continued nearby.⁴⁸⁸ Complaint materials also included concerns from people who reported that stadium attendees, including children, were affected by smoke or chemical irritants without meaningful warning from police or stadium announcements.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁴⁸⁷ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 7, 10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁸⁸ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 7, 10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁸⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2, 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant T, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

SPD Commander C recognized this concern in the C25-066 chain of command review and recommended clear communication with surrounding spectator events because soccer game attendees had some exposure to chemical irritants.⁴⁹⁰ That recommendation should guide future planning.

Future crowd management and First Amendment responses would benefit from planning when police activity occurs near places where uninvolved people may reasonably be affected. That planning does not need to be rigid or overly detailed in every case. It should be scaled to the event, the location, the tactics being considered, the number of uninvolved people nearby, and the likelihood that police activity may affect people outside the protest area.

Why Third-Party Impact Matters

Third-party impact is part of public safety. A crowd management operation can affect people who are not protesting, not refusing police orders, and not aware of the police plan. Those people may still experience smoke, irritants, crowd movement, traffic changes, closed sidewalks, police lines, emergency vehicles, or confusion about where to go. That concern becomes more important when the police response occurs near a large public event.

Future planning should treat nearby venues and uninvolved people as part of the incident footprint when circumstances indicate they may be affected. That does not mean SPD must delay or avoid necessary police action because a public venue is nearby. It means command should consider who else may be affected, what information they need, and whether there are practical steps to reduce unnecessary exposure or confusion.

One Spokane Stadium

One Spokane Stadium is central to this issue because it was occupied during the protest response. CAD recorded concern about the number of people at the stadium and whether the stadium was evacuating.⁴⁹¹ Complainants T and U reported that stadium attendees received no warning before perceived smoke or irritant exposure. Complainant T described coughing, movement by event security, the need to obtain a mask for a young child, and the absence of an announcement over the stadium intercom.⁴⁹²

Those complaints raise an important planning issue. Stadium attendees were not the intended subject of police action. They were not part of the protest crowd. Many may not have known why police were present, what tools were being used, whether they should remain inside, whether they should avoid certain exits, or whether the game would continue. SPD Commander C's

⁴⁹⁰ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

⁴⁹¹ *Id.* at 7.

⁴⁹² Interview Transcript, Complainant T, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

recommendation directly addressed this concern when he recommended clear communication with surrounding spectator events.⁴⁹³

That recommendation provides a practical path forward. When a protest response may affect a stadium or other public venue, SPD should consider whether venue management or event security needs timely safety information. The level of coordination will depend on the proximity of the venue, the tactics being used, the direction of crowd movement, the likelihood of smoke or irritant exposure, and whether people may soon be entering or leaving the venue.

Venue Notification and Public Announcements

Nearby venues need timely, practical information that helps staff protect attendees without disclosing sensitive operational details. Depending on the circumstances, SPD may need to identify the affected area, recommend avoiding particular streets or exits, advise whether people should remain inside temporarily, and warn of possible smoke or irritant exposure. Any message should be simple, calm, and updated as conditions change.

June 11 demonstrated the importance of that coordination. Without clear information, venue staff and attendees may not understand the source of nearby police activity, whether an exit is safe, or when medical assistance may be needed. Clearer communication can reduce confusion, limit unnecessary movement, and help protect people with respiratory or other medical vulnerabilities.

Coordination With Venue Staff and Event Security

Venue staff and event security can help reduce risk to uninvolved people when a protest response occurs near a large public event. They may have access to public address systems, internal security staff, medical rooms, cameras, gates, staff radios, and crowd flow decisions inside the venue.

Future planning would benefit from identifying a venue contact when a protest response occurs near a large public event. The contact would provide a practical communication path so SPD can share safety information when conditions may affect attendees, exits, medical access, or pedestrian movement.

This approach would implement SPD Commander C's recommendation without creating a rigid checklist. It would also help SPD document what was known, what was communicated, and what steps were taken to reduce unnecessary confusion or exposure for people who were not part of the protest.

⁴⁹³ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

Medical and Decontamination Considerations for Third Parties

When smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, or other irritants are used near uninvolved people, the medical plan should account for more than arrestees or people directly engaged with police. Stadium attendees, passersby, media, employees, and nearby residents may experience exposure even if they are outside the intended deployment area. People with asthma, children, older adults, and people with other medical vulnerabilities may need information or assistance.

A third-party medical plan could identify how EMS will be notified, where medical staff can safely stage, whether venue medical personnel are available, what decontamination information should be shared, and how affected uninvolved people can seek assistance. When a venue is involved, SPD should consider whether venue staff need basic medical or exposure information they can relay to attendees.

This planning does not require SPD to anticipate every possible exposure. It does require command to consider likely drift, crowd movement, venue exits, and the presence of uninvolved people when force tools may affect people outside the immediate protest area.

Traffic, Pedestrian Movement, and Egress

Third-party impact also includes traffic and pedestrian movement. A protest response near a stadium can affect people entering or leaving the event, rideshare pickup areas, parking lots, sidewalks, bike lanes, emergency access, and nearby intersections. If police lines, crowd movement, arrests, smoke, or irritants affect those routes, people who are not part of the protest may move toward unsafe areas or become confused about where to go.

CAD's reference to the game letting out is significant because the end of a public event creates a predictable surge of pedestrian and vehicle movement.⁴⁹⁴ A protest response may be manageable when most attendees are still inside the stadium, but the risk changes when hundreds or thousands of people begin leaving at once.

Future planning should consider nearby pedestrian routes, traffic control points, parking areas, public transit stops, rideshare locations, and emergency access routes. If conditions change, command may need to coordinate with a venue to delay exit, redirect people to different gates, close or open particular routes, or communicate safe movement options.

Media, Observers, and Nearby Public

Media and observers may also be affected by a protest response even when they are not the intended subject of police action. During a major protest response, media and observers may be near police lines, close to force deployment areas, or positioned between protesters and police.

⁴⁹⁴ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

They may be affected by smoke, irritants, crowd movement, or police orders while attempting to observe or document the event.

The IA timeline noted that SPD Supervisor D provided information about a safer place for media to film at approximately 7:23 p.m.⁴⁹⁵ That is a useful practice and should be considered in future planning. When feasible, command should identify safer observation areas for media and observers and communicate when those areas change because of police movement, smoke, irritants, arrests, or crowd conditions.

Documentation of Third-Party Impact

Third-party impacts should be documented as part of the major event record when they are known or reasonably anticipated. Documentation could include nearby venues identified, venue contacts notified, announcements requested or made, known exposures, medical or decontamination concerns, traffic or pedestrian impacts, route changes, and any complaints or reports from uninvolved people.

June 11 showed that this information may otherwise appear only through later complaints or interviews. That is less effective than capturing third-party concerns during the incident or immediately afterward. A venue contact log, command note, or After Action form could identify what SPD knew, what was communicated, and what issues developed.

This documentation would also help public explanation. If a nearby stadium, school, church, or business is affected by police action, the public will want to know what happened, what was communicated, who was notified, and what steps SPD took to reduce exposure or confusion. Clear documentation makes those answers easier to provide.

Issue Seven: Mutual Aid and Unified Command

Summary

The June 11 protest response involved SPD, Spokane County Sheriff's Office personnel, federal personnel, and other resources operating in close proximity during a rapidly evolving First Amendment event. SPD functioned as the primary local command entity for the police response, while also communicating with federal personnel inside or near the facility and county resources staged or deployed to assist with the operation.⁴⁹⁶

Mutual aid was operationally understandable. The protest grew in size and complexity, SPD command identified blocked exits and vehicles, and command believed additional resources were

⁴⁹⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁴⁹⁶ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

needed to create a safety corridor and address local law and public safety concerns.⁴⁹⁷ SPD Commander D's After Action Report states that SCSO contacted him and offered assistance, that he asked SCSO to stage support, and that he later formally requested mutual aid after command concluded that protesters had moved to block the gate and crimes were occurring.⁴⁹⁸

The same response also showed why mutual aid during a protest requires more than additional staffing. A multi-agency First Amendment response needs a clear command structure, shared mission understanding, consistent rules of engagement, common expectations for dispersal and force, visible agency and individual identification, and a process for documenting force, arrests, injuries, property issues, and complaints across agency lines.

SPD Commander D identified SCSO coordination as a lesson learned. He reported that SCSO contacted him at approximately 4:06 p.m. and offered assistance.⁴⁹⁹ He asked SCSO to stage support, but later learned that the ICE supervisor had also communicated with SCSO and had indicated that SCSO might bring armor and assist agents in exiting.⁵⁰⁰ SPD Commander D wrote that he informed the ICE supervisor that he was the primary contact and that coordination needed to go through him.⁵⁰¹ He later stated that earlier face-to-face coordination with SCSO at the command post would have improved the response.⁵⁰²

That coordination issue matters because SPD was also trying to define legal limits on its own involvement in relation to federal immigration enforcement. Assisting agencies needed to understand SPD's mission, legal constraints, command structure, and operational limits before deployment. Without that shared understanding, agencies may receive different information, act from different assumptions, or create public confusion about who is directing the operation and why.

The complaint record also shows that many community members experienced the response as a single law enforcement action, even when the conduct they described may have involved different agencies. Complainants referenced black uniforms, green uniforms, deputies, county personnel, federal personnel, "unidentified armed men," obscured identifiers, and officers or agents whose agency affiliation was unclear.⁵⁰³

That public experience is important. SPD does not control another agency's discipline, internal review, or personnel policies. Still, when SPD leads or coordinates a major public safety response inside the city, the public will often look to SPD to explain the overall operation. Future mutual

⁴⁹⁷ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 3–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁹⁸ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁴⁹⁹ *Id.* at 3.

⁵⁰⁰ *Id.* at 3–4.

⁵⁰¹ *Id.* at 4.

⁵⁰² *Id.*

⁵⁰³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025); OPOC August Meeting Complainants, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 6, 2025).

aid responses should include clearer briefings, visible identification expectations, force and arrest reporting, complaint routing, and public-facing explanation of which agencies were present and what roles they played.

Agencies and Resources Involved

Several categories of law enforcement personnel and resources were connected to the June 11 response. SPD resources included command staff, TAC, SWAT, patrol officers, bike officers, drone operators, undercover detectives, dialogue personnel, arrest teams, and transport or processing resources.⁵⁰⁴ SCSO personnel were requested or staged for assistance and participated in skirmish lines, transport, and armored vehicle support.⁵⁰⁵ Federal personnel included ICE/HSI staff or agents inside or around the facility and later federal transport or custody personnel.⁵⁰⁶

CAD entries show county involvement during the operational deployment. At approximately 6:28 p.m., CAD recorded that county assistance was being called.⁵⁰⁷ At approximately 6:34 p.m., CAD recorded “County TAC on scene.”⁵⁰⁸ At approximately 6:41 p.m., CAD recorded that two skirmish lines had formed.⁵⁰⁹ Later CAD entries referenced SCSO, the SCSO Bearcat, mixed SCSO/city teams, and coordination of transport.⁵¹⁰

SPD Commander D’s After Action Report states that he asked SCSO to stage support in case SPD needed to move in to uphold the law.⁵¹¹ Later, after command concluded that protesters had moved to block the gate and that crimes were occurring, he formally requested mutual aid from SCSO.⁵¹² The report also states that the plan to create a safety corridor included SCSO forming one skirmish line and SPD forming another.⁵¹³

That deployment was significant. Once SPD and SCSO formed lines and operated in a shared crowd management space, public perception, officer safety, command clarity, and After Action review depended on more than each agency’s individual role. The response became a multi-agency operation from the public’s perspective and from the standpoint of later review.

⁵⁰⁴ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 2–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁰⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 3–10 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁰⁶ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁰⁷ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 3–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁰⁸ *Id.* at 4.

⁵⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁵¹⁰ *Id.* at 4–10.

⁵¹¹ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵¹² *Id.* at 4–5.

⁵¹³ *Id.* at 5–6.

Command Structure and Coordination With SCSO

SPD Commander D wrote that earlier face-to-face communication with SCSO at the command post would have resolved the coordination concern much earlier.⁵¹⁴ That observation should be treated as an important command lesson. Separate agency-to-agency communication can create operational risk when the lead agency is trying to maintain a legally sensitive mission boundary.

Future responses would benefit from earlier command post contact with assisting agencies when feasible. That contact should identify who is in command, what the mission is, what legal or policy limits apply, what tools or tactics are authorized or prohibited, how force and arrests will be reported, how officers will identify themselves, how complaints will be routed, and how assisting agencies will clear the event.

This kind of briefing does not need to be lengthy. During a fast-moving event, even a short verbal briefing may provide important clarity. In planned events or events that allow staging time, SPD should use a written mutual aid briefing or ICS-style form to document the same information.

Communication With Federal Personnel

Communication with federal personnel created a different but related challenge. Federal personnel initially requested that SPD clear the crowd so detainees could be moved.⁵¹⁵ SPD Commander D reported that he explained SPD's legal concerns, noted safety concerns with the transport bus, and suggested that ICE develop a different transport plan.⁵¹⁶ Later, when federal personnel developed an alternate plan, SPD Commander D asked that timing be coordinated through him in case protest conduct rose to a level requiring SPD response.⁵¹⁷

The incident later shifted after command observed protesters move to block a secure gate and concluded crimes were occurring.⁵¹⁸ At that point, SPD advised the ICE supervisor that, due to protester behavior and crimes being committed, SPD would engage the crowd to create a safe exit for agents and other occupants.⁵¹⁹ Federal personnel were later moved from the building. CAD records at approximately 8:45 to 8:51 p.m. show people coming out, more people coming down the elevator, agents coming out, everyone out, transport vans moving, and all people accounted for.⁵²⁰ CAD documented that the occupants of both vans were transferred to U.S. Marshals custody at approximately 9:09 p.m.⁵²¹

⁵¹⁴ *Id.*

⁵¹⁵ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵¹⁶ *Id.* at 2–3.

⁵¹⁷ *Id.* at 3–4.

⁵¹⁸ *Id.* at 4–5.

⁵¹⁹ *Id.* at 5–6.

⁵²⁰ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 10–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵²¹ *Id.* at 11.

In a multi-agency event involving a federal immigration facility, SPD needs one clearly identified federal agency contact point and a documented understanding of what SPD is agreeing to do, what SPD is not agreeing to do, and what federal personnel are responsible for handling on their own. In this instance, multiple officers described talking to their own points of contact and different federal agents also called in requesting assistance to dispatch, while the Incident Commander was primarily communicating with the Supervisory Agent.

That distinction matters for public trust. If federal personnel communicate separately with different local agencies, or if federal personnel believe one local agency will assist with a function that another local agency has declined for legal reasons, the public may experience the entire operation as a single coordinated effort to assist federal immigration enforcement. Clear communication among agencies helps protect SPD's mission boundaries and improves later public explanation.

Unified Command and Legal Constraints

Unified command is not only a tactical concept. In a legally sensitive protest, unified command must include mission limits and legal constraints. On June 11, SPD command had concerns about Washington law, consulted City legal, and initially limited SPD's role.⁵²² IA later summarized that complaints alleging individual officers violated the Keep Washington Working Act would not be addressed as individual officer misconduct because deployment decisions, mission, and authorized force options were determined by command.⁵²³

That approach makes sense. Individual officers responding under command direction generally do not define the legal mission. Command does. But when mutual aid agencies join the operation, command's legal analysis and mission limits must be communicated to those agencies as well. Otherwise, assisting agencies may act from a different understanding of the event or may take actions that the public attributes to SPD.

Future unified command planning should therefore include a legal and mission briefing when the event involves federal immigration activity, First Amendment activity, or other legally sensitive circumstances. The briefing should identify the local law or public safety basis for SPD action, the limits on SPD involvement, the role of federal personnel, the role of assisting agencies, and any prohibited or restricted activity.

This is especially important in a protest related to immigration enforcement. Local police may have independent authority to respond to local crimes, blocked exits, or public safety risks. At the same time, the public may perceive any local police action that helps federal personnel leave as immigration enforcement assistance. Shared mission language across agencies can reduce confusion and protect the integrity of the City's legal position.

⁵²² After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵²³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

Field Command, Tactical Roles, and Mixed Deployment

The June 11 response was not a clean single-team deployment. It involved SPD TAC, SPD SWAT, patrol resources, county resources, armored vehicles, skirmish lines, dialogue or liaison resources, drone surveillance, undercover observation, arrest teams, and transport or processing functions.⁵²⁴ The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion described a fragmented tactical structure in which different resources operated with different missions, training models, and field expectations.⁵²⁵

That context matters for mutual aid and unified command. When multiple units and agencies are placed into the same crowd management operation, command should identify the field command structure before movement begins when feasible. Command should clarify whether TAC/Crowd Management, SWAT, patrol, or another field command element is responsible for the tactical plan, crowd movement, dispersal, arrest teams, and coordination with assisting agencies.

The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion described the June 11 field environment as involving SPD TAC, SPD SWAT, County TAC, and SPD patrol personnel operating together, with different training backgrounds and mission assumptions.⁵²⁶ TAC leaders described the primary mission as a crowd management operation to create space and safely move people from the building, while also noting that SWAT or other specialty resources may have supporting roles depending on the threat.⁵²⁷

Future multi-agency protest responses should clarify field command authority. Assisting agencies should know who is giving direction, who may authorize movement or force, how requests are routed, how the plan will change if conditions change, and how disagreement or confusion will be resolved in real time.

Public Confusion About Agency Identity

The complaint record shows that community members had difficulty distinguishing agencies and individual officers. Complainants referenced deputies, green uniforms, black uniforms, county personnel, federal personnel, “unidentified armed men,” and officers or agents whose affiliation was unclear.⁵²⁸ Some complaints described concern that officers did not have visible names, badge numbers, or agency identifiers.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁴ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵²⁵ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁵²⁶ *Id.*

⁵²⁷ *Id.*

⁵²⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025); OPOC August Meeting Complainants, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 6, 2025).

⁵²⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

This confusion is predictable in a multi-agency response, especially when officers wear helmets, gas masks, tactical equipment, external carriers, protective gear, or uniforms with small or obscured identifiers. From inside a crowd, community members may not be able to distinguish SPD from SCSO, federal agents, or other personnel. That confusion affects complaint routing, public accountability, and trust.

Visible identification is important in First Amendment settings, especially with the current practice of some agencies wearing masks. People observing or participating in a protest may need to know which agency is issuing orders, which agency is using force, which agency is making arrests, and how to later file a complaint or obtain records. Identification also protects officers and agencies by reducing misattribution. SPD has made it policy that its officers will not wear masks unless specifically authorized.

Future mutual aid briefings should include visible identification expectations. When operationally feasible, officers and deputies should display agency identifiers and individual identifiers in a way that remains visible with helmets, masks, and protective equipment. If individual names are not feasible for safety reasons, SPD should consider numbered identifiers or other methods that allow later accountability without unnecessarily increasing officer risk.

Policy Consistency Across Agencies

Mutual aid can create policy differences. Agencies may have different policies on crowd management, dispersal orders, uses of force, munitions, smoke, pepper ball, 40mm rounds, bean bag rounds, arrest teams, BWC, decontamination, medical care, property handling, and complaint intake. Those differences matter when agencies operate together in one event.

The public is unlikely to understand those distinctions in real time. If an assisting agency uses a tool, tactic, or threshold that differs from SPD's policy, the public may still attribute the action to SPD if SPD is the lead local agency or if SPD appears to be directing the response. Review also becomes more difficult if force, arrests, injuries, BWC, and reports remain separated by agency without an event-level collection process.

SPD cannot impose its disciplinary authority on another agency. But when SPD requests mutual aid for a First Amendment or crowd management event, SPD can brief assisting agencies on the mission, legal constraints, dispersal expectations, authorized tools, prohibited tools, force reporting expectations, medical and decontamination planning, identification expectations, and complaint routing procedures. When operational concerns arise, SPD can also assign assisting units to roles that reduce policy conflict, such as traffic management, medical assistance, perimeter support, transport, or arrestee detention management.

Policy consistency does not require every agency to have identical policies. It requires enough shared understanding that the operation can function safely, lawfully, and accountably as a single public-facing response.

Force, Arrest, and Reporting Across Agencies

SPD Reviewer B and SPD Commander E recommended a structured process for collecting force information before units clear. The recommendations included having specialty-team supervisors report force to the Incident Commander and designating a supervisor to collect force information from personnel outside those teams. This approach would improve event-level accounting when numerous units and agencies are involved.⁵³⁰

That same concept should apply to mutual aid operations at an event level. When assisting agencies deploy under or alongside SPD's operational plan, SPD Incident Command should receive basic event-level information before those agencies clear. That information should include whether force was used, whether arrests were made, whether anyone was injured, whether medical care or decontamination was provided or requested, whether property was collected, whether munitions were deployed, and whether any significant complaints or incidents were known.

This would not replace another agency's internal investigation or disciplinary process. It would give SPD and later reviewers a more accurate understanding of the full event. It would also help SPD respond to community concerns when a complaint describes conduct by a deputy, federal agent, or unidentified officer during an operation the public experienced as one law enforcement response.

Mutual Aid, Arrests, Property, and Complaint Routing

Multi-agency operations can complicate arrests, transport, property handling, and complaint routing. When one agency assists with arrests, another agency handles transport, another agency controls a skirmish line, and another agency maintains custody or receives detainees, the public may not know who handled a person, who collected property, who transported the person, or where a complaint should be filed.

The complaint record included confusion about agency roles, arrest handling, jail or transport responsibilities, and complaint routing.⁵³¹ Complaint materials also raised property and personal item concerns after arrests, including concerns involving phones, identification, recording devices, and other personal items.⁵³²

Future mutual aid planning should include arrestee and property expectations when a protest response may involve multiple agencies. The plan should identify who makes arrest decisions, who documents arrests, who collects property, who transports arrestees, how property is

⁵³⁰ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁵³¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 17–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵³² *Id.* at 27–38.

tracked, how medical or decontamination issues are documented, and how complaints involving multiple agencies are routed.

Mutual Aid and Public Messaging

Public messaging should account for mutual aid. A public statement that accurately describes SPD's tools, actions, or findings may still leave the public confused if other agencies used different tools or acted in the same space. Public reporting after June 11 reflected confusion about which agency used which less lethal tools and how different agencies participated in the response.⁵³³

In future multi-agency events, SPD should be prepared to explain which agencies were present, who served as the lead local command entity, what SPD authorized or used, what SPD did not authorize or use, and what information SPD has or does not have about assisting agency actions. That explanation should avoid speaking for another agency's internal review, but it should not ignore the public's experience of a unified police response.

Public-facing, transparent, and easily accessible After Action summaries are important to community understanding. When a major event involves mutual aid, the summary should identify participating agencies, general roles, command structure, significant tools authorized or restricted, known arrests or force events, complaint routing information, and any After Action lessons involving coordination.

Issue Eight: Arrests, Arrestee Processing, Property, and Collection Point Procedures

Summary

Complaint materials raised several arrest related concerns. Community members described confusion about whether they were free to leave, whether they had a safe route away from police lines, whether they were being pushed or taken down while trying to comply, whether officers communicated clearly during arrests, whether property was properly handled, and whether people knew which agency was involved.⁵³⁴

SPD's complaint review addressed multiple officer specific allegations connected to arrests, demeanor, property, and injuries.⁵³⁵ The record also identified a property-handling concern

⁵³³ Erin Sellers, Aaron Hedge, Valerie Osier, and Luke Baumgarten, "Everything We Know About the Spokane ICE Protests," RANGE Media, published June 12, 2025, last updated May 29, 2026, <https://www.rangemedia.co/everything-we-know-about-the-spokane-ice-protests/>.

⁵³⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 3–5, 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 2–15 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 30, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025).

⁵³⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 6–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

involving Complainant P's fanny pack, which illustrates why protest arrest property procedures need to be clear, documented, and easy to reconstruct after a major event.⁵³⁶

A major protest arrest process should preserve accountability without creating unnecessary complexity for officers working in a dynamic environment. SPD would benefit from protest arrest procedures that identify who makes arrest decisions, who applies restraints, who documents the arrest, who collects property, how property is tracked, where arrestees are taken, how medical or decontamination concerns are addressed, how BWC is identified, and how multi-agency involvement is recorded.

Arrests in a First Amendment Crowd Environment

Arrests during a First Amendment event carry additional public trust and documentation concerns. An arrest that occurs during a conventional call for service may be evaluated primarily through the officer's observations, probable cause, resistance, force used, injury, and property handling. During a protest, those same questions remain important, but the surrounding environment adds complexity.

A person may be arrested while police lines are moving, while dispersal orders are being issued, while smoke or irritants are present, while other people are pushing or moving nearby, while officers are wearing protective gear, and while multiple agencies are operating in the same area. A person may also be trying to understand whether they are still allowed to observe, whether they are required to leave immediately, which direction is safe, or whether a curfew announcement changes the legal situation.

That context matters because protest arrest documentation should capture more than the statutory basis for arrest. It should also capture the conditions surrounding the arrest when those conditions may affect ability to comply. This includes warnings given, the person's location, available routes, officer directions, whether the person appeared to understand or respond to commands, whether force was used, whether property was collected, and whether medical or decontamination issues were known.

This level of documentation protects both the public and officers. It gives later reviewers a clearer understanding of why the arrest occurred and what conditions surrounded it. It also protects officers from having an arrest judged later by a short video clip that may not show the full crowd conditions, warnings, prior conduct, or officer perspective.

Arrest Context and Processing Demands

The June 11 response involved multiple arrests and significant transport logistics. CAD recorded one person in custody around 6:48 p.m., detention vans being positioned, mixed SCSO and city

⁵³⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 27–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 3–5, 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

teams, multiple arrestees, transport vans filling, and additional transport needs.⁵³⁷ The IA timeline records another person under arrest at approximately 6:46 p.m., multiple warnings and arrests after the dispersal order, and several named or described arrests near the red van and surrounding areas.⁵³⁸

CAD recorded that the first transport van was en route to jail at approximately 7:48 p.m., that four arrestees were staged near Joe Albi and Washington around 8:00 p.m., that eight arrestees needed jail transport around 8:13 p.m., and that additional arrestee transport occurred after 8:53 p.m.⁵³⁹ CAD also recorded that the jail was on red light and that officers needed transport vans.⁵⁴⁰

Mass or multi-arrest protest operations differ from ordinary arrest processing. Officers may be making arrests in protective gear, near police lines, around smoke or irritants, while crowds are moving, while transport resources are limited, and while other agencies are assisting. In that environment, property, medical information, BWC, custody transfer, and complaint routing can become difficult to reconstruct if not documented at the time.

Future protest arrest procedures should include collection point procedures. The collection point should document arrestee identity when known, arresting officer or agency, assisting officers or agencies, property collected, medical or decontamination concerns, transport destination, custody transfers, BWC references, and any immediate complaint or injury claim.

Arrest Authority and Dispersal Context

Many arrests occurred after SPD had declared the assembly unlawful and issued repeated warnings. CAD and IA entries document dispersal orders beginning shortly after the 7:08 p.m. unlawful assembly approval and continuing over the next hour, with later arrest and force warnings.⁵⁴¹

Those entries support SPD's position that the arrest phase followed command authorized dispersal and repeated warnings. At the same time, complaint summaries and interviews describe people who did not hear or understand the warnings, did not know where to go, confused dispersal with the later curfew, or did not believe they had a safe route out of the area.⁵⁴²

That gap matters for arrest review. When an arrest is based on failure to disperse or refusal to comply with police directions, later review should consider whether the person was in a location

⁵³⁷ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵³⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵³⁹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 7–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁴⁰ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁴¹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁴² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 2–15 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 30, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025).

where the order was reasonably audible, whether the person had a practical route to leave, whether the person appeared to be refusing or unable to comply, and whether officers provided additional direction when feasible.

This does not mean every person must receive an individualized warning before arrest during a crowd event. It does mean that protest arrest documentation should capture enough context to evaluate the difference between refusal, delayed compliance, confusion, and physical inability to move.

Ability to Comply

Ability to comply was a recurring concern in the June 11 complaint record. Some people reported that they could not hear commands, did not know which direction to move, were pushed by the crowd, feared being trampled, encountered police lines, or were unsure whether movement toward a particular area would lead to arrest.⁵⁴³

From an officer's perspective, a person remaining in a dispersal area may appear to be refusing to leave. From the person's perspective, the same moment may feel confusing, physically constrained, or unsafe. Both perspectives may be honestly held, and both matter to review.

Future protest arrest procedures should prompt officers or supervisors to document ability-to-comply factors when they are apparent. Those factors may include crowd density, police line movement, smoke or irritants, physical barriers, conflicting directions, the person's location, whether the person was moving or stationary, whether the person was given a direction, and whether the person appeared to understand or respond to the direction.

This documentation would help distinguish people who were refusing to leave from people who were trying to determine how to leave safely. It would also help identify whether command-level dispersal communication, safe egress planning, or officer-level instructions need improvement.

Takedowns and Physical Control Tactics

Complaint materials raised concerns about takedowns, pushing, pain, injuries, and whether people were able to comply before physical control was used. Some of those concerns were evaluated as force or injury allegations. Others were connected to arrest circumstances, demeanor, or ability to comply.⁵⁴⁴ Others were not documented.

⁵⁴³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant G, at 2–15 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 30, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025); SPD Officer B's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 00:23:30–00:24:07; SPD Officer C's BWC Video 2025-06-11 at 01:28:25.

⁵⁴⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13, 18–20 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–12, 70–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

Takedowns during a protest arrest may be significant even if the tactic does not fit neatly into a separate force review category. The surrounding circumstances matter. Crowd noise, movement, emotional intensity, smoke, irritants, moving lines, multiple officers, and unclear egress can affect how the tactic occurs and how it is later understood.

Future protest arrest procedures should connect arrest documentation with the supervisory review mechanism recommended for significant physical control tactics in crowd events. Arrest documentation should identify the conduct that led to the takedown or physical control tactic, whether the person was given a warning when feasible, what force was used, what injury or complaint of pain was observed or reported, whether medical care was offered or provided, and what BWC captures the event.

Property Handling During Dynamic Arrests

Protest arrests can complicate property handling. People may carry bags, phones, medical items, signs, helmets, masks, water, legal-observer materials, cameras, or personal identification. Officers may be operating quickly, making multiple arrests, dealing with crowd movement, or transferring arrestees to another officer or transport team. Property may also be separated from the arrestee during a takedown, movement, search, or transport.

A clear property process protects everyone. Arrestees need confidence that personal property will be tracked and returned. Officers need clear expectations about who collects property, how it is documented, where it goes, and how responsibility transfers. Supervisors need a way to reconstruct property handling if a complaint is filed.

Future protest arrest property procedures should identify who collects property, how property is associated with the arrestee, how high-value or sensitive items are handled, how property is documented when an arrestee is moved quickly, how property transfers are recorded, and how property issues are reviewed after the event.

Property Handling Concern: Complainant P

Complaint materials identified a property-handling concern involving Complainant P. Complainant P reported that personal property, including a fanny pack, was removed or separated from him during arrest and was not recovered.⁵⁴⁵ The final chain of command review addressed the property issue, but this report does not state the substance of the final personnel determination.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 27–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 3–5, 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

⁵⁴⁶ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026). Under the agreements between the City, the Police Guild, and the Lieutenants and Captains Association in the current CBAs, the OPO is prohibited from stating whether the officer(s) acted properly, whether an officer's actions were acceptable, or whether an officer's actions were in compliance with training or policy. As such, this report states when the final

The issue is important because it shows how easily property can become separated from an arrestee during a dynamic protest arrest. The complaint materials identify a chaotic arrest environment, but it also demonstrates why property handling must be documented clearly enough to identify who collected property, where it was placed, whether it was booked, whether it was transferred, and how it can be returned or accounted for later.⁵⁴⁷

The property issue should not be treated as minor merely because the event was chaotic. Property may include identification, phones, medical items, keys, wallets, recording devices, legal materials, or other items needed immediately after release. Losing or failing to secure property can create practical harm and public trust concerns.

Other Property and Personal Item Concerns

The broader complaint record included additional property and personal item concerns. Complaint materials included concerns about phones, wallets, identification, driver's licenses, recording devices, and other personal effects.⁵⁴⁸ Some concerns involved uncertainty about whether property was held by SPD, SCSO, jail staff, federal personnel, or another entity.⁵⁴⁹

Public reporting also raised concerns about phones and property after the protest arrests. RANGE Media reported on questions regarding protesters' phones and property being held after arrests.⁵⁵⁰

These concerns reinforce the need for clear procedures. Protest arrestees should receive, when feasible, basic information about where property was taken, how property can be recovered, what agency has custody, whether any item is held as evidence, and whom to contact if property is missing. Officers and supervisors should have a process that allows them to answer those questions later.

Phones, Recording Devices, and Sensitive Property

Phones and recording devices require particular care during protest arrests. People at First Amendment events may be recording police activity, communicating with others, contacting legal support, or documenting what they believe is public interest activity. Officers may lawfully secure property during an arrest, but the handling of phones, cameras, memory cards, press equipment, or legal-observer materials can raise additional public concern.

chain of command review occurred but does not state the substance of the final determination made by the chain of command.

⁵⁴⁷ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 27–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

⁵⁴⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 27–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁴⁹ *Id.*; SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁵⁰ Aaron Hedge, "Where Are the Protesters' Phones?," RANGE Media, June 20, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/protesters-phones-police-custody/>.

The June 11 public reporting and complaint record included concerns about phones and property in custody.⁵⁵¹ Those concerns reinforce the need for clear procedures. Property handling should distinguish between securing property for transport and securing property for evidence purposes such as searching, reviewing, deleting, damaging, or interfering with recorded material. Officers should document when a phone or recording device is collected, where it is placed, whether it is booked as personal property or evidence, and how it is returned or transferred.

SPD should consider adding protest arrest property guidance for phones, cameras, press equipment, and legal-observer materials. That guidance would support First Amendment interests, protect evidence integrity, and reduce later disputes about whether property was lost, damaged, searched, withheld as evidence, or transferred to another agency for evidentiary purposes.

Transport and Custody Transfers

Transport and custody transfers can become complicated during a multi-agency protest response. Arrestees may be moved from the arrest location to a collection point, from the collection point to a transport vehicle, from one agency's custody to another, or from the scene to a jail or other processing location. Each transfer creates a point where information can be lost.

The record should identify who had custody of the arrestee, when custody changed, whether property transferred with the person, whether medical or decontamination concerns were known, and which agency or officer was responsible at each stage.

This is especially important when assisting agencies are involved. If one agency arrests or assists with physical control, another coordinates transport, and another processes property, After Action reviewers need a clear chain of custody for both the person and property. Without that documentation, a complaint may be difficult to evaluate, and the public may not know where to seek information.

Future protest arrest procedures should include custody-transfer documentation when multiple officers, teams, or agencies are involved.

Medical Care and Decontamination for Arrestees

Arrested people may have been exposed to smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, crowd compression, physical control tactics, or other conditions before or during arrest. Some may have asthma, anxiety, injuries, or medical vulnerabilities that are not immediately visible.

⁵⁵¹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 27–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Aaron Hedge, “Where Are the Protesters’ Phones?,” RANGE Media, June 20, 2025, <https://www.rangemedia.co/protesters-phones-police-custody>.

Policy 308 requires decontamination as soon as practicable for people exposed to OC or pepper balls and assessment or documentation of direct impact injuries.⁵⁵² SPD Reviewer B noted that some exposed people left before they could be identified or assessed, while SPD Commander E identified documentation gaps where officers did not explain why medical aid or decontamination was not provided.⁵⁵³ SPD Commander C recommended embedded medics at arrestee collection points.⁵⁵⁴

Those observations support a practical arrestee processing improvement. At the collection point, SPD should document whether the arrestee reports injury, shows visible injury, appears exposed to irritants, requests medical care, receives medical care, refuses care, or cannot be assessed because of operational conditions. If decontamination is not provided, the reason should be documented.

This does not mean officers can provide immediate medical care in every crowd condition. It means the arrest process should preserve what was known and what was done once the person was under police control.

Identification, Agency Confusion, and Complaint Routing

Complaint materials show that community members had difficulty identifying which agency arrested, pushed, transported, or interacted with them. People referenced deputies, federal personnel, black uniforms, green uniforms, unidentified armed men, obscured identifiers, and officers whose agency affiliation was unclear.⁵⁵⁵

That confusion matters after arrest. If a person does not know which agency arrested them, transported them, handled their property, or used force, filing a complaint becomes difficult. It also becomes harder for SPD to determine whether a complaint should be handled internally, referred to another agency, or addressed as a broader event-level concern.

Future protest arrest procedures should include agency and officer identification in arrest documentation. When assisting agencies participate, SPD should maintain an event-level record that identifies which agency made or assisted with arrests, which agency transported arrestees, and how complaints involving non-SPD personnel should be routed. Visible identifiers, BWC labels, arrest reports, property logs, and custody-transfer records all support that process. It is worth noting again that SPD has forbidden wearing facemasks unless expressly authorized and has ordered “Spokane Police” back identification panels for the back of officer uniforms.

⁵⁵² SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 10–12, 85 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁵⁵³ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025).

⁵⁵⁴ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

⁵⁵⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025); OPOC August Meeting Complainants, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 6, 2025).

Demeanor and Communication During Arrests

Complaint materials included concerns about officer demeanor during arrests and interactions. Some complainants described officers as aggressive, dismissive, or unclear.⁵⁵⁶ Other reviewed interactions showed officers communicating professionally and calmly under difficult circumstances. SPD Reviewer B identified examples of professional communication by individual officers, and the UOFRB discussion noted positive examples for demeanor training.⁵⁵⁷

That range of accounts matters because demeanor is often experienced at the individual level, while public trust is affected by the overall operation. When a person is being arrested during a loud, confusing, emotionally charged protest, officer tone, instructions, and explanation can strongly affect whether the person perceives the arrest as lawful, fair, or punitive.

Future arrest procedures and training should emphasize short, clear, professional communication. Officers should tell arrestees why they are being detained, what they need to do physically, what will happen next, and where property or medical concerns should be raised. This will not eliminate disagreement about arrests, but it may reduce confusion and improve reviewability.

BWC and Arrest Documentation

BWC was essential to reviewing the June 11 arrests, but BWC is only useful when the relevant footage can be located and connected to the arrest or complaint. SPD Commander E and the UOFRB identified BWC labeling, markers, and report-writing issues during the broader review.⁵⁵⁸

BWC labeling is especially important in protest arrests. A major protest may generate hundreds of hours of footage. If arrest related footage is not labeled or marked, later reviewers may struggle to locate the relevant interaction. Supervisors should consider requiring post-event BWC markers or labels for arrests, dynamic takedowns, medical assessments, property issues, and custody transfers.

Arrest reports should identify the available BWC whenever possible. A report should identify the arresting officer's BWC, assisting officers' BWC, transport BWC if applicable, and any known drone, public video, or other footage that captures the arrest or collection point.

⁵⁵⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–24, 41–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁵⁷ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 16–18, 70–71 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 7 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁵⁵⁸ Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

Issue Nine: Policy Integration and Crowd Management Framework

Summary

June 11 highlighted the challenges of addressing crowd management through policies that operate alongside one another without a sufficiently clear operational connection. SPD had policies governing First Amendment activity, de-escalation, force, tactical deployment, mutual aid, UAS, documentation, arrests, medical response, and review. The event nevertheless required command and field personnel to determine in real time how those policies fit together as the mission changed, multiple agencies arrived, dialogue opportunities narrowed, dispersal orders were issued, force options were considered, and uninvolved people were affected.

Policy 461 should provide the organizing framework for those decisions. Related policies and SOPs should then define how dialogue is integrated into command, how unlawful assembly and dispersal decisions are made and communicated, when TAC or SWAT assumes the tactical lead, how mutual aid personnel operate within SPD expectations, how force and medical information are captured, and how the operation is reviewed afterward. The framework should also establish clear responsibilities for public messaging, BWC and event documentation, arrestee processing, property handling, and UAS use.

Policy 461 already acknowledges First Amendment protections, planning requirements, and the public's right to record police activity. Those provisions provide an important foundation. The remaining concern is that the policy does not yet connect those protections with sufficiently detailed guidance on dialogue, de-escalation, unlawful assembly, dispersal, tactical deployment, force, mutual aid, documentation, and review. Clearer operational connections would help command and field personnel apply the related policies consistently during a rapidly changing event.

A coordinated policy structure would give Incident Command and field supervisors a common operating model before conditions deteriorate. It would also reduce uncertainty about authority, improve consistency across units and partner agencies, and create a clearer record for later review. Issue Nine therefore addresses how SPD can connect the lessons identified throughout this report into a durable crowd management system.

Policy 461: First Amendment Assemblies

Policy 461 should serve as the anchor policy for First Amendment assemblies and crowd management events. It should explain SPD's overall approach to lawful assembly, protest facilitation, crowd management, targeted enforcement, unlawful assembly, dispersal, safe egress, media and observer issues, and the connection to related policies.

The policy should begin with a facilitation-first statement. Streets, sidewalks, and parks are traditional public forums where expressive activity receives strong constitutional protection.⁵⁵⁹ Restrictions on expressive activity must be content neutral, narrowly tailored, and leave open adequate alternative channels for communication.⁵⁶⁰ National protest response guidance similarly emphasizes that agencies should facilitate lawful assembly while addressing specific unlawful conduct.⁵⁶¹

Policy 461 should also address the full dispersal communication sequence. The policy should establish a consistent core message and identify who may approve changes to it. Any change to the affected area, route, deadline, or stated consequences should be communicated clearly. Force warnings should describe only options that command has authorized. Formal dispersal orders should also remain distinct from movement commands and later curfew notices. If the crowd moves or the announced route is no longer practical, command should reassess the order and provide updated direction.

Potential Language:

It is the policy of the Spokane Police Department to facilitate and protect lawful First Amendment activity. Crowd management operations should prioritize the safe continuation of lawful assembly, speech, and press activity. Enforcement actions should be narrowly tailored to address specific unlawful conduct and should not unnecessarily interfere with lawful participants.

Except when exigent circumstances exist and doing so would place officers or the public at risk, a dispersal order shall be issued prior to forcibly dispersing a crowd. The Incident Commander, or his/her designee, shall issue a dispersal order: 1. As close to the crowd as practical; 2. In a manner clearly audible to people in the crowd; 3. Use sound amplification systems when necessary.

When practical, SPD should record the dispersal order to establish that the orders were audible to the crowd and employ officers stationed around the perimeter of the crowd to ensure the dispersal order is clearly audible in more than one language, if possible, depending on the needs of the crowd.

Additional dispersal orders may be given following a reasonable period of time to allow for crowd dispersal. Ongoing dispersal orders should be avoided. If after a dispersal order is given, a crowd is discovered in a different location, the new location should be evaluated to determine if it is an ongoing unlawful assembly

⁵⁵⁹ [United States v. Grace](#), 461 U.S. 171, 177–180 (1983).

⁵⁶⁰ [Ward v. Rock Against Racism](#), 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

⁵⁶¹ National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, [21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety](#), 2022, at 10–14; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, [Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials](#), 1990, Principles 12–14.

Policy 461 should also connect directly to Policy 300. De-escalation, communication, and voluntary compliance should not appear only in a separate de-escalation policy. They should be incorporated into the First Amendment assembly policy itself because they are operational tools in crowd management.

Potential Language:

The de-escalation requirements of Policy 300 apply to First Amendment assembly and crowd management operations. De-escalation, communication, and voluntary compliance strategies should be the primary operational response to crowd related incidents whenever feasible.

Policy 461 should also distinguish facilitation, targeted enforcement, dispersal, and tactical intervention. The policy should make clear that broad enforcement action affecting a crowd should be based on articulable conduct and risk, not on viewpoint, hostility, inconvenience, or criticism of government.

Potential Language:

Officers should not transition to force, dispersal, or tactical intervention unless de-escalation efforts have been attempted or are not reasonably feasible based on an articulable public safety concern or threat of harm.

Crowd management operations should prioritize facilitation of lawful assembly, de-escalation, communication, and targeted enforcement. Broad or indiscriminate force against crowds should be prohibited.

Those statements would align Policy 461 with the national reform direction discussed in the preceding framework and would make Policy 461 the starting point for the related policies that follow.

Policy 300: De-escalation

Policy 300 should be translated into crowd management practice. In a protest environment, de-escalation may include dialogue, liaison communication, public messaging, route-specific instructions, time and distance when feasible, targeted enforcement, safe egress planning, explanation of mission changes, City-to-Incident Command information flow, and officer-level communication.

On June 11, SPD command initially limited involvement because of concern that crowd control action could be interpreted as assisting federal immigration transport.⁵⁶² Later, command

⁵⁶² After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

concluded that local law and public safety concerns required police action.⁵⁶³ That kind of mission transition requires communication and de-escalation practices that are specific to crowd events, not only general de-escalation principles.

Potential Language:

Officers should employ de-escalation techniques as the primary response to crowd related incidents when feasible. Force should not be used unless de-escalation efforts have been attempted and are ineffective, or where immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent harm or address an articulable public safety concern.

Policy 300 should also address passive resistance, non-compliance, and expressive conduct. A person's presence at a protest, criticism of police, recording activity, or refusal to immediately respond to unclear directions should not automatically be treated the same as assaultive conduct or an immediate public safety threat.

Potential Language:

Passive resistance, non-compliance, or expressive conduct alone should not justify the Use of Force absent additional facts establishing an articulable public safety concern, threat, or lawful basis for enforcement.

This language is consistent with *Graham v. Connor*, which requires force to be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.⁵⁶⁴ It is also consistent with the IACP National Consensus Policy on Use of Force and PERF's de-escalation guidance, both of which treat de-escalation as an operational duty rather than an optional preference.⁵⁶⁵

Policy 301: Use of Force

Policy 301 should more clearly explain how Use of Force principles apply in First Amendment crowd events. Policy 301 should connect force to necessity, proportionality, objective reasonableness, individualized conduct where feasible, and the special risks of applying force in dense assemblies.

Crowd event force differs from force in a single-subject encounter. A force option may be directed at one person but affect many people. Smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, and impact munitions may affect bystanders, media, legal observers, uninvolved people, or people attempting to leave. Direct impact munitions may raise different concerns than area denial tools.

⁵⁶³ *Id.* at 4–6.

⁵⁶⁴ *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

⁵⁶⁵ International Association of Chiefs of Police, *National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force*, updated 2020; Police Executive Research Forum, *Guiding Principles on Use of Force*, 2016, at 11–18; National Policing Institute and U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *21st Century Protest Response: Promoting Democracy and Advancing Community and Officer Safety*, 2022, at 27–31.

Policy 301 should therefore identify the principles that guide force in protest settings and cross-reference Policy 308 for tool-specific rules.

Potential Language:

Force used during First Amendment assemblies should be narrowly tailored and directed toward specific individuals engaged in unlawful conduct whenever feasible.

The indiscriminate application of force against crowds, including force likely to affect uninvolved people, should be prohibited.

Force should not be used solely to compel compliance with dispersal orders absent an immediate and articulable threat to public safety or other lawful basis for force under SPD policy.

Policy 301 should also address chemical agents, impact munitions, and other less lethal force in crowd environments.

Potential Language:

The use of chemical agents, impact munitions, or other less lethal force affecting a crowd should be prohibited unless necessary to address an articulable public safety threat and, where feasible, directed at specific individuals engaged in conduct justifying that force.

This approach does not eliminate command discretion. It provides a clearer policy basis for distinguishing a person engaged in assaultive behavior, a person attempting to defeat an area denial tool, a person passively resisting, a person moving slowly, and a person who is confused or unable to leave.

Policy 308: Control Devices and Techniques

Policy 308 should provide more specific crowd event guidance for control devices and less lethal tools. June 11 raised questions involving smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, bean bag rounds, area denial, direct impact, active resistance, assaultive behavior, attempts to defeat smoke or PAVA, medical care, decontamination, and documentation.⁵⁶⁶

Policy 308 should distinguish area denial from direct impact and establish the separate authorization, warning, documentation, medical, and review requirements applicable to each use. Area denial requires attention to crowd movement, available egress, exposure, and effects on people in or near the deployment area. Direct impact requires documentation of the person's

⁵⁶⁶ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

conduct, the threat or resistance presented, the point of aim and impact, the number of rounds, the observed effect, injury potential, and medical follow-up.

Potential Language:

Chemical agents, OC spray, impact munitions, and launchable less lethal systems should not be deployed indiscriminately into crowds where uninvolved people are present.

Less lethal force should not be used solely for the purpose of gaining compliance with dispersal orders absent an articulable threat or other lawful basis for force under SPD policy.

Policy 308 should also make a clear policy decision about smoke. The completed Use of Force review and UOFRB discussion identified uncertainty about whether smoke should be treated as reportable force or separately tracked and reviewed.⁵⁶⁷ SPD should resolve that ambiguity. If smoke is reportable force, Policy 308 and Policy 301 should say so. If smoke is not reportable force, Policy 308 should still require mandatory tracking and review when smoke is used in crowd events.

Potential Language:

Smoke deployed during crowd management operations should be documented and reviewed. Policy should specify whether smoke is reportable force or a separately tracked crowd management tool, and should identify authorization, deployment, medical, decontamination, and reporting requirements.

This would allow SPD to preserve technical distinctions while still recognizing that smoke may move a crowd, affect breathing or visibility, create heat or flame concerns, affect uninvolved people, and become part of later force justification.

Policy 352: Outside Agency Assistance and Mutual Aid

Policy 352 should address mutual aid in First Amendment and crowd management settings more specifically. June 11 showed that mutual aid is not only a staffing issue. It is also a command, legal, communication, force, identification, reporting, and complaint-routing issue.

SPD Commander D identified SCSO coordination as a lesson learned after learning that the ICE supervisor also communicated with SCSO and indicated SCSO might bring armor and assist federal personnel in exiting.⁵⁶⁸ That issue was especially important because SPD was trying to

⁵⁶⁷ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–2 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–6 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁵⁶⁸ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

maintain a distinction between assisting federal immigration enforcement and responding to independent local law and public safety concerns.

Potential Language:

Outside agencies participating in First Amendment assembly or crowd management operations within Spokane jurisdiction should operate consistent with SPD crowd management, de-escalation, dispersal, and Use of Force expectations when operating under SPD incident command.

Prior to deployment, Incident Command should ensure that assisting agencies receive operational briefings regarding mission, rules of engagement, authorized crowd management tactics, force limitations, dispersal procedures, arrest protocols, reporting requirements, supervisory expectations, and legal constraints.

Supervisors assigned to mutual aid operations should ensure that assisting personnel understand and comply with SPD operational directives and constitutional policing standards while operating under SPD incident command.

Unified command structures should maintain clear supervisory accountability regarding crowd management decisions, tactical deployment, dispersal authorization, and force applications involving assisting agencies.

When feasible, crowd management training involving mutual aid agencies should incorporate standardized instruction regarding First Amendment facilitation, de-escalation, targeted enforcement, procedural justice, visible identification, force reporting, and restrictions on indiscriminate crowd force.

This type of language would clarify expectations when SPD requests or coordinates mutual aid for a First Amendment crowd management event.

Policy 408: Special Weapons and Tactics Team

Policy 408 should clarify tactical deployment thresholds and field command roles during First Amendment crowd events. Tactical resources may be necessary when there is a specific and articulable threat, trapped people, weapons, violence, or a high-risk rescue or extraction concern. At the same time, visible tactical deployment can affect crowd perception and escalation dynamics.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁹ Police Executive Research Forum, [Rethinking the Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: 9 Recommendations](#), 2022, at 99–103; U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, [Investigation of the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department](#), 2023.

Potential Language:

Tactical response teams (SWAT) should not be deployed into or near First Amendment assemblies absent a specific and articulable threat of violence, serious bodily injury, trapped people, or other public safety need that cannot reasonably be addressed through standard crowd management resources.

Policy 408 should also clarify whether tactical resources are leading, supporting, standing by, or operating under a crowd management field commander. That distinction matters because crowd management and SWAT operations require different assumptions, equipment, field authority, communication, and public perception planning.

Potential Language:

When tactical resources are used during First Amendment assembly or crowd management operations, Incident Command should identify whether tactical resources are leading, supporting, standing by, or operating under a designated crowd management field commander.

This would help avoid mixed deployment confusion and ensure that tactical capability supports, rather than unintentionally displaces, crowd management command.

Policy 463: Medical Aid and Response

Policy 463 should connect medical aid, emergency access, decontamination, and arrestee processing to crowd management planning. June 11 raised medical and decontamination issues involving smoke, OC/PAVA, direct impact munitions, arrest related force, arrestee collection points, stadium attendees, and other uninvolved people.⁵⁷⁰ SPD Commander C's recommendations included placing medics at arrestee collection points.⁵⁷¹

Potential Language:

Medical aid and emergency access routes should be maintained during crowd management operations whenever reasonably feasible, including access for EMS personnel, treatment or information for chemical agent exposure, and embedded or designated medical support at arrestee collection points when feasible.

Policy 463 should also require documentation when medical care or decontamination is provided, refused, delayed, or not feasible because of operational conditions.

⁵⁷⁰ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 10–12, 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 14–38 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁷¹ Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026).

Potential Language:

During crowd management operations involving OC/PAVA, smoke, impact munitions, arrests, or physical control tactics, officers and supervisors should document known injuries, reported injuries, exposure complaints, decontamination efforts, refusals of medical care, and reasons medical care or decontamination could not be provided when applicable.

That language would align medical aid practice with the realities of crowd events, where affected people may leave before identification, be moved to an arrestee collection point, or be located outside the immediate protest area.

Policy 604: Unmanned Aerial Systems

Policy 604 should include First Amendment safeguards for UAS use during assemblies and crowd management events. UAS can support legitimate public safety needs, including assessing blocked exits, identifying specific threats, evaluating crowd movement, supporting safe egress, locating medical emergencies, and helping command avoid broader enforcement by identifying specific problem areas. TAC leaders also described legitimate public safety uses for UAS during First Amendment events, while recognizing that drones should not be deployed merely to monitor peaceful First Amendment activity.⁵⁷² These reasons should be clearly articulated and documented.

Policy 604 should distinguish public safety use from generalized monitoring of lawful protest activity.

Potential Language:

Unmanned Aerial Systems should not be used to monitor, record, identify, track, or collect intelligence on individuals or groups engaged in lawful First Amendment protected activity unless specific and articulable facts establish a public safety purpose or reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct presenting a significant and immediate threat to public safety.

Policy 604 should also address retention and privacy.

Potential Language:

Footage or imagery collected during crowd management operations that does not contain evidence of criminal conduct or information necessary for administrative review should be managed pursuant to established retention schedules and should not be retained solely for intelligence, monitoring, or identification purposes and are documented.

⁵⁷² OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

Finally, Policy 604 should include transparency expectations.

Potential Language:

SPD should publish periodic reports summarizing UAS deployments, including deployments associated with crowd management or First Amendment activities, consistent with applicable law and public disclosure requirements.

That approach would preserve UAS as a public safety tool while reducing the risk that lawful protest activity is perceived or treated as intelligence activity.

Policy 1020: Personnel Complaints

Policy 1020 should include a systemic complaint-theme process for major First Amendment and crowd management events. June 11 generated both officer specific allegations and broader event-level concerns. The complaint review distinguished between individual allegations and broader department policy or operational concerns.⁵⁷³ That distinction is appropriate, but broader concerns still need a formal review pathway.

Potential Language:

Complaints arising from First Amendment assembly or crowd management events should be tracked, reviewed, and analyzed collectively to identify systemic operational, supervisory, communication, training, documentation, or policy issues.

Policy 1020 should also explain how systemic complaint themes are routed. Some concerns may require individual investigation. Others may require policy review, training review, After Action review, UOFRB discussion, command review, or public explanation.

Potential Language:

When multiple complaints arise from a major crowd management event, SPD should identify recurring themes and route systemic issues to command staff, training, policy, IA, and the OPO as appropriate, without converting every systemic concern into an individual personnel allegation.

This would help SPD preserve the distinction between personnel accountability and systemic learning.

Policy 1046: Uniform Regulations and Appearance Standards

Policy 1046 should address visible agency and individual identification during First Amendment, mutual aid, and crowd management events. Complaint materials showed that community

⁵⁷³ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

members had difficulty distinguishing SPD, SCSO, federal personnel, deputies, and other armed personnel.⁵⁷⁴ Some referenced green uniforms, black uniforms, deputies, federal personnel, unidentified armed men, or obscured identifiers.⁵⁷⁵

Potential Language:

Officers assigned to First Amendment assembly operations should deploy in standard uniform whenever feasible. Tactical protective equipment should be used only when supported by an articulable operational necessity.

Officer identification should remain visible during crowd management operations absent specific and clearly defined safety based exceptions within policy.

Policy 1046 should also consider agency identifiers and alternative individual identifiers when names are not feasible for safety reasons.

Potential Language:

When protective equipment obscures ordinary identification, SPD should use agency identifiers and individual identifiers, such as badge numbers, helmet numbers, or other accountability markings, when operationally feasible.

Identification protects both the public and officers. It improves complaint routing, reduces misattribution, and supports later review.

Command Checklist and Implementation

The policy package should be supported by a crowd event command checklist. The checklist should not be rigid or overly prescriptive. It should help command remember the issues that repeatedly arise in major First Amendment events.

A useful checklist would help command confirm that the mission, legal constraints, and lines of authority are clear. It should also address communication with the crowd and partner agencies, dispersal and egress planning, force and medical considerations, documentation, public messaging, and the After Action process.

The checklist should be scalable. A small protest may require only a few prompts. A large event involving mutual aid, munitions, arrests, nearby venues, or significant public concern may require more documentation.

⁵⁷⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant H Intake, at 2–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 19, 2025); OPOC August Meeting Complainants, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Oct. 6, 2025).

⁵⁷⁵ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

Several post-incident improvements appear to be underway, including TAC readiness, recurring training, improved field command structure, clearer dispersal practices, enhanced communication acquisition efforts, arrestee medical planning, and venue communication.⁵⁷⁶ Those improvements should be formalized through policy, SOP, training records, After Action documentation, and implementation tracking so they become department practice.

Commendable Practices

This report identifies significant policy, training, communication, documentation, and command practice issues raised by the June 11 response. The materials reviewed identify several actions by SPD personnel and reviewers that promoted restraint, legality, accountability, and organizational learning. Recognizing these practices is important because effective oversight should identify what should be preserved and formalized, not only what should be changed.

The June 11 response involved overlapping legal, operational, public safety, First Amendment, immigration enforcement, mutual aid, and public trust issues. The record shows that SPD personnel faced a rapidly changing event that developed from a small protest into a large multi-agency response involving blocked vehicles, obstructed exits, a nearby stadium event, protest activity at multiple locations, and significant public attention.⁵⁷⁷ The record also shows that SPD's later Internal Affairs review, Use of Force review, UOFRB discussion, complaint review, and TAC/Crowd Management discussion identified both commendable practices and key lessons for future protest response planning.⁵⁷⁸

Commendable Practice 1: SPD Recognized the Incident Required Command-Level Legal and Mission Assessment

Command documentation shows that SPD command recognized the June 11 event as more than a routine crowd control or Use of Force event. SPD command had to evaluate First Amendment activity, federal immigration enforcement concerns, local public safety issues, obstructed exits and vehicles, people inside the federal facility, mutual aid, force options, public messaging, and

⁵⁷⁶ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, C25-066, at 3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁵⁷⁷ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁷⁸ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Commander F, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 13, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

later arrest processing.⁵⁷⁹ SPD Commander D reported reviewing RCW 43.17.425, consulting SPD Commander B, contacting the City Attorney's Office, and concluding that SPD action at that stage could be interpreted as assisting ICE with detainee transport.⁵⁸⁰

This was an important command practice. SPD did not initially treat the federal request for assistance as automatically authorizing local crowd control action. Instead, command paused, sought legal guidance, and attempted to distinguish between federal immigration enforcement and local public safety enforcement. That practice should be preserved in future incidents involving federal immigration facilities, federal requests for assistance, or protests related to immigration enforcement.

Commendable Practice 2: The After Action Report Preserved Important Command Reasoning

SPD Commander D's After Action Report provided an important command post account of the incident. It documented the initial legal concern, contact with federal personnel, alternative transport planning, SCSO coordination, the perceived mission change, the safety corridor concept, and later operational concerns.⁵⁸¹ The report also identified lessons learned, including the need for clearer SCSO coordination and the value of earlier face-to-face contact at the command post.⁵⁸²

The After Action Report did not capture every field perspective, and this report recommends a more inclusive After Action review process for major events. Still, the existence of a written command post account is commendable. It preserved some key command reasoning and created a foundation for later review by SPD, the OPO, OPOC, and the public.

Commendable Practice 3: SPD Had Developed Dialogue Capacity and Recognized Its Value

The record shows that SPD had dialogue resources available and that command was aware of dialogue as a potential response option during the early stages of the protest.⁵⁸³ The supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion also reflects that SPD personnel understand dialogue as a relationship-based function that works best when deployed early and supported by preexisting community relationships.⁵⁸⁴ TAC leaders described dialogue as most effective before a protest becomes heated and explained that relationship building with community groups,

⁵⁷⁹ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 1–11 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁸⁰ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁸¹ *Id.* at 1–6.

⁵⁸² *Id.* at 3–4.

⁵⁸³ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁵⁸⁴ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

churches, and protest organizers can reduce unnecessary resource deployment and improve voluntary cooperation.⁵⁸⁵ SPD has continued to update its dialogue program since this event.

That practice should be recognized. The June 11 record also shows that dialogue was not visible or effective enough from the perspective of many community members. But the existence of a developing dialogue model is a strength. The improvement is to formalize that model, deploy it earlier when feasible, integrate it into the command structure, and document what dialogue officers learn and communicate to field and incident command.

Commendable Practice 4: TAC Leaders Clarified the Crowd Management Mission

TAC leaders provided useful operational context by distinguishing crowd management from a traditional SWAT or hostage rescue mission. Although people inside the federal facility needed to be moved safely, TAC leaders described the central problem as creating sufficient space for people and vehicles to leave while managing lawful First Amendment activity and unlawful conduct. That distinction helped clarify that specialty resources may be necessary during a protest response, but their roles should be defined by the mission rather than by their mere presence at the scene.⁵⁸⁶

This perspective is commendable because it identifies a concrete planning lesson. Future operations should establish which unit is responsible for the crowd management plan, which resources are supporting that plan, and what change in circumstances would require a different tactical lead.

Commendable Practice 5: TAC Leaders Identified the Need for Defined Field Command Authority

The TAC/Crowd Management discussion identified a significant lesson regarding field command authority. TAC leaders described the June 11 response as involving overlapping authority among SPD TAC, SPD SWAT, SCSO or county resources, and SPD patrol personnel.⁵⁸⁷ They explained that the response involved different leaders, different personnel groups, and different mission assumptions, which made the event less fluid than a normal crowd management response.⁵⁸⁸

They also described the need for a clearer tactical lead structure so that field personnel report through one tactical commander and support units remain in support roles unless the mission changes.⁵⁸⁹ That recognition is commendable because it identifies a specific operational improvement rather than only a general concern. Future crowd management operations should define the tactical lead, field command authority, command post role, support unit role, SWAT role, mutual aid role, and escalation authority before deployment whenever feasible.

⁵⁸⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁸⁹ *Id.*

Commendable Practice 6: TAC Leaders Recognized Both the Public Safety Value and First Amendment Limits of UAS

The TAC/Crowd Management discussion emphasized that UAS use during First Amendment events should be tied to a specific, documented public safety purpose. TAC leaders stated that drones should not be used simply to monitor lawful protest activity.⁵⁹⁰ When used, the justification should explain the operational need, such as roadway safety, locating dialogue officers, identifying specific threats, supporting rescue or extraction planning. Documenting that purpose helps distinguish legitimate situational awareness from generalized surveillance and allows later review of whether the deployment was appropriately limited.⁵⁹¹

That balance is commendable. It recognizes that UAS can help command understand a complex public safety environment without turning lawful protest activity into generalized surveillance. Future policy should preserve this distinction by requiring documented public safety justification and by prohibiting general monitoring, tracking, or intelligence gathering directed at lawful First Amendment activity without specific and articulable public safety or criminal conduct concerns.

Commendable Practice 7: SPD Issued Repeated Warnings Before Broad Munitions Deployment

The record contains repeated CAD and IA timeline entries documenting unlawful assembly announcements, dispersal orders, arrest warnings, and force warnings before smoke and pepper ball were authorized and deployed. The IA timeline records multiple announcements beginning around 7:12 p.m. and continuing before later munitions deployments.⁵⁹² CAD similarly records repeated announcements, including entries noting that the environment was loud and that announcements were being made every few minutes.⁵⁹³

Warning before enforcement or force is an important safeguard. At the same time, the complaint record shows that issuance of warnings and effective receipt of warnings are not the same. Several complainants reported that they did not hear, understand, or know how to comply with dispersal orders.⁵⁹⁴ The commendable practice is that SPD did issue repeated warnings. The improvement is to evaluate whether those warnings were audible, understandable, geographically directed, repeated, and paired with realistic safe egress options.

⁵⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁵⁹¹ *Id.*

⁵⁹² SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 12–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁵⁹³ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁹⁴ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–11, 24–26 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant D / Complainant M, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025); Interview Transcript, Complainant P, at 14–17 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 8, 2025).

Commendable Practice 8: SPD Limited Certain Force Options and Reviewers Identified Munitions Policy Issues

CAD and command records repeatedly state that CS tear gas was not authorized. CAD recorded that CS was not authorized at approximately 7:40 p.m. and later recorded that only OC and smoke were authorized.⁵⁹⁵ Those limits are important because community members and media sources used broad terms such as “gas,” “tear gas,” or “chemical agents,” while SPD records distinguish between CS, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm Blue Nose rounds, and bean bag rounds.⁵⁹⁶

SPD’s later review also identified munitions and force classification issues that should be addressed through policy. SPD Reviewer B, SPD Commander E, SPD Commander C, and the UOFRB discussed issues involving smoke, pepper ball, 40mm, bean bag rounds, Policy 308 clarity, report writing, BWC labeling, medical care, decontamination, and review capacity.⁵⁹⁷ This is commendable because the review did not simply stop at whether force was used; it identified broader policy and documentation questions that should guide future reform.

Commendable Practice 9: SPD Recognized the Importance of Mutual Aid Coordination

SPD coordinated with the SCSO and federal personnel during a rapidly changing event. SPD Commander D reported that SCSO contacted him and offered assistance, that he asked SCSO to stage support, and that he later formally requested mutual aid after command concluded that protesters had blocked access and crimes were occurring.⁵⁹⁸ SPD Commander D also identified a coordination lesson after learning that the ICE supervisor had separately communicated with SCSO and indicated SCSO might bring armor and assist agents in exiting.⁵⁹⁹

That recognition is commendable because mutual aid during a First Amendment event is not just a staffing issue. It is a mission, command, legal, identification, force, arrest, reporting, and public trust issue. SPD’s recognition that earlier face-to-face coordination with SCSO at the command post would have improved the response provides a practical lesson for future events.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁵ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 6, 9 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁹⁶ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 9–12 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025).

⁵⁹⁷ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander C, F25-022, at 1–3 (uploaded to IAPro on Jan. 2, 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

⁵⁹⁸ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025).

⁵⁹⁹ *Id.* at 3–4.

⁶⁰⁰ *Id.* at 4.

Commendable Practice 10: SPD Identified Post-Incident Improvements and Demonstrated Practices Worth Formalizing

The TAC/Crowd Management discussion identified meaningful post-incident improvements in operational readiness, training, and internal learning. The most measurable change involved take-home vehicles for TAC members, which reportedly reduced response time from approximately 90 minutes to 30 to 40 minutes. These changes demonstrate that SPD acted on several lessons identified after the incident.⁶⁰¹

The Chief has been working on additional improvements to the department's crowd management response. Those efforts include clearer Spokane Police agency markings on uniforms, updates to the dialogue program, limits on personnel wearing masks without an operational need, command-level crowd management training, and research into long range acoustic equipment or other communication systems that could improve the reach and clarity of public safety announcements.

The record also includes examples of SPD personnel demonstrating care for arrestees while they waited for transport. BWC shows officers checking on comfort, assisting with hydration when feasible, responding to handcuff concerns, helping people who had difficulty remaining seated, and allowing communication with family members or others nearby. These examples align with the department's stated commitment to professionalism, integrity, and compassion.

These improvements should be preserved through policy, SOPs, training, and After Action review. Formalizing them would reduce the risk that lessons are lost when personnel change assignments or leadership roles and would help ensure that future crowd responses build on the changes already underway.

Key Takeaways

The June 11 response should not be understood only as a series of individual force events or complaint allegations. It was also a command, communication, crowd management, mutual aid, documentation, and organizational learning event. The following takeaways summarize the principal systemic lessons identified through the full review.

Key Takeaway 1: The Incident Required a Clear Mission and Legal Framework

SPD command recognized the legal sensitivity of responding to a protest involving federal immigration enforcement and initially limited police action while seeking legal guidance. The mission later changed after command identified separate local law and public safety concerns. Future responses involving federal facilities or requests for assistance should begin with a documented mission that explains SPD's legal authority, operational limits, and the basis for any

⁶⁰¹ *Id.*

later change. That mission should also be communicated to participating agencies and, when feasible, to the public.⁶⁰²

Key Takeaway 2: The After Action Review Must Include Command and Field Perspectives

SPD Commander D's After Action Report preserved important command post reasoning, but it did not fully capture how the operation was experienced or implemented in the field. Future reviews should occur at multiple levels, with Incident Command assessing the overall response and field commanders and unit supervisors evaluating the performance of their personnel and plans. Supervisors should have access to relevant BWC, CAD, reports, and completed complaint and Use of Force reviews so that lessons are based on the full available record.⁶⁰³

Key Takeaway 3: Dialogue Must Be an Operational Command Function

SPD has developed meaningful dialogue capacity, but dialogue was not visibly or fully integrated into the June 11 response. Dialogue is most useful when relationships are established before an event and officers are deployed early enough to influence conditions. Future plans should define the Dialogue Team's role, its connection to field and Incident Command, and how information received from organizers or participants will inform mission, de-escalation, dispersal, and egress decisions.⁶⁰⁴

Key Takeaway 4: Tactical Roles Must be Defined by the Mission

Crowd management and SWAT resources may operate during the same event, but they should not work under unclear or competing assumptions. The June 11 response showed the need to identify the tactical lead, supporting units, delegated field authority, and the conditions that would shift responsibility from TAC/Crowd Management to SWAT. Those roles should be established in advance when feasible and reinforced through policy, SOPs, training, and After Action review.⁶⁰⁵

Key Takeaway 5: Field Command Needs Defined Authority

Incident Command must retain authority over major decisions, but trained field commanders also need the ability to make time-sensitive tactical decisions within the approved mission. The June 11 materials show uncertainty about which decisions could be made in the field and which

⁶⁰² After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 2–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁶⁰³ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 1–6 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁶⁰⁴ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁶⁰⁵ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

required command post approval. SPD should define those boundaries, establish a clear process for communicating requests and decisions, and document significant changes in direction.⁶⁰⁶

Key Takeaway 6: Warnings Must Be Evaluated for Effectiveness

SPD issued repeated warnings before broader munitions were deployed, but the announcement sequence became less consistent over time. Later messages combined dispersal directions with movement commands, force warnings, and curfew information, and some referred to CS even though it had not been authorized. Future operations should preserve a clear core message and plainly communicate any change in route, timing, or stated consequences.⁶⁰⁷

Key Takeaway 7: Crowd Event Munitions Require Clearer Policy and Tracking

The completed review identified recurring questions involving smoke, area denial, direct impact, command authorization, reporting, and medical follow-up. Crowd management tools are used in conditions that may include movement, reduced visibility, uninvolved people, and First Amendment activity. SPD should clarify how each tool may be used, whether smoke is reportable or otherwise subject to mandatory tracking and review, and what documentation and medical response are required after deployment.⁶⁰⁸

Key Takeaway 8: Documentation and Review Structure Must Scale to the Event

The volume of CAD, BWC, drone footage, force reports, complaint materials, arrest records, and other evidence made the June 11 review difficult to organize and complete. Ordinary single-incident practices are not sufficient for an event of this size. SPD needs a major event documentation and review structure that preserves command decisions, identifies key video, collects force and munitions information, connects complaint themes to operational review, and allows work to be divided among appropriate reviewers. Clear documentation supports accountability, organizational learning, and a fair assessment of officer and command decisions.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁶ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁶⁰⁷ CAD View for 2025-20116445, at 4–8 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 2–13, 24–26 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁶⁰⁸ SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 85, 90–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026); OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

⁶⁰⁹ SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 1–13 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025); SPD IA Additional, F25-022, SPD Reviewer B, at 1–91 (uploaded to IAPro on Sept. 1, 2025); Use of Force Supervisor Review, SPD Commander E, at 1–4 (uploaded to IAPro on Nov. 26, 2025); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

Key Takeaway 9: Mutual Aid Must Operate Within a Unified Command Structure

The public experienced June 11 as a multi-agency law enforcement operation, even though the participating agencies maintained separate policies and accountability systems. SPD should ensure that mutual aid partners understand the local mission, command structure, communication plan, force expectations, identification requirements, arrest procedures, and reporting responsibilities before deployment when feasible. Clearer coordination would improve operations and make later review and complaint routing more reliable.⁶¹⁰

Key Takeaway 10: Improvements Must be Formalized and Preserved

SPD and TAC leadership made meaningful changes after June 11, including improved TAC readiness, additional training, dialogue development, debriefing, agency identification, and command education. The record also contains positive examples of officers addressing arrestee comfort and care. These improvements should be preserved through policy, SOPs, training records, supervisory review, and implementation tracking so they continue after personnel or leadership changes.⁶¹¹

Final Recommendations

The recommendations below arise from the June 11 factual record, the completed complaint and Use of Force reviews, the supplemental TAC/Crowd Management discussion, the legal and operational frameworks described above, and the sources cited within Issues One through Nine. They are not limited to one policy, unit, or phase of the response. Several recommendations overlap because the same issues appeared in different ways: mission clarity, communication, unlawful assembly, dispersal, force review, documentation, mutual aid, third-party impact, arrests, property handling, medical care, and policy integration.

These recommendations are systemic policy, training, documentation, supervision, and review recommendations. They are not intended to comment on individual officer performance or to revisit completed personnel determinations.

Mission, Legal Framework, and Command Decision-Making

Recommendation 1: Create an immigration enforcement response protocol.

SPD should create a protocol for incidents involving federal immigration facilities, federal requests for assistance, or protests related to immigration enforcement. The protocol should

⁶¹⁰ After Action Report, SPD Commander D, at 3–5 (uploaded to IAPro on Jul. 7, 2025); SPD IA Additional, C25-066, SPD Reviewer A, at 8–11, 17–43 (uploaded to IAPro on Dec. 22, 2025).

⁶¹¹ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026); SPD Officer F’s BWC Video 2025-06-11, at 01:15:25, 01:25:28, and 01:27:23.

guide command staff in distinguishing federal immigration enforcement from independent local law and public safety concerns.

The protocol should require command to document the legal basis for SPD action, identify what SPD is and is not agreeing to do, identify the local public safety interest, and communicate mission limits to assisting agencies when feasible.

Related to Issues One, Seven, and Nine.

Recommendation 2: Require documented mission statements and mission change updates during major First Amendment or crowd management events.

SPD should require a written or recorded mission statement during major First Amendment or crowd management events when feasible. The mission statement should identify the public safety concern, legal basis, operational objective, command structure, and limits on police action.

When the mission changes, command should document the new mission, the facts supporting the change, who authorized the change, what tactical or communication steps follow, and how the change will be communicated to field personnel and assisting agencies.

Related to Issues One, Two, Seven, and Nine.

Recommendation 3: Revise Policy 461 to establish a facilitation-first crowd management framework.

SPD should revise Policy 461 to establish a facilitation first framework for First Amendment assemblies and crowd management events. The policy should recognize that lawful assembly is protected activity and that SPD's starting point should be facilitation, communication, de-escalation, targeted enforcement, and public safety planning.

Policy 461 should distinguish between lawful assembly, targeted enforcement, unlawful assembly, dispersal, area denial, and crowd control. It should also cross-reference the policies that govern de-escalation, Use of Force, control devices, mutual aid, tactical deployment, medical care, UAS, complaints, and identification.

Related to Issues Two, Three, Nine, and the Contemporary Crowd Management and Policy Reform Framework.

Recommendation 4: Integrate Policy 300 de-escalation requirements into First Amendment assembly and crowd management operations.

SPD should revise Policy 461, Policy 300, and related SOPs to make clear that de-escalation applies to First Amendment assemblies and crowd management operations. De-escalation in this context should include dialogue, liaison communication, layered public messaging, route-specific

instructions, voluntary compliance opportunities, time and distance when feasible, targeted enforcement when feasible, and safe egress planning.

Policy should also clarify that passive resistance, expressive conduct, or non-compliance alone should not automatically justify force absent additional facts establishing an articulable public safety concern, threat, or lawful basis for enforcement.

Related to Issues Two, Three, Four, and Nine.

Recommendation 5: Require targeted enforcement analysis before broad dispersal or crowd-wide force when feasible.

SPD should require command to consider targeted enforcement before broad dispersal, area denial, or crowd-wide force when feasible. The analysis should identify the specific conduct creating the public safety concern, whether the conduct is isolated or collective, whether particular individuals can be identified or removed, and why less intrusive options are not feasible if broader action is authorized.

This analysis should be documented in CAD, an incident command log, an After Action record, or another event documentation tool.

Related to Issues Three, Four, and Nine.

[Communication, Dispersal, and Safe Egress](#)

Recommendation 6: Develop a layered protest communication and dialogue plan.

SPD should develop a layered communication plan for protest and crowd management events. The plan should integrate dialogue officers, field supervisors, public address systems, social media or public information messaging, venue contacts, and officer-level communication.

The plan should identify who is responsible for communicating with organizers or informal leaders, how information from dialogue personnel is relayed to command, how mission changes are explained, how dispersal or arrest warnings are delivered, and how communication is documented.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Six, and Nine.

Recommendation 7: Standardize dispersal order content, delivery, and documentation.

SPD should establish a standardized dispersal order protocol for First Amendment and crowd management events. The initial order should identify the affected area, available routes, time to comply, and possible consequences. Later announcements should reinforce that core message unless conditions require a change.

Any change in route, timing, or stated consequences should be communicated clearly. Warnings about force should identify only the options approved by command. Dispersal orders should also remain distinct from movement commands and curfew notices.

The protocol should address announcement intervals, audibility, and documentation. Command should reassess the order when the crowd moves or the announced route is no longer practical. The record should identify what was announced, when and where it was delivered, and when enforcement or force began.

Related to Issues Two, Three, Six, and Nine.

Force, Munitions, Medical Care, and Documentation

Recommendation 8: Clarify Policy 301 and Policy 308 standards for area denial, direct impact, smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm, bean bag rounds, and related tools.

SPD should clarify Policies 301 and 308 for force and control-device use in First Amendment and crowd management environments. The policies should distinguish between area denial, direct impact force, crowd movement, arrest control, smoke deployment, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, 40mm, bean bag rounds, and other less lethal tools.

Policy 301 should explain how general Use of Force principles apply in a crowd setting, including necessity, proportionality, individualized conduct where feasible, effects on uninvolved people, ability to comply, and the difference between force directed at one person and force likely to affect a broader crowd.

Policy 308 should identify authorization requirements, deployment thresholds, warnings, documentation, medical or decontamination expectations, and review requirements for control devices and less lethal tools used in crowd management events.

SPD should also decide whether smoke is reportable force or, at minimum, a mandatory tracked and reviewed crowd management tool.

Related to Issues Four, Five, Six, Eight, Nine, and the Contemporary Crowd Management and Policy Reform Framework.

Recommendation 9: Create an event-level munitions log and crowd event force supplement.

SPD should create an event-level munitions log for major crowd management events. The log should document authorization, deployment time, location, tool used, number of rounds or canisters, purpose, target or area, warnings when feasible, observed effect, and known injury, exposure, or medical concerns.

SPD should also create a crowd event force supplement that connects individual force reports to the broader event, including command authorization, warnings, crowd conditions, area denial, direct impact, arrests, medical care, decontamination, and BWC references.

Related to Issues Four, Five, and Nine.

Recommendation 10: Create a supervisory review mechanism for dynamic takedowns and other significant physical control tactics used during First Amendment assemblies or crowd management events.

SPD should create a limited supervisory review mechanism for dynamic takedowns and other significant physical control tactics used during protest arrests or crowd management events. The review should be narrow enough to avoid turning every minor contact into a full force investigation, but clear enough to ensure that significant arrest control tactics are documented and reviewed when associated with injury, complaint, BWC, public video, or public concern.

The review should capture the person's conduct, officer objective, commands or warnings when feasible, ability to comply factors, surrounding crowd conditions, injury or complaint information, and BWC references.

Related to Issues Four, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 11: Develop a medical and decontamination plan for crowd events.

SPD should develop a medical and decontamination plan for crowd events where smoke, OC/PAVA, pepper ball, direct impact munitions, arrests, or crowd movement may create injury or exposure concerns. The plan should address EMS staging, arrestee collection point screening, embedded medics when feasible, decontamination information, medical refusals, inability to provide care, and documentation.

The plan should also account for uninvolved people when police activity may affect nearby venues, bystanders, media, residents, or passersby.

Related to Issues Four, Six, Eight, and Nine.

[Documentation, BWC, Review, and Public Explanation](#)

Recommendation 12: Create a major event documentation protocol.

SPD should create a documentation protocol for major First Amendment, crowd management, mutual aid, or public safety events. The protocol should identify what must be captured during and immediately after the event, including mission statements, command decisions, unlawful assembly approval, dispersal orders, force authorization, munitions use, arrests, property

handling, medical or decontamination concerns, mutual aid participation, third-party impacts, and public messaging.

The protocol should also identify who is responsible for collecting reports, BWC, drone footage, munitions logs, arrest information, and supervisor summaries before units clear.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 13: Develop event-specific BWC and scalable review procedures.

SPD should adopt BWC procedures for major crowd events, including activation expectations, battery planning, labeling, markers for force and arrests, post-event identification of relevant footage, and supervisor collection. SPD should also develop scalable review procedures so a major event involving hundreds of hours of video is not assigned primarily to one reviewer.

Large event reviews should be divided by issue, time period, location, unit, or force type, with a common template and coordinated final analysis.

Related to Issues Two, Three, Four, Five, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 14: Require a full internal After Action review from both command post and field command perspectives after major protest, First Amendment, or crowd management events.

SPD should require a full internal After Action review after major protest or crowd management events involving unlawful assembly, mutual aid, force, multiple arrests, significant public concern, third-party impact, or major operational disruption.⁶¹²

The review should address mission, command, communication, dialogue, unlawful assembly, dispersal, force, arrests, medical care, documentation, mutual aid, UAS, third-party impacts, complaint themes, and policy or training lessons. The review should identify action items, responsible owners, timelines, and implementation status.

The review should include both command post and field command perspectives. When applicable, it should include input from Incident Command, field commanders, TAC/Crowd Management, SWAT, patrol supervisors, mutual aid supervisors, communications personnel, training, IA or review personnel, and other personnel with relevant operational knowledge. These After Action reviews should be widely shared to ensure identified issues are corrected.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 15: Create a systemic complaint theme analysis process.

⁶¹² OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026); UOFRB Special Meeting Minutes, at 5–8 (Apr. 16, 2026) (received by email on May 1, 2026).

SPD should create a process for analyzing systemic or event-level complaint themes after major events. Officer-specific allegations should continue through the existing complaint process. At the same time, recurring event-level concerns should be grouped, analyzed, and routed to command staff, training, policy review, IA, the OPO, and After Action review.

Examples may include mission confusion, dispersal audibility, safe egress, smoke exposure, third-party impact, agency identification, property handling, BWC gaps, medical care, and public perception of police action.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 16: Develop public-facing After Action summaries.

SPD should develop public-facing After Action summaries for major protest or crowd management events. These summaries should not replace IA, OPO, criminal, civil, or personnel processes, and they should not disclose protected information. They should explain the mission, timeline, public safety basis for major decisions, agencies involved, warnings, force tools authorized and not authorized, arrests, known third-party impacts, medical or decontamination issues, complaint routing information, and lessons learned.

A clear public summary can improve transparency, reduce misinformation, and show that SPD reviewed the event beyond individual complaint findings.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

[Third-Party Impact, Mutual Aid, and Identification](#)

Recommendation 17: Require third-party impact and venue notification planning.

SPD should incorporate third-party impact planning into crowd management responses when police activity may reasonably affect nearby venues or uninvolved people. This planning should be scaled to the event and may include venue contacts, spectator event communication, public address coordination, medical or decontamination information, traffic and pedestrian routes, EMS access, and post-event documentation.

This recommendation is especially important when a protest response occurs near stadiums, schools, churches, transit hubs, hospitals, businesses, residential buildings, or other places where uninvolved people may be present.

Related to Issues Six and Nine.

Recommendation 18: Standardize mutual aid briefings and rules of engagement.

SPD should standardize mutual aid briefings for First Amendment and crowd management events. When feasible, assisting agencies should receive a briefing identifying the lead agency, command structure, mission, legal constraints, dispersal expectations, authorized and restricted tools, force reporting expectations, arrest and property procedures, medical or decontamination planning, visible identification expectations, and complaint routing.

This is particularly important when the event involves federal immigration activity or other legally sensitive circumstances.

Related to Issues One, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 19: Require mutual aid reporting before clearing.

When assisting agencies participate in a major SPD-led or SPD-coordinated crowd management event, SPD should collect basic event-level information before those agencies clear when feasible. That information should include whether force was used, whether arrests were made, whether anyone was injured, whether medical care or decontamination was provided or requested, whether property was collected, whether munitions were deployed, and whether any significant complaint or incident was known.

This would not replace another agency's internal review, but it would help SPD understand and explain the overall event.

Related to Issues Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 20: Require visible agency and individual identifiers.

SPD should require visible agency and individual identifiers during First Amendment and crowd management events when operationally feasible. If names are not feasible because of legitimate safety concerns, SPD should consider badge numbers, helmet numbers, vest numbers, or other accountability markings.

SPD should also address identification expectations for mutual aid partners operating under SPD incident command or in coordination with SPD.

Related to Issues Seven, Eight, and Nine.

[Arrests, Property, Tactical Resources, UAS, Training, and Integration](#)

Recommendation 21: Create protest arrest property and collection point procedures.

SPD should create protest arrest property and collection point procedures for major crowd events. The procedures should address who makes arrest decisions, who applies restraints, who documents arrests, who collects property, how property is associated with the arrestee, how

property is transferred, where arrestees are taken, how medical or decontamination needs are identified, and how BWC is linked to the arrest.

The procedures should also address phones, recording devices, identification, medical items, legal observer materials, press equipment, property held as evidence, property booked as personal property, and property transferred between agencies.

Related to Issues Eight and Nine.

Recommendation 22: Develop a crowd event command checklist.

SPD should develop a command checklist for major First Amendment and crowd management events. The checklist should help Incident Command confirm the mission, legal authority, command structure, and lines of communication before resources are deployed. It should also prompt consideration of dialogue, targeted enforcement, dispersal and safe egress, force authorization, medical support, mutual aid, public messaging, documentation responsibilities, and the After Action process. The checklist should be scalable so it can be used for both planned events and rapidly developing incidents.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 23: Conduct department-wide recurring scenario-based crowd management training.

SPD should conduct recurring scenario-based training for command staff, field supervisors, TAC, SWAT, patrol, communications personnel, and mutual aid partners. The exercises should use realistic, evolving conditions that require participants to apply SPD's crowd management policies, make mission changes, coordinate across units, communicate with the public, assess dispersal and force options, and respond to medical or third-party impacts. Training should include both command post and field decision-making and conclude with a documented After Action review that identifies lessons, assigns responsibility for follow-up, and tracks implementation.

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Recommendation 24: Establish UAS documentation and public safety justification during First Amendment events.

SPD should require documented supervisory approval and public safety justification for UAS use during First Amendment assemblies. The justification should identify the operational purpose, such as assessing blocked exits, identifying a specific threat, evaluating crowd movement, supporting safe egress, documenting dispersal routes, or helping command avoid broader enforcement by identifying a specific problem area.⁶¹³

⁶¹³ OPO TAC/Crowd Management/Dialogue Review Discussion (June 2026).

Policy should distinguish specific public safety use from general monitoring of lawful protest activity and should address retention, access, indexing, and use of UAS footage in review.

Related to Issues Five, Nine, and the Contemporary Crowd Management and Policy Reform Framework.

Recommendation 25: Clarify tactical deployment thresholds and TAC/Crowd Management, SWAT, patrol, mutual aid, and command post roles during crowd management events.

SPD should clarify when TAC/Crowd Management, SWAT, patrol, armored vehicles, or other tactical resources are deployed into or near First Amendment assemblies and who has field command authority during mixed deployments. The policy should distinguish crowd management missions from SWAT missions and identify whether tactical resources are leading, supporting, standing by, or operating under a crowd management field commander.

This recommendation should be supported by policy, SOP, training, and After Action review.

Related to Issues One, Four, Seven, Nine, and the Contemporary Crowd Management and Policy Reform Framework.

Recommendation 26: Integrate the relevant policies, SOPs, training, checklists, and review processes into a unified crowd management policy package.

SPD should integrate the policies and procedures relevant to First Amendment assemblies and crowd management events into a unified crowd management policy package. At minimum, the package should connect Policy 461, First Amendment Assemblies; Policy 300, De-escalation; Policy 301, Use of Force; Policy 308, Control Devices and Techniques; Policy 352, Outside Agency Assistance and Mutual Aid; Policy 408, Special Weapons and Tactics Team; Policy 463, Medical Aid and Response; Policy 604, Unmanned Aerial Systems; Policy 1020, Personnel Complaints; and Policy 1046, Uniform Regulations and Appearance Standards.

The policy package should explain how these policies work together before, during, and after major protest or crowd management events. It should address mission definition, legal constraints, dialogue and communication, unlawful assembly, targeted enforcement, dispersal orders, safe egress, force authorization, area denial, direct impact munitions, smoke, medical and decontamination planning, UAS use, mutual aid, tactical deployment, visible identification, BWC and documentation, arrestee processing, property handling, complaint theme analysis, After Action review, and public-facing explanation.

SPD should support the policy package with SOPs, command checklists, documentation templates, scenario based training, After Action review requirements, and implementation tracking. Implementation tracking should identify the responsible unit or command staff owner,

action steps, training or policy updates completed, timelines, and any follow-up review needed to confirm that the lessons from June 11 become durable department practice.⁶¹⁴

Related to Issues One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine.

⁶¹⁴ See Issues One through Nine, above.