

# Demographic Disparity Analysis of Law Enforcement Data from the Spokane Police Department



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## **Police Strategies LLC**

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#### **ABOUT THE AUTHORS**

Police Strategies LLC is a Washington State based company that was formed in February 2015. The company was built by law enforcement professionals, attorneys, and academics with the primary goal of helping police departments use their own incident reports to make data-driven decisions and develop evidence-based best practices. The company's three partners are all former employees of the Seattle Police Department and were directly involved with the Department of Justice's pattern or practice investigation of the department in 2011 as well as the federal consent decree that followed. The partners took the lessons learned from that experience and now provide other police departments with the tools they need to monitor their use of force incidents, identify high risk behavior, and evaluate the outcomes of any reforms that are implemented. The company has a partnership with the Center for the Study of Crime and Justice at Seattle University to assist in the analysis of the data and conduct academic research.

Police Strategies LLC has been working with the Spokane Ombudsman to analyze the last seven years of use of force reports from the Spokane Police Department. This database contains detailed information on 736 use of force incidents and some of that data is available to the public through interactive dashboards.

Our team has more than 20 years of experience examining issues of racial disparity in policing and the criminal justice system. These projects included working with the Seattle City Council's Racial Profiling Task Force, developing a biennial Police-Public Contact Survey for the City of Seattle, conducting independent research on racial disparities observed in open air drug markets, and drafting policies to prohibit racial profiling by police officers.

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#### **Executive Summary**

This report provides a quantitative analysis of demographic disparities found in law enforcement data from the Spokane Police Department. While quantitative data can be used to identify correlations between different variables, these correlations cannot be used to make findings or conclusions as to causation. This study does identify and measure demographic disparities by the race, age and sex of the subjects involved, but we do not attempt to determine whether these racial disparities may be caused by officer bias, racial profiling, or other discriminatory practices. These are causal questions that cannot be answered by a quantitative study alone.

The presence of a demographic disparity does not automatically mean that officers are engaged in biased behavior. Similarly, the absence of disparity does not mean that individual acts of bias by police officers are not occurring. This study is merely a starting point for a deeper examination of these issues by the Spokane Police Department. This report may also be used by the community to learn more about how their local police department works and how officers exercise their discretion when making law enforcement decisions. Our hope is that this report will stimulate an ongoing discussion between the Spokane Police Department and the communities they serve about procedural justice, fairness, and equity in policing.

The research methodology used in this report to measure demographic disparities employs several activity-based benchmarks rather than a single population-based benchmark. While the demographic disparities found in this report tend to be smaller than disparities found in studies that use a population-based benchmark, these activity-based disparities should be more reflective of officer behavior. Therefore, we have adjusted the disparity scale and consider disparities greater than 50% above the benchmark to be high disparity. This is roughly one-quarter of what population-based studies would consider to be high disparity (typically two or more times greater than the population).

The data from the Spokane Police Department revealed that Males were overrepresented, and Females were underrepresented as suspects in reported crimes, in uses of force and in searches, but there were not disparities observed for Males or Females in stops or arrests. Juvenile

Subjects and Subjects over age 50 were less likely to be reported as a crime suspect than would be expected based on their population while those between the ages of 18 and 49 were more likely to be reported as a crime suspect. When compared with reported crimes, those over 50 were more likely to be stopped by police while those under 30 were less likely to be stopped. After being stopped, Subjects over 50 were less likely to be arrested, searched, or have force used against them. Subjects between 18 and 30 were more likely to be searched. Black and Native American Subjects were more likely to be identified as a suspect in a reported crime than would be expected based on their populations. Asian Subjects were less likely to be identified as a crime suspect. There were no disparities by race in stops or in arrests, but Black and Native American Subjects were slightly more likely to have force used against them during an arrest. The largest racial disparities were observed in discretionary searches that occurred after a traffic stop. However, this search data should be viewed with caution since the total number of searches examined was only 256. This report provides detailed recommendations on how the quality of search data can be improved.

While no significant racial disparities were observed for stops or arrests, we conducted a deeper analysis by examining racial disparities in different levels of discretionary actions for both stops and the issuance of infractions, citations, and arrests for different crime levels. The findings show that it is unlikely that Spokane Police officers are engaged in systemic biased practices against any particular demographic group. The data also suggests that the racial groups that are typically viewed as the targets of police racial bias (Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans) have the lowest risk of being discriminated against during encounters where officers have a high level of discretion in making law enforcement decisions. The analysis shows that in those cases where officers have the highest levels of discretion, Black, Native American, and Juvenile Subjects have the lowest risk of encountering officer bias in law enforcement decisions. These Bias Risk Scores only apply to systemic officer bias. Individual acts of officer bias should not impact the overall Risk Scores, but systemic and repeated acts of bias would.

This report provides descriptive information and basic statistics on police-civilian interactions in the City of Spokane. With dozens of data fields and hundreds of thousands of records, there is a great deal of statistical research that could be conducted on this data set. This report provides a high-level look at the data. At the conclusion of this report, we provide some recommendations on how the ongoing data collection process by the Spokane Police Department can be improved as well as additional data variables that could enhance the analysis. Recommendations for SPD policy, training or procedural changes are beyond the scope of this report although this data set could certainly be used to support recommendations in these areas.

#### Summary of the Results

#### Data Used

This report takes a comprehensive look at demographic disparities found in law enforcement data from the Spokane Police Department. The methodology used in this report differs from traditional racial disparity studies in two regards:<sup>1</sup>

- 1) Traditional studies only examine disparities by race. This study explores disparities by sex and age in addition to race.
- 2) Traditional studies use population-based benchmarking to calculate disparities. This study uses reported crimes as an initial benchmark and then employs activity-based benchmarking to calculate the disparities for each subsequent law enforcement activity.

When traditional racial disparity methodology is used, the data from this report reaffirms the findings of prior racial disparity studies of the Spokane Police Department. Blacks and Native Americans are more likely to be stopped, arrested, searched, and have force used against them compared to their proportion of the population. Asians and Hispanics are generally involved in a smaller percentage of law enforcement actions than their proportion of the population would suggest. The proportion of Whites involved in policing activities is slightly less than their share of the population.

The racial disparity results are different when the activity-based benchmarking approach is used. When this methodology is applied to data from the Spokane Police Department, no significant racial disparities are observed in police stops or arrests. Disparities still exist in use of force rates for Black and Native American Subjects, but these disparities are much smaller than the disparities found using a population-based benchmarking approach. Racial disparities are still observed in consent searches and officer safety searches for all racial groups except for Whites.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See APPENDIX C – TRADITIONAL DISPARITY METHODOLOGY for a more complete discussion about the methodological differences between this report and other studies of racial disparities in policing.

Asians are underrepresented in searches while Blacks, Native Americans and Hispanics are overrepresented.

The disparity calculations for both the population-based benchmarking approach and the activity-based benchmarking approach use the same data sets from the same data sources.

**Table 1: Data Sources** 

Data Source	Name	Time Period	Total Records	
Census	sus US Census Population Estimates 2018 & 2019		219,197	
NIBRS	National Incident Based Reporting System	1/1/2017 - 12/31/2018	64,584	
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch System	1/1/2017 - 6/30/2020	248,048	
DPF	Demographic Profiling Form. <sup>2</sup>	1/1/2014 - 6/30/2020	85,871	
PFAS Police Force Analysis System		1/1/2013 - 12/31/2019	736	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) is used to track demographic information for officer-initiated stops such as traffic stops. It is not used for calls for service. In calls for service, demographic data is documented in CAD or the incident report.

These data sources yielded the following results:3

**Table 2: Demographic Percentages by Data Source** 

Da	ta Source	Census	NIBRS	CAD	CAD	PFAS	DPF	DPF	DPF
Tot	al Records	219,197	40,610	137,034	26,400	733	85,871	142	114
		Population	Reported Crimes	Stops	Arrests	Uses of Force	Traffic Stops	Consent Searches	Safety Searches
der	Female	50.8%	31.5%	33.1%	27.9%	8.5%	36.4%	16.2%	7.9%
Gender	Male	49.2%	68.5%	66.9%	72.1%	91.5%	63.6%	83.8%	92.1%
	White	88.6%	81.4%	79.8%	78.2%	73.4%	85.1%	77.3%	75.2%
	Black	4.3%	12.5%	10.7%	11.2%	13.7%	6.1%	10.6%	13.3%
Race	Nat Amer	2.7%	4.5%	4.6%	5.4%	8.1%	1.8%	5.0%	5.3%
	Asian	4.4%	1.6%	1.6%	1.9%	2.0%	3.5%	0.0%	0.9%
	Hispanic			3.3%	3.4%	2.9%	3.4%	7.1%	5.3%
	0-17	20.1%	9.2%	4.9%	4.5%	4.8%	5.0%	3.7%	6.2%
e Se	18-30	21.2%	42.2%	33.0%	37.6%	43.0%	35.2%	49.1%	46.2%
Age	31-49	24.4%	37.8%	43.7%	45.2%	46.4%	41.9%	42.1%	34.9%
	50+	34.4%	10.8%	18.4%	12.7%	5.9%	17.9%	5.1%	12.6%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Police records that did not include demographic information (age, race, or sex) were excluded from the analysis. Since ethnicity was not recorded consistently in the NIBRS dataset, Hispanic was not used as a racial category for the calculations involving NIBRS data. Those who identified as Hispanic in the Census data were added to their identified racial group and those who identified as multi-racial were added to their identified non-White racial group. Therefore, the percentages for the racial groups in this table may be higher than the non-Hispanic single race categories in the US Census data.

The following Disparity Matrix summarizes the risk ratios.<sup>4</sup> of reported crimes, police actions and searches during traffic stops.

**Table 3: Disparity Matrix** 

		Reported Crimes	Police Actions		Discretionary Searches During Traffic Stops		
Record Type		Reported Crime Suspects	Stops	Arrests & Citations	Uses of Force	Consent Search	Safety Search
Total Records		40,610	137,034	26,400	733	142	114
Data Sources		NIBRS / Census	CAD / NIBRS	CAD / CAD	PFAS / CAD	DPF / DPF	DPF / DPF
Risk Ratio		Suspects / Population	Stops / Suspects	Arrests / Stops	Uses of Force / Arrests	Consent / Stops	Safety / Stops
_	I						
Gender	Female	-	0	0	-	-	-
Ğ	Male	+	0	0	+	+	+
	White	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Black	++	0	0	+	++	++
Race	Nat Amer	++	0	0	+	++	++
	Asian	-	0	0	0	-	-
	Hispanic			0	0	++	++
	0-17	-	-	0	0	-	+
Age	18-30	++	-	0	0	+	+
	31-49	++	0	0	0	0	0
	50+	_	++	-	-	-	-

Symbol	Disparity	Risk Ratio	
++	Positive	> +50%	
+	Positive	+20% to +50%	
0	None	-20% to +20%	
-	Negative	-20% to -100%	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See APPENDIX A for a detailed explanation of the statistical methods used in this report.

#### **Key Findings**

#### Reported Crime Suspects Compared to the Spokane Population

- Sex Males were 39% more likely to be identified as the suspect in reported crimes than
  we would expect based on their proportion of the population. Females were 38% less
  likely to be identified as a suspect in reported crimes. Males are more than twice as likely
  as Females to be suspects in reported crimes.
- Race. The percentage of White suspects in reported crimes is proportional to their percentage of the Spokane population. Black suspects are nearly three times more likely to be identified in reported crimes as we would expect based on their population. Native American suspects are 68% more likely to be identified in crimes while Asians are 65% less likely to be identified as a suspect in a reported crime. Blacks are more than three times more likely than Whites to be identified as suspects in reported crimes while Native Americans are nearly twice as likely as Whites to be identified as a crime suspect. Asians are 60% less likely than Whites to be identified as a crime suspect.
- Age Juveniles and persons age 50 and older are more than 50% less likely to be identified
  as suspects in reported crimes than we would expect based on their population. Spokane
  residents that are between the ages of 18 and 49 are about 75% more likely to be named
  as a crime suspect.

#### Police Stops Compared to Reported Crime Suspects

- Sex Males and Females are equally likely to be stopped by the police when compared with their proportion of reported crime suspects.
- Race All races are equally likely to be stopped by the police when compared with their proportion of reported crime suspects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> NIBRS data does not include complete data on ethnicity so Hispanics cannot be evaluated in any calculations that use NIBRS.

Age – Juveniles are 47% less likely to be stopped by the police than we would expect
based on their proportion of crime suspects and individuals between the ages of 18 and
30 are 22% less likely. Individuals between 31 and 49 who are stopped by the police are
stopped at rates that are proportional to their share of reported crime suspect while
those age 50 and older are 70% more likely to be stopped.

#### Arrests Compared to Stops

- Sex When the proportion of arrests are compared to the proportion of stops made by the police, Males and Females are equally likely to be arrested.
- Race When the proportion of arrests are compared to the proportion of stops made by the police, all races are equally likely to be arrested.
- Age All age groups are equally likely to be arrested after being stopped by police except for those age 50 and older who are 31% less likely to be arrested.

#### Uses of Force Compared to Arrests

- Sex During the arrest process, Females are 70% less likely to have force used against them while Males are 27% more likely to be involved in a force incident. Males are more than four times more likely than Females to have force used against them.
- Race When White or Asian Subjects are arrested, they are equally likely to have force used against them. Black Subjects are 22% more likely to have force used against them and Native Americans are 49% more likely.
- Age Arrestees under 50 are equally likely to have force used against them while those
   50 and older are 54% less likely to have force used.

#### Consent Searches Made After a Traffic Stop.<sup>6</sup>

- Sex Male drivers are 32% more likely to be involved in a consent search while Female drivers are 55% less likely. Male drivers are three times more likely than Female drivers to be involved in a consent search.
- Race White drivers are equally likely to be involved in a consent search as we would expect based on the number of times they were stopped. No Asian drivers were involved in a consent search during the last 6½ years. Black drivers were 74% more likely to be involved a consent search and Native American drivers were nearly three times more likely.<sup>7</sup>
- Age Drivers between the ages of 18 and 30 were 40% more likely to be involved in a
  consent while juvenile drivers were 27% less likely. Drivers between 31 and 49 were
  equally likely to have a consent search while driver age 50 and older were 72% less likely.

#### Searches for Officer Safety Made After a Traffic Stop.<sup>8</sup>

- Sex Male drivers are 45% more likely to be involved in a search conducted for officer safety while Female drivers are 78% less likely. Male drivers are nearly seven times more likely than Female drivers to be involved in a search conducted for officer safety reasons.
- Race White drivers are equally likely to be involved in a search conducted for officer safety as we would expect based on the number of times they were stopped. Asian

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The consent search data is limited to searches conducted after an officer-initiated traffic stop where the officer completed the Demographic Profiling Form (DPF). Only 142 consent searches were recorded, and the data is too limited to draw any meaningful conclusions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> While the consent search disparities for Black and Native American drivers are high, it should be noted that the number of consent searches conducted during traffic stops is exceedingly small. Since 2014 only 15 Black drivers and 7 Native American drivers have been involved in a consent search.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The officer safety search data is limited to searches conducted after an officer-initiated traffic stop where the officer completed the Demographic Profiling Form (DPF). Only 114 officer safety searches were recorded, and the data is too limited to draw any meaningful conclusions.

drivers were 75% less likely to be involved in an officer safety search. Black drivers were more than twice as likely and Native Americans were nearly three times more likely to be involved a search conducted for officer safety reasons than we would expect based on their proportion of traffic stops.<sup>9</sup>

• Age – Drivers under age 30 are 65% more likely to be searched for officer safety reasons than drivers over 30.

#### **Key Recommendations**

This report expands on the work of two prior studies that have examined racial disparities in law enforcement data from the Spokane Police Department. While these reports provide a useful starting point for discussions about racial bias in policing, no definitive conclusions can be reached about individual officer bias or the impacts of bias in the Department based on the quantitative data alone.

Meaningful and impactful policing reform requires accurate and comprehensive data. Unfortunately, many reforms that have been attempted in the past and many reforms that are being proposed now, were developed in a data vacuum. Law enforcement needs to implement evidence-based solutions and policy decisions need to be data-driven. This cannot happen in the absence of data.

The Spokane Police Department has taken some preliminary steps on the road to evidence-based policing. This report provides a foundation for future research and improvements to the current data collection process. The Ombudsman's Police Force Analysis System<sup>™</sup> has provided the community with detailed information on all use of force incidents using interactive dashboards.

<sup>9</sup> While the disparities for searches conducted for officer safety reason for Black and Native American drivers are high, it should be noted that the number of officer safety searches conducted during traffic stops is exceedingly small. Since 2014 only 15 Black drivers and 6 Native American drivers have been involved in an officer safety search.

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The Department has already posted several important documents online including:

- Work Culture Audit Report
- 2020 Strategic Plan
- SPD Policy Manual
- Collaborative Reform Progress Report
- Protocol to Investigate Officer Involved Shootings
- Use of force incident reports and summaries and an annual Use of Force Comprehensive Analysis Report
- Community Survey Results
- Internal Affairs Investigation Summaries

Spokane should continue to post reports, plans and policies online for the community to review. Our recommendations build on the work that the Department has already done with the goal of creating a comprehensive information interface that would allow the community to view and query the Department's data and better understand law enforcement activities in the City of Spokane. This data will provide insights into how and why officers make discretionary law enforcement decisions. Online dashboards will allow members of the public to query the data to answer their own questions and will provide a valuable framework for discussions about bias, racial profiling, accountability, and reform.

Our recommendations are divided into two primary areas: improvements to the data collection process and providing engaging data interfaces and meaningful reports for the community. The recommendations are described in detail at the end of the report.

#### Data Collection Recommendations

- 1) Discontinue the Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) data entry process.
- 2) Add data fields to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system:
  - a. Consent Searches
  - b. Officer Safety Searches
  - c. Uses of Force
- 3) Develop a community survey instrument that collects ongoing and continuous feedback

#### Dashboards and Reporting

- 1) Create interactive dashboards for both internal and public using data from:
  - a. National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
  - b. Computer Aided Dispatch System (CAD)
  - c. Complaint and Internal Affairs data from the IAPro™ System
  - d. Use of Force data from the Police Force Analysis System<sup>sм</sup>
  - e. Community Survey Results
- 2) Enhance the regular reporting schedule for topics that are of interest to the community
  - a. Racial Disparity Analysis Report
  - b. Use of Force and Search Report
  - c. Internal Affairs and Complaints Report
  - d. Community Survey Report

#### Analysis & Methodology

An examination of demographic disparities in policing activities is an important component of an overall risk assessment for a law enforcement agency. The identification of demographic disparities can highlight areas in need of additional focus and study. Disparity data can also provide useful information for a police department to use as it engages with the community and can promote transparency and more informed discussions about policing issues. However, there are significant limitations to the conclusions that can be reached based solely on a quantitative analysis of demographic disparities.

Disparities can be used to identify correlations with other variables, but these correlations cannot be used to make findings or conclusions as to causation. For example, the presence of a racial disparity in a policing activity does not necessarily mean that officers are engaged is biased policing or racial profiling. Similarly, the absence of racial disparities does not automatically mean that individual officers are not engaged in racially discriminatory practices. The examination of racial disparities is just a starting point for a broader discussion and a more comprehensive examination of how officers behave and why they make the decisions they do.

Our analysis highlights several demographic disparities in policing activities conducted by the Spokane Police Department. Many of these same disparities are found in other police departments in Washington State and in departments across the country. We will explore each disparity in greater detail later in the report, but here is a brief overview of some possible explanations for the disparities observed in the Disparity Matrix.

#### **Disparities in Reported Crimes**

Males are much more likely than Females to be involved in crimes that were reported to the Spokane Police Department. This disparity is not unique to Spokane and this same pattern of behavior can be found in every country in the world. Males are much more likely than Females to engage in criminal behavior. <sup>10</sup> Juveniles and individuals older than 50 are much less likely to be identified as a suspect in a reported crime than those between the ages of 18 and 49. These disparities also mirror patterns found in other jurisdictions throughout the country. <sup>11</sup> Unlike sex and age, the issue of race and criminal behavior. <sup>12</sup> is more controversial. <sup>13</sup>

While it is safe to assume that there is no police department in the country that is "bias free" and we should assume that some level of racial profiling is occurring, it is also true that Blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics are typically identified as suspects in crime reports at rates that are higher than their share of the population. The disparities in crime reporting could also be due to the victim's bias as well. Recently there have been high profile incidents caught on video where white "victims" call the police to report a Black suspect committing a crime when no criminal behavior is occurring. Whether or not racial bias is involved in the reporting of crimes, the police are still receiving a higher percentage of crime reports involving Black, Hispanic, and Native American suspects. In response, the police will investigate these incidents and will make stops and arrests based upon information provided by victims and witnesses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> "Gender and Crime - Differences Between Male And Female Offending Patterns," Law Library - American Law and Legal Information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> "Why do young men commit more <u>crimes?"</u> Future Learn.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> "Do black Americans commit more crime?" Channel 4 News, November 27, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> "Another 'excuse' for police bias bites the dust," The Washington Post, June 4, 2019.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> "Amy Cooper Faces Charges After Calling Police on Black Bird-Watcher," July 6, 2020.

#### **Disparities in Police Stops**

When police stops are compared with reported crimes, there are no sex or race disparities observed (i.e. the proportion of stops by race and sex equals the proportion of reported crimes by race and sex). When age groups are examined, there are disparities between stops and reported crimes. Juveniles are less likely to be stopped than we would expect based on their involvement in reported crimes. This may be because 15% of all stops are for traffic offenses and juveniles are less likely to have a driver's license or own a car than adults are. Also, juveniles may be less likely to engage in activities that would bring them into contact with the police such as being out on the street late at night or frequenting nightlife establishments, businesses, or social service organizations. Individuals age 18 to 30 are less likely to be stopped than we would expect based on their involvement in crime reports. This age group is the most likely to commit crimes, but they may not encounter police as often as those 31 to 49 who may have more stable residences and jobs and may be easier to locate. Although those over age 50 were very unlikely to be identified in reported crimes, they formed a much higher percentage of all police stops. This disparity is primarily due to stops for traffic violations. Most of these traffic incidents would not be included in the reported crimes, but most people in this age group are likely licensed drivers and they may get stopped more often for minor traffic violations.

#### **Disparities in Arrests**

There is a close correlation between stops and arrests. The more stops officers make the more likely they are to discover criminal behavior that could lead to an arrest. There is a lack of disparity between arrests and stops for every demographic group (age, race, and sex), except for individuals over the age of 50 who are underrepresented in arrests. This again may be due to a high percentage of these stops involving minor traffic offenses where the driver is stopped but not arrested because no crime has been committed.

#### Disparities in Uses of Force

During the arrest process, Males are much more likely than Females to have force used against them by the arresting officers. This disparity pattern is typical and has been observed in every one of the more than 100 agencies where we have examined use of force data. This disparity is because Male Subjects are more likely than Female Subjects to resist arrest or flee from officers. Black and Native American arrestees are more likely to have force used against them than White arrestees. If Subject behavior was the same across all racial groups, then these observed disparities could be an indication of racial bias. We provide a detailed analysis in this report using information from the Police Force Analysis System<sup>5M</sup> that demonstrates that resistive behavior does differ by age, race, and sex.

# Disparities in Consent Searches and Searches for Officer Safety During Traffic Stops

While the data collected from the Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) on searches is limited and of questionable quality, it is important to note the significant disparities observed by age, race, and sex. We provide recommendations in this report for improving the data collection instrument so that these disparities can be studied in more detail with higher levels of confidence in the results.

Consent searches and officer safety searches are highly discretionary. Therefore, any disparities observed may the product of officer bias or selective enforcement. Male drivers are more likely than Female drivers to be searched by police. This disparity is likely due to Males being involved in more crimes, being more resistive and more likely to be carrying a weapon. Officers are more likely to search younger Subjects for safety reasons and it may be that younger people are more likely to carry weapons. Those over 50 were the least likely to raise officer safety issues. For consent searches the pattern by age group was the same as officer safety searches except that juveniles were less likely to be searched. Since we do not know how often juveniles were asked

for consent to search but refused to give consent, we do not know if officer bias could have played a role here.

A clear pattern of searches by race is observed for both consent and officer safety searches. White drivers are searched at the rates expected based on their proportion of traffic stops. Asian drivers are much less likely to be searched than expected. Black, Native American, and Hispanic drivers are much more likely to be Subjected to both consent searches and searches for officer safety. Since these types of searches are highly discretionary for officers and they produce significant racial disparities, there is a high risk of racial bias being a contributing factor. It is critical for the Department to improve its data collection capabilities in this area and we provide detailed recommendations for new data fields at the end of this report. The current sample size for searches is small (142 consent searches and 114 officer safety searches during a traffic stop). Therefore, the disparity results should be viewed with caution and no definitive conclusions should be made at this time.

#### Introduction

#### Why Study Racial Disparities in Policing?

The traditional methodology for examining racial disparities in the criminal justice system is outlined in a report by The Sentencing Project: 15

"Racial disparity in the criminal justice system exists when the proportion of a racial or ethnic group within the control of the system is greater than the proportion of such groups in the general population.

"The causes of such disparity are varied and can include differing levels of criminal activity, law enforcement emphasis on particular communities, legislative policies, and/or decision making by criminal justice practitioners who exercise broad discretion in the justice process at one or more stages in the system.

"Illegitimate or unwarranted racial disparity in the criminal justice system results from the dissimilar treatment of similarly situated people based on race. In some instances, this may involve overt racial bias, while in others it may reflect the influence of factors that are only indirectly associated with race. Moreover, in some cases disparity results from unguarded, individual- or institution-level decisions that are race-based. Structural racism, derived from the longstanding differential treatment of those with characteristics highly correlated with race (e.g., poverty) can cause or aggravate racial disparity as well."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System – A Manual for Practitioners and Policymakers, The Sentencing Project, 2008.

The criminal justice system is the end of the road for many individuals who have faced discrimination their entire lives. Once they enter the system, the impacts of discrimination are often amplified and worsened. Poor defendants may not be able to make bail forcing them to wait in jail even before any finding is made of their guilt. While in jail they may lose their jobs, their homes, and their families. If they are convicted of a crime, they will lose even more of their rights and their criminal history will make it next to impossible to find a good job that pays a living wage. These pressures may lead to recidivism with even stiffer punishment.

The United States jails more of its citizens per capita than any other nation in the world. <sup>16</sup> The incarceration rates for Blacks are five times higher than the rate for Whites, but this is down from an 8 to 1 disparity 16 years ago. <sup>17</sup> The reduction in racial disparities in incarceration rates may be due to a 30% decline in arrests for robbery, assault and rape cases involving Black suspects. <sup>18</sup> However, during this same period, as the racial disparities in incarceration rates were reduced, the disparities in sentencing increased with Black defendants receiving longer sentences than White Subjects for committing the same crime. <sup>19</sup> This could be due to a number of factors including Black defendants having longer criminal histories or biased decision making by prosecutors and judges.

The racial disparities that are found in the police activity data from Spokane are similar to the disparities found in cities throughout Washington State and in jurisdictions around the country. These disparities are undoubtedly a reflection of systemic bias in our society, institutional racism in our government and inequality throughout our economic system. It is unlikely that the observed racial disparities in policing data are caused by "a few bad apples." <sup>20</sup> This phrase is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> World Prison Population List, Institute for Criminal Policy Research, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Black imprisonment rates are down. It's important to know why. The Washington Post, April 30, 2019.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Trends in Correctional Control by Race and Sex, Council on Criminal Justice, December 2019.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Same Crime, More Time, Georgia State University Research Magazine, Spring 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> 'A few bad apples': Phrase describing rotten police officers used to have different meaning, ABC News, June 14, 2020.

often used as a defense mechanism and to deflect concerns away from broader inequity issues and the need for systemic reforms..<sup>21</sup> This simplistic analogy has also been turned against those agencies that try to use it to protect themselves from additional scrutiny..<sup>22</sup> Officer bias towards minorities will likely reflect society's bias towards these under privileged groups. There is no way to train this bias away and the best that can be hoped for is to prevent officer bias from impacting discretionary decision making and professional behavior. The issue facing law enforcement today is how to identify the extent of this bias and what to do about the bias once it is discovered.

There is no doubt that there are demographic disparities by race, age, and sex in all aspects of policing and in the criminal justice system. The goal of this report is to identify where racial disparities exist using the police activity data provided by the Spokane Police Department and determine how large those disparities are. This report does not attempt to determine to what extent these racial disparities are caused by officer bias, racial profiling, or other discriminatory practices. These are causal questions that cannot be answered by a purely quantitative study.

To effectively measure officer bias, qualitative data must also be examined. Simply counting the number of times an officer does something (stops, arrests, uses of force, etc.) will not tell us anything about why the officer decided to act and will not reveal how well the officer performed his job.

Instead of measuring frequencies to determine bias, officers need to be evaluated on the quality of their interactions with the public. How do officers treat the Subjects they interact with? Are they fair and impartial or are they unprofessional and belligerent? While law enforcement agencies typically do not collect this type of qualitative data on officer behavior, Stanford University recently did collect this information during an officer behavioral study for the Oakland Police Department. Researchers reviewed body worn camera videos of officer interactions with civilians and found that "police officers speak significantly less respectfully to black than to white

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Time to toss the 'Bad apples' excuse, The Washington Post, May 31, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Bad apples come from rotten trees in policing, Brookings, May 30, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Language from police body camera footage shows racial disparities in officer respect, PNAS, June 20, 2017.

community members in everyday traffic stops, even after controlling for officer race, infraction severity, stop location, and stop outcome." <sup>24</sup>

There is a saying, "You cannot manage what you do not measure.". This is especially true in policing. Data on police stops, arrests, searches, and uses of force cannot be used to measure the level of officer bias or institutional racism in policing. While racial disparities in policing data are often used as a proxy measure for officer bias (i.e. the greater the disparity the more biased the officer must be), it is unreasonable to assume that discriminatory police practices are responsible for 100% of the observed statistical disparities. If we lived in an isolated bubble where everyone was equal and behaved in the same manner, then we could reasonably assume that any disparities observed in policing data was caused by differential behavior by police officers. Obviously, the real world is much more complex and unequal than the type of controlled experimental environment we would need to conduct an accurate racial bias test.

While it is unreasonable to assume that 100% of observed disparities in policing data are due to officer bias and profiling, it is also unreasonable to conclude that officer bias does not play any contributing role in generating or exacerbating these disparities. Over the last 20 years racial disparities have been found in virtually every aspect of policing in every law enforcement agency in the country. <sup>26</sup> The debate is not about whether the disparities exist, but rather determining how much of those disparities are due to individual officer bias and/or institutional racism in the police department. <sup>27</sup> Critics of the police place most of the blame for the racial disparities on biased or racist officers while police departments claim to be professional and unbiased in their actions. Law enforcement often responds to concerns about biased policing by pointing out that they are simply responding to community calls for service and observed criminal behavior and

<sup>4 1</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> "The Two Most Important Quotes In Business," Growthink.com.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> "Economics Research on Racial Disparities in Policing," Crime and Criminal Justice, Econofact.org, June 16, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> "Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice System," The Sentencing Project, April 19, 2018.

they cannot take full responsibility for racial disparities that are caused by other parts of society. <sup>28</sup>

#### Policing Reform in the 21st Century

After Michael Brown was killed by police in Ferguson Missouri in 2014 there was an immediate and concerted effort to implement policing reforms to reduce officer involved shootings and uses of force. Several major initiatives were launched including:

- Body Worn Cameras.<sup>29</sup>
- De-Escalation Training.<sup>30</sup>
- Implicit Bias Training.31
- Police Data Initiative.<sup>32</sup>
- Task Force on 21st Century Policing 33

While each of these reform measures had positive benefits, none of them produce the kind of changes in policing the public was looking for and officer involved shootings and uses of force continued at the same rates as before. Racial disparities in policing data were not reduced and, in some cases, worsened after these reforms were implemented.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> "The Police and Public Discourse on "Black-on-Black" Violence," New Perspectives in Policing, National Institutes of Justice, May 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Body cameras are seen as key to police reform. But do they increase accountability? PBS News Hour, June 25, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Police reformers push for de-escalation training, but the jury is out on its effectiveness, ABC News, July 5, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> NYPD Study: Implicit Bias Training Changes Minds, Not Necessarily Behavior, NPR, September 10, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Police Data Initiative, Police Foundation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing, May 2015.

After the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis in May 2020, calls for additional police reforms have been made and some were quickly implemented. <sup>34</sup> Due to the nature of Mr. Floyd's death some local and state governments and police chiefs rushed to ban or limit the use of "choke holds." <sup>35</sup> When police used chemical munitions to quell protests, some elected officials reacted by banning those force options as well. <sup>36</sup> The New York Attorney General issued a report on September 25, 2020, after reviewing a traffic stop that resulted in an officer involved shooting and recommended that the New York Police Department discontinue traffic enforcement as a way to prevent violent encounters with the public. <sup>37</sup>

While it is understandable why politicians and police chiefs would want to react quickly to high profile policing incidents of national concern, most of these significant policy decisions and recommendations are being made in the absence of comprehensive data. There is an information vacuum around most aspects of policing, as a result, many of the reforms that have been implemented will not have the intended impacts and may produce unintended and unwanted consequences.

The failure of many policing reforms implemented during the last decade has created a new movement to defund the police. <sup>38</sup> Proposals range from abolishing police departments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> The major police reforms enacted since George Floyd's death, Axios, September 8, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Minnesota lawmakers pass sweeping package of police accountability measures, Star Tribune, July 21, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Seattle City Council bans police use of tear gas and chokeholds as protests for Black lives continue, The Seattle Times, August 12, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> New York AG suggests NYPD get rid of traffic stops to prevent deadly force incidents, The Hill, September 25, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> What does 'defund the police' mean and does it have merit?, Brookings, June 19, 2020.

altogether, <sup>39</sup> to reducing police budgets immediately by 50%. <sup>40</sup> to transferring some policing services to other departments or community-based organizations. <sup>41</sup>

These types of dramatic changes to the structure, functions and budgets of police departments are proving to be difficult to implement.<sup>42</sup>

This report is being written at a time of unprecedented conflict and tension between law enforcement and the communities they serve. Concerns about high profile incidents like the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis have generated thousands of protests across the country and around the world. During this unrest, additional acts of police violence have been captured on video and shared across social media. The police response to peaceful protests and associated incidents of violence, property destruction and looting have been criticized as being excessive and unnecessary. As frustrations and tensions grow, existing police reform measures are viewed as inadequate and ineffective and so a new movement to defund the police began. Advocates for reducing police budgets or eliminating the police entirely are driven by a deep distrust of law enforcement. They have seen prior reform efforts fail to make any difference in the issues they are concerned about. If the police cannot reform themselves, the argument goes, then the police should be defunded so they can do no more harm. Calls to defund the police have threatened the institution of policing and the careers of hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers. This has created a counter movement to support police departments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, Because reform won't happen, The New York Times, June 12, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Defunding Seattle Police by 50% proving complicated for council, Crosscut, July 31, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> <u>Durkan wants to move 911 dispatchers, parking enforcement outside SPD, criticizes City Council support for deeper defunding, The Seattle Times, July 13, 2020.</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> How a Pledge to Dismantle the Minneapolis Police Collapsed, The New York Times, September 26, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> "Seattle defends protest response, says police did not violate court order," The Seattle Times, October 2, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> "Defunding the Police Will Actually Make Us Safer," ACLU, June 11, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> "Can Cops Unlearn Their Unconscious Biases?" The Atlantic, December 23, 2017.

and officers. <sup>46</sup> As the struggle over policing reform continues, the issue is becoming more political with presidential candidates weighing in on the issue. <sup>47</sup> Clashes on the streets between police and protestors have drawn in unofficial armed groups in support of law enforcement. <sup>48</sup>

The totality of these circumstances has put an intense strain on the relationship between law enforcement and the communities they serve and has called into question the legitimacy of policing itself. The impacts on policing could be catastrophic according to former Police Chief Cedric Alexander: 49

"To perform their sworn mission, police officers are entrusted with very consequential legal authority, including the authority to use deadly force. But the power behind that authority comes not from any law but from the public. It is the members of the community who grant their officers the legitimacy to perform their mission. Without this grant of legitimacy, the police, for all their legal authority, are essentially powerless."

This is a challenging time for most law enforcement agencies in the United States including the Spokane Police Department. It is also a difficult time to be releasing a report that examines racial disparities in policing. Data from these types of studies is often cherry picked to support both sides of the policing debate. As Mark Twain once said, "There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics." <sup>50</sup> The goal of this report is not to support any single position or point of view, but instead to provide useful law enforcement data and context so that the local stakeholders in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> "Pro-police rally met with counter protesters ahead of defund vote," KOMO News, August 9, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> "Biden Said, 'Most Cops Are Good.' But Progressives Want Systemic Change." The New York Times, August 19, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> "Why Experts Say The Police Don't Need Militias' Help," National Public Radio, August 27, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> <u>"Ex-police chief: Police should never welcome the help of vigilantes"</u>, CNN Opinion by Cedric L. Alexander, September 1, 2020

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> "Lies, damned lies, and statistics," Wikipedia.

Spokane can begin to have an informed data-driven discussion about these controversial issues. There is no quantitative statistic that can confirm or deny the existence of racial bias or racial profiling by police officers. Statistics can be used to identify where racial disparities exist and determine the magnitude of those disparities, but quantitative data alone cannot be used to determine the causes of those disparities. To make causal findings, the data must be examined by those who know what is happening in Spokane today: residents, businesses, non-profits, churches, government officials and police officers. Outside consultants can provide a basic analysis of the data, but they are unable to interpret those results because they do not live and work in the community. They do not know the officers they are studying, and they cannot see what is happening in the local community.

# Background for this Study

In July 2020 Police Strategies LLC was retained by the Spokane Police Department to conduct a racial disparity analysis using data from the Department's Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and the Demographic Profiling database for officer initiated stops. Data from prior years had previously been analyzed by other researchers who issued reports in 2015.<sup>51</sup> and 2017.<sup>52</sup>

This report builds upon the prior research done for the Spokane Police Department and expands the scope of inquiry by examining use of force data from the Police Force Analysis System<sup>sM</sup> as well as data on reported crimes and arrests from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Comparative data from other law enforcement agencies in Washington State and the United States is also included. Police stops, arrests, uses of force and searches are examined and the data is presented at both the city and neighborhood level. Trends over time are discussed as well as comparative data with other city law enforcement agencies in Washington State. While racial disparities in policing activities are examined, the analysis has been expanded to explore

<sup>51</sup> "Officer Contacts with Civilians and Race in the Spokane Police Department", Edward Byrnes, Ph.D. & Brad Arleth, M.S. March 17, 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> "Officer Contacts with Civilians and Race in the Spokane Police Department", Edward Byrnes, Ph.D. & Brad Arleth, M.S. March 31, 2017.

disparities by sex and age as well. The statistical methods used for the analysis are simple and easy to understand. Rather than employing complex multivariate regression models and tests of statistical significance, the objective of this report is to provide easily digestible statistics so that the Department and the community can identify the issues of concern and the areas that they want to improve.

This report challenges the traditional methodology used to measure racial disparities in policing. Quantitative studies alone cannot be used to measure the level of bias among police officers. The observed racial disparities in policing data are caused by a myriad of factors that cannot be disaggregated through statistical research alone. Instead, these statistical disparities should be examined by the Department, the community, the Ombudsman, elected officials and other stakeholders who are better positioned to understand the root causes of the disparities. Once the causes have been identified, these same groups can work together to design reforms to address the concerns raised. Data analysis can then be used to track whether the reforms are achieving their intended goals for reducing racial disparities.

This report does not attempt to quantify how much of the observed racial disparities are due to officer bias. Instead, this report presents a more refined method for calculating disparities and expands the scope of analysis to include disparities by sex and age as well as race. The goal of this type of inquiry is to provide actionable data that law enforcement and policy makers can use to make data-driven decisions. If reducing racial disparities in policing is the goal, this report will help policy makers focus on the areas that will have the greatest impact on the desired outcomes. This data will also help the community better understand law enforcement activities, how the police respond to calls for service and how officers are working in the neighborhoods.

Rather than focusing solely on the quantitative data about law enforcement activities, our recommendation is to begin collecting and analyzing information on the quality of the interactions between officers and civilians. None of the policing reforms that have been implemented over the last decade have had any significant impact on racial disparities in policing or the criminal justice system. However, there are many policies and programs that departments have implemented that have likely improved the quality of policing. If qualitative data is collected

to prove that these reforms have worked, this would improve public trust and confidence in law enforcement.

Some of our recommendations include suggestions for replacing or improving existing data collection systems so that a more robust and meaningful analysis can be performed. We also provide recommendations on how to collect additional qualitative data on policing services. Finally, we provide suggestions on ways to improve transparency and openness to help build community trust and confidence in the Spokane Police Department.

A robust data collection and analysis program is essential for both transparency and to evaluate the impacts and effectiveness of any reforms that are implemented. However, there should be realistic expectations and an understanding of the limitations of a quantitative analysis of policing data. This report is merely a starting point for a much more involved discussion and debate between all the local stakeholders. What the data means and what can be done to reduce unwanted disparities is ultimately up to the community stakeholders to decide.


There are a few important questions that a quantitative disparity analysis will not be able to answer:

- Do officers engage in racial profiling or biased policing?
- How big is the problem? Is it just a few officers or the entire department?
- Are there problems with existing policies, training and supervision that enable biased enforcement?
- What can be done to reduce the racial disparities?
- What can be done to ensure that officers treat everyone fairly and equitably?

There is no policy, training or reform program that has been proven to reduce racial disparities in policing. Agencies that have gone through intensive reforms and consent decrees will emerge with the same racial disparities that they started with.

# Research Methodology

# A New Framework for Examining Racial Disparities in Policing



The traditional methodology for examining racial disparities in policing activities is overly simplistic and can produce misleading results. The problems with the traditional disparity analysis are numerous and are outlined in more detail in Appendix C.

For this report we have developed a new framework and methodology for analyzing disparities in policing. This framework takes into consideration the complexities of society, government, policing, and the criminal justice system. The new methodology accounts for the various levels of discretionary decision making by police officers as well as the structural and institutional factors that may impact observed disparities. The analysis in this report is not limited to racial disparities, but also includes an examination of disparities by sex and age.

An analysis of racial disparities in policing cannot be limited to examining the impacts of individual officer bias and discrimination. There are societal, governmental, and departmental factors that may play a significant role in contributing to observed disparities and these structures should be incorporated into the review of the findings from the analysis:

#### Government

- State and local governments pass criminal and civil laws that the police are responsible for enforcing. If a law has a discriminatory or disparate impact on a particular group, then police actions will reflect and reinforce those impacts.<sup>53</sup>
- Governments set the budgets and staffing levels for police departments. The more resources
  that are provided, the more law enforcement actions can be conducted.
- Governments provide programs and services for the community. The more support for the public that is provided, the lower the crime and delinquency rates are expected to be.
- Elected officials and department directors will set the tone for the city. If law and order leaders are elected to run the government then the police department will be expected to follow their agenda. If leaders are chosen who are focused on restorative justice and

<sup>53</sup> For example, a sit-lie ordinance which prohibits sitting or lying on the sidewalk will have a disproportionate impact on homeless individuals and chronic public inebriates.

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alternatives to incarceration, then the police department will adapt its practices to reflect those priorities.

• The degree of institutional racism present in governmental structures will also be reflected in the police department and the actions of its officers.

### Community

- Police respond to calls for service from the community and the observed unlawful behaviors of residents and visitors to the City. Many societal factors will influence the rates at which individuals engage in criminal behavior including poverty and unemployment rates, housing quality, affordability and availability, educational opportunities, access to health care and public transportation, etc. Most of the determinants of criminal behavior are influenced by structural, institutional, and societal racism. The same racial disparities observed in policing data are also found in housing, health care, education, and the economy. 54
- Crime rates can vary dramatically between communities with the largest urban centers
  typically having the highest levels of crime. The community's relationship with the police
  department will also play a role in this dynamic. If the public has trust and confidence in their
  local police officers, they will be more likely to report crimes and cooperate with the
  investigations.<sup>55</sup>

## **Police Department**

- A police department has a great deal of control over the actions of its officers and can provide clear direction on the types of behaviors that are desired. This influence is exerted through policies, training, supervision, and accountability practices.
- The department will set staffing levels and determine deployment strategies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> See Appendix B for a discussion of the factors leading to racial disparities in COVID-19 infections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> In 2007 funding was restored for the Spokane County Crime Check system for non-emergency calls. https://www.spokanecounty.org/1076/Crime-Check

- The department will provide equipment and tools for officers to use.
- Leadership and management will establish the tone and culture for the department and the types of individuals who will be hired as police officers.
- The department will interact with government officials and the community to set the priorities for law enforcement activities.

## **Individual Community Members**

Most criminal behavior is unorganized and may be dependent on the characteristics of the individual. Certain factors may contribute to an increased propensity to commit crimes including substance abuse and addiction, poverty, mental health and medical conditions, lack of family support, unemployment, and poor education.

#### **Police Officers**

Like members of the community, an officer's behavior will be impacted by their personal background and experience. Officers can have mental health and substance abuse issues as well as bias and prejudice that could negatively impact how they conduct themselves on the job.

#### Officer-Civilian Interactions

Officers may encounter members of the community in a variety of ways:

- They may be called by victims or witnesses of criminal activity or they may be asked to help with non-criminal emergencies or problems.
- Officers may stop individuals when they observe unlawful behavior, or they believe the suspect was previously engaged in criminal conduct.
- Officers may be directed to interact with the public for a specific reason such as community policing or DUI emphasis patrols.
- The type of interaction between an officer and a civilian will depend on the severity of the offense being investigated. This can range from a homicide investigation (Class A violent

felony) to making a traffic stop for a defective taillight (civil infraction). Officers may also contact individuals who are not currently engaging in criminal activity but have an active warrant for their arrest.

## **Police Investigation**

After an officer contacts a person who is suspected of engaging in unlawful behavior, the officer will investigate to determine what happened and then decide what the most appropriate law enforcement action should be. This will involve identifying the suspect and running a criminal history and warrants check, interviewing the suspect, victims, and witnesses, and gathering evidence. The quality of this interaction will depend on the demeanor and professionalism of the officer and the level of respect and cooperation from the suspect. If either side fails to act in an appropriate manner, the situation can deteriorate rapidly leading to adverse actions such as the use of force. While conducting the investigation, the officer has the discretion to ask the suspect for consent to search the suspect's person and/or vehicle. The officer may also conduct a pat down search for weapons if there is reason to believe that the suspect may be armed or dangerous.

#### Final Law Enforcement Action

Once the investigation has been completed, the officer must decide what law enforcement actions to take if any. This can range from releasing a person with a warning to making an arrest and booking the person into jail. The type of law enforcement action taken and the level of discretion available to the officer will depend on the type of offense involved, such as:

- There are some domestic violence crimes where state law requires the officer to make an arrest and book the person into jail.
- If an officer contacts a person who has committed a violent felony it is unlikely the suspect will be released with a warning.
- If the officer stops a driver for speeding the officer only has an option of writing an infraction or giving a warning since speeding is not a criminal offense.

Examining how officers choose to exercise the discretion they have available to them is a critical component of any disparity analysis.

## **Criminal Justice System**

If an officer makes an arrest or issues a criminal citation or civil infraction, then the suspect will enter the criminal justice system as a defendant. As the defendant works his way through the system, he will be impacted by discretionary decisions of prosecutors, judges, juries, probation officers and jail guards. Each of these decisions has the potential to be influenced by racial bias and prejudice which will impact the disparities observed in the data.

Given the complexities of the entire framework for policing, it is expected that demographic disparities by age, race and sex with the underlying population would exist. While these disparities are often viewed as a negative outcome of law enforcement practices, it is not possible to address these disparities by focusing solely on individual officer behavior. Instead, it is necessary to examine the entire framework and identify those areas that have the greatest impact on disparities so that effective corrective measures and reforms can be implemented.

# Quantity of Policing vs Quality of Policing.56

Racial disparity studies in policing tend to focus exclusively on the quantity of policing and the size of the racial disparities observed. The problem with this type of analysis is that it can lead to a significant number of both false positive and false negative findings. If an officer stopped a disparate number of a particular racial group, that officer would be flagged as potentially biased even if all the officer's actions were lawful, fair, and unbiased. Similarly, an officer who does not have disparate stop statistics would be assumed to be an unbiased officer even if the officer used racial slurs during every stop involving a minority individual.

To illustrate this point, here is a hypothetical example of two officers named Officer Fair and Officer Bias who work for the Mayberry Police Department. The City of Mayberry has a population of 100,000 and 30% of city residents are Black and 70% are White. Over the last 12

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> The quality of policing is often referred to as "procedural justice."

months Officer Fair and Officer Bias each used force ten times. Officer Fair used force against 4 White Subjects and 6 Black Subjects, and each use of force was necessary, constitutional, and within policy. Officer Fair always acts professionally and respectfully with every person he arrests. Officer Bias used force against 7 White Subjects and 3 Black Subjects, and each use of force was found to be necessary, constitutional and within policy. However, Officer Bias is biased against Black people and that bias is reflected in several different ways. Officer Bias is disrespectful towards Black Subjects and uses profanity and a harsh tone with Black arrestees. Although Officer Bias does not engage in excessive force that is a violation of policy, he tends to use higher levels of force against Black Subjects than White Subjects. The Police Department where the officers work has an Early Warning System that flags officers who have a disproportionate number of contacts with people of color. The system flagged Officer Fair for engaging in possibly discriminatory behavior.

**Table 4: Risk Ratio Example** 

		Uses of Force		
Subject Race	Population	Officer Bias	Officer Fair	
White	70%	70%	40%	
Black	30%	30%	60%	

Risk Ratio UOF/Population			
Officer Bias	Officer Fair		
1.0	0.6		
1.0	2.0		

If the analysis is based solely on the racial composition of uses of force for each officer compared to the population and assumes that a high disparity was evidence of racial bias, then Officer Fair would be seen as biased and Officer Bias would be seen as unbiased. Officer Fair used force against Black Subjects twice as often as we would expect based on the population and twice as often as Officer Bias.

The disparity analysis would flag Officer Fair as potentially engaging in racial profiling (false positive) while Officer Bias would be ignored by the system even though he is engaged in biased and unprofessional behavior (false negative).

The quantity of policing is driven by factors that are external to the department such as criminal behavior as well as internal factors like police budgets and staffing. It is difficult for police chiefs to have an impact on the quantity of policing through traditional reform measures. On the other hand, police departments have a great deal of influence over the quality of policing through policies, training, accountability systems and supervision. Openness and transparency can also improve the perception of the department by the community.





Figure 1: Factors Impacting the Quantity of Policing Services





Racial disparity studies focus exclusively on quantitative measures. These studies will count the number of calls for service, the numbers of stops, arrests, uses of force, etc. This type of data can answer some questions about racial disparities, but to do a thorough assessment of the issue, qualitative data must also be collected and incorporated into the analysis.

**Figure 3: Evaluating Police Performance** 

## **Qualitative Measures Quantitative Measures** Were the victims and witnesses satisfied Number of Calls for Service with the officer's performance? Was the officer able to apprehend Number of Reported Crimes the offender and gain compliance? Did the officer have a valid reason Number of Stops for making the stop? Disparity Analysis Did the officer have probable cause Race Number of Arrests to make the arrest? Gender Age Did the officer have sufficient legal Number of Searches authority to conduct the search? Was the officer's use of force Number of Uses of Force excessive or unnecessary? Population Demographics

## **Procedural Justice**

When we speak about the quality of policing, we are referring to procedural justice. Procedural justice speaks to four principles, often referred to as the four pillars: 1) being fair in processes, 2) being transparent in actions, 3) providing opportunity for voice, and 4) being impartial in decision making. While detailed examination of procedural justice issues is beyond the scope of this study, many resources are available online.<sup>57</sup> and we recommend that the Department focus on procedural justice issues in future studies.

## **Discretion vs Discrimination**

We have refined the disparity analysis even further by examining demographic disparities in the context of officer discretion. If disparities are present in activities where the officer has a high degree of discretion this could be a strong indicator that racial bias or profiling is occurring. On the other hand, if the same level of disparity is present in low discretion activities, it is less likely that officer bias is contributing to those disparities.

**Figure 4: Police Bias Risk Matrix** 

		R	acial Disparit	У
		Positive	None	Negative
tion	High	High Risk of Bias	Medium Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias
Officer Discretion	Medium High Risk of Bias	Medium Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias	
Offi	Fow	Medium Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> <u>Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy Resources</u>, California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training

If a department desires to change officer behavior in an area where officers can exercise a high degree of discretion, officer behavior can be modified through policy changes, training, supervision, and accountability. By contrast, modifying officer behavior in low discretion situations may require changes to the laws or regulations that limit the officer's discretion. In addition, there may be ways to limit an officer's exposure to some types of situations that lead to the unwanted outcomes. For example, some agencies have implemented restrictions. <sup>58</sup> on an officer's ability to pursue eluding vehicles. <sup>59</sup>

Racial disparities in the Spokane Police Department data are highest in consent searches and officer safety searches. <sup>60</sup> These activities also have a high degree of officer discretion. An officer may ask anyone they stop for consent to search for any reason or for no reason at all. Officer safety searches are based upon the officer's perceptions of the Subject stopped and they have the discretion to pat the person down for weapons if they have reason to believe the person is armed. Unfortunately, the sample size for searches is too limited to take this analysis any further, but we have provided recommendations for improving the quality and quantity of data collected on searches. <sup>61</sup>

Use of force is another area where racial disparities are high, although not as high as they are for searches. An officer has some level of discretion on when to use force, but that level of discretion is lower than for searches and must meet certain policy and legal requirements. An officer's decision to use force will be driven primarily by the Subject's behavior. An officer cannot lawfully use force if the Subject is complying with the officer's commands and does not present a threat to the officer or others. Fortunately, we have extensive data on police uses of force from Spokane

58 "Why High-Speed Police Chases Are Going Away," Popular Mechanics, May 30, 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> 13.031 - Vehicle Eluding/<u>Pursuits</u>, Seattle Police Department Manual.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> There are significant limitations with the search data both in terms of the sample size and the value of the data collected, but it is still important to explore disparities in searches further.

for the last seven years and we were able to conduct a detailed analysis of the observed disparities.

While no significant racial disparities were observed for stops or arrests, we conducted a deeper analysis by examining racial disparities on different levels of discretionary actions for both stops and the issuance of infractions, citations, and arrests for different crime levels. The findings show that it is very unlikely that Spokane Police officers are engaged in systemic biased practices against any demographic group. The data also suggests that the racial groups that are typically viewed as the targets of police racial bias (Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans) have the lowest risk of being discriminated against during encounters where officers have a high level of discretion in making law enforcement decisions.

## Benchmarking

A critical component of any disparity analysis is the benchmark that is used as the baseline for the risk ratio calculation. The traditional racial disparity methodology relies on the census population as the primary benchmark and uses population-based benchmarks to produce the Risk Ratios and Odds Ratios. This report uses one population-based calculation when comparing the demographics of suspects in reported crimes with the demographics of the census population of the City of Spokane. Our new disparity methodology relies primarily on activity-based benchmarks. Each Risk Ratio is calculated using the immediately preceding policing activity that is most closely correlated with the activity being measured.



**Figure 5: Benchmarking for Disparity Analysis** 

#### Population as the Benchmark for Reported Crimes

The demographics of a city's population are a relevant benchmark for an examination of disparities with identified Subjects in reported crimes. By using population as a benchmark, we can determine whether certain types of individuals are more or less likely to be reported as being involved in criminal activity.

#### Reported Crimes as the Benchmark for Stops and Arrests

Stops and arrests made by police officers are going to be driven by calls for service (911 calls reporting crimes and non-emergency calls for service) and unlawful conduct that is

observed by officers (officer initiated stops). An agency's deployment strategy will be based at least in part on calls for service. Areas with a higher number of reported crimes will receive a greater proportion of policing services. Therefore, reported crimes is a more appropriate benchmark for stops and arrests than the city's population. If 20% of a city's population were young White Males but 80% of all reported crimes involved young White Males, would we expect police stops and arrests to look like the population or reflect the reported crimes? Obviously, we would expect stops and arrests to mirror reported crimes. If there were significant disparities between stops/arrests and reported crimes, then we would want to examine this in more detail to determine the root causes of these unexpected disparities.

#### • Stops as a Benchmark for Arrests and Searches

A stop is a precursor for any subsequent law enforcement action such as an making an arrest, issuing an infraction or citation, conducting a search, or using force.

#### Arrests as Benchmark for Uses of Force

An officer may only use force if they have reason to believe that the Subject is engaged in criminal activity and the Subject offers some level of resistance to the officer's commands or actions. Since almost all uses of force are associated with an arrest, arrests are the best benchmark to measure disparities in uses of force.

# **Comparing Perceptions of Race**

Perceptions of race can be used as a benchmark for a racial disparity analysis if we compare the victim's/witness' perception of a suspect's race in reported crimes with the officer's perceptions of a suspect's race who is involved in law enforcement activities (e.g. stops, arrests, searches, uses of force, etc.). Using the perceived race of identified suspects in reported crimes from NIBRS as the initial benchmark for a racial disparity analysis has the additional advantage of allowing for comparisons by the type of crime involved.

# Legal Framework for Policing

Residents of Spokane are not at equal risk of being stopped by Spokane police officers. To fully understand the dynamics behind officer-civilian interactions we must examine both the officer's decision-making process to initiate a stop as well as the civilian's behavior that drew the attention of the officer.

There are five general scenarios where an officer may contact or stop an individual for investigatory purposes:

#### 1) Non-Custodial Interview

A voluntary and consensual investigatory interview that an officer conducts with a Subject during which the Subject is free to leave and/or decline any of the officer's requests.

#### 2) Terry Stop. 62

A brief, minimally intrusive seizure of a Subject based upon articulable reasonable suspicion.<sup>63</sup> to investigate possible criminal activity. The Subject of a Terry stop is not free to leave. An officer may develop facts to establish probable cause or dispel suspicion.

62

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the court recognized that a limited stop and frisk of an individual could be conducted without a warrant based on less than probable cause. The stop must be based on a reasonable, individualized suspicion based on articulable facts, and the frisk is limited to a pat-down for weapons. Reasonable suspicion has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as "the sort of common-sense conclusion about human behavior upon which practical people . . . are entitled to rely." Further, it has defined reasonable suspicion as requiring only something more than an "unarticulated hunch." It requires facts or circumstances that give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Reasonable Suspicion: Specific, objective, articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences, would create a well-founded suspicion that there is a substantial possibility that a Subject has engaged, is engaging or is about to engage in criminal conduct. Reasonable suspicion is a step before probable cause. At the point of reasonable suspicion, it appears that a crime may have been committed. The situation escalates to probable cause when it becomes obvious that a crime has most likely been committed.

During a Terry Stop a Subject may be briefly detained and frisked for weapons, but it does not permit the searching of a person or vehicle.

#### 3) Arrest

If an officer has probable cause.<sup>64</sup> to believe that a person has committed or is committing a felony, the officer has the authority to arrest the person without a warrant. A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant for committing a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor only when the offense is committed in the presence of an officer, but there are statutory exceptions to this rule.<sup>65</sup>

#### 4) Traffic Violations

Officers may stop a driver for any violation of state or local traffic laws. A routine traffic stop may turn into a Terry Stop or lead to an arrest if the officer learns of criminal activity during the investigation of the traffic violation.

#### 5) Arrest Warrant

If an officer learns that a Subject has an outstanding warrant the officer has probable cause to make an arrest.

Residents of Spokane who are suspected of engaging in violations of the law and this unlawful activity is either reported to or observed by police officers may be stopped and detained. Some individuals are more likely to engage in unlawful activity than others. There are many factors that may affect rates of unlawful behavior and the risks of encountering the police including (in no particular order):

- Sex, Race & Age
- Education & Training

<sup>64</sup> Probable cause means that a reasonable person would believe that a crime was in the process of being committed, had been committed, or was going to be committed. The officer must have a good faith belief that a crime has been committed and the individual he is arresting committed the crime.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> See Revised Code of Washington RCW 10.31.100

- Poverty & Unemployment
- Housing & Homelessness
- Drugs, Substance Abuse & Addiction
- Mental Health & Medical Support
- Injustice & Civil Unrest
- Peer Pressure, Gangs, Family Conditions
- Social Services & Government Support Available
- Bias & Prejudice
- Neighborhood Conditions

When a crime is reported to or investigated by the police, a suspect description will be recorded with general appearance information (e.g. sex, race, age, height, weight, build, hair color, eye color, etc.). This information may be reported to the 911 dispatcher or recorded in an incident report by the investigating officers. This demographic information is primarily used for identification purposes. When we examine crimes and the types of individuals who commit crimes, only basic demographic information (age, race, and sex) is available. This data can be used to measure disparities with the underlying population, but it does not provide a full description of the individuals who commit crimes and what may be causing them to offend. Individuals are not genetically predisposed to criminal behavior and the demographic characteristics do not, in and of themselves, determine whether someone will commit a crime. If the suspect descriptions in reported crimes also included information on the suspect's income and education levels, substance abuse and mental health issues, and employment and housing status, we would be able to get a much better sense of the factors that influence people to commit crimes.

# Reported Crimes Compared to the Population

## NIBRS Reported Crimes in Washington State

Spokane County has the highest annual crime rate of any county in Washington State with 98 crimes per 1,000 population. <sup>66</sup> Similarly, the City of Spokane has the highest annual crime rate of the 25 largest cities in the State with 148 reported crimes per 1,000 populations. These numbers do not reflect the total crime rate because NIBRS only includes data on the most serious types of crimes against persons and property as well as selected crimes against society. Reports and enforcement of some local criminal laws and some misdemeanors are not included in the NIBRS data.




Figure 6: NIBRS Reported Crimes by County in Washington State

Applied Paperted Crimes per 1 000 Population in 2017 and 2018

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> One reason that crime rates may be higher in Spokane is the use of the Crime Check system for non-emergency calls. These Crime Check incidents are reported to NIBRS which other cities and counties may not include.

**Table 5: NIBRS Reported Crimes for 25 Cities in Washington State** 

# Annual NIBRS Reported Crimes for 2017-2018 25 Largest Cities in Washington State

Police Department	Population	Annual Reported Crimes	Crime Rate 1,000 Population	Crime Rate Rank
Spokane	218,222	32,292	148	1
Tacoma	215,687	22,247	103	2
Puyallup	41,572	4,241	102	3
Kent	129,870	12,543	97	4
Lakewood	60,694	5,767	95	5
Yakima	93,959	8,454	90	6
Seattle	742,759	66,320	89	7
Spokane Valley	99,020	8,715	88	8
Auburn	82,381	7,197	87	9
Everett	111,091	9,318	84	10
Federal Way	97,762	7,937	81	11
Renton	102,749	8,115	79	12
Olympia	52,312	4,071	78	13
Bellingham	90,208	6,469	72	14
Kennewick	82,687	5,406	65	15
Vancouver	177,580	11,510	65	16
Lacey	50,844	2,838	56	17
Marysville	70,204	3,762	54	18
Richland	57,450	2,995	52	19
Pasco	74,582	3,798	51	20
Bellevue	146,913	6,852	47	21
Redmond	65,827	2,930	45	22
Bothell	46,387	2,003	43	23
Edmonds	42,565	1,814	43	24
Kirkland	89,805	3,207	36	25

All WA Cities	4,804,433	337,866	70

When the NIBRS crimes are broken down by individual crime types, additional comparisons can be made between Spokane and other municipal police departments in Washington State. For property crimes the reported crime rate in Spokane is more than double the rate in other Washington cities and the Spokane crime rate for crimes against persons is nearly three times the state crime rate. Reported crimes against society in Spokane are on par with other cities in

the State. One of the challenges facing law enforcement officers in the City of Spokane is dealing with the high violent crime and property crime rates. Any examination of racial disparities in policing should take into consideration the impacts of crime rates on those disparities. To have a significant impact on reducing racial disparities in law enforcement activities, it will also be necessary to address the high crime rates that are driving enforcement activity in the city.


Table 6: NIBRS Reported Crimes and Crimes Rates for Spokane and Other Washington Cities for 2017 and 2018

	184 Municipal Police Departments in Washington State							
Crime Against	Crime Type	All Other WA Cities	Spokane	WA Cities Crime Rate 1,000 Population	Spokane Crime Rate 1,000 Population	Risk Ratio		
	Theft	128,580	14,165	28.0	64.9	2.3		
	Vandalism	49,840	6,902	10.9	31.6	2.9		
Property	Burglary	29,082	2,595	6.3	11.9	1.9		
Property	Forgery & Fraud	22,503	3,154	4.9	14.5	2.9		
	Vehicle Theft	20,800	2,069	4.5	9.5	2.1		
	Stolen Property	5,944	627	1.3	2.9	2.2		
	Assault	50,220	7,112	11.0	32.6	3.0		
Person	Robbery	6,660	461	1.5	2.1	1.5		
	Sex - Violent	4,123	529	0.9	2.4	2.7		
	Kidnapping. <sup>67</sup>	802	173	0.2	0.8	4.5		
	Homicide	207	18	0.0	0.1	1.8		
	Drugs	22,640	1,247	4.9	5.7	1.2		
Society	Weapons	4,963	273	1.1	1.3	1.2		
	Sex - Non-Violent	1,417	83	0.3	0.4	1.2		
All P	roperty Crime	230,016	23,878	50	109	2.2		
All I	Person Crime	61,150	8,180	13	37	2.8		
All S	Society Crime	27,598	1,491	6	7	1.1		
All Re	ported Crimes	305,574	32,292	67	148	2.2		
-	Population	4,586,211	218,222					
P	торинаціон	7,300,211	210,222					

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Kidnapping includes Custodial Interference cases.

There is a strong correlation between the size of the population of a city and the number of crimes reported. On average there are 89 crimes reported for every 1,000 residents of the city. The City of Spokane is well above this trend line with 148 crimes per 1,000 residents.

Figure 7: Scatter Plot – City Population & NIBRS Reported Crimes



**P-value:** < 0.0001

Equation: Annual Reported Crimes = 0.0898117\*Population + -508.849

Coefficients

 Term
 Value
 StdErr
 t-value
 p-value

 Population
 0.0898117
 0.0017168
 52.3137
 <0.0001</td>

 intercept
 -508.849
 118.131
 -4.30748
 <0.0001</td>

## Reported Crimes - Risk Ratio Analysis

This section calculates risk ratios and odds ratios for NIBRS reported crimes for Spokane and then compares those ratios with other jurisdictions in Washington state and the United States.

Males are more than twice as likely to be involved in reported crimes as Females. Blacks are three times more likely to be involved in reported crimes than Whites and Native Americans are nearly twice as likely as Whites. Asians are 60% less likely to be identified in reported crimes as Whites are. Juveniles and those over 50 are less likely to be involved in reported crimes while those between the ages of 18 and 39 are twice as likely.

**Table 7: NIBRS Reported Crimes to Spokane – Demographic Risk Ratios** 


# All NIBRS Reported Crimes to Spokane Police Department in 2017-2018


Sex	Population	Reported Crimes	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
Female	50.8%	31.5%	0.6	1
Male	49.2%	68.5%	1.4	2.3

Race	Population	Reported Crimes	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
White	88.6%	81.4%	0.9	1
Asian	4.4%	1.6%	0.4	0.4
Black	4.3%	12.5%	2.9	3.2
Nat Amer	2.7%	4.5%	1.7	1.8

Age	Population	Reported Crimes	Risk Ratio
0-17	20.1%	9.2%	0.5
18-29	19.7%	38.4%	2.0
30-39	15.1%	28.3%	1.9
40-49	10.8%	13.3%	1.2
50-59	12.3%	7.6%	0.6
60+	22.0%	3.2%	0.2

**Figure 8: Demographics of Spokane Population and Crime Reports** 









Figure 9: Risk Ratios for NIBRS Reported Crimes in Spokane



# Type of Crime Reported – Risk Ratio Analysis

This section calculates risk ratios for the types of NIBRS crimes reported. In Spokane property crimes make up nearly three-quarters of all reported crimes. Crimes against persons make up nearly a quarter of reports and drug and weapon offense make up less than 5%.

**Table 8: Reported Crime Types to Spokane Police Department** 

# National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Reported Crimes to Spokane Police Department in 2017-2018

Crime Type	Crimes Reported	% of Total
Property	47,919	71.2%
Person	16,359	24.3%
Drug	2,494	3.7%
Weapon	546	0.8%
Total	67,318	100.0%

Males are most likely to be involved in weapon offenses and weapons offenses are the reported crimes least likely to involve a Female suspect. Black suspects are more than twice as likely to be involved in property or drug crimes and more than three times more likely to be involved in crimes against persons or weapons offenses. Native Americans are more than three times more likely to be identified in a weapons offense and are twice as likely to be involved in a drug offense. Native Americans were 60% to 70% more likely to be involved in crimes against person or property. Persons between 18 and 29 were twice as likely to be involved in a property crime or a drug crime.


Table 9: Risk Ratios for NIBRS Reported Crimes & Population – Spokane Police Department

		1	Reported Crimes				Risk R	atios	
Sex	Population	Person	Property	Drug	Weapon	Person	Property	Drug	Weapon
Female	50.8%	29.6%	32.9%	28.0%	15.4%	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.3
Male	49.2%	70.4%	67.1%	72.0%	84.6%	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.7

Race	Population	Person	Property	Drug	Weapon	Person	Property	Drug	Weapon
White	88.6%	78.4%	82.9%	82.0%	74.7%	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8
Asian	4.4%	1.7%	1.5%	1.0%	0.8%	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2
Black	4.3%	15.6%	11.1%	10.0%	15.9%	3.6	2.6	2.3	3.7
Nat Amer	2.7%	4.3%	4.5%	7.0%	8.6%	1.6	1.7	2.6	3.2

Age	Population	Person	Property	Drug	Weapon	Person	Property	Drug	Weapon
0-17	20.1%	10.4%	8.9%	4.8%	9.7%	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.5
18-29	19.7%	32.9%	42.2%	39.5%	38.1%	1.7	2.1	2.0	1.9
30-39	15.1%	27.3%	28.4%	33.4%	29.0%	1.8	1.9	2.2	1.9
40-49	10.8%	15.2%	11.8%	14.2%	15.1%	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.4
50-59	12.3%	9.4%	6.5%	6.8%	6.3%	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.5
60+	22.0%	4.8%	2.3%	1.3%	1.8%	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1

Figure 10: Demographics of Spokane Population Compared to Reported Crimes









Figure 11: Risk Ratios – Spokane Population and Reported Crime Types



# Reported Crimes in Spokane, Washington & United State – Risk Ratio Analysis

Aggregated NIBRS crime report data was collected for all jurisdictions in the United States and Washington state and the demographic percentages and census data are displayed below.

Table 10: Demographics of Population and Reported Crimes for Spokane, Washington, and United States

	Census Population 2017-2018				
Sex	US WA Spokane				
Female	50.8%	50.0%	50.8%		
Male	49.2%	50.0%	49.2%		

	NIBRS Reported Crimes 2017-2018				
Sex	US WA Spokane				
Female	29.5%	28.5%	31.5%		
Male	70.5%	71.5%	68.5%		

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	76.8%	79.8%	88.6%
Asian	7.0%	12.2%	4.4%
Black	14.7%	5.4%	4.3%
Nat Amer	1.5%	2.6%	2.7%

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	61.9%	75.1%	81.4%
Asian	1.0%	3.6%	1.6%
Black	35.7%	18.6%	12.5%
Nat Amer	1.4%	2.7%	4.5%

Age	US	WA	Spokane
0-17	22.4%	21.8%	20.1%
18-29	16.5%	16.8%	19.7%
30-39	13.3%	14.7%	15.1%
40-49	12.4%	12.5%	10.8%
50-59	13.0%	12.5%	12.3%
60+	22.3%	21.7%	22.0%

Age	US	WA	Spokane
0-17	12.0%	10.9%	9.2%
18-29	37.6%	38.8%	38.4%
30-39	26.0%	27.9%	28.3%
40-49	13.0%	12.3%	13.3%
50-59	8.8%	7.4%	7.6%
60+	2.6%	2.7%	3.2%

When risk ratios and odds ratios are calculated using NIBRS reported crimes and census population data, the results are similar across all jurisdictions examined. Males are between 2.2 and 2.5 times more likely to be involved in a reported crime as Females are. Asians are underrepresented in every jurisdiction and are between 50% to 80% less likely to be involved in a crime report than Whites are. Blacks are consistently overrepresented by more than three times over Whites ranging from 3.0 to 3.7. Native Americans are no more likely than Whites to be identified in a crime report in the United States and Washington State but were 80% more likely than Whites to be involved in a crime report in Spokane. The disproportionality by age in

reported crimes is consistent across all jurisdictions with those between the ages of 18 and 39 being the most likely to be involved in a crime report.

Table 11: Risk Ratios for NIBRS Crime Reports and Population – Spokane, Washington, and United States

	Risk Ratio NIBRS Reports / Population			
Sex	US WA Spokane			
Female	0.6 0.6 0.6			
Male	1.4	1.4	1.4	

	Odds Ratio			
	NIBRS Reports / Population			
Sex	US WA Spokane			
Female	1	1	1	
Male	2.5	2.5	2.2	

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	0.8	0.9	0.9
Asian	0.1	0.3	0.4
Black	2.4	3.4	2.9
Nat Amer	0.9	1.0	1.7

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	1	1	1
Asian	0.2	0.3	0.4
Black	3.0	3.7	3.2
Nat Amer	1.1	1.1	1.8

Age	US	WA	Spokane
0-17	0.5	0.5	0.5
18-29	2.3	2.3	2.0
30-39	1.9	1.9	1.9
40-49	1.0	1.0	1.2
50-59	0.7	0.6	0.6
60+	0.1	0.1	0.1

Finally, an odds ratio calculation was done comparing Spokane's risk ratios with the risk ratios of the United States and Washington State. By sex and age there was little difference between rates of involvement in crime reports and the population. However, by race there were some significant differences. Asians were more than twice as likely to be involved in a reported crime in Spokane as the United States and Native Americans in Spokane were nearly twice as likely to be included as a suspect in a crime report. These differences by race were less pronounced when Spokane crime reports were compared with crime reports from Washington State. Blacks and Whites were found in crime reports at similar rates across all jurisdictions.

Table 12: Odds Ratios for NIBRS Crime Reports and Population – Spokane, Washington, and United States

	Odds Ratio NIBRS Reports / Population	
Sex	Spokane / US	Spokane / WA
Female	1.1	1.1
Male	1.0	1.0

Race	Spokane / US	Spokane / WA
White	1.1	1.0
Asian	2.6	1.2
Black	1.2	0.8
Nat Amer	1.9	1.6

Age	Spokane / US	Spokane / WA
0-17	0.9	0.9
18-29	0.9	0.8
30-39	1.0	1.0
40-49	1.2	1.3
50-59	0.9	1.0
60+	1.3	1.2


## Arrests Compared to Reported Crimes

#### NIBRS Arrests in Washington State

Although the crime rate for Spokane County was the highest in the state, the arrest rate is near the lower end for other counties in the state.

Figure 12: Annual NIBRS Arrest Rates for Counties in Washington State





Arrest rates were calculated for the 25 largest cities in Washington State by dividing the number of annual arrests for NIBRS offenses by the number of NIBRS reported crimes. The City of Spokane had the lowest arrest rate at 12.0%. This is similar to the arrest rates for the two cities that rank closest to Spokane in population size: Seattle (Arrest Rate 13.9%) and Tacoma (Arrest Rate 15.6%). Smaller cities like Marysville, Pasco and Richland have arrest rates exceeding 40%. Police departments in larger cities with a higher number of crimes have lower clearance rates for

reported crimes. This may be due to the anonymity that larger urban areas provide for offenders. Low arrest rates for NIBRS crimes in larger cities could also be caused by lower staffing levels per capita as well as other directed enforcement activities that are not focused on NIBRS reported crimes.

**Table 13: Arrest Rates for Cities in Washington State** 


# Annual NIBRS Reported Crimes & Arrests for 2017-2018 25 Largest Cities in Washington State

Police Department	Population	Annual Reported Crimes	Annual Arrests	Arrest Rate	Arrest Rate Rank
Marysville	70,204	3,762	1,587	42.2%	1
Pasco	74,582	3,798	1,590	41.9%	2
Richland	57,450	2,995	1,249	41.7%	3
Lacey	50,844	2,838	992	35.0%	4
Yakima	93,959	8,454	2,939	34.8%	5
Puyallup	41,572	4,241	1,419	33.5%	6
Kennewick	82,687	5,406	1,771	32.8%	7
Bellingham	90,208	6,469	2,014	31.1%	8
Edmonds	42,565	1,814	565	31.1%	9
Everett	111,091	9,318	2,660	28.5%	10
Olympia	52,312	4,071	964	23.7%	11
Bothell	46,387	2,003	470	23.5%	12
Auburn	82,381	7,197	1,668	23.2%	13
Redmond	65,827	2,930	657	22.4%	14
Bellevue	146,913	6,852	1,479	21.6%	15
Kent	129,870	12,543	2,594	20.7%	16
Federal Way	97,762	7,937	1,594	20.1%	17
Kirkland	89,805	3,207	595	18.6%	18
Spokane Valley	99,020	8,715	1,576	18.1%	19
Lakewood	60,694	5,767	1,027	17.8%	20
Renton	102,749	8,115	1,420	17.5%	21
Vancouver	177,580	11,510	1,893	16.4%	22
Tacoma	215,687	22,247	3,472	15.6%	23
Seattle	742,759	66,320	9,216	13.9%	24
Spokane	218,222	32,292	3,890	12.0%	25

All WA Cities	4,804,433	337,866	76,712	22.7%

There is a strong correlation between the number of reported crimes in a city and the number of arrests made. On average for every 100 crimes reported there are 15 arrests made. Spokane and Seattle are the two largest cities that fall slightly below that average.

Figure 13: Scatter Plot – NIBRS Reported Crimes, Arrests & Arrest Rates for Cities in Washington State



 P-value: < 0.0001</th>

 Equation: Annual Arrests = 0.147281\*Annual Reported Crimes + 146.468

 Coefficients
 Yalue
 StdErr
 t-value
 p-value

 Annual Reported Crimes
 0.147281
 0.0036177
 40.7114
 < 0.0001</td>

 intercept
 146.468
 22.3705
 6.54739
 < 0.0001</td>

When arrest rates for individual NIBRS crimes are examined there are some types of crimes where arrest rates in Spokane are on par with other cities in the state: stolen property, vehicle theft, drug crimes and unlawful weapons. Compared to other cities, arrest rates were lowest in Spokane for theft, forgery and fraud, violent sex crimes, and non-violent sex offenses.

Table 14: NIBRS Arrest Rates for Cities in Washington State by Type of Crime

Annual NIBRS Arrests for 2017-2018 184 Municipal Police Departments in Washington State						
Crime Against	Crime Type	All Other WA Cities	Spokane	WA Cities Arrest Rate	Spokane Arrest Rate	Risk Ratio
	Theft	20,760	794	16%	6%	0.3
	Vandalism	7,617	571	15%	8%	0.5
Property	Stolen Property	3,822	292	13%	11%	0.9
Arrests	Burglary	3,825	236	17%	7%	0.4
	Forgery & Fraud	2,497	73	12%	4%	0.3
	Vehicle Theft	1,474	136	25%	22%	0.9
	Assault	24,580	1,639	49%	23%	0.5
Dawasa	Robbery	1,710	80	26%	17%	0.7
Person Arrests	Sex - Violent	761	18	18%	3%	0.2
Airests	Kidnapping	432	37	54%	21%	0.4
	Homicide	109	5	53%	28%	0.5
	Drugs	16,376	847	72%	68%	0.9
Society Arrests	Weapons	2,934	145	59%	53%	0.9
Airests	Sex - Non-Violent	578	10	41%	12%	0.3
All Property Arrests		35,948	1,778	16%	7%	0.5
All Pe	erson Arrests	27,102	1,741	44%	21%	0.5
All Sc	ciety Arrests	18,796	931	68%	62%	0.9
All Arrests		72,822	3,890	24%	12%	0.5

## NIBRS Arrests – Risk Ratio Analysis

Aggregated NIBRS arrest data was collected for all jurisdictions in the United States and Washington state and the demographic percentages and census data are displayed below.

Table 15: Demographics of NIBRS Reported Crimes and Arrests in Spokane, Washington, and United States

	NIBRS Reported Crimes 2017-2018				
Sex	US WA Spokane				
Female	29.5%	28.5%	31.5%		
Male	70.5%	71.5%	68.5%		

	NIBRS Arrests 2017-2018			
Sex	US WA Spokane			
Female	27.4%	28.6%	27.8%	
Male	72.6%	71.4%	72.2%	

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	61.9%	75.1%	81.4%
Asian	1.0%	3.6%	1.6%
Black	35.7%	18.6%	12.5%
Nat Amer	1.4%	2.7%	4.5%

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	68.7%	77.9%	80.9%
Asian	1.4%	3.7%	1.8%
Black	27.9%	15.0%	11.0%
Nat Amer	2.1%	3.3%	6.4%

_			
Age	US	WA	Spokane
0-17	12.0%	10.9%	9.2%
18-29	37.6%	38.8%	38.4%
30-39	26.0%	27.9%	28.3%
40-49	13.0%	12.3%	13.3%
50-59	8.8%	7.4%	7.6%
60+	2.6%	2.7%	3.2%

Age	US	WA	Spokane
0-17	11.3%	10.0%	9.2%
18-29	34.6%	38.0%	37.7%
30-39	26.9%	28.1%	30.1%
40-49	14.8%	13.6%	13.8%
50-59	9.1%	7.8%	7.1%
60+	3.3%	2.5%	2.1%

When risk ratios and odds ratios are calculated using NIBRS arrests and NIBRS reported crimes, the results are similar across all jurisdictions examined. There are no significant disparities by sex or age except for individuals over 60. In the United States this group is 30% more likely to be arrested while in Spokane those over 60 are 40% less likely to be arrested than would be expected based upon their frequency in reported crimes.

When odds ratios by race are examined Blacks are less likely to be arrested than Whites and Native Americans are more likely to be arrested than Whites. This pattern holds true across all jurisdictions.

Table 16: Risk Ratios for NIBRS Arrests and Reported Crimes in Spokane, Washington, and United States

	Risk Ratio NIBRS Arrests/NIBRS Reports		
Sex	US	WA	Spokane
Female	0.9	1.0	0.9
Male	1.0	1.0	1.1

	Odds Ratio				
	NIBRS Arrests/NIBRS Reports				
Sex	US WA Spokane				
Female	1 1 1				
Male	1.1 1.0 1.2				

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	1.1	1.0	1.0
Asian	1.4	1.0	1.1
Black	0.8	0.8	0.9
Nat Amer	1.5	1.2	1.4

Race	US	WA	Spokane
White	1	1	1
Asian	1.3	1.0	1.1
Black	0.7	0.8	0.9
Nat Amer	1.3	1.2	1.4

Age	US	WA	Spokane
0-17	0.9	0.9	1.0
18-29	0.9	1.0	1.0
30-39	1.0	1.0	1.1
40-49	1.1	1.1	1.0
50-59	1.0	1.1	0.9
60+	1.3	0.9	0.6

Finally, an odds ratio calculation was done comparing Spokane's risk ratios with the risk ratios of the United States and Washington State. By sex and race there was no variation between Spokane and the United States or Washington State that was greater than 10%. By age there was no variation except for those over 60. In Spokane individuals over 60 are less likely to be arrested than in the rest of Washington State or the United States as a whole.

When NIBRS arrests are compared with NIBRS reported crimes, the arrest practices of the Spokane Police Department are similar to the practices of other agencies in Washington State and across the country.

Table 17: Risk Ratios for NIBRS Arrests and Reported Crimes in Spokane, Washington, and United States

	Odds Ratio NIBRS Arrests/NIBRS Reports			
Sex	Spokane / US Spokane / WA			
Female	1.0	0.9		
Male	1.0	1.1		

Race	Spokane / US	Spokane / WA
White	0.9	1.0
Asian	0.8	1.1
Black	1.1	1.1
Nat Amer	0.9	1.1

Age	Spokane / US	Spokane / WA
0-17	1.1	1.1
18-29	1.1	1.0
30-39	1.0	1.1
40-49	0.9	0.9
50-59	0.9	0.9
60+	0.5	0.7


### NIBRS Reported Crimes/Arrests – Washington City Comparisons

To provide context for the racial disparities observed in Spokane's NIBRS data for reported crimes and arrests, a comparison was made with racial disparities from the 30 largest cities in Washington State.

When NIBRS reported crimes were compared with the demographics of city population the average risk ratio for Whites were slightly underrepresented in reported crimes compared to their population (-5%) while Asians were 70% less likely to be involved in a reported crime. Blacks were 3.5 times more likely to be involved in a reported crime and Native Americans were twice as likely. In five cities (Bellevue, Kirkland, Sammamish, Redmond, and Edmonds), Blacks were more than 8 times more likely to be involved in a reported crime than their population would suggest and in four cities (Bellingham, Marysville, Sammamish, and Redmond), Native Americans were more than 4 times more likely to be involved in a reported crime. All the cities had a positive disparity with Blacks in reported crimes and a negative disparity with Asians in reported crimes. Native Americans had negative disparities in four cities (Vancouver, Lakewood, Shoreline and Richland). Whites had the greatest negative disparities in Seattle, Tacoma and Lakewood and the largest positive disparities in Redmond, Sammamish, and Bothell.

Spokane is below the average city disparity for Blacks and Native Americans and is close to average for Whites and Asians.


Figure 14: Racial Disparities – Reported Crimes & Population – Cities in Washington State



When NIBRS arrests are compared with NIBRS crimes the racial disparities are dramatically reduced for all 30 cities examined. On average there was virtually no disparity between arrests and reported crimes for White Subjects while Black Subjects were underrepresented in arrests by 8%. By contrast Asian Subjects were 9% more likely to be arrested and Native Americans are 21% more likely to be arrested than would be expected based on their proportion of all reported crimes.


Spokane had a higher-than-average arrest disparity for Native American Subjects at nearly 50% while the arrest disparities for White, Black and Asian Subjects were all near the mean for the 30 cities.


Figure 15: Racial Disparities – NIBRS Reported Crimes & Population – 30 Largest Cities in Washington State



Odds ratios were calculated for Subject sex. Burien had the highest odds ratio where Males were more than 4 times more likely to be involved in a reported crime than Females. Spokane Valley had the lowest odds ratio where Males were nearly twice as likely as Females to be involved in a reported crime. On average Males were 2.5 times more likely to be involved in a reported crime and Spokane's odds ratio was slightly below the mean at 2.3.

Figure 16: Odds Ratio for Gender – NIBRS Reported Crimes to Population – Cities in Washington State






Odds ratios for NIBRS arrests compared to NIBRS reported crimes were calculated for each city. The disparities were low and on average Males are 10% less likely to be arrested than Females. In Spokane Males and Females were equally likely to be arrested after being identified in a reported crime. Sammamish had the highest disparity where Male Subjects were 45% more likely than Female Subjects to be arrested while Kent had the lowest disparity where Males were 24% less likely to be arrested.


Figure 17: Odds Ratio for Gender – NIBRS Arrests to NIBRS Reported Crimes – Cities in Washington State






When compared with Whites, racial disparities between reported crimes and the population for other racial groups is substantial. Blacks are more than 4 times as likely as Whites to be identified in a reported crime. Kirkland had the highest Black/White odds ratio at 15 and Lynnwood had the lowest at 1.7. Spokane was below average at 3.7.


Figure 18: Odds Ratio for Race (Black to White) – NIBRS Reported Crimes and Population – Cities in Washington State






Native Americans were nearly two and a half times more likely to be identified in a reported crime than Whites. Bellingham had the highest Native American/White odds ratio at 7 and Lakewood had the lowest where Native Americans were 37% less likely than Whites to be involved in a reported crime than their population would suggest. Spokane was below the city odds ratio average at 1.8.


Figure 19: Odds Ratio for Race (Native American to White) – NIBRS Reported Crimes and Population – Cities in Washington State






Compared to Whites, Asians were underrepresented in NIBRS crime reports in every city examined. On average Asians were 68% less likely than Whites to be identified in a reported crime. Spokane was close to the city average at 71%.

Figure 20: Odds Ratio for Race (Asian to White) – NIBRS Reported Crimes and Population – Cities in Washington State






Racial disparities are significantly smaller when NIBRS arrests are compared with NIBRS reported crimes. On average Black Subjects are 9% less likely than Whites to be arrested after being involved in reported crime. Spokane is close to this city average with Blacks being 12% less likely to be arrested than Whites.

Figure 21: Odds Ratio for Race (Black to White) – NIBRS Arrests and NIBRS Reported Crimes – Cities in Washington State






Native American Subjects are generally more likely to be arrested than White Subjects who are involved in reported crimes. On average Native Americans are 28% more likely to be arrested. Spokane is above the average city odds ratio at 43%.


Figure 22: Odds Ratio for Race (Native American to White) – NIBRS Arrests and NIBRS Reported Crimes – Cities in Washington State






Asian Subjects are slightly more likely to be arrested than White Subjects who are involved in reported crimes. On average Asians are 7% more likely to be arrested. Spokane is above the average city odds ratio at 13%.

Figure 23: Odds Ratio for Race (Asian to White) – NIBRS Arrests and NIBRS Reported Crimes – Cities in Washington State






## Victims and Offenders - Spokane

Data from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). 68 was used to prepare a series of pie charts displaying the demographic composition of the population for the City of Spokane, crime victims, reported crimes and arrests. The average of two years of NIBRS data was examined (2017 and 2018).

Figure 24: Spokane Demographics for Population, Reported Crimes and Arrests



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Ethnicity was not captured consistently by NIBRS, so Hispanics were not included in this analysis.

#### Spokane Victims and Offenders – Risk Ratio Analysis

Risk ratios were calculated for each metric:

- Percentage of victims compared to the percentage of the population
- Percentage of reported crimes compared to the percentage of the population
- Percentage of arrests compared to the percentage of reported crimes

Finally, odds ratios for sex (comparing the risk ratio of Males with Females) and odds ratios for race (comparing the risk ratios of non-White races with Whites) were calculated.

Table 18: Risk Ratio & Odds Ratio – Spokane Victims, Reported Crimes and Arrests

	Risk Ratio				
	Victims / Crimes / Arrests / Population Population Crimes				
Female	1.0	0.6	0.9		
Male	1.0	1.4	1.0		

White	1.0	0.9	1.0
Black	1.3	2.9	0.9
Nat Amer	0.9	1.7	1.4
Asian	0.4	0.4	1.1

0-17	0.3	0.5	1.0
18-30	1.4	2.0	1.0
31-49	1.4	1.5	1.1
50+	0.8	0.3	0.9

	Odds Ratio				
	Victims / Crimes / Arrests / Population Population Crimes				
Female	1	1	1		
Male	1.0	2.2	1.1		

White	1	1	1
Black	1.2	3.2	0.9
Nat Amer	0.9	1.8	1.4
Asian	0.4	0.4	1.1

Males and Females comprise the same proportion of victims of crime as they do in the population. Males were 40% more likely to be reported involved in a crime and Females were 40% less likely to be involved in a crime than we would expect based on their proportion of the population. When arrests were compared with reported crimes, Males and Females were equally likely to be arrested.

Blacks were the only racial group to be more likely to be a victim of a crime than we would expect based on their population (30% more likely to be a victim). Asians were 60% less likely to be the victim of a crime and Whites and Native Americans were equally likely. Blacks were nearly three times more likely to be identified as a suspect in a reported crime than we would expect based on their percentage of the population. Native Americans were 70% more likely to be identified in a reported crime and Asians were 60% less likely. Whites were about equally likely to be involved in a crime as their population would predict. Racial disparities virtually disappeared when arrests were compared with reported crimes. Whites, Blacks and Asians were arrested in the same proportions as they were involved in reported crimes. However, Native Americans were 40% more likely to be arrested.

Spokane residents between the ages of 18 and 49 were 40% more likely to report being the victim of a crime. Juveniles were 70% less likely to be a crime victim and those over 50 were 20% less likely. Persons between 18 and 30 were twice as likely to be identified in reported crimes and those 31 to 49 were 50% more likely. Juveniles and those over 50 were more than 50% less likely to be involved in a reported crime.

When arrests were compared with reported crimes there was no significant disparity by age.

Males were more than twice as likely as Females to be identified in a reported crime, but Males were not more likely than Females to be a victim or an arrestee.

Blacks were more than three times more likely than Whites to be involved in a reported crime, but Blacks were slightly less likely to be arrested than Whites. Native Americans were nearly two times more likely than Whites to be involved in a reported crime and they were 40% more likely to be arrested than Whites. Asians were 60% less likely than Whites to be a crime victim or involved in a reported crime, but Asians were just as likely as Whites to be arrested.

Police actions do not determine who becomes a crime victim or who the suspects are in reported crimes. Therefore, the significant sex, race and age disparities observed in victimization rates and crime rates, are not the product of racial bias or racial profiling by the police.

When the demographics of arrestees are compared with the demographics of the suspects in reported crimes there are no disparities by age, race, or sex, except for Native Americans. Native Americans are 40% more likely to be arrested than we would expect based on their proportion as suspects in reported crimes. Since most arrests are a discretionary police actions, <sup>69</sup> it is possible that at least some of this disparity could be due to racial bias and/or racial profiling. This disparity could also be caused by other factors such as the types of crimes committed by Native Americans. Different crime types will have different arrest rates. Crimes against persons and social disorder crimes tend to have the highest arrest rates and property crimes have the lowest arrest rates. If Native Americans were disproportionately involved in crimes against persons or social disorder crimes that may explain some of the disparity in arrests when compared with reported crimes.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Some criminal incidents like domestic violence require officers to make an arrest when there is probable cause, and the suspect has been identified.

#### **Victim Reporting Bias**

Another possible cause of disparities between suspects in reported crimes and the underlying population, is victim bias or prejudice. Are certain types of victims more or less likely to report certain types of Subjects who are involved in crimes?

Male victims are more likely to report that a Female was the perpetrator (35% Female crime suspects) than Female victims are (22% Female crime suspects).




Figure 25: Gender of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Gender in Spokane

Female victims are 21% more likely than Male victims to report that a Black suspect committed a crime against them. Male victims are more likely than Female victims to report that a Native American suspect or and Asian suspect committed a crime against them.




Figure 26: Race of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Gender in Spokane

Younger victims are more likely to report Black suspects committing crimes against them, while victims over 50 are more likely than younger victims to report White suspects being involved in crimes against them. Victims between 31 and 49 were more likely to report Native American crime suspects than older or younger victims while juvenile victims were most likely to report Asian crime suspects.




Figure 27: Race of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Age in Spokane

When the race of victims is compared to the race of reported crime suspects, significant disparities are observed. Compared to the racial makeup of the population, Black, Native American, and Asian victims are more likely to report being victimized by a person of their own race than other racial groups. Asian victims are 8 times more likely to report that the suspect was also Asian than would be expected based upon the proportion of Asians in the population. Similarly, Black victims are 12 times more likely to report Black suspects and Native American victims are 11 times more likely to report Native American suspects.

White victims were three times more likely to report Black victims and twice as likely to report Native American victims as would be expected based on the racial composition of the population. White victims were 75% less likely to report Asian victims.

The overall racial disparities in reported crime suspects compared to the city population, appear to be driven by reporting victims who share the same race as the suspect. Racial bias and prejudice could still play a role in these disparities since White victims report the majority of


crimes and they report Black and Native American suspects at a rate two to three times higher than their portion of the population.

Table 19: Risk Ratios – Race of Victim and Suspect - Spokane

Victim Race	Suspect Race	% of All Suspects in Victim Group	% of Suspect Race in Population	Risk Ratio
White	White	83%	89%	1
Black	Black	46%	4%	12
Nat Amer	Nat Amer	33%	3%	11
Asian	Asian	31%	4%	8

White	Black	10%	4%	3
White	Nat Amer	5%	3%	2
White	Asian	1%	4%	0.25

Figure 28: Race of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Race - Spokane




Crime victims are more likely to report suspects of a similar age. For victims 0-17, 18-30 and 31-49, they were two to three times more likely to report a suspect in the same age range. Victims over age 50 were 44% less likely to report a suspect in the same age range. This indicates that older victims are more likely to be victimized by younger suspects.

Table 20: Risk Ratios for Ages of Crime Victims and Reported Suspects in Spokane

Victim Age	Suspect Age	% of All Suspects in Victim Group	% of Population	Risk Ratio
0-17	0-17	43%	20%	2
18-30	18-30	58%	21%	3
31-49	31-49	50%	24%	2
50+	50+	19%	34%	0.56


Figure 29: Age of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Age - Spokane



When victims are grouped by age, race and sex, the racial disparities of reported suspects can become even more pronounced.


White Female victims between 31 and 49 reported Black suspects 12% of the time while White Female victims over 50 only reported Black suspects 7% of the time. White Female victims over 50 were most likely to report White suspects (87%).

Figure 30: Race of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Gender, Race and Age – White Victims - Spokane



Juvenile White Female victims and Female Native American victims between 18 and 49 did not report any Asian suspects, while Juvenile White Males and Black Males between 31 and 49 reported Asian suspects 5% of the time. Black Female victims between 18 and 49 reported Black suspects more than 60% of the time, while Native American Female victims between 18 and 49 reported Native American suspects 37% of the time.

Figure 31: Race of Arrestees by Reporting Victim's Gender, Race and Age - Black Victims - Spokane



### Victim and Offender Demographic Characteristics

In Spokane, White Male adults comprise 42% of crime victims and White Female adults make up 38% of all victims. By contrast, White Male adults comprise 50% of all arrestees and White Female adults make up 20% of arrestees. Black Male adults make up 4% of victims, but 10% of arrestees.

The social dynamics of victimization rates and offending rates are complex and it is beyond the scope of this study to explore all the possible reasons why disparities may exist. This information was provided to highlight the difficulties in using quantitative law enforcement data to determine how much officer bias may contribute to these observed disparities.




Figure 32: Demographics of Crime Victims and Arrestees in Spokane

#### **Residence of Offenders**

How often do Spokane Police officers take law enforcement action against non-residents?

Twelve percent of arrests and 26% of infractions issued by Spokane police officers are given to non-residents. The higher percentage of infractions for non-residents is likely due to traffic infractions where Subjects from out of town are stopped while visiting or travelling through Spokane.

Table 21: Residence of Offenders Arrested or Cited by the Spokane Police

Department

	Offender's Residence		
SPD Action	Spokane	Non-	
Taken	Эрокапе	Resident	
Arrest	88%	12%	
Infraction	74%	26%	


How often are suspects stopped by police in their own neighborhood?

The CAD system provides the zip code where the stop occurred when law enforcement action was taken (arrest, citation or infraction) as well as the zip code of the Subject's residence. The zip code boundaries are larger than most of Spokane's neighborhoods. Nevertheless, only 37% of all stops where law enforcement action was taken were made within the Subject's home zip code. This means that two-thirds Subjects were stopped outside of their own neighborhoods.

Stops that were made in the 99223 zip code involved a resident of that zip code 46% of the time, while stops made in the 99218 zip code only involved a resident of that zip code 15% of the time.

Since the police do not encounter most Subjects in their own neighborhoods, it is not possible to conduct a meaningful disparity study by comparing law enforcement activities in a neighborhood with the underlying population of the neighborhood.

Figure 33: Zip Codes of Stop Location and Offender Residence for Contacts Made by the Spokane Police Department



## Police Stops & Law Enforcement Action Taken

#### Call Source – Risk Ratio Analysis

The first question examined is whether there are demographic disparities based on the source of the contact (911 call/Non-Emergency call for service or an officer intiated stop). The disparity calculations are based on the following data:

Table 22: Demographics of Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Contacts and NIBRS
Reported Crimes – Spokane Police Department

		Call Sour	NIBRS	
Reason for		Officer	911 &	Crime
	Stop	Initiated	Non-Emergency	Reports
Tot	al Records	45,031	92,003	40,610
D	iscretion	Higher	Lower	Suspects
Gender	Female	27.9%	35.4%	31.5%
Ger	Male	72.1%	64.6%	68.5%
	White	83.9%	82.9%	81.4%
Race	Black	10.1%	10.9%	12.5%
Ra	Nat Amer	4.5%	4.6%	4.5%
	Asian	1.5%	1.6%	1.6%
	0-17	2.0%	6.3%	9.2%
Age	18-30	35.5%	31.8%	42.2%
Ą	31-49	45.5%	42.8%	37.8%
	50+	17.0%	19.2%	10.8%

When compared with the demographics of reported crimes, there are no racial or sex disparities in police stops from either calls for service or officer initiated contacts. There are observed disparities by Subject age groups. Juveniles are 78% less likely to be stopped by an officer initiated contact and 31% less likely to be stopped as a result of a call for service. Subjects 18 to 30 are 25% less likely to be stopped after a call for service and those 31 to 49 are 20% more likely to be stopped in an officer initiated contact. Those over 50 are much more likely to be stopped than we would expect based on their involvement in reported crimes. After a call for service, Subjects over 50 are 77% more likely to be stopped and 57% more likely during an officer initiated stop.

Table 23: Risk Ratios for Demographics of CAD Stops by Call Source Type -**Spokane** 

	Call Source (CAD)			
Reason for Stop	Officer Initiated	911 & Non-Emergency		
Total Records	45,031	92,003		
Discretion Level	Higher	Lower		
Risk Ratio	Stops / Crime Reports	Stops / Crime Reports		

Stop	Initiated	Non-Emergency
Total Records	45,031	92,003
Discretion Level	Higher	Lower
Risk Ratio	Stops / Crime Reports	Stops /

der	Female	0	0
Gen	Male	0	0

	White	0	0
Race	Black	0	0
Ra	Nat Amer	0	0
	Asian	0	0

	0-17	-	-
3e	18-30	0	-
Age	31-49	+	0
	50+	++	++

Symbol	Disparity	Risk Ratio
++	Positive	> +50%
+	Positive	+20% to +50%
0	None	-20% to +20%
-	Negative	-20% to -100%

## Call Source and Call Summary/Reason for the Stop Comparisons

The source of the call plays a large role in the reason for the stop. Traffic stops, directed enforcement, assistance stops, and warrant stops are generated primarily by officer-initiated activity. Stops for crimes against persons and welfare checks come mostly from 911 calls and rarely involve officer-initiated activity. It is more common for property crimes to be reported as a non-emergency call while reports of suspicious circumstances and disturbances are nearly equally distributed among 911 calls, non-emergency calls and officer-initiated activity.





Figure 34: CAD Call Summary by Call Source - Spokane



#### Reason for the Stop – Risk Ratio Analysis

The officer's reason for the stop and the original call types were divided into six categories based on officer discretion levels. When a call is received about a violent crime, officers will be dispatched with the highest prority. Similarly if an officer witnesses a violent crime being committed, the officer will act immediately to stop the crime and arrest the suspect. Violent crimes are very low discretion incidents for officers. By contrast, non-emergency calls for service and requests for general welfare checks will be classified as low priority calls. Similarly officers may observe non-criminal activities and choose not to investigate. Therefore, officers have a very high degree of discretion in dealing with non-criminal and non-emergency matters..<sup>70</sup>

Table 24: Demographics of CAD Stops by Reason for the Stop - Spokane

		Reason for the Stop (CAD)			NIBRS		
Reason for		Assistance &	Suspicious &	Traffic &	Crime Against	Crime Against	Crime
	Stop	Welfare Check	Disturbance	Directed	Property	Person	Reports
Tot	al Records	18,571	37,636	32,275	15,644	32,908	40,610
D	iscretion	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low	Suspects
Gender	Female	42.4%	32.1%	33.8%	31.0%	29.8%	31.5%
Gen	Male	57.6%	67.9%	66.2%	69.0%	70.2%	68.5%
	White	86.5%	83.1%	87.0%	83.1%	79.4%	81.4%
Race	Black	7.8%	10.6%	8.0%	9.3%	14.4%	12.5%
Ra	Nat Amer	4.3%	4.9%	3.0%	5.9%	4.8%	4.5%
	Asian	1.3%	1.4%	2.0%	1.7%	1.6%	1.6%
	0-17	7.9%	3.1%	1.6%	5.1%	8.3%	9.2%
Age	18-30	27.5%	30.5%	38.1%	35.1%	33.0%	42.2%
Ř	31-49	41.4%	47.4%	39.9%	45.1%	43.7%	37.8%
	50+	23.1%	19.0%	20.4%	14.7%	15.0%	10.8%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Another factor to consider is officer workload. Officers may not have a choice regarding non-criminal and non-emergency matters because they do not have capacity to deal with them due to high call volume and reduced staffing.

When compared with the demographics of reported crimes, there are no disparities in police stops by sex except for calls for assistance/welfare checks where Females were 35% more likely to be stopped. This suggests that either Females are more likely than Males to be involved in these types of calls/contacts and/or that officers are more likely to contact Females than Males when they are observed in non-emergency/non-criminal situations.

There were no disparities for any stop category for White Subjects. Black Subjects were about 30% less likely to be stopped for property crimes, traffic/directed enforcement, and assistance/welfare checks. Native Americans were 30% more likely to be stopped for property crimes and 34% less likely to be stopped for traffic/directed enforcement. Asian Subjects were 26% more likely to be stopped for traffic/directed enforcement. The lack of racial disparities for high discretion calls makes it unikley that officer are engaging in widespread racial profiling when deciding who to stop. This data does not rule out the existence of individual incidents of racial profiling or racial bias in the decision to make a stop.

Demographic disparities in the reason for the stop were greatest among the different age groups. Juveniles were 82% less likely to be stopped for traffic/directed enforcement, 67% less likely to be stopped for suspicious circumstances/disturbances and 44% less likely to be stopped for property crimes. Subjects between the ages of 18 and 30 were about 30% less likely to be involved in violent crimes, suspicious circumstances/disturbances and assistance/welfare checks. Those over 50 were overrepresented in every "reason for the stop" category. They were nearly twice as likely to be stopped for higher discretion stops (traffic/directed enforcement, suspicious circumstances/disturbances and assistance/welfare checks) and about 40% more likely to be stopped for property crimes and violent crimes.

Table 25: Risk Ratios for Demographics of CAD Stops by Reason for the Stop - Spokane

		Reason for the Stop (CAD)									
Re	eason for Stop	Assistance & Welfare Check	Suspicious & Disturbance	Traffic & Directed	Crime Against Property	Crime Against Person					
Tot	al Records	18,571	37,636	32,275	15,644	32,908					
D	iscretion Level	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low					
R	isk Ratio	Stops / Crime Reports	Stops / Crime Reports	Stops / Crime Reports	Stops / Crime Reports	Stops / Crime Reports					
Gender	Female	+	0	0	0	0					
Gen	Male	0	0	0	0	0					
	White	0	0	0	0	0					
Race	Black	-	0	-	-	0					
Ra	Nat Amer	0	0	-	+	0					
	Asian	0	0	+	0	0					
	0-17	0	-	-	-	0					
Age	18-30	-	-	0	0	-					
Ag	31-49	0	+	0	0	0					
	50+	++	++	++	+	+					

Symbol	Disparity	Risk Ratio		
++	Positive	> +50%		
+	Positive	+20% to +50%		
0	None	-20% to +20%		
-	Negative	-20% to -100%		

## Number of Stops per Subject

When disparities in police stops are calculated, one issue that needs to be taken into consideration are Subjects that are stopped multiple times. Over the last 3½ years there have been 67,410 stops where the Subject's identity was recorded by a "jacket number" in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. There were 44,465 identified Subjects who were stopped by the police at least once during the time period. Most of these Subjects (79%) were stopped only once during the last 3½ years. The remaining 21% of Subjects were involved in 48% of all the stops made. The top 7% of Subjects were involved in 27% of all stops.

Subjects that have been stopped only once over the last 3½ years are usually released with a warning or no action taken (60%) while 18% are issued an infraction and 23% are arrested. <sup>71</sup> The more a Subject is contacted by the police the more likely it is that they will be arrested. Individuals who were stopped four or more times were arrested in 63% of those stops.




Figure 35: Number of Stops per Subject and Type of Action Taken - Spokane

When the demographics of Subjects who are stopped by the police are examined some clear patterns emerge. Males are more likely than Females to be stopped by the police. Younger Subjects are stopped more often than older Subjects. Black and Native American Subjects make up a greater percentage of Subjects that have been stopped four or more times by the police (19.6%) than those who have been stopped only once (11.6%). White, Hispanic and Asian Subjects are less likely to be involved in multiple stops by the police.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding errors.

The type of Subject most likely to be stopped multiple times by the police is a younger Male who is either Black or Native American. There are several possible reasons why this type of Subject is involved in more stops by police including:

- Subjects are engaged in more serious crimes that lead to arrest
- Subjects are more likely to encounter police after committing an offense
- Subjects are repeat offenders
- Officers are profiling Subjects based on age, race, and sex

With quantitative data alone we cannot assign specific causes to these disparities.

Figure 36: Number of CAD Stops per Subject by Sex and Age - Spokane





Figure 37: Number of CAD Stops per Subject by Race - Spokane



The following table shows the number of stops per Subject, the number of Subjects who have been stopped and the percentage of all Subjects by sex, race, and age. Subjects in most demographic groups were stopped an average of once a year (3.5 stops over 3½ years). Females, Hispanics, Asians, and those over 50 were less likely to be stopped by police than other groups. There was one White Male Subject between 18 and 30 who was stopped 30 times during the period.

Figure 38: Frequency of CAD Stops by Subject Demographics - Spokane

Average I Stops Pe	Number of er Subject							Num	ber o	of Sto	ps p	er Su	bject	t Betv	ween	Janu	ary 2	2017 :	and J	lune	2020						
		1 17,513 73%	2 2,952 12%	3 1,335 6%	4 807 3%	5 469 2%	6 333 1%	7 224 1%	8 120 0%	9 92 0%	10 57 0%	11 49 0%	12 31 0%	13 15 0%	14 8 0%	15 13 0%	16 11 0%	17 4 0%	18 6 0%	19 1 0%	20 3 0%	21 2 0%	22 2 0%	23 2 0%	25 2 0%	26 1 0%	30 1 0%
Male	3.4			1,335	3%	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	0	0	۰	۰	0	۰	۰	•	0	•	٠	•	•	•	•
Female	2.9	8,553	1,352	493 4%	278	186 2%	86 1%	63 1%	34 0%	24 0%	22 0%	19 0% •	10 0% •	5 0% •	3 0% •	2 0% •	2 0%	1 0%	1 0%			3 0%	1 0%	2 0% •			
White	3.3	19,830	3,350 12%	1,409	821 3%	483 2%	312 1%	212	116 0%	85 0%	62 0% ©	54 0% ©	30 0% ©	15 0% o	8 0%	13 0% •	10 0% •	3 0% •	5 0% •	1 0%	3 0%	4 0% •	3 0% •	3 0%	2 0%	1 0%	1 0%
Black	3.6	2,605	462 12%	230	132	92 2%	54 1%	52 1%	22 1%	18 0%	8 0% •	9 0% ©	7 0% •	4 0% •	2 0% o	1 0% o	2 0% o					1 0% o		1 0% o			
Nat Amer	3.7	892	184	86 6%	66 5%	3%	29 2%	9 1%	6 0%	8 1%	3 0% •	3 0% ©	2 0% ©		1 0% o		1 0% ©	2 0% ©	1 0% ©								
Hispanic	2.9	978	155	48 4%	33 3%	17	14 1%	9 1% ○	3 0%	2 0% •	4 0%	1 0% o	1 0% •	1 0% •		1 0% •			1 0% •								
Asian	2.5	569 80%	11%	25 4%	17 2%	7 1%	6 1%	1 0% •	1%	1 0% •	1 0% •	1 0% O	1 0% •														
0 - 17	3.6	1,405	257	133 7%	80	36 2% ©	22 1% 0	16 1% o	10 1% o	4 0% •	3 0% •	6 0% •	5 0% •	1 0% •			2 0% •	1 0% •	1 0% •			1 0%		1 0% -			
18 - 30	3.5	8,070	1,649	696 6%	415 4%	292 3%	159 1% ©	125 1% ©	65 1% o	50 0% o	31 0% •	24 0% -	20 0% -	9 0%	6 0%	6 0% -	5 0% -	2 0% •	3 0%	1 0% -		3 0%	2 0% •	2 0% -		1 0%	1 0% -
31-49	3.7	8,187	1,969	872 7%	527 4%	330 3%	213 2%	146 1% ©	83 1% •	70 1% •	44 0% •	38 0% •	16 0% •	10 0% •	5 0% •	11 0%	5 0% •	2 0% •	4 0% -		3 0% •	3 0%	3 0% •	2 0% •	2 0%		
50+	2.7	4,265	620	244 4%	139 3%	56 1% •	64 1% ⊕	28 1% e	17 0% •	15 0% •	9 0% •	9 0% *	3 0% *	2 0% •	2 0%	2 0%	1 0% •	1 0% •					1 0%		1 0%		

# Law Enforcement Actions Taken After a Stop

## Officer Discretion – Risk Ratio Analysis

To understand the underlying causes of racial disparities in policing, one must first examine how officers exercise their discretion when carrying out their law enforcement duties. During routine patrols, most officers will be alone with no partner or sergeant looking over their shoulder. During most of the officer's encounters, he/she will have a great deal of discretion in determining what type of law enforcement action to take. If an officer pulls over a vehicle for a minor traffic infraction the officer may decide to give the driver a ticket or let them go with only a warning. If the officer discovers the driver has a suspended license (a misdemeanor crime) the officer has the discretion to write a citation or arrest the driver and book him into jail. As the seriousness level of the crime being investigated increases, the less discretion the officer will have.

If an officer responds to a domestic violence assault and locates the suspect, the officer is required by state law to arrest the assailant and book him into jail. If, on the other hand, the officer responds to a fight outside of a bar between two mutual combatants, the officer may decide not to arrest either Subject. Officer discretion also comes into play with use of force incidents. If an officer tries to stop a robbery suspect and the suspect flees, the officer is going to need to use some level of force to bring the suspect into custody unless the suspect stops and surrenders. For public safety reasons, the officer could not let a suspect involved in a Class A violent felony just run away. On the other hand, if an officer responds to a shoplifting call and finds the suspect in the store and the suspect refuses to be handcuffed, the officer may have additional de-escalation and compliance options that could be employed before force needs to be used.

To determine the level of discretion that officers have in taking law enforcement action after a stop has been made each type of action was grouped into one of five categories based on:

- 1. The type of offense involved
  - a. Person
  - b. Warrant
  - c. Weapon
  - d. Property
  - e. Drug
  - f. Obstructing
  - g. Traffic
  - h. Other
  - i. Firearm license
- 2. The level of offense involved
  - a. Felony
  - b. Warrant
  - c. Misdemeanor
  - d. Infraction
- 3. The action taken by the officer
  - a. Arrest
  - b. Citation
  - c. Infraction

Using these factors 25 scenarios were created based on the level of seriousness of the offense type, crime level and action taken. These scenarios were ranked from 1 (most serious and lowest discretion) to 25 (least serious and highest discretion). These 25 levels of seriousness were grouped into five levels of officer discretion:

- 1. Very Low Discretion
- 2. Low Discretion
- 3. Medium Discretion
- 4. High Discretion
- 5. Very High Discretion

Table 26: Discretionary Classification by Crime Type, Crime Level and Action Taken

Level	Discretion Level	Crime Type - Crime Level - Action Taken	Total Stops	% of Total
25	Very High	Firearm License-Infraction-Infraction	636	1.9%
24	Very High	Other-Infraction-Infraction	113	0.3%
23	Very High	Traffic-Infraction-Infraction	6,887	20.2%
22	High	Other-Misdemeanor-Citation	805	2.4%
21	High	Obstructing-Misdemeanor-Citation	93	0.3%
20	High	Drug-Misdemeanor-Citation	7	0.0%
19	High	Traffic-Misdemeanor-Citation	3,630	10.7%
18	Medium	Property-Misdemeanor-Citation	1,147	3.4%
17	Medium	Weapon-Misdemeanor-Citation	19	0.1%
16	Medium	Person-Misdemeanor-Citation	483	1.4%
15	Medium	Other-Misdemeanor-Arrest	591	1.7%
14	Medium	Obstructing-Misdemeanor-Arrest	407	1.2%
13	Medium	Drug-Misdemeanor-Arrest	53	0.2%
12	Medium	Traffic-Misdemeanor-Arrest	2,120	6.2%
11	Low	Property-Misdemeanor-Arrest	3,801	11.2%
10	Low	Other-Felony-Arrest	7	0.0%
9	Low	Obstructing-Felony-Arrest	99	0.3%
8	Low	Drug-Felony-Arrest	2,028	6.0%
7	Low	Traffic-Felony-Arrest	67	0.2%
6	Low	Property-Felony-Arrest	2,115	6.2%
5	Very Low	Weapon-Misdemeanor-Arrest	166	0.5%
4	Very Low	Weapon-Felony-Arrest	270	0.8%
3	Very Low	Warrant-Warrant-Arrest	463	1.4%
2	Very Low	Person-Misdemeanor-Arrest	5,289	15.5%
1	Very Low	Person-Felony-Arrest	2,740	8.1%

Table 27: Demographics of Subjects Contacted at Each Discretionary Level - Spokane

			Discret	ionary Level	s for Police A	Actions Taker	n (CAD)
	Discretion L	evel	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
	Total Records	137,034	7,682	4,641	4,876	8,237	9,039
		CAD Stops	Arrests Citations Infractions	Arrests Citations Infractions	Arrests Citations Infractions	Arrests Citations Infractions	Arrests Citations Infractions
Gender	Female	33.1%	37.4%	30.1%	28.9%	28.0%	26.1%
Ger	Male	66.9%	62.6%	69.9%	71.1%	72.0%	73.9%
	White	79.8%	88.1%	80.9%	79.6%	79.7%	74.6%
	Black	10.7%	5.7%	10.1%	9.9%	9.3%	14.1%
Race	Nat Amer	4.6%	1.1%	4.0%	5.1%	6.4%	5.4%
	Asian	1.6%	2.1%	2.0%	2.3%	1.7%	1.7%
	Hispanic	3.3%	3.1%	3.0%	3.1%	2.9%	4.1%
	0-17	4.9%	2.5%	0.5%	2.3%	5.3%	7.1%
Age	18-30	33.0%	39.2%	36.7%	37.7%	38.3%	35.9%
¥	31-49	43.7%	34.7%	47.2%	44.4%	45.7%	45.7%
	50+	18.4%	23.7%	15.6%	15.5%	10.7%	11.3%

Risk ratios were then calculated based on the percentages of discretionary levels divided by the percentages of total stops.

There were no disparities in discretionary levels compared to stops for Males or Females. Similarly, there were no disparities for White Subjects at any level of discretion. Black Subjects were 32% more likely to be involved in a Very Low Discretion incident and were 46% less likely to be involved in Very High Discretion incidents. For High, Medium and Low Discretion incidents Black Subjects were involved proportionately to the rate at which they were stopped. Native American Subjects were 76% less likely to be involved in a Very High Discretion incident and were 39% more likely to be in a Low Discretion incident. Asian Subjects were more likely to be involved in incidents with a higher degree of officer discretion (29% more likely in Very High Discretion, 26% more likely in High Discretion and 43% more likely in Medium Discretion incidents). Hispanic

Subjects were only disproportionately represented in Very Low Discretion incidents where they were 23% more likely to be involved than expected based on their proportion in stops.

Disparities by age were somewhat symmetrical. There were no disparities by discretionary levels for Subjects between the ages of 18 and 49. Juvenile Subjects were 46% more likely to be involved in Very Low Discretion Incidents and were more than 50% less likely to be involved in Medium, High and Very High Discretion incidents. By contrast, Subjects over 50 were 28% more likely to be involved in Very High Discretion incidents but were about 40% less likely to be involved in Low or Very Low Discretion incidents.

Table 28: Risk Ratios for Demographics at CAD Discretionary Levels - Spokane

		Discret	ionary Level	s for Police A	Actions Take	n (CAD)
Action Taken		Arrests Citations Infractions				
Total Records		7,682	4,641	4,876	8,237	9,039
D	iscretion Level	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low
Risk Ratio		Action Taken / Stops	Action Taken / Stops	Action Taken / Stops	Action Taken / Stops	Action Taken / Stops
Gender	Female	0	0	0	0	0
Gen	Male	0	0	0	0	0
	White	0	0	0	0	0
<b>a</b> .	Black	-	0	0	0	+
Race	Nat Amer	-	0	0	+	0
	Asian	+	+	+	0	0
	Hispanic	0	0	0	0	+
	0-17	-	-	-	0	+
Age	18-30	0	0	0	0	0
Αξ	31-49	-	0	0	0	0
	50+	+	0	0	-	-

Symbol	Disparity	Risk Ratio			
++	Positive	> +50%			
+	Positive	+20% to +50%			
0	None	-20% to +20%			
-	Negative	-20% to -100%			

### Police Bias - Risk Assessment

The next step is to examine how the disparities observed at different discretionary levels translate into risk of police bias.

Figure 39: Police Bias Risk Matrix

		R	acial Disparit	У
		Positive	None	Negative
tion	High	High Risk of Bias	Medium Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias
Officer Discretion	High Risk of Bias		Medium Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias
Offi	Low	Medium Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias	Low Risk of Bias

The higher the level of officer discretion the greater the chance that an officer's biases and prejudices may play a role in law enforcement decisions. If high discretion incidents are combined with positive disparities, there is a high risk that officer bias may be contributing to these disparities. By contrast, low discretion incidents have a lower risk of officer bias influencing law enforcement actions. If these low discretion incidents are combined with negative disparities, there is a low risk that officer bias is impacting the observed disparities.

By applying the Police Bias Risk Matrix to the disparity table, we can calculate the risk that officer bias is playing a role in law enforcement decision making at each discretionary level.

Table 29: Demographics of Police Bias Risk Levels for Spokane

	Police Bias Risk Levels									
Total Records	7,682	4,641	4,876	8,237	9,039					
Discretion Level	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low					

der	Female	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk
Gen	Male	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk

	White	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk
	Black	Low Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Medium Risk
Race	Nat Amer	Low Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk
	Asian	High Risk	High Risk	High Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk
	Hispanic	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Medium Risk

	0-17	Low Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk	Medium Risk
Age	18-30	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk
Ą	31-49	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk
	50+	High Risk	Medium Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk	Low Risk

Using this risk analysis framework, the only Subject characteristics that produce a high risk of officer bias are being Asian or over the age of 50. When accusations of racial bias are made against a police department, Asians and the elderly are not typically the groups that are raising these concerns. It is unlikely that Spokane Police officers are discriminating against Asians and the elderly by taking more severe actions against them after making a stop in a higher discretion incident. Therefore, these high-risk designations are more likely to be caused by Subject behavior than officer bias. When a stop is made officers are finding that Asians and the elderly are more likely to be engaging in unlawful behaviors that fall within the higher officer discretion categories.

These high-risk designations could also be due to officers being less willing to allow Asians and those over 50 who commit minor offenses to leave with a warning.

It is noteworthy that the racial groups that typically raise the greatest concerns about police bias, Blacks and Native Americans, do not have any discretionary levels that fall within the high-risk officer bias category. Instead, we see that in those cases where officers have the highest levels of discretion, Blacks, Native Americans, and Juveniles have the lowest risk of encountering officer bias in law enforcement decisions. These risk Scores would apply to systemic officer bias only. These risk Scores do not consider individual acts of officer bias that would not impact the overall frequency Scores. What we can conclude from this analysis is that it is unlikely that Spokane Police officers are engaged in a systematic effort to discriminate against Black, Native American or Hispanic Subjects when making decisions on the type of law enforcement action to take (arrest, citation, infraction, or no action). If systemic bias were occurring, we would expect those biased behaviors to be reflected in in the data.

### Reason for the Stop vs Law Enforcement Action Taken

The reason for a stop will have a large impact on the type of law enforcement action that is taken. Stops for violent crimes are most likely to lead to an arrest (18%), while only 2% of stops for a welfare check or general assistance result in an arrest. Infractions and criminal citations are most likely to be issued after a traffic stop (15% infraction rate and 7% citation rate). Calls reporting suspicious circumstances or disturbances are the most common type of call, but these stops only result in an arrest 5% of the time.

Traffic stops are most likely to result in some type of law enforcement action (arrests, citations or infractions issued in 28% of stops while welfare checks and calls for assistance resulted in law enforcement action less than 3% of the time.

Reason for the Stop/Contact and Action Taken by Officers Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) - January 2017 to June 2020 **Property Crime** Welfare Check Directed Enforce Suspicious Disturb Traffic Person Crime Warrant 18% 16% 10% 6% 2% Reason for the Stop/Contact and No Action Taken by Officers Suspicious Disturb Traffic Person Crime **Property Crime** Welfare Check Assistance Directed Enforce Warrant 27,771 34,633 70% 60% 50%


40% 30% 20% 10%

Figure 40: Reason for the Stop and Action Taken by Officers – Spokane

Males were more likely than Females to have some type of law enforcement action taken against them. Males were 34% more likely to be arrested, but Females were 20% more likely to receive an infraction.

Figure 41: Actions Taken After a Stop by Subject Sex - Spokane


Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) - January 2017 to June 2020



Asian Subjects were the most likely to have some type of law enforcement action taken against them (41%) and Black Subjects were the least likely (32%). Native American Subjects were the most likely to be arrested after a stop (26%) and White Subjects were the least likely to be arrested (20%). Asian Subjects were more than 5 times more likely to receive an infraction than Native American Subjects. Criminal citation rates were similar across the racial groups at about 6% of all stops.


Figure 42: Actions Taken After a Stop by Subject Race - Spokane

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) - January 2017 to June 2020



Subjects over 50 were the least likely to be arrested after a stop and were only half as likely as juveniles to be arrested. Juveniles were the least likely to receive an infraction (2.9%) or a criminal citation (0.4%) but were the most likely to be arrested (18%).

Figure 43: Actions Taken After a Stop by Subject Age - Spokane



Percentage of Total Stops & Contacts ★

## Severity of Crimes and Offenses by Subject Demographics

Each crime/offense was assigned a rank ranging from 1 (most serious felonies like homicide) to 78 (for minor civil infractions). The average rankings were computed for each type of demographic group of the Subjects involved. The lower the average Score the higher the average ranking and the more serious the crimes that were involved.

Male Subjects tend to be involved in more serious crimes than Female Subjects. Offenses involving Black Subjects or Native American Subjects are often more serious than those involving Hispanic, Asian or White Subjects. Juveniles had the highest average ranking for offenses committed while Subjects over 50 had the lowest average ranking.

Male Subjects were 65% more likely to be involved in serious violent felonies than Female Subjects. Female Subjects were 26% more likely to receive a civil infraction than Males. Native American and Black Subjects were twice as likely to be involved in serious violent felonies than White Subjects. Native American Subjects were 54% less likely than White Subjects to receive a civil infraction. Juvenile Subjects had the highest percentage of involvement in serious violent felonies (13%) and the lowest level of involvement in civil infractions (16%). Subjects over 50 had the highest level of involvement in civil infractions (46%) and the lowest level of involvement in serious violent felonies (4%).




Figure 44: Demographics of Subjects by Average Crime Rank - Spokane

The Subject demographics were combined, and each individual group of age, race and sex combinations was examined. During the last 3½ years there have been 33,108 contacts. With Spokane Police where the officer took some type of law enforcement action (arrest, citation, or infraction). White Male Subjects between 18 and 49 made up 45% of all contacts where action was taken. White Female Subjects between 18 and 49 made up 20% of all contacts where action was taken while White Male and White Female Subjects over age 50 made up 13%. Black Male Subjects between 18 and 49 made up 6% of the total. The remaining 16% of contacts involved other demographic group combinations.

Some demographic groups that had very few contacts with law enforcement had the highest average crime rankings. All these included juvenile Subjects. This suggests that law enforcement actions are generally only taken against juveniles when they are involved in more serious crimes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Only incidents where the Subject's age, race and sex were identified are included in this analysis.

Of these juvenile groups, White Subjects both Male and Female were more likely to receive a minor civil infraction than Black, Native American or Hispanic Subjects. There were no juvenile Asian Females that had any law enforcement action taken against them.

Demographic groups with Subjects over the age of 50 tended to have a higher percentage of incidents that involved minor infractions and they had lower average crime rankings. Fifty-seven percent of contacts with White Female Subjects over 50 involved an infraction. Asian and Hispanic Subjects over 50 are much more likely to receive an infraction than a criminal citation or arrest.




Figure 45: Average Crime Rank by Subject Sex, Race & Age Group - Spokane


Table 30: Average Crime Rank for Juvenile Subjects by Gender and Race – Spokane

	Average Crime Rank for Juvenile Subjects						
Gender	Race	Age	Stops	Average Crime Rank	Serious Violent Felony	Minor Civil Infractions	
Male	Asian	0-17	36	39	14%	25%	
Female	White	0-17	347	34	6%	28%	
Male	White	0-17	572	31	13%	15%	
Male	Hispanic	0-17	74	26	20%	8%	
Male	Black	0-17	154	26	21%	10%	
Female	Black	0-17	74	24	11%	7%	
Female	Hispanic	0-17	15	23	0%	0%	
Male	Nat Amer	0-17	61	23	25%	0%	
Female	Nat Amer	0-17	22	21	23%	5%	

### Police Use of Force

For disparity analysis of use of force incidents, data from Spokane's Police Force Analysis System<sup>sM</sup> (PFAS) was used. The core of PFAS builds upon the research work of Professor Geoff Alpert and his Force Factor method. Force Factor analysis formed the basis of Professor Alpert's 2004 book "Understanding Police Use of Force − Officers, Subjects and Reciprocity".<sup>73</sup> and has been the Subject of several scholarly articles..<sup>74</sup>


PFAS is a relational database that contains 150 fields of information extracted from law enforcement agencies' existing incident reports and officer narratives. The data is analyzed using legal algorithms that were developed from the evaluation criteria outlined in the United States Supreme Court case of *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The Court adopted an objective reasonableness standard which evaluates each case based upon the information that the officer was aware of at the time the force was used and then compared the officer's actions to what a reasonable officer would have done when faced with the same situation. PFAS uses Force Justification Analysis to determine the risk that a use of force incident would be found to be unnecessary and Force Factor Analysis to evaluate the risk that the force would be found to be excessive.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Understanding Police Use of Force – Officers, Subjects, and Reciprocity, Cambridge Studies in Criminology, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> See, e.g., <u>Reliability of the Force Factor Method in Police Use-of-Force Research, Police Quarterly, December 2015.</u>

PFAS examines relevant temporal data from immediately before, during and after an application of force.



PFAS contains several years of historical data for each agency and is designed to be updated on a regular basis. This allows the department to immediately identify trends and patterns as well as measure the impacts and outcomes of any changes that are made to policies, training, equipment, or practices. For example, if a department provides crisis intervention and deescalation training to its officers, the system will be able to evaluate whether that training has had any impact on officer behavior.

PFAS currently has use of force data from 88 law enforcement agencies in eight states involving more than 11,000 incidents and 4,500 officers who used force a total of 20,000 times. PFAS is the largest database of its kind in the nation. Although the incident reports from each of these agencies uses a different format, all the data extracted and entered into the system has been standardized which allows us to make meaningful interagency comparisons. The Police Force Analysis Network™ allows agencies to compare their use of force practices with other agencies in the system.

The Police Force Analysis System<sup>sM</sup> provides comprehensive information about police use of coercive authority and permits the study of the intersection of individual and contextual factors that explain situational, temporal, and spatial variation in the distribution of police coercive authority. PFAS supports meaningful community engagement about police coercion by providing

comprehensive and relevant data to address and inform community concern regarding policecivilian interactions.

#### Police Uses of Force and Arrests

One key finding from the Police Force Analysis System<sup>5M</sup> is that police uses of force are causally linked with arrests. Almost all use of force incidents are associated with an attempt by an officer to bring an individual into custody. If a suspect resists a lawful arrest or detention, then it is usually necessary for the officer to use some type of force to gain control of the suspect. To reduce the need to use force, many agencies have sent some or all their officers through crisis intervention and de-escalation training. These courses help officers identify individuals with mental health issues and provides them with the verbal and interpersonal skills needed to help de-escalate and gain control of problematic situations without having to use force. While there are no comprehensive studies that have linked de-escalation training with a reduction in use of force incidents, it is likely that these programs do provide officers with valuable skills that they can use to resolve conflicts.

While many people view any use of force by police as a negative outcome regardless of how or why the force was used, our data shows that officers cannot do their jobs effectively without using some amount of force in appropriate circumstances. No matter how much de-escalation training an officer receives, there will always be a certain percentage of arrestees who will resist or flee regardless what the officer says or does. PFAS data from more than 80 law enforcement agencies shows that on average 4% of all arrests involve in a use of force.

Some departments have seen dramatic declines in uses of force when consent decrees are imposed or when departments come under intense public scrutiny or when body cameras have been implemented. However, these declines in uses of force are almost always associated with a corresponding decline in arrests as officers become less proactive and they are more reluctant to engage in situations involving minor crimes, infractions, or suspicious circumstances.

There is a strong correlation between the total number of uses of force a department has and the total number of arrests their officers make. Similarly, the more proactive and productive an officer is, the more arrests they will make and, often, the more uses of force they will have. Rather than simply measuring the frequency of force, a better metric to assess risk is the use of force rate compared to arrests. For example, an officer who makes 10 arrests and uses force against 4 of those suspects (40% use of force rate) is a much higher risk than an officer who makes 300 arrests and uses force against 12 suspects (4% use of force rate).

Uses of force and arrests were compared for 115 law enforcement agencies using the PFAS system and agencies that post their data online. On average 3.1% of arrests made by these agencies resulted in a use of force. This correlation held up for all sizes of departments and a wide range of annual numbers of arrests. Spokane has a lower use of force rate (1.3% for the last 3 years and 1.7% for the last 7 years) than average primarily because the Department does not report on low levels of physical force that some other agencies do.

Figure 46: Scatterplot of Arrests and Uses of Force for 115 Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States





Figure 47: Scatterplot of Arrests and Uses of Force for 115 Law Enforcement Agencies in the United States (Only Smaller Agencies Displayed)



P-value: < 0.0001

Equation: Total UOF = 0.0313088\*Total Arrests


Coefficients


 Term
 Value
 StdErr
 t-value
 p-value

 Total Arrests
 0.0313088
 0.0005593
 55.9747
 < 0.0001</td>

The strong correlation between uses of force and arrests even held up at the neighborhood level in Spokane. Use of force rates ranged from 0.7% in Northwest to 2.6% in Hillyard.<sup>75</sup>







These strong correlations between arrests and uses of force will mean that disparities in uses of force will primarily be driven by disparities in arrests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> The Spokane Police Department has three precincts: North Precinct in Hillyard, Downtown Precinct in Riverside, and South Precinct in East Central.

While census data of the residential population is sometimes used as a benchmark for a disparity analysis, it does not provide an adequate measure to assess the possible impacts of bias by police officers. There are many factors that could affect the demographic disparities between uses of force and the population that have nothing to do with officer bias such as crime rates, compliance rates, possession of weapons, poverty rates, deployment strategies, etc.

A better benchmark for measuring demographic disparities in police uses of force is arrest data.<sup>76</sup> Almost every use of force incident is associated with an arrest. All things being equal, we would expect to see the same proportion of Subject characteristics for those who are arrested as those who have force used against them. If there is any demographic disparity observed between the use of force data and the arrest data, this disparity could be caused by differential Subject behavior (i.e. one Subject group is more or less likely to resist arrest than other groups) or differential officer behavior (i.e. officers are more or less prone to use force against one Subject group than other groups) or a combination of differential behavior from both Subjects and officers.

76

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> A recent report from the University of Texas at San Antonio and the University of Cincinnati used this methodology to examine racial disparities between uses of force and arrests using data from the from the Tulsa Police Department.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/tulsaworld.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/6/48/64860}{d34-4fe8-5c06-bc0f-92e7a85acab3/5e60500e75e7e.pdf.pdf}$ 

## Police Use of Force - Subject Demographics

Ninety-one percent of the 736 use of force Subjects from 2013 to 2019 fall into 14 different demographic categories. White Males between the ages of 18 and 49 make up 59% of all force Subjects followed by Black Males age 18 to 49 who make up 11%. White Females between 18 and 49 and Native American Males between 18 and 49 each make up 6% of all force Subjects. All other demographic groups make up the remaining 18% of Subjects.




Figure 49: Use of Force Subjects by Demographic Groups – Spokane

Arrest data from the Spokane Police Department from 2017, 2018 and 2019 was examined and compared to the use of force data collected by the Police Force Analysis System<sup>™</sup>. Arrest data was broken down by sex, race and age and the use of force data was organized into the same demographic categories as the arrest data.

## Police Uses of Force / Arrests – Risk Ratio Analysis

In 2018 the estimated population of the City of Spokane was 219,197.<sup>77</sup> During the three-year period from 2017 to 2019 the Department made 23,485 arrests and used force against 307 Subjects. The annual arrest rate per thousand population was 36 and the use of force rate per 100 arrests was 1.3%. The following tables provide the sex, race and age composition of all arrestees and Subjects who had force used against them from 2017 through 2019:

Table 31: Demographics of Arrests, Uses of Force and Use of Force Rates – Spokane

Sex	CAD Arrests	Uses of Force	UOF Rate
Female	6,579	25	0.4%
Male	16,854	282	1.7%

Race	CAD Arrests	Uses of Force	UOF Rate
White	18,022	229	1.3%
Black	2,544	42	1.7%
Nat Amer	1,262	19	1.5%
Hispanic	776	6	0.8%
Asian	428	11	2.6%

Age	CAD Arrests	Uses of Force	UOF Rate
0 - 17	1,072	12	1.1%
18 - 30	8,869	124	1.4%
31-49	10,505	148	1.4%
50+	2,963	22	0.7%

Total	23,433	307	1.3%
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<sup>77</sup> United States Census Bureau – Spokane City, Washington

Table 32: Risk Ratios for Demographics of Subjects Involved in Uses of Force and Arrests – Spokane

Sex	CAD Arrests	Uses of Force	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
Female	28.1%	8.1%	0.3	1
Male	71.9%	91.9%	1.3	4.4

Race	CAD Arrests	Uses of Force	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
White	78.2%	74.6%	1.0	1
Black	11.0%	13.7%	1.2	1.3
Nat Amer	5.5%	6.2%	1.1	1.2
Hispanic	3.4%	2.0%	0.6	0.6
Asian	1.9%	3.6%	1.9	2.0

Age	CAD Arrests	Uses of Force	Risk Ratio
0 - 17	4.6%	3.9%	0.9
18 - 30	37.9%	40.5%	1.1
31-49	44.9%	48.4%	1.1
50+	12.7%	7.2%	0.6

After arrest, Males are more than four times more likely to have force used against them than Females are. Use of force rates for White, Black and Native American Subjects are similar and range from 1.3% to 1.7%. Hispanic Subjects are 40% less likely to have force used against them than White Subjects are, while Asian Subjects are twice as likely to have force used against them. Use of force rates are the same for Subjects between the ages of 18 and 49. Juvenile Subjects are 10% less likely to have force used against them than we would expect and those over age 50 are 40% less likely.

## Necessary Force – Force Justification Analysis

As we will examine in more detail below, under the legal standards outlined in the US Supreme Court case of Graham v. Connor, an officer's lawful decision to use force will be governed by the seriousness of the offense being investigated, the threat the Subject poses to officers or others, the level of resistance and whether the suspect fled. There are likely many incidents where an officer was legally justified in using force but chose not to. Unfortunately, we do not have data on these types of incidents.

**Figure 50: Police Use of Force – Graham Factor Scoring Matrix** 

	<b>Graham Factor Scores</b>					
Score	Severity of the Crime	Threat to the Officer or Others	Maximum Level of Resistance	Suspect Flight		
6	Violent Crime + Weapon	Deadly Weapon	Deadly Weapon			
5	Violent Crime	Less Lethal Weapon	Less Lethal Weapon	Flight		
4	Threats / Weapon / NCO	Assault / Self-Harm	Active Physical Resistance			
3	Property Crime / Warrant	Attempt Assault / Harm	Physical Non-Compliance			
2	Drugs / Trespass	Furtive / Posture / Move	Threatening Posture/Verbal	Attempted Flight		
1	Traffic / Liquor / Infraction	Verbal Threat	Verbal/Passive Resistance			
О	No Crime	No Threat	No Resistance	No Flight		

When law enforcement agencies investigate use of force incidents as part of the regular use of force review process or in response to a complaint, they will typically find compliance with policies more than 98% of the time. If we were to assume that all a department's uses of force met the Graham v. Connor justification requirements, then we would need to assume that higher use of force rates were caused by Subject behavior rather than officer bias or misconduct. For Spokane, applying this theory would mean that Male Subjects were much more likely to engage in force justification behavior than Female Subjects. Asians were more likely than other racial

groups to engage in force justification behavior. Females, juveniles, those over 50 and Hispanics were the least likely groups to engage in force justification behavior.

In the following graphs we examine each of the four Graham v Connor force justification behaviors:

- 1) Seriousness of the Offense
- 2) Threat to the Officers or Others
- 3) Level of Resistance
- 4) Flight from Officers

If we find that a higher or lower use of force rate is not supported by the measured force justification behaviors, then we must assume that the officer is behaving differently towards the Subject based upon other factor which may include age, race and/or sex.

For each use of force incident, each of the four force justification behaviors is given a Score of 0 to 6 (0 to 5 for Subject flight). A combined Force Justification Score is calculated by adding all the four factors together on a range of 0 to 20. The higher the Score, the more likely it is that the use of force incident would be found to be justified under the Graham v Connor standard. A low Score does not automatically mean that a use of force incident is unjustified, but it does mean that the incident is at higher risk of being found to be unjustified. If a use of force incident has a Score of 0 it is objectively unreasonable force because the officer has not provided any evidence to support a constitutional use of force (i.e. no crime, no threat, no resistance, and no flight).


The mean threat Score for all use of force incidents is 1.88. The average threat Score for Females is 30% above the Score for Males indicating that Females who have force used against them are presenting a higher threat level to the officers than Males. The average threat Score for Asian Subjects is 43% above the mean and is higher than all other racial groups. The average threat Score for juveniles and Subjects over 50 are 16% and 11% above the mean respectfully.

Of all the demographic groups examined, Asian Subjects had the highest threat Score which is consistent with having the highest use of force rate (i.e. Asians are presenting a higher level of threat and officers are responding with force to protect themselves and others). By contrast the

higher level of threat for Female, juvenile and over 50 Subjects is inconsistent with their lower use of force rates. This suggests that officers may be reluctant to use force against these types of individuals when lower levels of threat are presented and will only use force when much higher threat levels are observed. For example, all things being equal if a Male and a Female Subject were presenting the same level of threat to an officer, the officer would be much less likely to use force against the Female Subject than the Male Subject.

The mean crime Score for all use of force incidents is 3.31. The average crime Scores for each demographic group is within 10% of the mean except for Hispanic Subjects which were 33% above the mean and Subjects over 50 who were 12% below the mean. Hispanic Subjects had an extremely low use of force rate which means that officers are only using force against Hispanics when serious crimes are involved. The lower average crime Score for Subjects over 50 supports their lower use of force rate. Native American, Asian and Black Subjects all had elevated flight rates as well as use of force rates.

Figure 51: Use of Force – Average Threat Scores and Average Crime Scores – Spokane




Rather than use the average Subject flight Score, we presented the data as a percentage of Subjects who fled or attempted to flee from officers. On average 40% of Subjects who have force used against them fled from officers. Females were 26% less likely to flee than Males. White Subjects were less likely to flee from officers than all other racial groups. Native American Subjects were the most likely to flee and they fled 23% more often than White Subjects. Subjects between the ages of 18 and 30 were most likely to flee and those over 50 were nearly half as likely to flee than the mean.

When an officer attempts to take a Subject into custody and the Subject flees, it is inevitable that officers will need to use some level of force to apprehend them. Rarely do fleeing Subjects stop and give themselves up without a struggle. Therefore, flight Scores are a strong predictor of use of force rates. Females and Subjects over 50 have the lowest flight rates and the lowest use of force rates.

The average initial resistance Score was 2.16. There was little variation in these Scores by sex or race. Juvenile Subjects had a 15% lower resistance Score and Subjects over 50 have a resistance Score that was 13% above the mean. This Score measures the initial resistance the Subject presented to an officer's lawful commands or use of force. Juvenile Subjects may be less likely to offer significant initial resistance and may be more deferential to the officer's instructions while those over 50 may be more defiant and less compliant. This data could also mean that officers are willing to give Subjects over 50 more latitude to defy their commands while they are quicker to use force on juveniles who disobey.

Figure 52: Use of Force – Percentage of Subjects Fleeing from Officers and Average Resistance Score – Spokane



When we combine the four Graham factor Scores, we produce the Force Justification Score that is read on a scale of 0 to 20. The distribution of the Force Justification Scores for all 736 use of force incidents from the last 7 years is shown below:




Figure 53: Use of Force – Distribution of Force Justification Scores

The above graph appears to be a normal distribution of Force Justification Scores with a mean of 11.2. However, there is a clear spike in the number of incidents with a maximum Force Justification Score of 20. These are incidents where an officer was assaulted by the Subject prior to the officer making the decision to use force. In these circumstances the officer is not making a discretionary decision to use force but is instead using force to defend himself/herself from an attack by the Subject. Therefore, it is automatically assigned a Score of 20 since the force would always be found to be justified when used in self-defense. Over the last 7 years 14% of all force incidents occurred because the officer was assaulted by the Subject prior to using force.

For purposes of a risk analysis, we categorize any Force Justification Score with a 5 or below as a "Low Justification" incident. Even though all these incidents may have been found to be justified by the Department, these incidents are at much higher risk of being found to be unjustified than incidents with higher Scores. Every agency will have some percentage of incidents that fall in the Low Justification category (typically between 6% and 33% of all force incidents). Twelve percent of Spokane's use of force incidents were classified as Low Justification. Over the last 7 years there were no incidents with a Justification Score of 0 and only one incident with a Score of 1 and one incident with a Score of 2.

# Force Justification – Risk Ratio Analysis

If a particular demographic group has a disproportionately greater share of Low Justification incidents this may be an indicator of potential bias by officers. Over the last 7 years there were 87 use of force incidents with a Low Justification Score. The following table presents the percentage of incidents with Low Justification Scores for each demographic group compared to the proportion of all force incidents:

Table 33: Use of Force - Risk Ratios for Low Force Justification Scores - Spokane

Sex	All Use of Force Incidents	Low Force Justification Score	Risk Ratio Odds Rat	
Female	8.1%	11.5%	1.4	1
Male	91.9%	88.5%	1.0	0.7

Race	All Use of Force Incidents	Low Force Justification Score	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
White	74.6%	79.1%	1.1	1
Black	13.7%	10.5%	0.8	0.7
Nat Amer	6.2%	9.3%	1.5	1.4
Hispanic	2.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0
Asian	3.6%	1.2%	0.3	0.3

Age	All Use of Force Incidents	Low Force Justification Score	Risk Ratio
0 - 17	3.9%	2.4%	0.6
18 - 30	40.5%	42.4%	1.0
31-49	48.4%	48.2%	1.0
50+	7.2%	7.1%	1.0


Female Subjects were more likely than Males to have force used against them with a Low Justification Score. The Spokane Police Department is conducting a secondary review of the 10

Low Justification incidents involving Female Subjects to determine whether any action is needed to correct policies, procedures, or officer performance. Native American Subjects were 40% more likely than White Subjects to experience a Low Justification force incident. Spokane is also conducting a secondary review of these 8 incidents to see if any corrective measures are needed. Black, Hispanic and Asian Subjects were all less likely to be involved in a Low Justification force incident than White Subjects, so it is very unlikely that there are systemic problems with policies, training or officer behavior that are adversely impacting these racial groups in this area of examination.

For adult Subjects, age is not a factor in determining the likelihood of being involved in a Low Justification force incident. Juveniles are 40% less likely than adults to have force used against them with a Low Justification Score. This suggests that officers are only using force against juveniles when they are faced with significant crimes, threats, and resistance.

Even though we are recommending that Spokane take a closer examination of Low Justification incidents involving Female and Native American Subjects, we are not reaching any conclusions about whether any problematic officer behavior occurred. The data analysis is only able to assign a risk level to individual incidents, but we cannot use the data to make any definitive conclusions about whether any misconduct occurred or whether there are any defects in policies or training. That assessment can only be made by examining the details of individual incidents identified by the risk analysis.

Figure 54: Use of Force – Demographics of Average Force Justification Scores – Spokane



Finally, we examine the averages for the total Force Justification Scores for each demographic group and compare those averages with the observed use of force rates.

Table 34: Demographics of Use of Force Rates and Average Justification Scores – Spokane

Demographic	UOF Rate	Average Justification
Female	0.4%	13.01
Asian	2.6%	12.03
Nat Amer	1.5%	11.70
0 - 17	1.1%	11.46
Black	1.7%	11.45
50+	0.7%	11.37
18 - 30	1.4%	11.12
Hispanic	0.8%	11.09
31-49	1.4%	11.03
White	1.3%	11.03
Male	1.7%	10.96

Based on the table above, there does not appear to be any correlation between Force Justification Scores and use of force rates (uses of force per 100 arrests). If Subject behavior was identical regardless of demographic characteristic and officers behaved uniformly and used force each time they were legally authorized to do so, then we would expect use of force rates to be identical across demographic groups and average Force Justification Scores to be the same across the board as well. However, as we can see from the data, Subject behavior can vary dramatically across the demographic groups. Similarly, it does not appear that officers treat different demographic groups in the same way. However, there is insufficient information to draw any conclusions on officer bias and whether it impacts their decision making. This is because we do not have any data on how many times an officer was legally authorized to use force but chose not to exercise that authority. No agency that we know of collects this type of critical information.

The Graham v Connor case sets out the legal standard for when use of force is authorized under the United States Constitution. All law enforcement officers are trained on this standard and they understand that the risks of using unnecessary or excessive force may lead to discipline, personal liability and even dismissal. Most departments have procedures in place for officers to report their uses of force and those reports are reviewed by supervisors and force review boards to ensure they fell within policy and were lawful. However, there are probably many more incidents where force was legally authorized, but the officer was able to resolve the situation without having to resort to using force. The officer may have decided to wait until the Subject calmed down and complied or they may have used specific de-escalation techniques, or the Subject may have complied when additional officers arrived. To fully examine officer behavior and measure potential bias, it is essential that we know how many times the officer could have used force but chose not to. Without this information we are simply speculating at what the observed disparities mean.

Since this data on officer discretion is unavailable, we will attempt to develop some theories to explain the observed data patterns. Female Subjects have the lowest use of force rate and the highest average Force Justification Score. If we only consider Subject behavior this finding is counter intuitive. We would normally expect Subjects with higher justification Scores to be

involved in more uses of force since these individuals are engaged in more serious crimes, present higher levels of threat and resistance and are more likely to flee. A low use of force rate and a high Force Justification Score suggests that officers are only using force against Female Subjects when they have extremely high legal justification. When a normal range of justification Scores are presented officers are less likely to use force on Females than Males. This suggests that officers may be more tolerant of non-cooperative Female Subjects and officers may be more reluctant to use force on a Female Subject than a Male Subject.

For Asian Subjects we see the expected relationship between use of force rates and justification Scores. Asians had the highest use of force rate and the second highest average justification Score. This suggests that when Asian Subjects are arrested, they are more likely than other racial groups to present higher levels of resistance and threat, are involved in more serious crimes and are more likely to flee. However, officer behavior may also play a factor here. Although the use of force rate is high the arrest rate and the reported crime rate are exceptionally low. Therefore, officers may only be encountering and arresting aggressive and resistive Asian Subjects and may not be stopping or arresting Asians that are engaged in lower-level offenses or may be more cooperative.

There also may be co-variate issues coming into play here. It may be that some demographic characteristics have a stronger correlation with use of force behavior than other characteristics. To examine this phenomenon, we presented the data by combinations of demographic groups.

### **Excessive Force - Force Factor Analysis**

For police use of force to be constitutional, it must be objectively reasonable under the standards of Graham v Connor. Lawful force must be necessary and not excessive. The concept of excessive force can be measured by examining the proportionality of force to resistance. If an officer uses a disproportionate amount of force compared to the level of resistance, then that force is likely to be found to be excessive. Conversely, if officers use force that is proportional to the resistance presented then the force will likely be found to be lawful.

The Force Factor method is one way to measure the proportionality of force to resistance. We have adapted Professor Alpert's work for the Police Force Analysis System<sup>™</sup>. First, we determine the maximum level of force the officers used on a scale of 1 to 7 and then subtract the maximum level of resistance also Scored on a 1 to 7 scale. The net result is the force factor which can range from -6 to +6. Here are a couple of examples:

- A Subject kicks the officer (level 5 resistance), and the officer strikes the Subject (level 5 force) leading to a 0 Force Factor Score (5-5=0). This force would not likely be found to be excessive because it is directly proportional to the level of resistance.
- An officer strikes a Subject with a baton (level 6 force) and the Subject is only passively resisting by refusing to turn around (Level 2 resistance). The Force Factor Score is +4 (6-2=+4) and the force is likely to be found to be excessive.

We categorize incidents with a Force Factor of +3 higher as a high Force Factor. While these cases may not be found to be excessive, they are at the highest risk of being found to be unconstitutional.

The Force and Resistance scoring is outlined in the following diagram. If an officer uses a Lateral Neck Restraint (LNR) on a Subject and the Subject loses consciousness it is coded as a Level 5 Force. If the LNR does not result in a loss of consciousness it is coded as a Level 4 Force.


Figure 55: Use of Force – Force Factor Scoring Matrix

Force and Resistance Scores						
Score	Officer Force	Score	Subject Resistance			
7	Deadly Force	7	Deadly Force			
6	Less Lethal Weapon	6	Less Lethal Weapon			
5	Physical Strikes / Takedown	5	Active Physical Resistance			
4	Physical Control Tactics	4	Physical Non-Compliance / Flight			
3	Threat of Force	3	Threatening Posture / Verbal Threats			
2	Lawful Orders	2	Verbal / Passive Resistance			
1	Officer Presence / Verbal Exchange	1	No Resistance / Verbal Exchange			

The average Force Factor Score for all demographic groups examined fell in a narrow range between 0.5 and 0.9. This indicates that officers behave very consistently when faced with a given level of resistance regardless of the demographic characteristics of the Subject. The Force Factor mean was 0.76 indicating that most officers only use force that is only one level above the level of resistance or is directly proportional with the level of resistance.

The average Force Factor Scores for Native American and Asian Subjects were 14% above the mean and the Scores for Subjects over 50 were 24% below the mean. This indicates that officers use slightly higher levels of force against Native American and Asian Subjects and lower levels of force against Subjects over 50. It is unlikely that racial bias is playing a role in these differentials because Black Subjects had the lowest average Force Factor Score of any racial group. The lower Force Factor Score for the older Subjects indicates that officers may be attempting to avoid injury and they may feel less threatened by higher levels of resistance presented by the elderly.

Figure 56: Use of Force – Demographics of Average Force Factor Scores – Spokane



For purposes of a risk analysis, we categorize any Force Factor Score with a +3 or below as a "High Force Factor" incident. Even though all these incidents may not have been found to be excessive by the Department, these incidents are at much higher risk of being found to be excessive than incidents with lower Force Factor Scores. Every agency will have some percentage of incidents that fall in the High Force Factor category (typically between 0% and 10% of all force incidents). Fifteen percent of Spokane's use of force incidents were classified as High Force Factor. While this is one of the highest High Force Factor rates in the Network, we believe this is because Spokane officers are not required to report on lower levels of physical force that other agencies report on. If these cases were included, Spokane's use of force rate per arrest would increase but its Force Factor profile would be reduced because lower-level force incidents would be included in the numbers. Over the last 7 years there were 107 incidents with a high Force Factor. No incidents had a Force Factor of +6 and only one incident had a +5 Force Factor. The remaining high Force Factor incidents had a Score of +3 or +4.

## Force Factor – Risk Ratio Analysis

If a particular demographic group has a disproportionately greater share of high Force Factor incidents this may be an indicator of potential bias by officers. Over the last 7 years there were 107 use of force incidents with a high Force Factor Score. The following table presents the percentage of incidents with high Force Factor Scores for each demographic group compared to the proportion of all force incidents:

Table 35: Risk Ratios for Demographics of High Force Factor Scores – Spokane

Sex	All Use of Force Incidents	High Force Factor Score	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
Female	8.1%	11.2%	1.4	1.0
Male	91.9%	88.8%	1.0	0.7

Race	All Use of Force Incidents	High Force Factor Score	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio
White	74.6%	74.3%	1.0	1.0
Black	13.7%	14.3%	1.0	1.0
Nat Amer	6.2%	7.6%	1.2	1.2
Hispanic	2.0%	2.8%	1.4	1.4
Asian	3.6%	1.0%	0.3	0.3

Age	All Use of Force Incidents	High Force Factor Score	Risk Ratio
0 - 17	3.9%	2.8%	0.7
18 - 30	40.5%	37.4%	0.9
31-49	48.4%	54.2%	1.1
50+	7.2%	5.6%	0.8

While none of the observed disparities were large, Female Subjects were more likely to be involved in a high Force Factor incident than Males and Native American and Hispanic Subjects were 20% and 40% more likely to be involved in high Force Factor incidents than White Subjects. Asian Subjects were rarely involved in a high Force Factor incident although their average Force Factor Score was the highest of any demographic group. This is because Asian Subjects had a higher percentage of incidents with a +2 Force Factor than other demographic groups which is the top end of the medium Force Factor range. Juvenile Subjects and Subjects over 50 were underrepresented in high Force Factor incidents.

# Types of Weapons Used During Police Uses of Force

Demographic disparities were also calculated for each type of physical force and weapon that was used.

Table 36: Types of Force Tactics Used by Spokane Police Officers from 2013 to 2019

	Force Tactic	Subjects Involved	Description		
	Grab	427	Grabbing or pulling on a Subject.		
	Takedown	325	Subject is brought to the ground in a controlled or uncontrolled manner (e.g. arm bar takedown, tackle, leg sweep).		
	LNR	218	Lateral Neck Restraint (aka carotid restraint)		
cal	Wrestle	192	Protracted struggle between officer and Subject usually when both parties are on the ground.		
Physical	Weight	191	Officer uses body weight to hold Subject down (e.g. knee in the back, sitting on Subject, holding down arms or legs).		
	Strike 96		Physical strike using hands, elbows, feet, or knees.		
	Push 74		Pushing a Subject away from officer.		
	Pain 50		Pain compliance or joint manipulation (e.g. wrist lock)		
	Hair Hold 19		Grabbing or holding the Subject's hair.		
	ECW	188	Electronic Control Weapon (i.e. Taser) used in probe and/or drive stun mode.		
	Canine	154	Canine bite.		
noo	Impact	31	Impact weapon – may include any blunt object used to strike a Subject (e.g. baton, shield, flashlight)		
Weapon	ОС	29	Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) or any other type of chemical munitions		
	Projectile	25	Impact rounds and projectile weapons (e.g. rubber bullets and sponge rounds)		
	Firearm	23	Any discharge of a firearm regardless of whether the Subject was injured or killed.		

Table 37: Frequency of Force Tactics Used by Subject Sex – Spokane

	Tactic	Female	Male	Total
al	Grab	55%	59%	58%
	Takedown	45%	44%	45%
	LNR	16%	31%	30%
	Wrestle	26%	26%	26%
Physical	Weight	23%	26%	26%
4	Strike	5%	14%	13%
	Push	11%	10%	10%
	Pain	11%	6%	7%
	Hair Hold	10%	2%	3%
	ECW	21%	26%	26%
_	Canine	21%	21%	21%
por	Impact	3%	4%	4%
Weapon	OC	6%	4%	4%
	Projectile	5%	3%	3%
	Firearm	0%	3%	3%

Table 38: Frequency of Force Tactics Used by Subject Race – Spokane

	Tactic	White	Black	Nat Amer	Hispanic	Asian	Total
	Grab	59%	59%	53%	43%	73%	58%
	Takedown	45%	51%	39%	38%	33%	45%
	LNR	30%	34%	22%	33%	33%	30%
a	Wrestle	26%	30%	24%	29%	40%	26%
Physical	Weight	26%	28%	20%	24%	40%	26%
石	Strike	13%	16%	7%	10%	13%	13%
	Push	10%	9%	5%	24%	27%	10%
	Pain	7%	6%	8%	5%	0%	7%
	Hair Hold	3%	2%	2%	0%	7%	3%
	ECW	24%	31%	32%	29%	27%	26%
	Canine	22%	12%	24%	24%	20%	21%
u	Impact	5%	0%	5%	5%	0%	4%
Weapon	OC	5%	2%	3%	0%	0%	4%
Š	Projectile	3%	3%	7%	5%	7%	3%
	Firearm	3%	2%	5%	0%	0%	3%
	Other	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%

Table 39: Frequency of Force Tactics Used by Subject Age – Spokane

	Tactic	0-17	18-30	31-49	50+	Total
	Grab	62%	58%	56%	64%	58%
	Takedown	53%	45%	42%	55%	45%
	LNR	32%	33%	27%	26%	30%
_	Wrestle	29%	26%	26%	26%	26%
Physical	Weight	32%	26%	26%	19%	26%
P	Strike	3%	12%	14%	12%	13%
	Push	21%	8%	10%	17%	10%
	Pain	6%	5%	8%	10%	7%
	Hair Hold	9%	2%	3%	0%	3%
	ECW	24%	23%	30%	14%	26%
	Canine	12%	24%	22%	2%	21%
<u> </u>	Impact	3%	3%	5%	5%	4%
Weapon	OC	0%	2%	6%	7%	4%
	Projectile	6%	1%	5%	10%	3%
	Firearm	0%	2%	4%	2%	3%
	Other	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%

## Weapons Used – Risk Ratio Analysis

Use of force tactics used against Male Subjects were proportional to arrests except for hair holds where Males were 30% less likely to have that technique used. Females were nearly 4 times more likely to have hair holds used against them than would be expected based on the number of arrests. Females were also more likely to have OC, projectile weapons and pain compliance techniques used against them. Females were 50% less likely to have a lateral neck restraint (LNR) used and 60% less likely to be struck by officers.

Table 40: Risk Ratios for Force Tactics by Sex – Spokane

		Risk Ratio		
	Tactic	Female	Male	
	Grab	0.9	1.0	
	Takedown	1.0	1.0	
	LNR	0.5	1.0	
<del>-</del>	Wrestle	1.0	1.0	
Physical	Weight	0.9	1.0	
4	Strike	0.4	1.1	
	Push	1.1	1.0	
	Pain	1.7	0.9	
	Hair Hold	3.6	0.7	
	ECW	0.8	1.0	
	Canine	1.0	1.0	
Weapon	Impact	0.8	1.0	
	OC	1.6	0.9	
	Projectile	1.4	1.0	
	Firearm	0	1.1	

Black Subjects did not have any impact weapons used against them in the last 7 years and were 50% less likely to have OC used against them during an arrest. Black Subjects were about 30% less likely to have hair holds, canines or firearms used against them. Native Americans were twice as likely to have projectile weapons used against them during an arrest. From 2013 to 2018 there were 3 Native Americans who were shot at by officers which makes them 70% more likely to be shot at during an arrest. Native American Subjects were about 50% more likely to be struck or pushed by an officer or have a hair hold used against them. Hispanic Subjects did not have any hair holds, firearm or OC used against them, but they were more than twice as likely to be pushed by officers and 40% more likely to have a projectile weapon used against them. Asian Subjects were more than twice as likely to be pushed by officers or be put in a hair hold or have a projectile weapon used against them. Asian Subjects were not involved in any incidents where pain compliance, OC, impact weapons or firearms were used.

Table 41: Risk Ratios for Force Tactics by Race – Spokane

		Risk Ratio				
	Tactic	White	Black	Nat Amer	Hispanic	Asian
	Grab	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.7	1.3
	Takedown	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.7
	LNR	1.0	1.1	0.7	1.1	1.1
<del>-</del>	Wrestle	1.0	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.5
Physical	Weight	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.5
P.	Strike	1.0	1.2	0.5	0.7	1.0
	Push	1.0	0.9	0.5	2.4	2.6
	Pain	1.0	0.9	1.2	0.7	0
	Hair Hold	1.1	0.7	0.6	0	2.4
	ECW	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.0
Weapon	Canine	1.1	0.6	1.2	1.2	1.0
	Impact	1.2	0	1.2	1.1	0
	OC	1.2	0.5	0.9	0	0
	Projectile	0.9	0.9	2.0	1.4	2.0
	Firearm	1.1	0.7	1.7	0	0

Juveniles were three times more likely to be put in a hair hold and about twice as likely to be pushed or have a projectile weapon used against them. Juveniles were rarely struck by officers and were not involved in any OC or firearm force incidents. Subjects between 18 and 30 were less likely to have most weapons used against them except for canines while Subjects 31 to 49 were more likely to have all weapons used against them except for canines. Subjects older than 50 were nearly three times more likely to have a projectile weapon used against them and nearly three times more likely to be pushed or have OC used against them. No Subjects over 50 were put in a hair hold and almost none of them were bitten by canines.


Table 42: Risk Ratios for Force Tactics by Age – Spokane


		Risk Ratios			
	Tactic	0-17	18-30	31-49	50+
	Grab	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1
	Takedown	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.2
	LNR	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.9
<del>-</del>	Wrestle	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Physical	Weight	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.7
ᇫ	Strike	0.2	0.9	1.0	0.9
	Push	2.0	0.8	1.0	1.7
	Pain	0.9	0.7	1.2	1.4
	Hair Hold	3.2	0.6	1.1	0
	ECW	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.6
	Canine	0.6	1.2	1.0	0.1
Weapon	Impact	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.1
	OC	0	0.6	1.5	1.8
	Projectile	1.7	0.3	1.3	2.8
	Firearm	0	0.7	1.3	0.8
	Other	0	0.8	1.5	0


# Subject Injuries from Police Uses of Force

Subject injury rates from police uses of force did not vary significantly by sex. Asian Subjects were the least likely to be injured (73%) and Native American Subjects had the highest injury rates (81%). Juvenile Subjects were the least likely to be injured (74%) and Subjects between the ages of 31 and 49 were the most like to be injured (82%).

Figure 57: Use of Force – Demographics of Subject Injury Rates – Spokane








Each type of injury was assigned a seriousness level on a scale of 0 to 9 and the average injury Scores were calculated for each demographic group.


Figure 58: Use of Force – Injury Level Scoring Matrix


Injury Level	Injury Description		
9	Death		
8	Gunshot wound		
7	Any fracture including broken teeth		
6	Loss of consciousness		
5	Canine bite regardless of injury		
4	Chemical Irritation from pepper spray or gas		
3	Minor cut, puncture wound or bloody nose		
2	Minor bruise or scrape		
1	Probe from ECW contacts the Subject's skin		
0	Complaint of pain or injury but no visible injury		

Male Subjects had more serious injuries than Female Subjects. Hispanic Subjects had the most serious injuries of any demographic group and Native American Subjects received injuries that were more serious than average. Asian Subjects had injury levels comparable with Female Subjects. Injury levels across the different age groups was similar.

Figure 59: Use of Force – Average Seriousness Level of Subject Injury - Spokane







### Other Force Techniques

Spokane is a member of the Police Force Analysis Network<sup>sM</sup> (PFAN). PFAN is a group of 88 law enforcement agencies in 8 states that have provided incident reports that have been entered into the Police Force Analysis System<sup>sM</sup>. Since all the use of force data is coded consistently, PFAN enables us to make interagency comparisons on a wide range of use of force practices.

Spokane uses two types of force tactics at much higher rates than other agencies in the Network. Over the last 7 years 30% of Spokane's force incidents involved the use of a lateral neck restraint compared to an average of 2% for other agencies in the Network. Similarly, 21% of all Spokane's force incidents involved a canine bite compared to 3% for other agencies. One of the reasons for the high level of canine bites is that Spokane is a regional canine service provider. If a Spokane canine is deployed to assist another agency and the canine bites the Subject, the use of force will still count for Spokane. The high rates of use for these force tactics does not necessarily mean there is anything wrong or that policies or training should change. However, since these two techniques are used in half of all force incidents, it is important for both the Department and the community to examine policies and practices to ensure that the desired objectives are being achieved.

### Lateral Neck Restraints (LNR)

The Lateral Neck Restraint (LNR), also known as carotid restraint, <sup>78</sup> is a martial arts technique that is used to control or immobilize a resisting Subject. Generally, the LNR is divided into two levels. LNR 1 is a control hold and LNR 2 involves an attempt to render the Subject unconscious.

We do not take a position on whether the LNR should be permitted as a force option for police officers. However, we strongly believe that before any decisions are made to allow or prohibit the technique, policy makers should examine all available data to understand the risks and benefits of using the LNR. While there is little data available on this topic, Spokane is in the

<sup>78</sup> The term "choke hold" is often incorrectly used in the media to refer to the use of LNR. A choke hold is an unauthorized technique that involves constricting the windpipe and asphyxiating the Subject.

unique position of having access to seven years' worth of local data, and they can compare their LNR practices with other agencies in PFAN.

Based on the 11,000 use of force incident reports we have collected from 88 law enforcement agencies around the country, we believe that about a third of law enforcement agencies allow the LNR to be used by officers in most situations where force is authorized. Another third of agencies restrict the use of the LNR to specific situations where higher levels of force are authorized, most commonly deadly force. The final third of agencies prohibit the use of the LNR in all circumstances. As cities and states move quickly to ban the technique, there may be far fewer agencies now that still allow their officers to use the LNR.

We estimate that the LNR is used 13,000 times a year by police officers in the United States. Based on the data from all agencies in our Network about a third of the time LNR is applied the Subject loses consciousness. LNR is most frequently used when the Subject is assaulting the officer (51%) and is rarely used when the Subject is only threatening the officer or only passively resisting (<1%). The LNR is most commonly used after other force tactics have been attempted but failed and typically a force incident involving an LNR lasts longer than incidents where officers use less lethal weapons. Since LNR incidents are typically protracted struggles between officers and Subjects the injury rates for both officers and Subjects are higher than average (28% vs 15% for officers and 63% vs 48% for Subjects). We have data on 371 use of force incidents where an LNR was used and none of those incidents resulted in a fracture or serious medical injury to the Subject. By contrast, 8.5% of all uses of an impact weapon result in a serious injury, fracture, or death.

In Spokane, the LNR is used twice as often on Males than Females. LNR use does not vary by the Subject's race except that Native American Subjects are 30% less likely than White Subjects to experience an LNR. LNR use is similar across all age groups.

If LNR use in Spokane is banned, it is unlikely that it would reduce the overall number of use of force incidents. This means that officers would need to substitute other physical force techniques or weapons in place of the LNR that they are currently using. Before any changes are made to policies or laws impacting the LNR we strongly recommend that the Department have

discussions with the community and policy makers about the potential impacts of such a change. If any policy or legislative changes are made, we will be able to track the impacts of those changes using the Police Force Analysis System<sup>™</sup> which is updated on an annual basis.

#### **Canine Bites**

Police canines have a variety of uses in law enforcement. Canines are typically used to track and apprehend fleeing suspects or dangerous suspects that are hiding in areas that are inaccessible or dangerous for officers to enter. Canine units can be costly to maintain and they require specialized and highly trained officers to work with the canine officers. As a result, canine units are typically found only in larger police departments. Since not all agencies have a canine unit, those agencies that do will typically be called out to assist neighboring jurisdictions under mutual aid agreements. Of the 154 canine bites during the last 7 years, 12% were outside the City of Spokane. Canine bites can result in serious injuries that may require stitches. Only 2 canine bites did not result in an injury resulting in a 99% injury rate. No officers were injured during any canine incident. This validates one of the arguments for using canines which is that it improves officer safety.

In Spokane canines are used at equal rates on Males and Females. Black Subjects are 40% less likely to receive a canine bite than White Subjects. Canines are rarely used on juveniles or person over the age of 50. Generally, the annual number of canine bites varies between 20 and 30 but in 2019 there were only 4 incidents involving a canine bite.

There are many different schools of thought on the use of canines including the use of animals on-leash versus off-leash and bark versus bite training. We do not take any position about what the most appropriate use of canines is, but again we want to emphasize that policy and training decisions in this area should be driven by data and evidence.

### **Deadly Force**

From 2013 through 2018 Spokane police officers used deadly force against 23 Subjects. According to the police incident reports reviewed for the Police Force Analysis System, 12 Subjects died from gunshot wounds, 10 Subjects were injured, and 1 Subject was unharmed. The following table shows the demographic information for the involved Subjects:

Table 43: Use of Force – Demographics of Deadly Force Incidents - Spokane

Race	Deadly Force Incidents	
White	17	
Native American	3	
Black	2	
Unknown	1	

Gender	Deadly Force Incidents	
Male	23	
Female	0	

Age	Deadly Force Incidents	
18-29	6	
30-39	11	
40-49	3	
50-59	1	
Unknown	2	

Weapon Used by Subject	Deadly Force Incidents	
Firearm	11	
Knife	5	
Vehicle	3	
None/Unknown	4	

#### Mental Health and Use of Force

Concerns have been expressed in some cities like Portland, Oregon.<sup>79</sup> about police uses of force against individuals with mental health issues.<sup>80</sup> When officers encounter an individual, who appears to be having mental health problems, they will document this information in their narrative reports. This is not a medical diagnosis and it may be incorrect, but it provides insight into how officers perceive a Subject's behavior and mental state.

Spokane officers identified a mental health issue in 22% of all use of force incidents during the last 7 years. In most of these incidents the Subject was engaged in the commission of a crime and force was used because the Subject resisted arrest. From 2017 through 2019 SPD officers contacted 23,091 individuals to provide a welfare check. Force was used in only 8 of those incidents (0.03%). In all but one of those incidents the officers used force because the Subject was being involuntarily committed and refused to be taken into custody.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> "No Progress to Show in Four Years of Police Reform in Portland", Mental Health Association of Portland, June 9, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Spokane has formed a behavioral health unit and the region has broken ground on the first mental health crisis diversion center in the state.

#### **Police Searches**

It is important to examine police searches during any analysis of racial disparities in law enforcement activities. Although searches are relatively uncommon (6.8% of all stops in the DPF system involved some type of search) an officer's decision to search a Subject could be influenced by bias and prejudice. Traditionally, a search analysis examines two types of variables:

- 1) Search Rates After being stopped by the police are some racial groups more likely to be searched than others?
- 2) Hit Rates Of the Subjects who are searched, are officers more likely to find contraband on some racial groups than others?

The theory is that if search rates are higher for one racial group than another and if the hit rate for searches is lower, then the officers may be making searches of that racial group based on bias rather than having evidence of potential contraband.<sup>81</sup> There are several problems with this traditional method for analyzing searches.

### Types of Searches

Most studies simply examine whether a search was conducted and whether contraband was discovered because of that search. However, not all searches are created equal. There are several different types of searches that an officer may conduct, and they do not involve the same level of discretion by the officer:

1) **Search Incident to Arrest** – This is the most common type of search and can be made whenever any Subject is taken into custody. Once a Subject is handcuffed the officers will typically pat the Subject down for weapons or sharp objects and will remove any items on their person for safekeeping or evidence before they are booked into jail. According

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> <u>"A large-scale analysis of racial disparities in police stops across the United States,"</u> Nature Human Behavior, May 4, 2020

- to the DPF system, 91% of all searches conducted by Spokane officers were done incident to arrest.
- 2) Inventory Search When a vehicle is impounded an officer may conduct a search of the Subject's vehicle to inventory its contents. Depending on the circumstances, a warrant may need to be obtained before a search can be conducted. In the DPF system, 1.7% of all searches were for inventory purposes.
- 3) **Search Warrant** An officer may obtain a search warrant in advance and then execute the warrant when the Subject is contacted, or the officer may obtain a search warrant after a Subject has been detained. The warrant will define the permissible scope of the search. In the DPF system, 1.2% of all searches were based on a search warrant.
- 4) Officer Safety Search If an officer contacts a Subject that they have reason to believe may be armed or dangerous, they may conduct a cursory pat down for weapons. This type of search is limited to weapons only and the officer is not allowed to open small containers or soft objects that could not be used as a weapon. In the DPF system, 5.1% of all searches were for officer safety.
- 5) Consent Search An officer may ask anyone at any time for consent to search their person or their vehicle. The Subject has a right to refuse the search and the officer must inform them of that right. Since consent to search is voluntary, many agencies require officers to obtain a signed written consent form before a search can be conducted. Once the search has begun, consent can be revoked at any time assuming that nothing illegal had been discovered. The officer may have a reason for asking for consent or they may have no reason at all. Since this kind of request by an officer is highly discretionary, the risks of bias and prejudice playing a role in the request for consent are high. Therefore, data on consent searches should be included in any racial disparity analysis. In the DPF system 7.7% of all searches were conducted after obtaining consent from the Subject.
- Note: Data does not include all searches conducted by officers. None of the consent searches
  conducted in calls for service are captured in the DPF. The data for consent searches after a traffic
  stop is from traffic stops and is a small percentage of the total searches conducted by officers.

Most studies that examine racial disparities in searches have found that Blacks and Hispanics are searched at a higher rate than Whites but the hit-rates for Black and Hispanic Subjects is lower than the hit rate for White Subjects. These finding suggest that officers may be using inappropriate criteria or bias when deciding who they are going to search. Since most searches are made incident to arrest and are non-discretionary, if Blacks and Hispanics were arrested at higher rates than Whites that would explain the higher search rates. If most of these searches were incident to arrest, then the decision to search would not be based upon an officer's suspicion that the Subject had contraband or weapons but instead was merely part of a routine arrest process. This would explain the low hit rates for these types of searches.

A more effective way to analyze racial disparities in officer search decisions would be to focus on consent searches and officer safety searches.

### **Consent Searches**

Unlike all other types of law enforcement activities which require reasonable suspicion or probable cause before any action can be taken, an officer can ask anyone at any time for consent to search their person or their vehicle.


For a racial disparity analysis, the critical question is whether the officer asked for consent to search regardless of whether a search was conducted. Since the request for consent does not require any reasonable suspicion or probable cause, if an officer disproportionately asks one racial group for consent to search, that may be an indication of racial bias.

It is also important to know how different racial groups respond to an officer's request to search their person or their vehicles. This consent rate may also impact the hit rate. For example, a Subject from a racial minority group may feel intimidated by the officer and believe that they will get into trouble if they refuse consent. They may also feel that by refusing it may make the officer more suspicious. Non-native English speakers or immigrants may not fully understand their rights and may end up consenting as a result. It could also go in the opposite direction and the Subject may simply refuse to cooperate with the officer because they do not trust law

enforcement. All these factors will impact both the consent rate and the hit rate when a search is conducted.

Many possible scenarios could play out that would affect these rates. For example, White Subjects may feel less intimidated by officers and may become more defiant when asked for consent regardless of whether they have anything to hide. This scenario could produce a lower consent rate and a higher hit rate. Individuals from certain minority groups may be more willing to give consent because they know that they have nothing to hide and they may feel that they need to prove that to the officer. This would produce a higher consent rate but a lower hit rate for this group.


Figure 60: Demographics of Consent Searches – Spokane – January 2014 to June 2020




## Officer Safety Searches

When an officer stops or detains someone, the officer may conduct a cursory pat down of the person if the officer has reason to believe that the Subject may be armed and dangerous. This search must be based on the officer's observations of the Subject or prior information received from a victim or a witness that the Subject was possibly armed. Therefore, it is important to know why an officer conducted a pat down for officer safety and whether any weapons were found.

Figure 61: Demographics of Officer Safety Searches – Spokane – January 2014 to June 2020






#### Search Hit Rates

Search hit rates are presented for illustrative purposes only. The sample size is too small, and the data quality is too poor to reach any definitive findings.


Figure 62: Demographics of Consent Searches and Hit Rates - Spokane




## Search Data Quality Concerns

The following graphs demonstrate why the Demographic Profiling Form database is not a reliable measure for consent searches and officer safety searches. Prior to July 2019 when the Department migrated to a new Demographic Profiling system which automatically prompts officers to fill out the form at the conclusion of all officer initiated stops, it does not appear that search data was being entered into the database as required. Based on the search number from 2019 it appears as if only a quarter of searches from prior years were entered into the database.

Figure 63: Consent Searches and Officer Safety Searches During Traffic Stops – Spokane – January 2014 to June 2020





# Spokane Neighborhoods and Locations

The Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system contains geocoded data, neighborhood information and the name of the location associated with the incident (i.e. store name, restaurant name, apartment complex name, etc.). This section examines calls for service, arrests and uses of force by neighborhood and location type.

## Calls for Service by Neighborhood

Spokane has 27 neighborhoods. These areas are not like census tracts and they have different populations and irregular boundaries. Some neighborhoods encompass large areas and some are very small. The following comparative analysis examines law enforcement data by Spokane neighborhoods.

Over the last 3½ years, Riverside. 83 has received the most law enforcement activity with 33,759 calls for service and officer initiated stops making up nearly 14% of the total for the entire City of Spokane. Peaceful Valley. 84 had the fewest number of law enforcement activities with only 432 calls and stops making up less than 0.2% of the City total.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> In this report the neighborhoods of Northwest and Audubon have been combined into one area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Riverside includes the downtown core and has one of the three police precincts in the City.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Peaceful Valley is the smallest neighborhood by area and has very few residents.

Table 44: Calls for Service and Officer Initiated Stops by Spokane Neighborhood

– January 2017 to June 2020

Geo Neighborhood	All Calls & Stops	% of City Total
Riverside	33,759	13.6%
Nevada / Lidgerwood	31,909	12.9%
East Central	28,207	11.4%
Emerson / Garfield	16,819	6.8%
Logan	16,105	6.5%
West Central	15,575	6.3%
North Hill	11,241	4.5%
Bemiss	10,832	4.4%
Northwest / Audubon	10,561	4.3%
Cliff - Cannon	10,058	4.1%
Hillyard	9,155	3.7%
Chief Garry Park	8,701	3.5%
Lincoln Heights	6,116	2.5%
West Hills	5,332	2.1%
Whitman	4,763	1.9%
Browne's Addition	4,299	1.7%
Southgate	3,361	1.4%
Minnehaha	2,787	1.1%
Balboa / South Indian Tr	1,749	0.7%
Comstock	1,729	0.7%
Latah / Hangman	1,586	0.6%
Rockwood	1,543	0.6%
North Indian Trail	1,043	0.4%
Manito / Cannon Hill	946	0.4%
Grandview / Thorpe	533	0.2%
Five Mile Prairie	529	0.2%
Peaceful Valley	432	0.2%

Figure 64: Map of Spokane Neighborhoods – Calls for Service and Officer Initiated Stops – January 2017 to June 2020




### Law Enforcement Activities by Neighborhood

This section examines the raw percentages of the law enforcement activities occurring in each neighborhood and the Subject's involved.

#### 1) Sex and Average Age of Subjects by Neighborhood

Female Subjects were most likely to be associated with an incident occurring in Riverside (28%), Peaceful Valley (26%) or Balboa/South Indian Trail (25%). Males were most likely to be involved in incidents occurring in Rockwood (87%), Five Mile Prairie (85%) or outside Spokane (85%). Younger Subjects were more likely to be involved in incidents occurring in Balboa/South Indian Trail (33) while older Subjects are more frequently found in North Indian Trail (average age 40), Five Mile Prairie (39), Rockwood (39), Grandview/Thorpe (39) and Latah/Hangman (39).

Figure 65: Spokane Neighborhoods – Total Stops, Female Subjects and Average Subject Age



## 2) Race of Subjects by Neighborhood

White Subjects were most likely to be associated with an incident occurring in North Indian Trail (91%) and were least likely to be associated with incidents in West Central (76%). Black Subjects were most likely to be involved in incidents occurring in East Central (15%) and Riverside (13%). Native American Subjects has the highest incident involvement rates in West Central (8%), Browne's Addition (6%) and Emerson/Garfield (6%). Hispanic Subjects were most often found in incidents in Lincoln Heights (5%), while Asian Subjects were most often involved in incidents in Five Mile Prairie (5%).





Figure 66: Spokane Neighborhoods - Total Stops & Subject Race

# 3) Officer Initiated Stops and Arrests by Neighborhood

Officers were most likely to conduct an officer initiated stop outside Spokane city limits (58%), East Central (46%) and Riverside (46%). Law enforcement activities that occur in Southgate (86%), North Indian Trail (84%), and Five Mile Prairie (84%) were most likely to be generated by a call for service.

Riverside had the highest arrest rate at 15% followed by Peaceful Valley at 14%. Rockwood and Five Mile Prairie had the lowest arrest rates at 6%.

Figure 67: Spokane Neighborhoods – Total Stops, Officer Initiated Stops & Stops Resulting in Arrest



# 4) Average Crime/Offense Rank by Neighborhood

Each crime/offense was assigned a rank ranging from 1 (most serious felonies like homicide) to 78 (for minor civil infractions). The average rankings were computed for each type of location. The lower the average Score the higher the average ranking and the more serious the crimes that were involved.

Incidents that occurred in Five Mile Prairie, North Indian Trail and Southgate had the most serious average crime Scores. Incidents that occurred in Rockwood had significantly lower average crime Scores than the other neighborhoods in the City.




Figure 68: Spokane Neighborhoods – Total Stops & Average Crime Rank

# Correlations Between Law Enforcement Variables by


# Neighborhood

This section examines correlations between law enforcement activities to determine whether the correlations observed at national, state and city levels also hold up at the neighborhood level.

## 1) 911 Calls vs Non-Emergency Calls for Service

There is a statistically significant correlation between the number of 911 emergency calls for service in a neighborhood and the number of non-emergency service calls. On average for every 100 emergency calls there are 64 non-emergency calls.

Figure 69: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot – 911 Calls & Non-Emergency Calls



P-value: < 0.0001
Equation: Call Crime Check = 0.64094\*Call Dispatch + -59.6984

Coefficients
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value
Call Dispatch 0.64094 0.0103051 62.1965 < 0.0001
intercept -59.6984 50.9139 -1.17254 0.251613

# 2) 911 Calls & Non-Emergency Calls for Service.85 vs Officer Initiated Stops


There is a statistically significant correlation between the number of calls for service (both emergency and non-emergency) in a neighborhood and the number of officer initiated stops. On average for every 100 calls for service from a neighborhood there are 57 officer initiated stops in that neighborhood. This correlation suggests that the Spokane Poice Department is deploying its officers based on the number of calls for service. Neighborhoods that have more calls for service will have more officers deployed there and those officers will make more officer initiated stops than in neighborhoods with fewer calls for service.

The three neighborhoods with the most calls for service: Nevada/Lidgerwood, Riverside and East Central, have the greatest variation in officer initiated stops. Nevada/Lidgerwood only had 33 officer initiated stops per 100 calls for service while Riverside and East Central each had 84 officer initiated stops. The Spokane will be able to explain why there is a difference in the number of officer initiated stops between these neighborhoods, but one possible explanation is that a higher percentage of the criminal behavior in Nevada/Lidgerwood occurs indoors or out of sight from policing patrols while the criminal behavior in Riverside and East Central may be more likely to attract the attention of police patrols. It is also possible that there is a higher concentration of proactive patrols in Riverside and East Central or the differential could be caused by a combination of several factors. The goal of this report is to identify disparities in law enforcement activities, but it will be up to the Department to determine why those disparities exist and whether any adjustments are needed to deployment strategies.

No other neighborhoods had as high a concentration of officer initiated stops as Riverside and East Central, but several neighborhoods had disproportionately fewer stops per 100 calls for service: Northwest (34), Lincoln Heights (33), Southgate (16).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Non-emergency calls for service are typically going through the Crime Check system: https://www.spokanecounty.org/1076/Crime-Check

Figure 70: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Calls for Service and Officer Initiated Contacts



P-value: < 0.0001
Equation: Onview All = 0.574504\*Call All + -222.926


Coefficients
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value
Call All 0.574504 0.0598427 9.60022 < 0.0001
intercept -222.926 491.679 -0.453397 0.654174


#### 3) Calls for Service That Lead to an Arrest

There is a statistically significant correlation between the number of calls for service (both emergency and non-emergency) in a neighborhood and the number of arrests that result from those calls. On average for every 100 calls for service from a neighborhood there are 12 arrests made as a result of those calls.

For the larger neighborhoods arrest rates (arrests per 100 calls) ranged from 8.3% in West Hills to 13.1% in Southgate.

Figure 71: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Calls for Service & Arrests






# 4) Officer Initiated Stops That Lead to an Arrest

There is a statistically significant correlation between the number of officer initiated stops in a neighborhood and the number of arrests made as a result of those stops. On average for every 100 police stops in a neighborhood there are 14 arrests made.

For the larger neighborhoods, arrest rates (arrests per 100 calls) ranged from 6.9% in Northwest to 17.6% in Riverside. While East Central and Riverside had the largest number of officer initiated stops, the arrest rate for Riverside was nearly double the rate for East Central (10.4%). This differential may be caused by the types of stops made in each neighborhood. Stops in Riverside tend to be for more serious criminal offenses that are more likely to lead to an arrest, while in East Central there is a higher proportion of traffic stops which typically result in the issuance of an infraction rather than an arrest.

Figure 72: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Officer Initiated Contacts and Arrests




## 5) Calls for Service That Lead to an Infraction

There is a statistically significant correlation between the number of calls for service in a neighborhood and the number of infractions issued as a result of those calls. On average for every 100 calls for service in a neighborhood there were 2 infractions issued.

For the larger neighborhoods infraction rates (infractions per 100 calls) ranged from 1.2% in West Hills to 6.9% in Rockwood. This suggests that calls for service from Rockwood more frequently involve non-criminal behavior.

Figure 73: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Calls for Service & Infractions Issued



 P-value: < 0.0001</th>

 Equation:
 Call Infraction = 0.0225685\*Call All + 6.93329

 Coefficients
 Term
 Value
 StdErr
 t-value
 p-value

 Call All
 0.0225685
 0.0017889
 12.6159
 < 0.0001</td>

 intercept
 6.93329
 14.4331
 0.480375
 0.634978


# 6) Officer Initiated Stops That Lead to an Infraction


There is a statistically significant correlation between the number of officer initiated stops in a neighborhood and the number of infractions issued as a result of those stops. On average for every 100 police stops in a neighborhood there are 4 infractions issued.

For the larger neighborhoods, infraction rates (infractions per 100 calls) ranged from 2.3% in West Central to 10.5% in Chief Garry Park.

A high infraction rate in a neighborhood is likely due to higer levels of traffic enforcement that where a stop typically leads to an infraction being issued.

Figure 74: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Officer Initiated Contacts and Infractions Issued






#### 7) Calls for Service by Race of Subject vs Officer Initiated Stops by Race of Subject

To examine issues of racial disparities in policing activities, the number of White Subjects involved in calls for service by neighborhood was compared to the number of White Subjects who were stopped by the police during an officer initiated contact. There is a statistically significant correlation between these two variables. For every 100 calls for service involving a White Subject there were 34 officer initiated stops of White Subjects in the same neighborhood.

There was a large variation in these rates among the three neighborhoods with the most calls for service. Nevada/Lidgerwood only had 16 stops of White Subjects for every 100 calls for service involving White Subjects. East Central had 49 and Riverside had 65 stops of White Subjects per 100 calls. These observed differences are due in part to deployment practices and also behavioral differences in White Subjects in the neighborhood. In Nevada/Lidgerwood, White Subjects are more likely to engage in unlawful behavior that is out of view from most policing patrols while in Riverside the unlawful behavior is much more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement.

Figure 75: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Officer Initiated Contacts & White Subjects



 P-value:
 < 0.0001</td>

 Equation:
 Onview White = 0.337593\*Call White + -72.4078

 Coefficients
 Term
 Value
 StdErr
 t-value
 p-value

 Call White
 0.337593
 0.0499994
 6.75194
 < 0.0001</td>

 intercept
 -72.4078
 151.911
 -0.476645
 0.637597

The number of Black, Native American, Hispanic and Asian Subjects involved in calls for service by neighborhood was compared to the number of the same race Subjects who were stopped by the police during an officer initiated contact. There is a statistically significant correlation between these two variables for each racial group. For every 100 calls for service involving a Black Subject there were 36 officer initiated stops of Black Subjects in the same neighborhood. This ratio was 31 for Native American Subjects, 28 for Hispanic Subjects and 21 for Asian Subjects.

Riverside had the highest number of stops per calls for service for all racial groups (54 for Native Americans, 57 for Blacks, 65 for Whites, 67 for Asians, and 69 for Hispanics). Whites, Asians and

Hispanics were more likely to be stopped by police than Blacks or Native Americans in Riverside. Nevada/Lidgerwood had some of the lowest rates of stops per calls for service (11 for Asians, 13 for Blacks, 15 for Native Americans, 16 for Whites, and 16 for Hispanics). Whites and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped by police in Nevada/Lidgerwood than Asians or Blacks. While there is some variation among racial groups within these two neighborhoods, these differences are dwarfed by the large differential in rates between the two neighborhoods. This suggests that there are fundamental differences in deployment strategies and/or Subject offending behavior between Riverside and Nevada/Lidgerwood.

East Central.<sup>86</sup> has the third highest number of calls and stops in the City and its ratios of stops to calls for service by race are between Riverside and Nevada/Lidgerwood (31 for Asians, 39 for Native Americans, 40 for Hispanics, 40 for Blacks, and 49 for Whites). This suggests that there is more proactive enforcement occurring in East Central than Nevada/Lidgerwood but less than Riverside. Again there are no substantial differences by race and White Subjects are the most likely to be stopped in the neighborhood.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> East Central is home to the South Precinct.


Figure 76: Spokane Neighborhoods – Scatterplot of Officer Initiated Contacts & Black, Native American, Hispanic & Asian Subjects

| P-value: < 0.0001 | Equation: Onview Black = 0.358091\*Call Black + -22.346 | Coefficients | Term Value StdErr t-value p-value | Call Black 0.358091 0.042316 8.4623 < 0.0001

intercept -22.346 18.8204 -1.18733 0.245834

P-value: < 0.0001
Equation: Onview Native = 0.311987\*Call Native + -1.65378

Coefficients
Term Value StdErr t-value p-value
Call Native 0.311987 0.0382056 8.16599 < 0.0001
intercept -1.65378 7.49776 -0.22057 0.82715



 
 P-value:
 < 0.0001</td>

 Equation:
 Onview Asian = 0.208884\*Call Asian

 Coefficients
 Term
 Value
 StdErr
 t-value
 p-value

 Call Asian
 0.208884
 0.0315884
 6.61268
 < 0.0001</td>

# Neighborhood Rankings by Crime and Law Enforcement Activity

Spokane's 27 neighborhoods were ranked based upon the number of law enforcement activities occurring from January 2017 through June 2020. Calls and contacts that were made by Spokane police officers outside of the City limits were grouped into a 28<sup>th</sup> neighborhood called "Outside Spokane." By examining side by side rankings of each neighborhood, the law enforcement activity characteristics of the area can be examined.

#### 1) Neighborhood Rankings by Call Source

Riverside had the highest number of officer-initiated stops and the second highest number of both 911 and non-emergency calls. Nevada/Lidgerwood had the third highest number of officer-initiated stops and the highest number of both 911 and non-emergency calls. East Central ranked second in stops and third in calls. This call source pattern for the three neighborhoods with the highest amount of law enforcement activity confirms what was observed during the neighborhood correlation analysis. Law enforcement contacts in Riverside and East Central are more likely to come from an officer initiated stop, but in Nevada/Lidgerwood those contacts are more likely to be generated by a call for service.

Table 45: Spokane Neighborhoods – Rank by CAD Call Source

	Officer Initiated	911	Non-Emergency		
Riverside	1	2	2		
Nevada / Lidgerwood					
East Central	2				
Emerson / Garfield	6	4	4		
Logan	4	6	5		
West Central	5	5	6		
North Hill	9	8	10		
Bemiss		10	9		
Northwest	13	7	8		
Cliff - Cannon	11	9	7		
Hillyard	10	12	11		
Chief Garry Park	12	11	12		
Outside Spokane		15	14		
Lincoln Heights	16	13	13		
West Hills	14	14	15		
Whitman	15	16	17		
Browne's Addition	17	17	18		
Southgate	20	18	16		
Minnehaha	18	19	19		
Balboa / South Indian Tr	23	21	20		
Comstock	22	20	21		
Latah / Hangman	21	22	22		
Rockwood	19	23	23		
North Indian Trail	25	24	24		
Manito / Cannon Hill	24	25	25		
Grandview / Thorpe	26	27	27		
Five Mile Prairie	28	26	26		
Peaceful Valley	27	28	28		

#### 2) Neighborhood Rankings by Call Summary

The CAD Call Summary is the reason for the call for service or the initial reason for the officer initiated stop. Riverside ranked highest in law enforcement activity generated by suspicious circumstances/disturbances, general requests for assistance, directed enforcement and warrants. Nevada/Lidgerwood ranked highest in crimes against persons, crimes against property and welfare checks. East Central ranked highest for traffic enforcement. Police are more likely to be notified about crimes against persons and property and receive requests for welfare checks from a call for service than from an officer observing the activity on the street. By contrast officers are more likely to proactively investigate suspicious circumstances, respond to requests for assistance from witnesses and victims who flag them down, engage in directed enforcement or contact a wanted suspect. Traffic enforcement is also generally an officer-initiated activity.

These rankings confirm prior observations of the three neighborhoods where enforcement activities in Nevada/Lidgerwood were primarily generated by calls for service, while contacts in Riverside and East Central were more likely to come from an officer initiated stop.

Table 46: Spokane Neighborhoods – Rank by CAD Call Summary

	Suspicious Disturb	Traffic	Person Crime	Property Crime	Welfare Check	Assistance	Directed Enforce	Warrant
Riverside	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Nevada / Lidgerwood	3	3	1	1	1	2	3	3
East Central	2	1	3	3	3	3	2	3
Emerson / Garfield	4	5	4	5	4	7	13	6
Logan	6	4	6	4	7	6	5	8
West Central	5	8	5	6	5	4	6	4
North Hill	9	6	10	9	9	10	11	12
Bemiss	7	7	8	10	10	12	16	13
Northwest	10	11	7	8	6	8	7	9
Cliff - Cannon	11	12	9	7	8	9	8	7
Hillyard	8	13	11	13	11	11	16	10
Chief Garry Park	12	10	12	12	13	13	10	11
Outside Spokane	17	9	14	11	14	5	4	5
Lincoln Heights	16	15	13	14	12	14	19	16
West Hills	13	16	17	15	15	15	14	14
Whitman	15	14	16	18	18	16	17	15
Browne's Addition	14	17	18	16	17	17	12	17
Southgate	18	20	15	17	16	18	23	18
Minnehaha	19	19	19	19	19	19	18	20
Balboa / South Indian Tr	21	22	20	21	22	21	21	19
Comstock	22	23	21	20	20	20	9	22
Latah / Hangman	20	21	23	22	21	22	29	24
Rockwood	23	18	24	23	25	23	24	28
North Indian Trail	24	26	22	24	23	24	26	26
Manito / Cannon Hill	25	24	25	25	24	25	23	22
Grandview / Thorpe	26	26	28	27	28	27	28	26
Five Mile Prairie	27	27	26	26	27	28	26	23
Peaceful Valley	28	28	28	28	27	26	20	27

# 3) Neighborhood Rankings by Law Enforcement Action Taken

The rankings for the top three neighborhoods in arrests (Riverside, Nevada/Lidgerwood and East Central) correlate with the total number of calls and stops in those neighborhoods. Riverside is number one in stops and number one in arrests and so on. For Infractions East Central ranks the highest and this is due to the high level of traffic enforcement in the neighborhood.

Table 47: Spokane Neighborhoods – Rank by Officer Action Taken

	Arrest	Citation	Infraction	No Action	
Riverside	1	1	2	1	
Nevada / Lidgerwood	2	3	3	2	
East Central	3	2	1	3	
Emerson / Garfield	5	6	5	4	
Logan	4	4	6	6	
West Central	6	8	13	5	
North Hill	9	9	4	7	
Bemiss	10	7	9	8	
Northwest	7	13	8	9	
Cliff - Cannon	8	5	11	10	
Hillyard	12	11	14	11	
Chief Garry Park	11	10	7	13	
Outside Spokane	14	16	10	12	
Lincoln Heights	13	17	12	14	
West Hills	15	16	17	15	
Whitman	18	12	15	16	
Browne's Addition	16	14	18	17	
Southgate	17	19	19	18	
Minnehaha	19	18	20	19	
Balboa / South Indian Tr	20	24	22	21	
Comstock	22	23	24	20	
Latah / Hangman	21	21	21	22	
Rockwood	24	20	16	23	
North Indian Trail	23	27	26	24	
Manito / Cannon Hill	25	22	23	25	
Grandview / Thorpe	27	25	25	27	
Five Mile Prairie	28	28	28	26	
Peaceful Valley	26	26	28	28	

# 4) Neighborhood Rankings by Most Serious Crime Charge

Neighborhoods were ranked based upon the number of charges for each crime type or civil violation type. This provides the best assessment of the type of unlawful behaviors occurring in each neighborhood. Riverside ranked highest for property crime, drug crime, obstructing law enforcement officers, and weapon offenses. Nevada/Lidgerwood ranked highest for crimes against persons and warrant arrests. East Central ranked first in traffic offenses and firearm license violations. It is likely that many of the firearm violations were discovered after a traffic stop and that violation was issued rather than the traffic infraction.

Table 48: Spokane Neighborhoods – Rank by Most Serious Crime Charged

	Traffic	Person	Property	Drug	Other	Firearm License	Obstructing	Warrant	Weapon
Riverside	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	4	1
Nevada / Lidgerwood	3	1	2	3	3	3	3	1	2
East Central	1	3	4	2	2	1	2	2	3
Emerson / Garfield	4	5	7	6	6	6	5	4	5
Logan	6	10	3	5	4	4	4	6	6
West Central	10	4	6	4	8	11	7	5	4
North Hill	5	11	12	10	11	5	10	14	10
Bemiss	7	9	11	8	10	7	8	9	14
Northwest	9	7	8	14	9	12	16	11	14
Cliff - Cannon	11	6	5	9	5	14	7	7	16
Hillyard	12	12	14	12	7	8	12	9	8
Chief Garry Park	8	9	10	15	12	9	9	13	10
Outside Spokane	13	20	9	13	13	10	15	13	14
Lincoln Heights	14	13	16	18	18	17	17	18	15
West Hills	16	15	15	7	17	15	12	10	7
Whitman	15	17	20	16	15	13	13	23	11
Browne's Addition	18	16	17	12	14	18	14	15	17
Southgate	20	14	13	20	19	24	18	23	18
Minnehaha	19	19	19	18	21	24	20	23	20

# Geographic Distribution of Law Enforcement Activities in Spokane

Since each CAD record is geocoded, this information can be used to create heat maps that present the spatial patterns of offending behaviors and law enforcement activities within the City of Spokane. The primary goal of providing these maps as part of this report is to highlight that neither criminal behavior nor law enforcement actions are spread uniformly throughout the City. As reforms are developed and new strategies are implemented, the impacts will not be felt equally across the City. For example, a policy that limits the number of traffic stops would greatly affect law enforcement activities in the East Central neighborhood but it would have little impact in North Indian Trail where few traffic stops are made. Traffic stops are also focused around the I-90 corridor and major arterials within the City so a change in the policy would have little impact in quiet residential neighborhoods.

In general, about 90% of the City's law enforcement activity occurs in about 20% of the area of the City. These areas have the highest concentration of business activity and traffic. There are also high areas of activity in densely populated areas of the city where apartment complexes are located.

The maps below include data from the Computer Aided Dispatch System (CAD) from January 2017 through June 2020. The lighter the area depicted on the map, the higher the density of calls, stops and other law enforcement activity.

Figure 77: Density Map and Point Map for All CAD Contacts from January 2017 to June 2020









Figure 78: Density Maps for All CAD Contacts by Call Type




































































# Law Enforcement Activity at Specific Locations in Spokane

The Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system contains the name of the location associated with the incident (i.e. store name, restaurant name, apartment complex name, etc.).<sup>87</sup> This section examines calls for service, arrests and uses of force by neighborhood and location type. Where possible, these named locations were grouped into various location categories. While the categorization could not be completed on all named locations, approximately 80% were successfully categorized.

## 1) Sex and Average Age of Subjects by Location

Female Subjects were most likely to be associated with an incident occurring at a retail store (35%) or a grocery store (34%). Males were most likely to be involved in incidents occurring at a school or university (87%) or an apartment complex (84%). Not surprisingly younger Subjects are most strongly associated with incidents occurring at a school or university (average age 28) and older Subjects are involved in incidents occurring at a business, medical facility, or hotel/motel (average age 38).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> When medical facilities are reported as the location of the incident, sometimes the incident took place elsewhere but was reported at a medical facility. This can artificially inflate the number of reported incidents at medical facilities.





Figure 79: Stop Location Type – Stops, Female Subjects & Average Subject Age

#### 2) Race of Subjects by Location

White Subjects were most likely to be associated with an incident occurring at a business (35%) or a medical facility (80%) and were least likely to be associated with incidents at schools, universities, or transportation facilities (73%). By contrast Black Subjects were most likely to be involved in incidents occurring at transportation facilities (17%) and schools and universities (16%). Native American Subjects had the highest incident involvement rates at gas stations (7%), grocery stores and drug stores (6%) and transportation facilities (6%). Hispanic Subjects were most commonly seen in incidents at government buildings (4%) while Asian Subjects were most often involved in incidents at schools and universities (2.4%).

Figure 80: Stop Location Type – Number of Stops and Subject Race




# 3) Officer Initiated Stops and Arrests by Location

Officers were most likely to conduct an officer initiated stop at a government building or a transportation facility (60%). About 90% of all law enforcement activity that occurred at apartment complexes or medical facilities originated with a call for service.

Grocery stores had the highest arrest rates at 21% followed by retail stores at 20%. A large percentage of these arrests are related to shoplifting. Incidents at schools or universities had the lowest arrest rate at only 5% followed by apartment complexes at 9%.

Figure 81: Stop Location Type – Total Stops, Officer Initiated Stops and Stops
Resulting in an Arrest



#### 4) Call Summary by Location

Calls and stops for suspicious circumstances and general disturbances were most likely to occur at parks/playfields (42%) and gas stations (35%). Violent crimes were most likely to be associated with medical facilities (28%), apartment complexes (27%), social service providers (27%) and bars and restaurants (26%). Property crimes made up the largest share of calls to businesses (32%) and retail stores (30%). Directed enforcement and warrant enforcement took place most often at transportation facilities (46%) and government buildings (38%). Welfare checks were most strongly associated with calls to apartment complexes (18%) and were least likely to come from a business or a government building (6%).




Figure 82: Stop Location Type – Number of Stops and Stops by Call Summary

# 5) Average Crime/Offense Rank by Location

Each crime/offense was assigned a rank ranging from 1 (most serious felonies like homicide) to 78 (for minor civil infractions). The average rankings were computed for each type of location. The lower the average Score the higher the average ranking and the more serious the crimes that were involved.

Apartment complexes and medical facilities were involved in crimes with the most serious average Scores followed by social service facilities. Most of the other locations had similar average crime Scores. The least serious crimes were associated with gas stations.




Figure 83: Stop Location Type - Number of Stops & Average Crime Rank

# Law Enforcement Data Trends in Spokane 2017-2020

This section takes a brief look at Spokane Police Department data trends from January 2017 through June 2020.

# **Call Source Trends**

The percentage of 911 calls has remained stable over the last 3½ years while the proportion of non-emergency calls has increased, and the percentage of officer-initiated stops has fallen. The percentage drop in officer-initiated contacts during the first 6 months of 2020 may be due to COVID-19 with fewer people on the street and less activity at businesses.




Figure 84: CAD Call Source Annual Trends – Spokane

When call source trends are examined by neighborhood, there are not uniform trends occurring across the city. In Riverside 911 calls were flat while both non-emergency calls and officer-initiated stops increased. In Nevada/Lidgerwood both 911 calls and non-emergency calls increased in 2020 but officer-initiated stops decreased. In East Central all types of call sources fell during the period.

Figure 85: CAD Call Source Annual Trends by Spokane Neighborhood

Annual Percentage of Total Calls for the City from January 2017 to June 2020



# Call Summary / Reason for Contact Trends

Most of the call summary/reasons for contact trends were stable over the 3½ year period. Between 2019 and 2020 there was a 10% increase in property crime calls and a 10% increase in assistance and welfare check calls while warrant contacts dropped by 32% and traffic/directed enforcement fell by 10%.





Figure 86: CAD Call Summary Annual Trends – Spokane

In Riverside contacts for property crimes increased during the period while falling in Nevada/Lidgerwood. Suspicious circumstances and disturbance contacts rose in Riverside and Nevada/Lidgerwood but fell in East Central.

Figure 87: CAD Call Summary Annual Trends by Spokane Neighborhood Annual Percentage of Total Calls for the City from January 2017 to June 2020



### Law Enforcement Action Taken Trends

Between 2019 and 2020 arrests/criminal citations fell by 14% while infractions dropped by 25%.

These reductions in law enforcement actions may be due to the Corona virus.

Figure 88: CAD Action Taken by Officer Annual Trends – Spokane


Percentage of Total Annual Stops - Jan 2017 to June 2020



Between 2019 and 2020 the most dramatic reductions in law enforcement actions by neighborhood were in Riverside and Nevada/Lidgerwood. By 2020 East Central was the neighborhood with the most infractions issued, and its arrests were comparable to Nevada/Lidgerwood.

Figure 89: CAD Action Taken by Officer Annual Trends by Spokane Neighborhood

# **Annual Percentage of Total Calls for the City from January 2017 to June 2020**



# **Subject Demographic Trends**

From 2017 to 2020 the percentage of Female Subjects stopped by the police remained stable.


Figure 90: CAD Annual Trends – Subject Sex – Spokane





Over the last 3½ years the number of Female Subjects in Nevada/Lidgerwood increased while the number of Male Subjects decreased.

Figure 91: CAD Annual Trends – Subject Sex by Spokane Neighborhood Annual Percentage of Total Calls for the City from January 2017 to June 2020



From 2017 to 2020 the racial composition of all stops by Spokane has remained very stable.


Figure 92: CAD Annual Trends – Subject Race – Spokane

Percentage of Total Annual Stops - Jan 2017 to June 2020



Asian and Hispanic Subjects are more likely to be stopped in Nevada/Lidgerwood than other neighborhoods. Native American Subjects are more likely to be stopped in Riverside and Nevada/Lidgerwood while Black Subjects are more likely to be stopped in Riverside and East Central.


Figure 93: CAD Annual Trends – Subject Race by Spokane Neighborhood Annual Percentage of Total Calls for the City from January 2017 to June 2020



The percentage of Subjects age 18 to 30 who have been stopped by the police has fallen steadily over the last 3½ years while the percentage of those over 30 has increased steadily.


Figure 94: CAD Annual Trends – Subject Age – Spokane

### Percentage of Total Annual Stops - Jan 2017 to June 2020



Juvenile Subjects are more likely to be stopped in Nevada/Lidgerwood, East Central and Northwest than other neighborhoods. Subjects over 50 are trending up in Riverside and Nevada/Lidgerwood but down in East Central.

Figure 95: CAD Annual Trends – Subject Age by Spokane Neighborhood Annual Percentage of Total Calls for the City from January 2017 to June 2020



# Recommendations

### **Data Collection Recommendations**

# Discontinue the Demographic Profiling Form (DPF)

The Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) database, formerly known as the OnBase database, was designed specifically to provide data for a racial disparity analysis. \* The Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) is used to track demographic information for officer-initiated stops such as traffic stops. It is not used for calls for service. In calls for service, demographic data is documented in CAD or the incident report.

Although the database was used to provide data for the two prior racial disparity studies for Spokane, the data was found to be incomplete and unreliable, so its use was limited in this report. Here is a list of concerns about the quality of the database and reasons for discontinuing its use:

- Unlike the CAD and NIBRS systems, the DPF database is used exclusively for statistical research and does not serve any other law enforcement purpose. Much of the data in the DPF database is duplicative with other systems which means officers are having to make duplicate entries into multiple systems. Since the DPF data is used for research purposes only there is no incentive for officers to be complete and accurate in their data entries. Additional quality assurance processes are necessary to ensure that the data is being entered completely and accurately.
- Between 2018 and 2019 the annual number of stops entered into the DPF data system climbed from 10,260 to 16,137 (57% increase). During this same time, the number of officer-initiated stops recorded in the CAD system fell from 27,582 to 25,392 (8% decrease). The dramatic increase in DPF entries is probably due to better compliance with the data entry requirements rather than an actual 57% increase in stops

- The DPF system contains officers' names and badge numbers, but officers do not enter this information in a consistent manner (i.e. first name then last name or last name then first name or last name only, etc.).
- When a stop is made only one officer enters the data into the DPF system even if multiple officers were involved in the stop, search or use of force. The database does not include how many officers were involved in each incident.
- There are 375 officers listed in the database and 85,871 stops recorded. Ten of those officers are responsible for more than half of all stops recorded and the top officer made 8,574 stops. The majority of officers listed in the database made less than 100 stops in the 6½ year period covered by the database. It seems highly unlikely that only 10 officers in the department made 44,784 stops during the last 6 years while the other 365 officers in the database made only a handful of stops or no stops each year. Most of the 10 officers are in the traffic unit which suggests that these are the types of officers who routinely enter data into the DPF system while most other officers do not. Therefore, the DPF database is primarily a reflection of the activities of only 10 officers in the Department and probably does not reflect the enforcement actions of the Department as a whole.
- There is a high concentration of consent searches among only a few officers. According to the DPF database, over the last 6½ years, only 402 consent searches were performed. The top 10 officers conducted nearly half of those consent searches and the top officer performed nearly one-quarter of all the consent searches. It is unlikely that only a handful of officers are conducting most consent searches for the Department. More than 200 officers in the database did not record a single consent search in the last six years.
- Like the CAD system, the DPF database has a field for officers to enter the race of the person stopped. However, the CAD system has a separate field for ethnicity while the DPF system forces officers to choose between race and ethnicity in a single race field.

- The DPF database added two additional "racial groups" for officers to choose from that are not present in CAD or any other department database. In addition to White, Black, Hispanic, Native American and Pacific Islander, the options for a Subject's race also include Eastern European and Middle Eastern. These terms do not represent any recognized racial or ethnic group and instead are terms used to describe a grouping of ethnicities. It is not known how officers were trained to identify these types of individuals or how the officers made their decisions about which racial category to choose. Therefore, it is unclear how to categorize the 3% of individuals who were identified in these two racial groups.
- Due to typographical errors in the entry of the case number, about 15% to 20% of the records from the DPF system could not be matched with the records from the CAD system. This is problematic because the DPF database does not contain the date, time, or location where the stop was made. To get this information a record must be linked to the CAD system which is only possible for about 80% of the records.
- There are limited options for entering the Subject's age in the DPF system that prevent a comprehensive analysis by age. Rather than entering a specific age as the CAD system allows, the DPF system forces officers to use one of the following categories:
  - Under 15 years old
  - Between 15 and 19 years old
  - Between 20 and 29 years old
  - Between 30 and 39 years old
  - o Between 40 and 49 years old
  - Between 50 and 64 years old
  - More than 64 years old

These fixed age categories do not permit the calculation of an average age nor does it allow for the examination of juveniles separately from adults. More than a third of the records in the DPF database (27,468) do not have any age entered for the Subject so officers are not consistently entering data into this field.

- The DPF system requires officers to answer several questions that have little value for a racial disparity analysis:
  - o How was race identified?
    - Visually
    - Civilian Speech
    - Civilian's Name
    - Civilian Self Report
  - O How was age determined?
    - Civilian's Appearance
    - Civilian's Self-Report
    - Civilian's Driver's License
    - Asked Civilian About Their Age
  - There is little value in asking officers how they determined the civilian's race and age.
     In a disparity analysis the issue to be examined is what the officer's perception of a
     Subject's race was regardless of how they reached their perception.
- Questions related to searches were poorly structured and do not provide sufficient information for a meaningful analysis:
  - Search Conducted? (Yes/No)
  - O What was Searched?
    - Vehicle Searched
    - Person Searched
  - Authority for Search
    - Incident to Arrest
    - Search Warrant
    - Inventory Search
  - Contraband Found? (Yes/No)
  - Property Seized? (Yes/No)
- The DPF question asking whether force was used captured less than one-quarter of all force incidents that occurred during the period. The Police Force Analysis System<sup>sм</sup> contains

comprehensive data on all use of force incidents that occurred over the last 7 years for the entire Department. The DPF system captures primarily traffic stop data where force is rarely used and so its use of force number falls far short of the actual number.

Once the redundant and unhelpful DPF questions are removed, there is nothing left in the DPF entry form to warrant its continued use by the Department. A much better data collection system can be designed by making some modifications to the existing Computer Aided Dispatch system. These changes will not only improve the quality of data collection, but it will also reduce the amount of time officers must spend on data entry.

### Add Additional Questions to the Computer Aided Dispatch System

The Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) data collection system was developed for the Spokane Police Department and designed specifically to collect the data needed for a racial disparity analysis. While officers are required to enter data into this system whenever they make an officer initiated stop, unlike the CAD system, the DPF database and does not have any law enforcement purpose. By contrast the CAD and NIBRS reporting systems are the core records management systems that are used to track reported crimes, stops and arrests. These data systems contain information on individual Subjects both known and unknown and have descriptive information on those individuals (age, race, sex, etc.) that can be used for identification purposes and criminal investigations. Since officers will use these databases to identify and track offenders, officers have legitimate law enforcement incentive for ensuring that the data entered into these systems is accurate and complete. The database can also be used to confirm an officer's perception of a Subject's race or can be used to provide the race when the officer is uncertain. For example, if an officer stops a Subject who already has a "Jacket Number" entered into CAD then all the demographic information will be included.

In addition, the CAD and NIBRS systems will contain information obtained from witnesses and victims about identifiable characteristics of criminal suspects. All parties involved have an interest in ensuring that this information is as accurate as possible so that the correct suspects

are located. Officers will treat this data as reliable and will take law enforcement action based on the information contained in these systems. For example, if a victim reports that she was robbed by a young White Male, the officers searching for the suspect will make their investigatory stops based on this information. If a particular racial group is disproportionately involved in reported crimes, then officers will naturally make more investigatory stops of Subjects that match the suspect descriptions.

#### **Consent Search Questions**

- Did the officer request consent to search the Subject's person or vehicle? (Yes/No)
- If Yes, Did the Subject consent to the search? (Yes/No)
- If Yes, Did the search produce any contraband or weapons? (Yes/No)
- If Yes, what was recovered?
  - o Firearm
  - Knife
  - o Impact Weapon
  - Illegal Drugs
  - Alcohol
  - Stolen Property

0 (	Other	:						

### Officer Safety Search Questions

- Was a search conducted for officer safety? (Yes/No)
- If yes, what was the safety concern the officer had?
  - Victim or witness said the Subject was armed
  - Subject made furtive movements or refused safety commands (e.g. "Take your hands out of your pockets!")
  - Officer observed object that he/she perceived to be a weapon
- Were any weapons recovered during the search? (Yes/No)
- If yes, what weapons were recovered?
  - o Firearm

Knife

Impact Weapon

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

### **Uses of Force Questions**

The Police Force Analysis System<sup>sM</sup> (PFAS) captures 150 data variables from each incident that involves a reportable use of force. Low level physical force, such as grabbing and pulling, that does not result in an injury or a complaint of injury are not considered to be reportable force under SPD policy. Information on these types of low-level force incidents would be valuable for the analysis and some other agencies do collect this data. Since PFAS collects data directly from the incident reports, it is only necessary for officers to identify these low-level force incidents in the CAD system, and additional force reporting by the officer is not needed.

Another valuable use of force data point to collect would be incidents where force was legally authorized but was not used by the officer. Collecting this information will tell us how officers are exercising their discretion to use force and will provide critical data on the use of deescalation techniques and how effective those techniques are. We are not aware of any other law enforcement agency in the country that is collecting this type of counter factual. 88 outcome. This type of analysis would be invaluable for evaluating the effectiveness of de-escalation training as well as identifying officers who are adept at using these techniques.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> A counterfactual outcome in statistics is a potential outcome that would be realized if the individual received a specific value of the treatment. For each individual, one can generally observe only one, but not both, of the two potential outcomes. The unobserved outcome is called the "counterfactual" outcome.

#### Use of Force Questions for CAD

- Was any type of force used against the Subject? (Yes/No)
- If Yes, was the force reportable force? (Yes/No)
- Was any type of force used against the Subject? (Yes/No)
- If No, Did the officer have legal justification to use force even if no force was used? (Yes/No)
- If Yes, was force used? (Yes/No)
- If No, what would have been the legal justification for using force?
  - Suspect fled from officers
  - o Suspect failed to comply with officer's commands or orders
  - Suspect threatened officer or others
  - Suspect assaulted officer or others
- Why was force not used when it was authorized?
  - o Officer threatened to use force by drawing weapon
  - Officer verbally threatened to use force
  - Officer actively engaged in verbal de-escalation
  - Officer waited until suspect complied
  - Suspect escaped before force could be used

# **Develop a Community Survey Instrument**

Conducting surveys.<sup>89</sup> of local residents about their opinions of and interactions with Spokane Police officers would provide valuable guidance for developing reforms that will improve community trust and confidence..<sup>90</sup> If these surveys are conducted regularly, they can serve as an evaluation tool to measure the impacts of any reforms that are implemented..<sup>91</sup> There are several national police-public contact surveys.<sup>92</sup> that have been conducted over the years. Many of these surveys have produced similar results. For example:

- Black respondents have a less favorable view of police than White respondents do.
- Black respondents are less likely to report a crime to the police than White respondents are.
- Black respondents are more likely than White respondents to say that police frequently use excessive force and are too quick to use lethal force.
- Black respondents are less likely than White respondents to consider their local police officers to be courteous and fair.
- Black respondents are much less likely than White respondents to feel confident that local police officers treat all racial groups equally.
- Black respondents are more likely to report being stopped by the police and having a bad interaction with the police than White respondents are.
- Nearly two-thirds of all Americans believe that police officers regularly engage in racial profiling and nearly the same number of respondents oppose this practice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> 2019 Citizen Survey of Police Services, Plano Police Department

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Citizen Satisfaction Report, Calgary Police Commission, September 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Conducting Community Surveys, A Practical Guide for Law Enforcement Agencies, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, October 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> "Policing in America – Understanding Public Attitudes Toward the Police. Results from a National Survey." Cato Institute, 2016.

• Black respondents are five times as likely as White respondents to personally expect worse treatment from police officers.

Law enforcement agencies typically do not perceive their officers' behavior in the same way that the public does, and management will believe that they have policies and procedures in place to ensure constitutional policing. The practice of racial profiling is unconstitutional, and, in many jurisdictions, it is also explicitly prohibited by law and/or policy. No police chief could ever condone racial profiling and departments will routinely deny that their officers engage in profiling. Yet, despite laws prohibiting the practice and assurances from law enforcement that racial profiling does not occur, the majority of the public does not believe that officers treat racial and ethnic groups equally. 93

After examining the issue of racial profiling for more than 20 years and observing how policy makers and police departments respond to accusations of biased policing, our belief is that there is no law, policy or training program that will change the public's perceptions of biased-based policing. We believe this is because there is no law, policy or training program that will significantly reduce the racial disparities observed in policing or the criminal justice system. Police departments and police officers already know that racial profiling and bias-based policing is unconstitutional, and they deny that they are engaged in these unlawful practices. Since biased-based policing and racial profiling are already unlawful and there is no policy or training program that will reduce quantitative racial disparities in policing data, a more productive community engagement strategy would be to focus on providing more information to the public and educating the community on what is happening on the streets every day. The public currently views racial disparities in policing activities as evidence of racial profiling and racial bias. It is important for law enforcement agencies to provide comprehensive data to the public to help explain why these disparities exist. It is also important to be responsive to any questions or concerns about policing activity that are raised by the community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> "Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for Misconduct," Pew Research Center, July 9, 2020.

Transparency is the key to building community trust. Being able to engage in an open and honest dialogue about any policing issue will foster trust and confidence in the police. It is also important to focus on the qualitative interactions between police and the public. If police officers are professional, respectful, courteous, and fair in all their interactions with the community, including persons they arrest and use force against, then public opinion of the police will improve even if the quantitative disparities in policing statistics do not change. On the other hand, if police officers routinely have unprofessional or disrespectful encounters with the people they encounter, it will not matter if the department has done implicit bias training or de-escalation training. The public will not care if there is a strong policy prohibiting racial profiling or if the department has a sophisticated early warning system. The only thing that will matter to the public is how the officer behaved during these negative encounters, especially if these events are captured on video. Most law enforcement agencies in the country have implemented several progressive reforms since the events in Ferguson Missouri in 2014. However, as Minneapolis PD discovered, a single high-profile incident where officers are perceived as being discourteous, unfair, or indifferent to human life will immediately negate years of positive policing reform and will completely erode community trust and confidence in a police department and all its officers.

There are a variety of ways that the Spokane Police Department, the Spokane Ombudsman, and the City of Spokane could solicit additional feedback from the community:

- Online Surveys This is a simple, inexpensive but unscientific way to obtain feedback from
  the community. The survey could ask general questions about the perceptions of the
  Spokane Police Department as well as specific questions about interactions the respondent
  may have had with a Spokane Police officer in the preceding 12 months.
- Police-Contact Surveys Whenever an individual has an interaction with a Spokane police
  officer, the person stopped could be provided with a link and a code that would enable them
  to provide feedback about that encounter. This could be done anonymously, and there could
  be a call-in option with questions for those who do not have computer access.
- Polling A formal scientific survey could be developed like the national surveys that have been conducted on policing. This would involve the selection of a randomized sample that

could be representative of the community. These types of surveys can be expensive to implement, but they would only need to be done once every few years.

• Focus Groups – The City of Spokane and the Spokane Police Department already have many advisory groups, commissions and task forces that provide advice for policy makers. While these groups provide valuable information, sometimes the views of the members of these groups may not necessarily reflect the opinions of the general community. The Department may want to obtain community feedback on specific issues of concern, or they may want to solicit opinions about a particular police issue or neighborhood problem. These types of issues can be addressed by assembling a focus group with a trained neutral facilitator. The structured feedback received could then be turned into impactful actions. Focus group participants could be volunteers or they may receive a stipend or some other benefit for participating. You could have some groups that meet only once to discuss a specific issue and other groups could meet on a regular basis to discuss ongoing issues of concern.

Another use for focus groups would be for obtaining community feedback on body camera videos. Videos of routine law enforcement encounters could be reviewed to solicit feedback on the officers' behavior and how these interactions may be improved.

• General Community Feedback – The Department could have a dedicated phone line and website where community members could raise specific issues of concern and could make general comments about policing and public safety and could also provide positive feedback to the Department when officers perform exceptionally well. The Department may not be aware of all the specific issues and concerns that the community may have about policing in the City. The Department is also unlikely to have knowledge of all the incidents where its officers perform well. It is important for police management and policy makers to have a full understanding of both the positive and negative encounters with police officers. Negative feedback can be turned into policy and training reform while positive feedback can be used to encourage and incentivize officers for exceptional work.

If the Department solicits feedback from the community, it is essential that this information is actively reviewed by management and incorporated into new and ongoing reforms when

possible. The community needs to be made aware that their comments are appreciated and will be incorporated into the ongoing reform process. If the policy is effective at addressing the specific community concern raised, then it should have a positive influence on police-community relations even if other issues, such as racial disparities, are not addressed.

# Data Dashboards and Reporting Recommendations

Create interactive dashboards.<sup>94</sup> for both internal and public consumption using data from:

a) National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS)

NIBRS data is readily available for every law enforcement agency in the country. Raw data can be downloaded from the FBI's Crime Data Explorer website. <sup>95</sup> This database contains information on reported crimes and arrests and includes the demographics of both victims and suspects. This information could be displayed on interactive dashboards that could be accessed by the community and would provide a look at crime trends and patterns in the city.

b) Computer Aided Dispatch System (CAD)

This database contains a record of every call for service made to the Spokane Police Department and every officer-initiated stop made by SPD officers. This data provides a detailed look at law enforcement activity within the city including geolocation data. This is an example of a dashboard created from the CAD data:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> According to the Spokane Police Department these types of dashboards are already in development.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Crime Data Explorer, Federal Bureau of Investigation



### c) Complaint and Internal Affairs data from the IAPro™ System

Providing comprehensive data on complaints against police officers, internal investigations and disciplinary actions taken, can help to improve community trust and confidence in the police. Several agencies have begun using interactive dashboards to display complaint data and allow the public to query the data themselves:

- King County Sheriff's Office
- Chicago Police Department
- New York Civilian Complaint Review Board
- <u>Seattle Office of Police Accountability</u>
- Chattanooga Police Department

d) Use of Force data from the Police Force Analysis System<sup>™</sup>

The Spokane Ombudsman already posts the PFAS dashboards online. <sup>96</sup> The data used in this system could be combined with NIBRS and CAD data to create additional dashboard systems that provide a comprehensive view of all law enforcement activities in the City.

#### e) Community Survey Results

Results from community surveys and focus groups could be translated into interactive dashboards. This would likely encourage more feedback from the community when individual members agree or disagree with the survey results. It would also be valuable to track community sentiment about the police over time to determine whether policing reforms are impacting public opinion.

# Racial Disparities and Reform

To craft an effective solution to a problem, we must first understand the root cause of the problem. Racial disparities in law enforcement statistics are the symptom of a much larger problem of societal, institutional, and structural racism in our country. These disparities can also be exacerbated by acts of bias and profiling by individual officers. The statistical disparities are the manifestation of an underlying problem that must be addressed before the disparities can be reduced.

Data collection and analysis is essential for both problem identification as well as measuring the impacts and outcomes of any reforms that are implemented. To be effective and impactful, data collection must be:

Ongoing – A single study will not provide much value if it is done in isolation. An ongoing analysis
will enable longitudinal studies that can examine trends and patterns and evaluate the impacts
and effectiveness of any reforms that are implemented.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Spokane Police Department Use of Force Analysis, Police Ombudsman.

- Comprehensive Most agencies keep track of how many times things occur (stops, arrests, searches, uses of force, reported crimes, etc.). However, to understand what is happening during police encounters, we need to know the context behind the frequencies. We need to go beyond just counting how many times certain events occur, when and where the events happened and who was involved to also answer questions about why officers decide to take the actions they do and how officers exercise their law enforcement authority.
- Standardized It is difficult to study data in isolation. To understand the broader context of
  policing, we need to include and examine comparable data from other jurisdictions such as data
  from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS).<sup>97</sup>

How can data be used to help reform in police departments? There are five primary areas where data can have the greatest impact on reform:

#### 1) Policies

A clear and concise policy will provide guidance for officers as they carry out their law enforcement duties. Policies that set bright lines between acceptable and unacceptable behavior are the easiest for officers to follow. Long policies with potentially conflicting sections and nuanced language can lead to confusion and a lack of compliance. Data can be used to identify the need for new policies or changes to existing policies. After implementation, data can be used to measure the impacts of those policies and whether the desired outcomes are being achieved.

#### 2) Training

Officers appreciate in-service training and they often complain about the limited amount of training that is available. Training can be costly for agencies and may take officers away from other responsibilities. Whenever an agency changes its policies or procedures it is essential for officers to be adequately trained to ensure that the reforms achieve their intended results. Data

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> While the FBI discourages the use of Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data for "ranking" jurisdictions, comparative crime data can help provide valuable context and perspective. Crime data should not be examined in isolation but should be included in any comprehensive analysis of an agency's policing practices.

can be used to identify high risk or unwanted behavior during stops, searches and uses of force.

Data can identify individual officers who may need to be retrained and can also highlight systemic deficiencies that may require modifications to existing in-service training programs.

#### 3) Supervision

Most officers operate independently during their shifts and will only see their Sergeant at the beginning and end of the shift or when an issue arises while they are on duty. It is important for frontline supervisors to closely monitor their officers' performance data and take corrective measures whenever issues or problems occur.

#### 4) Accountability

Generally, there is tension between an agency's internal affairs section (civilian or sworn) and police officers. Officers must feel like they are treated fairly when a complaint is filed against them, but they must also be held accountable when misconduct occurs. When this delicate balance becomes skewed in one direction or the other, the credibility of the accountability process can be lost. The use of data can help to ensure that officers are treated fairly and consistently by the accountability system. Data can also help management focus on areas that are of growing concern before they become a significant problem or generate complaints.

#### 5) Transparency

Law enforcement must be in constant communication with the communities they serve. Officers need to know where the problems are and how to best serve the public and the community needs to trust that their police department is looking out for their best interests. Unless there is an investigative reason for withholding information, law enforcement agencies should be willing to share all types of data with the public. This will help to foster an open, honest, and well-informed dialogue.

### Other Recommendations for Consideration

The following recommendations are based on our collective experience and research and are not necessarily based upon specific findings from this study. These recommendations are focused on transparency and building trust with the community.

## **Written Warnings**

In the early 2000s the Seattle Mayor implemented several policing reforms designed to address concerns about racial profiling in traffic stops. One of those changes was to require officers to issue a written warning whenever a traffic stop was made for a violation, but no infraction was issued. These written warnings were identical to an infraction form, but they were not filed with the municipal court and they did not affect the person's driving record. The written warning included the officer's name and badge number and listed the reason for the stop. The driver was given a copy of the written warning and the Department retained the original. Some of the written warning information was entered into a database. This program allowed the Department to examine all traffic stops made by police officers and police management could study how officers were exercising their discretion to issue a warning rather than writing a traffic infraction. They could also examine racial disparities issues related to traffic stops because a detailed record was made over every traffic stop and not just the stops where an arrest was made, or an infraction issued.

Just before the written warning policy was implemented the Department hired a consulting firm to conduct a biennial police-public contact survey of Seattle residents. This survey asked respondents about their general impressions of the Seattle Police Department as well as any interaction that the respondent had with Seattle Police officers in the prior 12 months. The results of the first survey were like the findings of national surveys that had been conducted and they found that there was significant distrust of police among Black residents and a high percentage of Black drivers reported having a negative experience with police during a traffic stop. Two years after the written warning policy was implemented a second police-public contact survey was conducted. The results were like the prior survey except for one specific question: "If

you were stopped by the police while driving in the last 12 months, do you believe the officer had a legitimate reason for stopping you?". The positive responses to this question increased dramatically from the prior survey and the most significant increase was from Black respondents. The only significant policy change in traffic stops during this period was the implementation of the written warning program. While we do not know for certain, it is reasonable to assume that this program dramatically changed how drivers viewed the legitimacy of the police stop. Although the outcome of the stop is the same (i.e. the driver gets a warning instead of a ticket), when the driver receives an official piece of paper from the officer that explains why they were stopped, the driver is more confident that the officer behaved appropriately. If no written warning is given and the driver believes that the officer had no basis for pulling them over, then the verbal warning may simply reinforce their belief and lead to more distrust of the officer and the Department.

The Seattle Police Department has continued using the written warning program to this day and it is included in their policy manual as a Traffic Contact Report (TCR). 98

## Business Cards for Officers & Policy Requiring Officers to Hand Them Out

Many concerns have been raised across the country about officers failing to properly identify themselves especially in situations involving demonstrations. Although officers are normally required to wear identification with their last name and badge number, an individual who wants this information may not be able to see it or they may not have a way to remember it or write it down. If an individual has a concern about a police encounter or they want to compliment the officer and they do not have the officer's information, then they may be less likely to contact the department with their feedback.

If all officers were provided with business cards and they were required to hand out these cards to anyone they encountered including individuals that they cite and arrest, the community would likely perceive this as professionalism and that the officers have nothing to hide. The business card could provide contact information for the Department including a way for people to provide

<sup>98 16.230 -</sup> Issuing Tickets and Traffic Contact Reports, Seattle Police Department Manual. July 1, 2019

comments or complaints about the officer's conduct. If the Department implements an online police contact survey then the link for that survey could be included on the business card.

# Use Body Worn Camera Video for Training and Community Engagement

Body worn cameras are now commonplace in policing. Originally body cameras were designed to be a police accountability tool and many advocates hoped that body cameras would modify policing behavior and reduce uses of force and officer misconduct. Numerous studies have been conducted that have produced inconclusive results on how body cameras may impact officer behavior. <sup>99</sup> Body cameras have proved to be a useful tool for gathering evidence for prosecutions and the videos are used more often to exonerate officers from complaints of misconduct than to sustain a complaint. Officers generally support wearing body cameras because the videos can be used to protect them from unfounded complaints, and it is not uncommon for the videos to be used to support charging a complainant for filing a false report against an officer.

Body camera videos are an underutilized resource. Millions of dollars are spent each year to manage and maintain thousands of hours of video footage and yet these videos are seldom used outside of the complaint investigation and criminal prosecution process. There are four main areas where body cameras could make a significant impact:

- Training Use Department videos to show examples of both model behavior and actions that should be corrected. Use the videos to develop a consensus among officers about appropriate conduct in each situation.
- Community Engagement Videos can be used to provide context and details of highprofile incidents and can also be used to show the public the kinds of situations that officers face daily.
- Research and Analysis A systematic review of video footage may reveal strengths and weaknesses in existing policies and training.

<sup>99 &</sup>quot;Research on body-worn cameras", Criminology & Public Policy, February 2019.

# APPENDIX A - Data Sources & Statistical Methods Used

# National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). 100

The National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) has been implemented over the last few years to improve the overall quality of crime data collected by law enforcement. NIBRS captures details on each single crime incident including information on victims, known offenders, relationships between victims and offenders, arrestees, and property involved in the crimes.

Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies collect a variety of details about each incident, including the time and location of the crime; the circumstance of the incident; the characteristics of the victim and offender (age, sex, race, and ethnicity); the victim's relationship to the offender; the involvement of weapons or drugs; property loss; and whether the crime was motivated by bias.

In 2018, the FBI Arrest statistics for the nation were based on data received from 12,996 law enforcement agencies that submitted 12 months of arrest data out of 18,815 total number of law enforcement agencies in the country that year.

In 2018, there were 20,590 violent crime incidents and 221,253 property crime incidents reported in Washington State by 231 law enforcement agencies that submitted incident-based (NIBRS) data. This covers 98% of the total state population.

NIBRS records where the age, race or sex were unknown were excluded from the calculations. NIBRS collects ethnicity data separately from race but about half of the NIBRS records for ethnicity were listed as unknown. Therefore, ethnicity was not used in the calculation and Hispanic/Latino records were included with records for their recorded race (e.g. White Hispanic was coded as White, Black Hispanic as Black, etc.). Census data records for individuals who reported having two or more races, but no race was identified were excluded from the population percentages.

<sup>100</sup> https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/nibrs

# Computer Aided Dispatch System (CAD)

The CAD system is a standard law enforcement database that captures basic information on every law enforcement related call or contact that SPD officers make. If an officer makes an arrest or issues a citation or infraction, then a unique "jacket number" is assigned to that individual in the CAD system. The jacket number allows individual Subjects to be tracked through multiple contacts in CAD.

CAD Database - Jan 2017 to Jun 2020						
Incidents	Total Incidents	Total Records				
Incident Number	239,835	248,048				
Location Outside Spokane	6,897	7,040				

Subjects	Total Subjects	Total Stops
Jacket Number – Subject Identified	44,465	67,410
Sex Known	35,194	129,071
Race Known	33,854	99,055
Age Known	31,649	137,034

# **Data Preparation & Data Quality**

As with most raw data obtained directly from law enforcement records management systems, the information cannot be immediately used by statistical software packages like SPSS. The databases provided by Spokane contained over 300,000 rows of information. Some of the records had typographical errors and some of the data was inconsistent. In the Demographic Profiling database, the same officer may have his name entered several different ways (e.g. John Smith, J Smith, John T Smith, etc.). Before the data could be analyzed, a considerable amount of data preparation and clean up was required. Now that the data set has been prepared for analysis, this information could be used for a wide variety of research projects.

CAD records included address information and latitude and longitude coordinates. For the record, location information was missing from about 10% of the records. Spatial joins were conducted to match neighborhood information with each geocoded record.

Some data variables contained too many categories to conduct a meaningful analysis of the data. We consolidated the data into fewer categories to facilitate the analysis. Below is a table that gives the number of categories for selected data fields before and after consolidation.

Variable	Original Categories	Consolidated Categories		
Call Source	8	3		
Call Description	156	21		
Crime Statute and Description	693	81		
Location Description/Name	15,865	2,192		

### Statistical Methods Used

# **Descriptive Statistics**

Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. They provide simple summaries about the sample and the measures. Descriptive statistics describe what the data is or what the data shows.

Descriptive statistics allows data to be characterized based on its properties. There are four major types of descriptive statistics:

- 1. Measures of Frequency Shows how often something occurs
  - Count
  - Percent
  - Frequency
- 2. Measures of Central Tendency Locates the distribution by various points
  - Mean
  - Median
  - Mode
- 3. Measures of Dispersion or Variation Identifies the spread of Scores by stating intervals
  - Range
  - Variance
  - Standard Deviation
- 4. Measures of Position Describes how Scores fall in relation to one another
  - Percentile Ranks
  - Quartile Ranks

## **Proportionality Measures**

- The absolute risk (AR) is the probability of an event in a sample or population of interest.
- The relative risk (RR) is the risk of the event in an experimental group relative to that in a control group.
- The odds ratio (OR) is the odds of an event in an experimental group relative to that in a control group.

A Risk Ratio (RR) or Odds Ratio (OR) of 1.0 indicates that the risk is comparable in the two groups. A value greater than 1.0 indicates increased risk; a value lower than 1.0 indicates decreased risk. RR and OR convey useful information about the effect of a risk factor on the outcome of interest. However, the RR and OR must be interpreted in the context of the absolute risk. Here is a hypothetical example of how to calculate RR and OR:

- In a sample of 100 Subjects who were arrested by the police, 80 were White and 20 were
  Black. The probability (AR) of a White Subject being arrested by the police is 80% (80 White
  Subjects Arrested / 100 Total Subjects Arrested) and 20% for a Black Subject (20 Black
  Subjects Arrested / 100 Total Subjects Arrested).
- Of the 100 Subjects who were arrested 10 Subjects had force used against them (6 White Subjects and 4 Black Subjects). The probability (AR) of a White Subject having force used against him is 60% (6 White Subjects Involved in Force / 10 Total Subjects Involved in Force) and 40% for a Black Subject (4 Black Subjects Involved in Force / 10 Total Subjects Involved in Force).
- The Risk Ratio (RR) for White Subjects is 0.75 (60% AR for Use of Force / 80% AR for Arrests). This means that White Subjects are 25% less likely to have force used against them than we would expect based upon their proportion of arrests. The Risk Ratio (RR) for Black Subjects is 2.00 (40% AR for Use of Force / 20% AR for Arrests). This means that Black Subjects are twice as likely to have force used against them than we would expect based upon their proportion of arrests.

 The Odds Ratio (OR) for Black Subjects is 2.67 (2.00 RR for Black Subjects / 0.75 RR for White Subjects). This means that Black Subjects who are arrested are 2.67 times more likely to have force used against them than White Subjects are.

#### Correlation vs Causation

In the example above, there is a negative correlation between White Subjects and the likelihood of force being used after an arrest is made (i.e. White Subjects are less likely to have force used against them after being arrested). There is a positive correlation between Black Subjects and the likelihood of force being used after an arrest is made (i.e. Black Subjects are more likely to have force used against them after being arrested). However, these correlations do not prove that race is the cause of the increased or decreased likelihood of force being used. There is no causal direction implied (correlation does not imply causation): a positive OR does not establish that B causes A, or that A causes B. While causation and correlation can exist at the same time, correlation does not imply causation. Causation explicitly applies to cases where action A causes outcome B. On the other hand, correlation is simply a relationship. Action A relates to Action B—but one event does not necessarily cause the other event to happen.

Correlation is a statistical measure that describes the size and direction of a relationship between two or more variables. A correlation between variables, however, does not automatically mean that the change in one variable is the cause of the change in the values of the other variable. Causation indicates that one event is the result of the occurrence of the other event, i.e. there is a causal relationship between the two events. This is also referred to as cause and effect.

Theoretically, the difference between the two types of relationships is easy to identify — an action or occurrence can cause another (e.g. smoking causes an increase in the risk of developing lung cancer), or it can correlate with another (e.g. smoking is correlated with alcoholism, but it does not cause alcoholism). In practice, however, it remains difficult to clearly establish cause and effect, compared with establishing correlation.

If there is a correlation, then this may guide further research into investigating whether one action causes the other. By understanding correlation and causality, it allows for policies and programs that aim to bring about a desired outcome to be better targeted.

Correlation and causation are often confused because the human mind likes to find patterns even when they do not exist. We often fabricate these patterns when two variables appear to be so strongly associated that one is dependent on the other. That would imply a cause-and-effect relationship where the dependent event is the result of an independent event.

Correlation tests for a relationship between two variables. However, seeing two variables moving together does not necessarily mean we know whether one variable causes the other to occur. Therefore, we commonly say, "correlation does not imply causation."

A strong correlation might indicate causality, but there could easily be other explanations:

- It may be the result of random chance, where the variables appear to be related, but there is no true underlying relationship.
- There may be a third, lurking variable that that makes the relationship appear stronger (or weaker) than it is.

Correlations between variables show us that there is a pattern in the data: that the variables we have tend to move together. However, correlations alone do not show us whether the data are moving together because one variable causes the other.

It is possible to find a statistically significant and reliable correlation for two variables that are not causally linked at all. Often, this is because both variables are associated with a different causal variable, which tends to co-occur with the data that we are measuring. Only with well-designed empirical research we can establish causation.

Determining causality is never perfect in the real world. However, there are a variety of experimental, statistical and research design techniques for finding evidence toward causal relationships: e.g., randomization, controlled experiments, and predictive models with multiple variables. Beyond the intrinsic limitations of correlation tests, it is important to understand that

evidence for causation typically comes not from individual statistical tests but from careful experimental design.

Understanding causation is a difficult problem. In the real world, it is never the case that we have access to all the data we might need to map every possible relationship between variables. But there are some key strategies to help us isolate and explore the mechanisms between different variables. For example, in a controlled experiment we can try to carefully match two groups, and randomly apply a treatment or intervention to only one of the groups.

However, we cannot implement these kinds of controlled experiments in a public safety environment. We cannot establish the necessary control groups by denying policing services to certain neighborhoods or refusing to make arrests for certain types of crimes or failing to make traffic stops when violations occur.

#### How is correlation measured?

For two variables, a statistical correlation is measured using a Correlation Coefficient, represented by the symbol (r), which is a single number that describes the degree of relationship between two variables. The coefficient's numerical value ranges from +1.0 to -1.0, which provides an indication of the strength and direction of the relationship.

If the correlation coefficient has a negative value (below 0) it indicates a negative relationship between the variables. This means that the variables move in opposite directions (i.e. when one increases the other decreases, or when one decreases the other increases).

If the correlation coefficient has a positive value (above 0) it indicates a positive relationship between the variables meaning that both variables move in tandem, i.e. as one variable decreases the other also decreases, or when one variable increases the other also increases.

Where the correlation coefficient is 0 this indicates there is no relationship between the variables (one variable can remain constant while the other increases or decreases).

#### How can causation be established?

Causality is the area of statistics that is commonly misunderstood and misused by people in the mistaken belief that because the data shows a correlation that there is necessarily an underlying causal relationship.

The use of a controlled study is the most effective way of establishing causality between variables. In a controlled study, the sample or population is split in two, with both groups being comparable in almost every way. The two groups then receive different treatments, and the outcomes of each group are assessed.

For example, in medical research, one group may receive a placebo while the other group is given a new type of medication. If the two groups have noticeably different outcomes, the different experiences may have caused the different outcomes.

There are limits to the use of controlled studies and it would be difficult and potentially dangerous to conduct a controlled experiment of law enforcement activities in a public safety environment. However, we can conduct longitudinal studies over time and measure the potential impacts of changes to police policies, training, and practices on demographic disparities.

Observational studies can also be used to investigate correlation and causation for the population of interest. These studies can look at the groups' behaviors and outcomes and observe any changes over time. The objective of these studies is to provide statistical information to add to the other sources of information that would be required for the process of establishing whether causality exists between two variables.

Additional insights into the data may also be obtained through discussions with stakeholders in the community that may have specific knowledge of the facts and circumstances that may be causing the observed disparities in policing statistics.

### **Tests of Statistical Significance**

This report is designed to be used by the Spokane Police Department to help guide the development of policies, procedures, and training and to help inform discussions with the community about the demographics and disparities in policing activities.

Both the Department and the community want to understand if the observed racial disparities are due to police bias or racial profiling. Unfortunately, this type of quantitative research is unable to answer these causal questions. The presence of racial disparities does not mean that officers are biased. Similarly, the absence of any observed disparities does not mean that officers do not engage in racial profiling. However, sometimes researchers will claim that statistically significant racial disparities in policing statistics "prove" that racial profiling and race-based policing is occurring. <sup>101</sup> Conversely, if an observed racial disparity is not statistically significant that may mislead the reader into believing that officers do not engage in biased policing.

Here is an example from the City of Seattle that illustrates this point:

In 2000 the Seattle City Council passed a resolution. <sup>102</sup> condemning racial profiling and racial pretext stops and establishing a Citizen Task Force to work with the Seattle Police Department to study the issue and bring back recommendations for reform including data collection and analysis. The civilian members of the Task Force were appointed and confirmed by the City Council. The Council appointed a diverse group to the Task Force including representatives from various advocacy groups such as the ACLU and the Urban League. However, there were no Asian representatives on the Task Force.

In Seattle, like most other cities across the country, Asians are underrepresented in policing statistics and concerns about biased policing had not been raised by the Asian community in Seattle before. The underrepresentation of Asians in policing data was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> <u>"ADDRESSING THE REAL PROBLEM OF RACIAL PROFILING IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON,"</u> Journal of Race, Gender, and Equity, Volume 2, March 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Resolution 30223, Seattle City Council, November 9, 2000.

statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and the assumption was made that officers were not biased against Asian Subjects.

Several months after the Task Force began to meet an incident occurred in the International District where Seattle officers detained a group of Asian-American students for jaywalking. The students claimed that they had been racially profiled. A complaint was filed against the officer involved. One of the allegations was sustained and the officer was reprimanded. 104

After the incident occurred there was a demand to add Asian representatives to the 14-member task force and the City Council quickly appointed 3 new Asian members.

Since tests of statistical significance can be misleading in a racial disparity study, this report minimizes the use of this technique.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> <u>"Police stop of Asian Americans is called case of race profiling,"</u> The Seattle Post Intelligencer, July 13, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> "Officer in jaywalking incident gets reprimand," The Seattle Post Intelligencer, January 18, 2002.

## APPENDIX B – Other Racial Disparity Examples

## **Major League Sports**

Significant racial disparities exist in most major league sports with players of color overrepresented compared to their share of the US population. Since a professional sports career is a desirable and lucrative profession, racial disparities would be viewed positively. However, these disparities do not mean that players of color receive preferential treatment nor does it mean that racial discrimination does not occur within the leagues. Several studies and reports have been done to examine these issues in more detail. None of these studies relies exclusively on an examination of racial disparities to reach their conclusions or develop their recommendations.

Why do these racial disparities exist? Why does the racial makeup of players not match the racial composition of the population? While there are undoubtedly many factors that are responsible for the racial disparities, a simple examination will reveal the most important ones.

First, we must understand how players are selected by the teams. Management will look at their existing rosters and identify existing strengths and weaknesses. A list of desired player attributes, talents, skills, and experience will be created for the positions they are seeking to fill. Then the scouts and recruiters will be sent out to identify potential candidates. Players are typically recruited from selected universities that have programs designed to produce high quality athletes. The actual player selection process may be regulated by a draft or other hiring restrictions and rules. Individual recruiters and scouts will have their own personal biases and opinions about what makes a great player, and these will factor into the selection process. There may be inbuilt institutional biases in the formal selection process that may favor one type of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> "In an ethnic breakdown of sports, NBA takes lead for most diverse," Global Sport Matters, December 12, 2018 <sup>106</sup> "The 2018 Racial and Gender Report Card: Major League Soccer," The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, January 9, 2019.

<sup>107 &</sup>lt;u>"A Different Measure of Diversity in Pro Sports,"</u> Harvard Sports Analysis Collective, July 14, 2014

candidate over another. It is not possible to disaggregate and measure the impacts of all these various selection biases based simply by examining racial disparities alone.

The purpose of presenting this example is to show that observed racial disparities are not necessarily a reflection of racial bias, preferential treatment, or discrimination. Similarly, racial discrimination can occur even when there is no measurable impact on racial disparities. Discrimination can also be present even when the oppressed group is shown to have a preferred disparity (overrepresentation in the case of sports and underrepresentation in policing).

**Table 49: Racial Disparities in Major League Sports** 

		Race of Players by League				
US Population	Race/Ethnicity	NHL	MLB	MLS	NFL	NBA. <sup>108</sup>
60%	White	93%	58%	46%	27%	21%
27%	Hispanic & Other Races	3%	35%	43%	3%	6%
13%	Black	4%	8%	11%	70%	73%

	Risk Ratio				
Race/Ethnicity	NHL	MLB	MLS	NFL	NBA
White	1.5	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.3
Hispanic & Other Races	0.1	1.3	1.6	0.1	0.2
Black	0.3	0.6	0.8	5.2	5.5

	Odds Ratio / White					
Race/Ethnicity	NHL MLB MLS NFL NBA					
White	1	1	1	1	1	
Hispanic & Other Races	0.1	1.4	2.1	0.2	0.7	
Black	0.2	0.6	1.1	11.4	16.1	

Number of Players	690	1,026	713	1,696	450
% Foreign Players	74%	28%	57%	4%	24%
Average Salary (millions)	\$ 4.0	\$ 4.4	\$ 0.4	\$ 2.1	\$ 7.7

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Lapchick, Richard; Guiao, Angelica (July 1, 2015). "The 2015 Racial and Gender Report Card: National Basketball Association". tidesport.org. Archived from the original on November 11, 2015.

The table above presents the racial composition of players in each of the 5 major league sports groups. When we compare these percentages with the makeup of the US population, we can immediately identify significant disparities. Blacks make up only 13% of the population but over 70% of the players in the NFL and the NBA... 109 This creates a risk ratio of more than 5 (i.e. Blacks are 5 times more likely to play in the NFL and NBA than we would expect based on their proportion of the population. By contrast Whites are significantly underrepresented in the NFL and NBA. Whites make up 60% of the US population but only about a quarter of the players in these leagues. This risk ratio for Whites is about 0.5 which means that Whites are 50% less likely to play in these leagues compared to their portion of the population. Hispanics and other races are underrepresented in the NHL, NFL, and NBA but overrepresented in the MLB and MLS. Whites are underrepresented in every league except for the NHL where they make up 93% of all players.

The Odds Ratio compares the likelihood of one racial group playing in a league with the likelihood of Whites playing in the leagues. Blacks are 16 times more likely than Whites to play in the NBA and 11 times more likely to play in the NFL. Blacks are just as likely as Whites to play in the MLS and are less likely than Whites to play in the MLB and NHL. Hispanics and Other Races are twice as likely as Whites to play in the MLS and 40% more likely to play in the MLB.

The NHL is the least diverse major league sport in the country. It is possible that this lack of diversity is due to bias and prejudice, but it could also be caused by many other factors. To find the root causes of the statistical disparities we must go deeper to look at the root causes behind the numbers. <sup>110</sup>

All this information on racial disparities is useful to have, but it does not tell us anything about racial bias or discrimination in major league sports. If too much is read into the data, it can lead to erroneous conclusions. For example, Blacks are heavily overrepresented in the NBA which has the highest average salaries for players (\$7.7 million). Hispanics are overrepresented in the MLS which has the lowest average salaries (\$400,000). When we look at all the leagues together by

https://cdn.nba.net/nba-drupal-prod/NBA-Roster-Survey-2019-20.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> "Thrashers Top NHL With Highest Percentage Of Black Players," WSB-TV 2 Atlanta, January 4, 2011.

race and salary, we find a strong positive correlation between Black players and higher salaries and a strong negative correlation between Hispanics and salary level. When we control for the type of league involved, we see that the driving factor for salaries is not the race of the player but rather the type of league they play for.

Another issue that this example highlights is the impact of individuals who do not fall within the underlying benchmark population. In the NHL 74% of players come from foreign countries with nearly half of them being Canadians. Since Canada is 73% White that is one factor that is driving the racial disparities. Similarly, 57% of MLS players come from other countries and the league has the highest percentage of Hispanic and other race players. Clearly when we have a significant percentage of foreign players, the US population is not an appropriate benchmark to use to measure racial disparities. Similarly, when we examine disparities in policing, we cannot use the census population of the city as the benchmark if a significant number of individuals stopped by the police are not city residents.

## **COVID-19 Infection and Mortality Rates**

Viruses are not racially biased, and they do not discriminate based solely on the color of someone's skin. Nevertheless, we see significant racial disparities in the COVID-19 infection rates and mortality rates for persons of color in the United States. <sup>111</sup> Since these disparities are not based on racial prejudice by the virus, there must be other factors causing these disparities. Most of these factors can be traced back to structural, institutional, and societal racism that is prevalent in our society.

For COVID-19 infections Whites and Asians are underrepresented and Hispanics, Blacks and other racial groups are overrepresented. This is the same racial disparity pattern that we see with policing statistics. It may be that many of the drivers causing COVID-19 disparities are also the factors producing racial disparities in policing statistics.

Table 50: Racial Disparities in COVID-19 Infection Rates in the United States

Race / Ethnicity	US Population	COVID-19 Infections	Risk Ratio	Odds Ratio / White
White	60%	36%	0.6	1
Hispanic	18%	33%	1.8	3.1
Black	13%	22%	1.7	2.8
Asian	6%	4%	0.7	1.1
Other	3%	6%	2.0	3.3

<sup>111 &</sup>quot;The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial Inequity of Coronavirus," The New York Times, July 5, 2020.

COVID-19 Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity. 112

Rate ratios compared to	American Indian or Alaska	Asian, Non-	Black or African	Hispanic or
White, Non-Hispanic	Native, Non-Hispanic	Hispanic	American, Non-Hispanic	Latino
Persons	persons	persons	persons	persons
Cases <sup>1</sup>	2.8x	1.1x	2.6x	2.8x
	higher	higher	higher	higher
Hospitalization <sup>2</sup>	5.3x	1.3x	4.7x	4.6x
	higher	higher	higher	higher
Death <sup>3</sup>	1.4x	No	2.1x	1.1x
	higher	Increase	higher	higher

By examining the factors driving racial disparities in COVID-19 infections, we may be able to learn more about the causes of racial disparities in policing. In the context of public health, the CDC refers to these factors as "Social Determinants of Health (SDOH)." <sup>113</sup> The five key areas of SDOH are:

#### Health and Healthcare

The connection between the financial resources people have (income, cost of living, and socioeconomic status) and their health. This area includes key issues such as poverty, employment, food security, and housing stability.

#### Education

The connection of education to health and wellbeing. This domain includes key issues such as graduating from high school, enrollment in higher education, educational attainment in general, language and literacy, and early childhood education and development.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> "COVID-19 Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, August 18, 2020.

<sup>113 &</sup>quot;Social Determinants of Health: Know What Affects Health," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

#### • Social and Community Context

The connection between characteristics of the contexts within which people live, learn, work, and play, and their health and wellbeing. This includes topics like cohesion within a community, civic participation, discrimination, conditions in the workplace, and incarceration.

#### Economic Stability

The connection between people's access to and understanding of health services and their own health. This domain includes key issues such as access to healthcare, access to primary care, health insurance coverage, and health literacy.

#### Neighborhood and Built Environment

The connection between where a person lives (housing, neighborhood, and environment) and their health and wellbeing. This includes topics like quality of housing, access to transportation, availability of healthy foods, air and water quality, and neighborhood crime and violence.

Resources that enhance quality of life can have a significant influence on population health outcomes. Examples of these resources include safe and affordable housing, access to education, public safety, availability of healthy foods, local emergency/health services, and environments free of life-threatening toxins.

Differences in health are striking in communities with poor SDOH such as unstable housing, low income, unsafe neighborhoods, or substandard education.

According to Dr. Lisa Cooper, director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Equity: 114

"Black, Latino and Native American people are nearly three times as likely to be infected with COVID-19 than their White counterparts. Those three groups are about five times as likely to be hospitalized. And people of color across the board are more likely to die of the virus. The statistics are no coincidence: Public health officials have long known that systemic racism is a public health issue. But the coronavirus pandemic, set against a national reckoning on race since the killing of George Floyd, has amplified the problem. What COVID-19 does is actually shine a light on a problem that was already there."

According the Centers for Disease Control here are some of the factors that contribute to increased risk of COVID-19 infection: 115

- Discrimination in health care, housing, education, criminal justice, and finance. Racism
  and discrimination can lead to chronic and toxic stress that puts some people from
  minority groups at increased risk for COVID-19.
- Healthcare Access and Utilization People from some minority groups are less likely to be insured than non-Hispanic Whites. Other limitations for these minority groups may include:
  - Lack of transportation
  - Lack of childcare options
  - Unable to take time off work
  - Communication and language barriers
  - o Cultural differences between patients and providers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> "These variables affect whether you live, die or get help during the pandemic," CNN, August 20, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> "Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, July 24, 2020.

- Historical and current discrimination in healthcare systems
- Distrust of the government and healthcare systems responsible for inequities in treatment and historical events such as the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the African American Male and sterilization without permission
- Occupation People from some racial and ethnic minority groups are disproportionately represented in essential work settings such as healthcare facilities, farms, factories, grocery stores, and public transportation. Some people who work in these settings have more chances to be exposed to the virus that causes COVID-19 due to several factors, such as close contact with the public or other workers, not being able to work from home, and not having paid sick days.
- Educational, income, and wealth gaps: Inequities in access to high-quality education for some racial and ethnic minority groups can lead to lower high school completion rates and barriers to college entrance. This may limit future job options and lead to lower paying or less stable jobs. People with limited job options likely have less flexibility to leave jobs that may put them at a higher risk of exposure to the virus that causes COVID-19. People in these situations often cannot afford to miss work, even if they are sick, because they do not have enough money saved up for essential items like food and other important living needs.
- Housing: Some people from racial and ethnic minority groups live in crowded conditions
  that make it more challenging to follow prevention strategies. In some cultures, it is
  common for family members of many generations to live in one household. In addition,
  growing and disproportionate unemployment rates for some racial and ethnic minority
  groups during the COVID-19 pandemic may lead to greater risk of eviction and
  homelessness or sharing of housing.

If many of the covariates that are responsible for the racial disparities in COVID-19 infections also play a role in racial disparities observed in policing data, then the proposed solutions for reducing COVID-19 disparities may also have an impact on the disparities in policing.

Community- and faith-based organizations, employers, healthcare systems and providers, public health agencies, policy makers, and others all have a part in helping to promote fair access to health. To prevent the spread of COVID-19, we must work together to ensure that people have resources to maintain and manage their physical and mental health, including easy access to information, affordable testing, and medical and mental health care. We need programs and practices that fit the communities where racial and minority groups live, learn, work, play, and worship.

## **APPENDIX C - Traditional Racial Disparity Analysis**

## What is Race and Ethnicity? What Are We Trying to Measure?

Before we can discuss racial disparities in policing, we need to define some basic terms and identify the overall goals and objectives of this type of research.

Race and ethnicity are two concepts related to human ancestry. Race is defined as "a category of humankind that shares certain distinctive physical traits." The term ethnicities is more broadly defined as "large groups of people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or background."

"Race" is usually associated with biology and linked with physical characteristics such as skin color or hair texture. "Ethnicity" is linked with cultural expression and identification. However, both are social constructs used to categorize and characterize seemingly distinct populations. <sup>116</sup>

When the issue of racial bias in policing is studied, the issue is whether an officer's perception of a person's race inappropriately influences how an officer exercises his/her law enforcement authority. Officers may legitimately consider a person's race in some circumstances such as when the officers have received a physical description of a crime suspect that may include age, race, sex, height, weight, clothing, etc.

When a racial disparity analysis is conducted, the goal is to determine whether an officer's conscious or unconscious bias or prejudice influenced their behavior, decision making, or the law enforcement actions they took. Similarly, factors other than officer behavior should also be

<sup>116 &</sup>quot;Race and ethnicity: How are they different?" National Geographic

examined such as department policies, training and deployment strategies that may have disparate impacts on certain racial groups.

For this type of analysis, it is not necessary to know how the suspect would identify his or her race/ethnicity. Instead, it is the victim's, witnesses' and officers' perception of the suspect's race that is the critical variable. For example, if an officer were engaged in racial profiling and stopped a driver simply because he thought the driver was Black, it would not matter if the driver considered himself to be mixed race and identified as White.

A typical disparity analysis will examine two quantitative variables and their relationship with one another. The presence of racial disparities in quantitative data does not prove that police officers are biased or that they are engaging in racial profiling. Similarly, the lack of racial disparities in policing activities does <u>not</u> mean that officers are consistently behaving in a fair and equitable manner and does **not** mean that officers are free of bias and are not engaged in racial profiling.

The traditional racial disparity methodology begins with the premise that the demographics of policing activities (stops, arrests, uses of force, etc.) should match the demographics of the underlying population (i.e. if 10% of a city's population is Asian then you would expect 10% of traffic stops to involve Asian drivers, 10% of arrests to involve Asian suspects, and so on). When racial disparities are observed they are typically presented as the likelihood of an event happening. For example, if 10% of the population was Asian but 20% of traffic stops involved Asian drivers then we would say that Asians are twice as likely to be stopped by the police as we would expect based on their population. Sometimes these statistics are presented as the odds of one racial group being stopped compared to Whites (i.e. Black drivers are three times more likely than White drivers to be stopped by the police). Virtually every study that has been conducted using this methodology has found some level of disparity between Whites and other racial groups. Black, Hispanic, and Native American racial groups typically have more frequent and more serious contacts with the police than Whites, while Asians have fewer and less serious interactions with police than Whites.

Cities with small minority populations tend to have the greatest racial disparities in policing because the disparity calculations use the population as the denominator for the equation. For

example, if 10% of the population was Asian and they made up 20% of drivers who were stopped by police the risk ratio would be 2 (twice as likely to be stopped as we would expect based on their population). By contrast if only 1% of the population was Asian and 5% of stops were Asian then the risk ratio would be 5 and you would say that Asian drivers are five times more likely to be stopped by police than we would expect. When the racial group that you are trying to assess makes up more than a majority of the population, it is impossible to have a risk ratio greater than 2. For example, 83% of residents of Detroit are Black and even if 100% of traffic stops made by Detroit Police were Black drivers you would only have a risk ratio of 1.2 (100% stops/83% population). Cities like Baltimore. 117 and New Orleans. 118 that have been placed under federal consent decrees for having a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing practices, would never have Black racial disparities above 2 because their populations are over 60% Black. In New Orleans Blacks comprise 61% of the population and 68% of stop and frisks by New Orleans Police officers. 119 Blacks are only 11% more likely to be stopped and frisked than we would expect based on their proportion of the population. Whites in New Orleans make up 30% of the population and 25% of the stops, so they are 17% less likely to be stopped than we would expect. The odds of a Black person being stopped by New Orleans Police are only 13% higher than a White person being stopped and yet the Department of Justice still found a pattern or practice of biased policing by the New Orleans Police Department.

The Seattle Police Department is also under a federal consent decree for having a pattern or practice of unnecessary or excessive force. During their investigation, the Department of Justice found "troubling practices that could have a disproportionate impact on minority communities." Seattle has a relatively small Black population (7%), and two-thirds of the population is White. In 2018, six years after the Consent Decree began, 30% of stops and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> City of Baltimore Consent Decree

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> New Orleans Police Department Consent Decree

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> City of New Orleans Open Data – Stop and Search (Field Interviews)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> "Investigation of the Seattle Police Department", United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, December 16, 2011.

detentions made by Seattle Police officers were Black and 51% were White..<sup>121</sup> This means that the odds of a Black person being stopped in Seattle are more than 5 times greater for a Black person than a White person. Several reforms implemented under the Consent Decree were specifically designed to reduce racial bias by officers. However, as the data clearly shows, these reforms did not have any impact on racial disparities in police stops and detentions. If we were to use racial disparities in stops as a primary indicator of racial bias by police officers, then we would have to conclude that Seattle Police officers are 5 times more biased than New Orleans police officers. It is doubtful that the Seattle Monitor or the federal judge overseeing the Consent Decree would agree with that conclusion since that same year they found the Seattle Police Department to be in "full and effective compliance" with the consent decree. <sup>123</sup> This example illustrates how the traditional racial disparity analysis is greatly influenced by the population size of the racial group is being measured. The smaller the population, the greater the disparity is likely to be.

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<sup>121 &</sup>quot;Stops and Detentions Annual Report 2018," Seattle Police Department.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> <u>United States of America v. City of Seattle – Settlement Agreement</u>, United States District Court, Western District of Washington, July 27, 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> "Judge Finds SPD in "Full and Effective Compliance" With Consent Decree," The Stranger, January 10, 2018.

## The Problem with Population

There are many problems with using a city's population as the benchmark for a racial disparity analysis of policing activities. For population to be a valid benchmark, all the following assumptions must be true:

- Each demographic group must commit the same types of offense at the same rates. Each
  group must have an equal chance of encountering police officers and have the same risk of
  being stopped, arrested, etc.
- Each demographic group must have the same driving habits and they must violate traffic laws at the same rates.
- Police patrols must be dispersed uniformly across the jurisdiction and they all must perform the same policing functions (i.e. no specialized units or emphasis patrols).
- The police must only stop individuals who are residents of their city so that they will be part of the underlying census population. Police must not make any stops outside of the city limits since non-residents would not be representative of the city's population.
- An officer's perception of a person's race must always match the person's self-reported race in the census data. If there are discrepancies between perception and reality, then population cannot be used as a benchmark. Also, the census data for Spokane has nearly 6% of the population identifying as "two or more races." Since officers do not have this option available, these individuals will be placed in a single race category elevating the numbers above the census population.

If all these assumptions hold true, then any observed racial disparities in policing activities would be an indication of officer bias, discrimination and/or selective enforcement. However, since none of these assumptions are true, population is a poor benchmark to use for measuring disparities in policing. Here are a few reasons why a Population Based Calculation (PBC) for a racial disparity analysis does not work:

#### 1) Not all residents of a city are at equal risk of being stopped by the police

Based on data from reported crimes, offending behavior can vary significantly by age, race, and sex in both the frequency and the severity of unlawful conduct. There are many factors that may influence criminal behavior and these factors are not distributed evenly throughout the community:

- a. Poverty
- b. Unemployment
- c. Substance Abuse & Addiction
- d. Mental Health Issues
- e. Access to Health Care
- f. Availability of Weapons
- g. Quality of Housing & Homelessness
- h. Family Stability

#### 2) Everyone does not drive the same type of car or drive in the same way.

Driving behavior can vary significantly by age, race, and sex. Some people cannot afford to own a car, some can only afford old cars with many problems and others can lease a new car every year. Some drivers may be unable to pay their tickets, car insurance or vehicle license leading to a suspended license. Some people may commute to work while others walk or take public transportation. Some people may just be bad drivers while others may have a professional driver's license.

#### 3) Police officers do not randomly patrol the city.

A department will deploy its officers based primarily on calls for service. Areas that are densely populated and have more commercial activity tend to have more calls for service and so more officers will be deployed there. Sparsely populated residential neighborhoods normally have fewer calls and so there will be fewer officers assigned to patrol them. If there are more officers in an area, there will be a greater chance that they will observe suspicious activity or criminal acts and so there is a greater chance of an individual being stopped. A

police department may also have emphasis patrols where they focus enforcement efforts in a particular area to combat a specific problem such as drunk driving.

## 4) Officers will stop non-residents inside the city, and they will make stops outside of the city limits.

As a rule of thumb, about 10% of all stops within a city will involve an individual who does not reside in the city. These could be workers, shoppers, tourists or just people passing through. In addition, about 10% of stops made by police officers will be outside of the city limits. This may be due to a pursuit of a suspect across the city border, a request for mutual aid from another jurisdiction, participation in regional task forces or serving an arrest warrant. Since up to 20% of all police stops involve non-residents, it is not possible to compare the demographics of policing activities with the demographics of the underlying population.

#### 5) Officers are required to guess a person's race.

A person's date of birth and sex are recorded on all state issued identification, but a person's race does not appear in these documents. Whenever an officer makes an arrest or issues a citation, they must record the person's age, race, and sex along with other identifying information such as height, weight, hair color, eye color, home address, etc. Officers are normally discouraged or prohibited by policy from asking questions about a person's race.

Some police departments, including Spokane, have developed special data collection forms to measure racial bias. These forms will normally ask for the officer's perception of the suspect's race. The theory is that when measuring racial bias, it is the officer's perception of race that matters regardless of what the person's race is. There are several problems with this approach:

An officer guessing someone's race is like asking them to guess the person's age. It is
not always obvious from outward appearances what racial or ethnic group an
individual belongs to. We are not aware of any studies that have been done to
determine how often an officer's perception of a person's race matches the person's
actual race.

- Officers receive no training in how to identify a person's race. As a result, four officers
  may arrest a Subject and each officer records the Subject's race differently.
- There is no way to verify whether an officer is recording his actual perception of a person's race or whether the officer is instead recording a race that may look more favorable in the analysis. Any racial disparity analysis must assume that officers will always record their honest perception of a person's race and that officers will have no uncertainty about what the person's race is. Officers know that these racial tracking systems are used to evaluate racial bias and that if they record a disproportionate amount of a minority racial group, they could be flagged as a biased officer. Since there is no way to verify whether the officer recorded his perceptions accurately and there is always going to be some level of uncertainty, there is an incentive to record a race that would be favorable to the officer's statistics. This incentive would be even greater if the officer were consciously engaged in racial profiling or biased policing. As a result, these disparity calculations can never be used to identify potentially biased officers. Even if officers are doing their best to record their actual perceptions of a person's race, we have no way to know how many times that perception will match the person's self-reported race to the census bureau. If the officer were a poor race guesser and his policing activity was compared to the population, the disparities would be large despite the fact the officer was not engaged in biased policing.
- Another problem with recording an officer's perception of race is that we do not know how the officer forms his opinion about the race of the individual. Did the officer choose the Subject's race based on skin color, hair style, accent, clothing, or other factors? Was it a combination of factors? Did a witness or victim tell the officer the Subject's race? If racial disparities are used to measure officer bias, these are all important questions that must be answered.

## 6) Data sets used for a PBC disparity analysis have different racial and ethnic categories and some databases have missing or unknown values.

The data sets collected by law enforcement agencies are not entirely consistent with the data provided by the census bureau. Internal agency data collection systems can also produce incompatible data for a comparative analysis.

#### a. Racial Categories

The Census Bureau collects information for five main racial groups (White, Black, Asian, Native American and Pacific Islander). The Census allows individuals to identify with two or more races and this mixed-race group comprises 5.9% of the Spokane population. Many internal police databases also include the five main racial groups but there is normally no option for mixed race individuals. To make a meaningful comparison between police data and census data, mixed race individuals from the census must be distributed among the five racial groups. Since officers may be more likely to perceive a mixed-race person as a person of color rather than a White person, it may be necessary to distribute mixed race individuals from the census into their non-White categories. This will have the effect of increasing the non-White population and decreasing racial disparities for those groups.

#### b. Unknown Race or Missing Data

The Census data does include people with an unknown race. However, because law enforcement data is based upon the officer's perception of a person's race and the officer is required to enter that information into the data collection system, there are sometimes cases where the officer could not identify the race, or they failed to enter the data.

Spokane's CAD system enters a unique "Jacket Number" whenever an individual is cited or arrested. This number normally contains age, race, and sex information but

race data is missing from 16.3% of these records. The Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) is specifically designed to track race data and only 1% of records have an empty race field. Officers are required to enter the Subject's race even if the officer is uncertain what the person's race is.

## c. Sometimes ethnicity is included as a racial category and sometimes it is tracked separately from race.

The US Census and the Spokane CAD system both track ethnicity separately from race. An individual can be recorded as any race with or without a Hispanic designation. By contrast the Demographic Profiling Form (DPF) includes ethnicity as a racial category forcing officers to choose between race and ethnicity. It is unclear whether officers are prioritizing race over ethnicity or vice versa when they enter data into the DPF system. This can cause problems when trying to compare the DPF with census data and CAD data that tracks ethnicity separately. It also calls into question how officers choose to enter their perceptions of race and ethnicity since the CAD and DPF systems are not consistent. The DPF also provides two additional options for entering a person's race (Eastern European and Middle Eastern) that are not even racial or ethnic categories further compounding analytical problems.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> Person information (age, race, and sex) is often entered by a 911 call taker/dispatcher and they may not have this demographic information available during the call.

## Traditional Racial Disparity Analysis Model

The traditional racial disparity analysis methodology that uses population-based calculations (PBC) is overly simplistic and makes unrealistic assumptions for the model to work.




Figure 96: Traditional Racial Disparity Analysis Model

The traditional racial disparity analysis model relies on the following assumptions:

- 1) A person's race is the only demographic variable that matters. Usually, no examination is made of other demographic traits such as age or sex.
- 2) Offending behavior within the community is homogeneous. All racial groups are equally likely to commit offenses and all types of offenses are committed at the same rates regardless of race (i.e. if the population were 50% Black and 50% White then 50% of assaults, robberies, burglaries and all other types of crimes and traffic violations would have been committed by Black Subjects).
- 3) Each racial group within the community has an equal risk of being stopped by the police.

  This would require some type of randomization. Each person in the jurisdiction would randomly be committing crimes at the same rate as everyone else and they are equally likely to encounter a police officer as they are committing the offense.
- 4) Police officers would be randomly deployed around the City and they would need to stop anyone they see who is committing a crime or traffic offense.
- 5) Since the benchmark used in the disparity calculation comes from the census of the jurisdiction's population, it must be assumed that no one residing outside the jurisdiction will be stopped by officers and officers will conduct all their enforcement action within the jurisdiction.

If all the above assumptions are true, then we would expect the racial composition of police stops and arrests to match the racial makeup of the population. If any racial disparities exist it would be because the officers were not behaving in a random, neutral, and unbiased manner. This leads to the conclusion that racial disparities in policing are caused by officer bias, discrimination, and racial profiling.

Since the racial disparities are assumed to be caused by police officers engaged in unwanted behavior, the remedies proposed to reduce the racial disparities are focused on trying to change officer behavior such as:

- Implicit Bias Training
- De-Escalation Training
- Early Warning Systems
- Body Cameras
- Policy Changes
- Civilian Oversight & External Reviews

While many jurisdictions have implemented many of these types of reforms there is little evidence that officer behavior has changed, and the observed racial disparities continue to exist. This is true even with departments that have undergone intensive reforms under federal consent decrees with independent monitors. <sup>125</sup> If an overrepresentation of a racial group in policing statistics infers officer bias then we must assume that officers give preferential treatment to racial groups that are underrepresented in policing data. Usually these are Whites, Asians, and Pacific Islanders.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> <u>"Report: Seattle police use low levels of force, but racial disparity remains,"</u> The Seattle Times, February 6, 2019.

Using this traditional disparity analysis model on data from the Spokane Police Department we find large racial disparities between the city population and police stops, arrests, and uses of force.

Table 51: Demographic Distribution of Spokane Population and Police Action Databases

Da	ta Source	Census	CAD	CAD	PFAS	DPF	DPF	DPF
То	tal Records	219,197	137,034	26,400	733	85,871	142	114
		Population	Stops	Arrests	Uses of Force	Traffic Stops	Consent Searches	Safety Searches
Gender	Female	50.8%	33.1%	27.9%	8.5%	36.4%	16.2%	7.9%
Gen	Male	49.2%	66.9%	72.1%	91.5%	63.6%	83.8%	92.1%
	White	82.2%	79.8%	78.2%	73.4%	85.1%	77.3%	75.2%
	Black	4.2%	10.7%	11.2%	13.7%	6.1%	10.6%	13.3%
Race	Asian	4.1%	1.6%	1.9%	2.0%	3.5%	0.0%	0.9%
	Nat Amer	2.4%	4.6%	5.4%	8.1%	1.8%	5.0%	5.3%
	Hispanic	7.1%	3.3%	3.4%	2.9%	3.4%	7.1%	5.3%
	0-17	20.1%	4.9%	4.5%	4.8%	5.0%	3.7%	6.2%
Age	18-30	21.2%	33.0%	37.6%	43.0%	35.2%	49.1%	46.2%
Ā	31-49	24.4%	43.7%	45.2%	46.4%	41.9%	42.1%	34.9%
	50+	34.4%	18.4%	12.7%	5.9%	17.9%	5.1%	12.6%

Table 52: Demographic Disparity Matrix Based Upon the Traditional Disparity Methodology – Spokane

Da	ata Source	CAD	CAD	PFAS	Onbase	Onbase
	sk Ratio /	Stops	Stops Arrests		Consent	Safety
P	opulation			Force	Searches	Searches
der	Female	-	-	-	-	-
Gender	Male	+	+	++	++	++
	White	0	0	0	0	0
	Black	++	++	++	++	++
Race	Asian	-	-	1	-	-
	Nat Amer	++	++	+	++	++
	Hispanic	-	-	-	0	-
	0-17	-	-	-	-	-
Age	18-30	++	++	++	++	++
Ř	31-49	++	++	++	++	+
	50+	<u>-</u>	-	•	-	-

Symbol	Disparity	Risk Ratio
++	Positive	> +50%
+	Positive	+20% to +50%
0	None	-20% to +20%
-	Negative	-20% to -100%

Using a traditional racial disparity analysis, it is easy to find racial disparities for all non-White groups in Spokane for all types of police actions. When this simplistic analysis has been done in other jurisdictions, the same levels of racial disparities have appeared in the results. While we do not agree with this methodology, the results are included in this report to highlight the differences between a traditional disparity analysis and the more comprehensive methodology that we have developed for this study.

Under the traditional analysis, when the racial composition of stops, arrests and uses of force is compared with the underlying population, we find disparities with every racial/ethnic group. Hispanics and Asians are more than 50% less likely to be stopped and arrested than we would

expect based upon their population. Blacks and Native Americans are overrepresented in every type of police activity. Blacks are more than twice as likely to be stopped and arrested and more than three times more likely to have force used against them than we would expect based on their population. Similarly, Native Americans are nearly twice as likely to be stopped and more than twice as likely to be arrested and have force used against them than we would expect from their population. Whites were slightly underrepresented in every police activity.

Based on this traditional racial disparity analysis of the Spokane Police Department, a typical researcher would conclude that Black and Native American residents in Spokane suffer some level of discrimination when they are stopped, arrested, or have force used against them. The researchers might conduct multivariate regression tests to determine whether the disparities remain statistically significant when other factors are taken into consideration. They may also break down the data by individual neighborhoods to see if disparities are greater in some parts of the city than others. However, no matter how many statistical techniques are used, some level of racial disparity will remain. Although this type of quantitative analysis cannot be used to prove racial bias by individual officers, the researchers may propose interventions that are designed to reduce racial bias and ensure fair and equitable policing. After those reforms are implemented the researchers will conduct the same analysis with more recent data and will invariably find the same racial disparities that they observed before the reforms were implemented. This will reduce public trust and confidence in the police since none of the reforms will have produced the desired results. This cycle of "Research and Reform" will cost a lot of money, take years to implement and can erode police community relations.

Aside from the issue of actual versus perceived race there are other challenges with comparing officer perceived race with census demographics:

Officer Veracity – Racial disparity studies are designed to identify officers, policies, training, etc. that may have a disparate effect on different racial groups. If an officer is biased and performs his duties in a discriminatory manner, why would he be inclined to report his true perceptions of a Subject's race. When a stand-alone data system is set up specifically to measure racial disparities, all officers may be inclined to underreport perceived minority

contacts for fear of being flagged by the system and accused of being biased. Conversely officers may believe that it is more important to fill out the form whenever they stop a Subject who they perceive as non-white and they may be less likely to record data on White Subjects that they stop. This could skew the statistics and increase measured disparities. There is no way to prove that an officer is providing his honest perception of a person's race so there is no way to hold officers accountable for intentionally misreporting race.

- Ethnicity In the US Census data Hispanic/Latino is reported as an ethnicity and not a racial group. A person identifies their race first and then they will be asked if they consider themselves to be Hispanic. The census data breaks down the numbers for each racial group and then includes a separate line for each race for Hispanic and Non-Hispanic. By contrast most law enforcement data includes Hispanic/Latino as a racial group and reporting forms do not have a separate variable to record ethnicity. This forces officers to make a choice between race and ethnicity which is not how the census data is collected.
- Mixed Race 2.9% of the US population identifies as mixed race. The FBI's NIBRS crime reporting system does not have a category for mixed race. How should mixed race individuals in the census data be categorized for purposes of a disparity analysis with law enforcement data. While this is a small percentage of the overall population, it could have a significant impact on a disparity analysis where other minority populations are exceedingly small.
- How do officers perceive race? Is there a way to accurately perceive someone's race without asking them directly? What factors should the officer take into consideration? Skin color, language, accent, hair style or color, facial features, etc.? There is obviously no training program and no manual that can teach officers how to accurately predict someone's race. Mixed raced individuals and a person's ethnicity create additional complexities for the officer to decipher. How accurate are an officer's perceptions of race? What is an acceptable error rate to conduct a meaningful racial disparity analysis?
- Race Reported by Victim/Witness If the Subject is not identified in the CAD system, then
  the race data will come from the victim or witness. We do not know how the victim/witness
  determined the race of the Subject. How close were they? What were the lighting conditions?

Did they know the Subject personally or were they strangers? If the Subject is unknown to the victim/witness, it is likely they are simply guessing the Subject's race and age without much information to go on.

Multiple Officers – During many incidents multiple officers may deal with the same suspect
and each officer could perceive the race differently. Only one officer fills out the report so
that officer's perception is the only one that is recorded even though the other officers may
have perceived differently.

When an officer records the age and sex in a report, there is a high degree of confidence that these entries are accurate. This is because sex and date of birth are included on all state issued identification. If the Subject does not have an ID, the officer will typically ask for a name and date of birth to check for warrants and criminal history. This information will allow the officer to record the Subject's sex and age accurately.

## Comparing Demographics of Policing Data with Census Data

Census data is often used to examine demographic disparities with policing statistics. There are several challenges that prevent a strictly apples-to-apples comparison. Census data is based on self-reporting of the individual completing the census form. An individual's age and sex are reported to the department of motor vehicles and will appear on the person's driver's license. If an officer has access to a Subject's state ID, then they will be able to record the Subject's self-reported demographic information in their reports and data entry systems. However, an individual's race does not appear on state identification documents. While officers routinely will ask Subjects for their name and date of birth for identification purposes, they do not inquire about the person's race. This means that all racial information obtained by law enforcement agencies is based upon the officers' perceptions of a person's race. Based on data from Spokane's demographic profiling system, officers determine the race of Subjects they stop using the following methods:

Method Officer Uses to Determine	Percentage of All
Subject's Race	Stops
Visual Observation of Subject	96.1%
Subject's Name	4.8%
Subject's Speech or Accent	3.0%
Subject's Self-Reporting	0.7%

Less than 1% of race/ethnicity characteristics recorded by law enforcement are based on self-reports from the Subjects. This means that the accuracy of race/ethnicity reporting by officers is based almost solely on the perceptions of the officers recording the information.

When we examine racial disparities between law enforcement data and the census a small difference in the perceived race of Subjects can have a large impact on the risk ratio.

### Perception vs Self Reporting

One argument that is made in favor of reporting the officer's perception of the Subject's race rather than the Subject's self-reported race is that when issues of racial profiling are examined it is most important to know what the officer's perception of the Subject's race is even if that perception is incorrect. If we are going to examine issues of racial bias in policing, it is essential to understand how officers perceive the individuals they interact with. However, the methodology breaks down when we attempt to compare officer perceptions of the race/ethnicity of the Subjects they stop with self-reported race/ethnicity of the jurisdiction's population from the US Census. We do not know how often an officer's perception of a Subject's race matches the Subject's self-reported race/ethnicity. Even if officers were 90% accurate in their perceptions of race/ethnicity, this still introduces a large margin of error when policing statistics are compared with the census demographics.

When race data is collected as a suspect description for law enforcement purposes, officers have an incentive to report the Subject's race as accurately as possible in the CAD system. This race data will be used across the entire criminal justice system and may be used for suspect identification in subsequent incidents.

## Do officers have an incentive to report their perceptions of race accurately?

When officers enter a Subject's demographic information (age, race, sex, height, weight, hair color, eye color, etc.) into an incident report or CAD system, there is a strong incentive to enter the data as accurately as possible so that the Subject can be correctly identified in future encounters and matched with prior contacts/arrests. However, when a standalone data system is created specifically designed to monitor and evaluate officer activity, there is less of an imperative to report the information accurately. There may even be an incentive to misreport the data to reduce concerns that may be raised about the officer's activities. We are not suggesting that officers would intentionally misrepresent the data. However, since all the race/ethnicity data that is entered into these systems is based on an officer's perceptions and there is no way to challenge the veracity of those perceptions, officers may have an incentive to

err on the side of reporting less controversial statistics. For example, if an officer stops a mixed-race Subject who could be perceived as Hispanic, Black, or Native American, how will the officer decide which race to enter into the demographic profiling database? There is no correct answer and no way to verify whether or not the officer is reporting on his/her best guess, so officers may enter the option that they believe will raise the fewest questions.

# Perceptions vs Reality – What is the Best Way to Track Race in Policing?

Since a person's race is not recorded on state identification documents and officers are not required to ask a Subject what his or her race is, we usually must rely on the officer's perception of the race of people they encounter. There is no way to verify whether the officer's perception is accurate or not. No one knows how often an officer's perception will match how the person identified their race to the census bureau. How do officers perceive mixed race individuals or the complex combinations of race and ethnicity? There is no test to determine how skillful officers are at guessing someone's race or how accurate their guesses are. We do not know how many times officers are uncertain about someone's race and simply make a guess when they enter the data. If an officer is uncertain of someone's race, how can the officer be biased against that person? Since it is impossible to gauge the veracity of an officer's perception of a person's race, there is no way to assess whether officers are making up their answers or only entering data that they think may be favorable to them in the analysis. Comparing an officer's perception of a person's race/ethnicity to the person's self-reporting of race/ethnicity to the census bureau is akin to guessing the weight of attendees at a county fair. Officers are only able to base their decisions on characteristics that are readily observable (skin tone, hair color, facial features, accents, etc.). Officers do not have access to the person's genealogy and will know nothing about their background or family history. Similarly, there are no objective standards for reporting a person's race to the census bureau. A dark-skinned person who is mixed race may identify as White even though the officer may perceive them as Black.

There is no definition of different racial groups and no chart that officers can use to help them identify someone's race. Officers are given no guidance and are forced to guess a person's race based upon each officer's unique Subjective criteria. Similarly, the census data does not necessarily reflect what the population may look like from an officer's perspective. Individuals may choose their own race when filling out census forms. There are no objective standards for filling out the census forms and an individual is free to choose whatever race/ethnicity they want.

There are infinite numbers of permutations that could occur between perceived and self-reported race, but here is one example that illustrates how difficult it is to make a meaningful comparison between a person's self-reported race and the officer's perception of that person's race. An individual who has a Black mother, a White father and a Hispanic grandparent may choose to identify themselves in several different ways on the Census form:

Reported to Census Bureau		
Race	Ethnicity	
Black	Hispanic	
White	Hispanic	
Mixed Race	Hispanic	
Black	Non-Hispanic	
White	Non-Hispanic	
Mixed Race	Non-Hispanic	

If an officer stops this person and is required to record her race based solely on the officer's perceptions, the officer will have no knowledge of the person's family history or the person's view of their own race. The officer would be free to enter any racial/ethnic group that they thought was most appropriate:

Officer's Perception of Race/Ethnicity
Black
White
Native American
Hispanic
Asian
Pacific Islander

An officer may make hundreds of stops each year. How often will the officer's perception of a person's race match what that person reported to the census bureau? No one knows the answer to this question, but it is reasonable to assume that there will be a significant margin of error.

## **Racial Profiling Definitions**

The American Civil Liberties Union has defined the term "racial profiling" as follows: 126

"Racial Profiling" refers to the discriminatory practice by law enforcement officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual's race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin. Criminal profiling, generally, as practiced by police, is the reliance on a group of characteristics they believe to be associated with crime. Examples of racial profiling are the use of race to determine which drivers to stop for minor traffic violations (commonly referred to as "driving while black or brown"), or the use of race to determine which pedestrians to search for illegal contraband.

Racial profiling does not refer to the act of a law enforcement agent pursuing a suspect in which the specific description of the suspect includes race or ethnicity in combination with other identifying factors.

Defining racial profiling as relying "solely" on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion can be problematic. This definition found in some state racial profiling laws is unacceptable because it fails to include when police act on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion in combination with an alleged violation of a law. Under the "solely" definition, an officer who targeted Latino drivers who were speeding would not be racial profiling because the drivers were not stopped "solely" because of their race but also because they were speeding. This would eliminate the vast majority of racial profiling now occurring.

Any definition of racial profiling must include, in addition to racially or ethnically discriminatory acts, discriminatory omissions on the part of law enforcement as well.

<sup>126 &</sup>quot;RACIAL PROFILING: DEFINITION," ACLU

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policy for Bias-Free Policing. defines "biased policing" as:

Discrimination in the performance of law enforcement duties or delivery of police services, based on personal prejudices or partiality of agency personnel toward classes of people based on specified characteristics.

For the purposes of this policy, real or perceived personal characteristics, to include but not limited to race, ethnic background, national origin, immigration status, gender, gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, religion, socioeconomic status, age, disability, or political affiliation.

Agencies should be prepared to recognize all forms of bias in the delivery of police services, whether the bias is based on prejudice towards specified characteristics, nepotism and favoritism, or other factors.

"Fair and bias-fee treatment" means: Conduct of agency personnel wherein all people are treated in the same manner under the same or similar circumstances irrespective of specified characteristics.

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<sup>127 &</sup>quot;Bias-Free Policing," Law Enforcement Policy Center, International Association of Chiefs of Police, January 2020.

## Crime/Offense Rank for All Crimes in the Computer Aided Dispatch System Number of Arrests Made and Citations Issued from January 2017 to June 2020

Crime Rank	Crime Description	Arrests & Citations
Nalik	MURDER 1D	2
	MURDER 2D	3
1	MURDER-1D	5
	MURDER-2D	10
	VEHICULAR HOMICIDE	4
2	MANSLAUGHTER-2ND DEG	1
	ASSAULT 1D	68
	ASSAULT 2D SEXUAL MOTIVATION	1
3	ASSAULT OF A CHILD 1D	1
J	ASSAULT OF A CHILD-1D	1
	ASSAULT-1D	80
	KIDNAPPING 1D	6
	KIDNAPPING-1D	17
	ROBBERY 1D CARJACKING	6
	ROBBERY 1D COMMERCIAL	28
4	ROBBERY 1D COMMERCIAL (NOT PURSE SNATCHING)	20
-	ROBBERY 1D PERSON	42
	ROBBERY 1D PERSON (NOT PURSE SNATCHING)	56
	ROBBERY-1D (All Except Purse Snatching)	55
	ROBBERY-1D (Purse Snatching)	6
	CHILD MOLESTATION 1D	5
	CHILD MOLESTATION-1D	3
	COMMERCIAL SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR PROMOTE	1
	HUMAN TRAFFICKING 1D SEX ACTS	1
	HUMAN TRAFFICKING (COMMERCIAL SEX ACT/SEXUALLY EXPLICIT ACT)	1
	INDECENT LIBERTIES (FORCIBLE COMPULSION)	7
	INDECENT LIBERTIES FORCIBLE COMPULSION	1
5	PROMOTE COMMERCIAL SEX ABUSE OF MINOR	2
	RAPE 1D	1
	RAPE 2D	3
	RAPE OF A CHILD 1D	2
	RAPE OF A CHILD-1D (RAPE)	4
	RAPE OF A CHILD-2D (SEXUAL ASSAULT W/OBJECT)	2
	RAPE-1ST DEG (RAPE)	1
	RAPE-2ND (RAPE)	8
	ASSAULT 2D	368
6	ASSAULT 2D INTENT TO COMMIT FELONY	9
	ASSAULT 2D INTENTION TO COMMIT FELONY	5

	ASSAULT OF A CHILD 2D	4
	ASSAULT OF A CHILD-2D	1
	ASSAULT-2D	503
	DISARM LE/COR OFF(FIREARM)	3
	DRIVE BY SHOOTING	10
	VEHICULAR ASSAULT	45
	CHILD MOLESTATION 2D	2
	INCEST	1
_	INCEST 1D WITH MINOR	1
7	INDECENT LIBERTIES	4
	INDECENT LIBERTIES (NO FORCIBLE COMPULSION)	1
	PROMOTING PROSTITUTION 1D	1
	KIDNAPPING 2D	1
	KIDNAPPING-2D	1
	ROBBERY 2D COMMERCIAL	28
	ROBBERY 2D COMMERCIAL (NOT PURSE SNATCHING)	16
8	ROBBERY 2D PERSON	21
	ROBBERY 2D PERSON (NOT PURSE SNATCHING)	14
	ROBBERY-2D (All Except Purse Snatching)	18
	ROBBERY-2D (Purse Snatching)	6
	ASSAULT 3D	158
	ASSAULT 3D WEAPON OR NEGLIGENT INJURY	35
	ASSAULT 4D NO WEAPON, PRIOR DV CONVICTIONS	10
	ASSAULT 4D WEAPON AND PRIOR DV CONVICTIONS	1
	ASSAULT - 4D (No Weapon, Prior DV Convictions)	14
	ASSAULT OF A CHILD 3D WEAPON OR NEGLIGENT INJURY	3
	ASSAULT-3D	182
9	ASSAULT-3D (d)or(f) (Weapon/Instrument/Bodily Harm)	50
9	CHILD ASSAULT-3D (CRIM NEG) DVCA	2
	CHILD ASSAULT-3D (CRIMINAL NEG)	1
	CRIMINAL MISCHIEF RIOT	1
	CRIMINAL MISTREATMENT-2D	1
	CUSTODIAL ASSAULT	1
	UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT	66
	VEH HIT/RUN INJURY	24
	VEHICLE HIT AND RUN INJURY	26
	COMMUNICATION WITH MINOR IMMORAL PURPOSES	1
	INDECENT EXPOSURE	3
	INDECENT EXPOSURE (PRIOR CONV)	8
	MINOR (COMMUN IMRL PRPS-PRIOR)	2
10	PROMOTING PROSTITUTION 2D	2
	PROMOTING TRAVEL FOR PROSTITUTION	1
	RAPE OF A CHILD 3D	2
	RAPE OF A CHILD-3D (RAPE)	4
	VOYERUISM 1D	2
	ASSAULT	63
11	ASSAULT 4	1
	ASSAULT 4D	1,588

	ASSAULT 4D WEAPON	14
	ASSAULT 4TH DEGREE	288
	ASSAULT - 4D (Weapon Involved)	17
	ASSAULT-4D	1,684
	CITY ASSAULT	648
	CRIMINAL MISCHIEF [RIOT]	10
	CRIMINAL MISCHIEF RIOT	12
	EXPLOSIVES MALICIOUS EXPLOSION SUBSTANCE 2D	1
	FIREARMS UNLAWFUL POSSESSION 1D	42
15	POSS STOLEN FIREARM	27
	POSSESSING A STOLEN FIREARM	18
	UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS 1D	93
	FIREARM (POSSESS/MANUF/ETC)	1
	FIREARMS UNLAWFUL FIREARMS	2
16	FIREARMS UNLAWFUL POSSESSION 2D	36
10	UNLAW POSS FIREARM-2D (<18)	3
	UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS	7
	UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS 2D	40
	AIMING OR DISCHARGING FIREARMS DANGEROUS WEAPONS	3
17	AIMING/DISCHARGING FIREARMS, DEADLY WPN	8
1/	FIREARMS DEADLY WEAPONS PROHIBITED CERTAIN PLACES	1
	WEAPONS VIO, AIM-DISCHARGE FIREARM-DANGEROUS WEAPON	1
	DANGEROUS WEAPONS	78
	PARK DANGEROUS WEAPON	2
18	POSS DANGEROUS WPN ON SCHOOL FACILITIES	3
10	WEAPON BRANDISHING OR INTIMIDATING	27
	WEAPON (INTIMIDATE WITH)	43
	WEAPONS VIO, POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON [POSSESS]	5
	CARRYING FIREARMS-VIOLATIONS	7
19	FIREARMS CARRYING VIOLATIONS	2
	FIREARMS (POSS/CNTRL IN PLACE)	7
	POSSESION OF A PISTOL BY A PERSON 18-21	2
	BOMB THREATS	2
	STALKING	1
20	STALKING-FEL	6
	THREATS TO BOMB OR INJURE PROPERTY	2
	WITNESS(BRIBE)TESTIMONY	1
	CYBERSTALKING	1
	HARASSMENT	204
	HARASSMENT (Weapon Involved)	19
	HARASSMENT FELONY WEAPON INVOLVED	22
	MAL HARASS (PHYSICAL INJURY)	1
21	MAL HARASS (THREAT/FEAR OF HARM)	1
	MALICIOUS HARASSMENT MINOR INJURY (HATE BIAS)	1
	MALICIOUS HARASSMENT THREAT AND FEAR OF HARM (HATE BIAS)	3
	Malicious Harassment (Threat/Fear of Harm Property)	4
	MALICIOUS PROSECUTION  TAMBETING MUTUA MUTUAGES	1
	TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS	6

	TELEPHONE HARASSMENT (THREATEN TO KILL)	5
	TELEPHONE HARASSMENT THREAT TO HARM	1
	THREATS AGAINST GOV/FAMILY	1
	WITNESS TAMPERING	1
22	VIOL OF ORDER(ASSLT/RECK)	38
	VIOL OF ORDER (PRIOR CONVIC)	178
22	Violation of Foreign Order	2
	VIOLATION OF ORDER	164
	COERCION	1
	CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE	1
	CYBERSTALKING	7
	HARASS INCL PRETRIAL-POSTTRIAL ORDERS	2
	HARASSMENT	114
22	HARASSMENT (Weapon Involved)	1
23	HARASSMENT THREAT TO HARM	8
	INTERFEREING WITH REPORTING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	8
	INTERFERING W/REPORTING OF DOM VIOL	3
	INTERFERING WITH REPORTING OF DV	2
	STALKING	16
	TELEPHONE HARASSMENT THREAT TO HARM	3
	ORDER, PROTECT VIO DV	6
	VIOL CIV ANTIHARRASS ORDER	2
	VIOL COURT ORDR REQUIREMENTS	3
24	VIOL NCO-HARASSMENT	1
24	VIOLATION OF ANTIHARASSMENT ORDER	10
	VIOLATION OF ANTIHARASSMENT ORDER JUVENILE	2
	Violation of Foreign Order	1
	VIOLATION OF ORDER	1,165
	DV VIOL TEMP REST ORD	2
26	NO CONTACT ORDER VIOLATION	74
	RESTRAINING ORDER VIOLATION	11
	INDECENT EXPOSURE	10
27	INDECENT EXPOSURE (UNDER 14)	2
	INDECENT EXPOSURE (VICTIM <14)	1
	MINOR (COMMUN IMMORAL PURPOSES)	2
	INDECENT EXPOSURE	48
28	LEWD CONDUCT	35
20	PROSTITUTE-PATRONIZING	12
	PROSTITUTION	1
	BURGLARY 1D	10
	BURGLARY 1D COMMERCIAL	11
29	BURGLARY 1D FENCED AREA	1
	BURGLARY 1D FROM RESIDENCE	12
	BURGLARY 1D GARAGE	1
	BURGLARY 1D RESIDENTIAL	27
30	ARSON 1D	10
	ARSON-1D	7
31	BURGLARY 2D COMMERCIAL	250

	BURGLARY 2D FENCED AREA	37
	BURGLARY 2D GARAGE	28
	BURGLARY-2ND DEG	44
	BURGLARY-RESIDENTIAL	128
	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	111
	COUNTERFEIT SUB-CREATE, POSS, DELIVER	1
	IDENTITY THEFT 1D	1
	IDENTITY THEFT 1D CREDIT CARD FRAUD	1
	IDENTITY THEFT >\$1500	6
	IDENTITY THEFT >\$1500 (WELFARE FRAUD)	1
	MONEY LAUNDERING	10
	ORGANIZED RETAIL THEFT	1
	POSS STLN PROP-1D (Not Firearm or Motor Vehicle)	6
	POSS STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE	300
	POSSESSION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE	188
	POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY 1D	3
	RETAIL THEFT W/ SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES	5
	TAKING MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT PERMISSION 1D	1
	THEFT 1D ALL OTHER	7
22	THEFT 1D POCKET PICKING	1
32	THEFT 1D SHOPLIFTING	1
	THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE	242
	THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE [RENTAL/LEASE/TEST DRIVE]	1
	THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE RENTAL/LEASE/TEST DRIVE	1
	THEFT WITH INTENT TO RESELL (From Building)	1
	THEFT WITH INTENT TO RESELL (Shoplifting)	2
	THEFT-1D (All Other Thefts)	4
	THEFT-1D (From Building)	3
	THEFT-1D (From Motor Vehicle)	2
	THEFT-1D (Pocket Picking)	3
	THEFT(FIREARM) (All Other)	1
	THEFT(FIREARM) (From Motor Vehicle)	1
	TMVWOP-1D	2
	TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN PROPERTY 1D	13
	TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN PROPERTY-1D	16
	ARSON 2D	6
33	ARSON-2ND DEG	3
33	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF 1D	7
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-1D	14
	COUNTERFEIT SUB-CREATE, POSS, DELIVER	1
	FINANCIAL FRAUD COUNTERFEITING MEANS	2
	FINANCIAL FRAUD POSSESSION OF PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS	3
	FINANCIAL FRAUD-UNLAWFUL PRODUC/POSSESS	9
34	FORGERY	37
	IDENTITY THEFT 2D	5
	IDENTITY THEFT 2D CREDIT CARD FRAUD	2
	IDENTITY THEFT <\$1500	14
	IDENTITY THEFT <\$1500 (WELFARE FRAUD)	1

	MAIL THEFT	2
	ORGANIZED RETAIL THEFT	5
	ORGANIZED RETAIL THEFT 2D	6
	POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY 2D	57
	POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY-2D	78
	RETAIL THEFT W/ SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES	37
	RETAIL THEFT WITH SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 2D	5
	RETAIL THEFT WITH SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 3D	12
	TAKING MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT PERMISSION 2D	27
	THEFT 2D ALL OTHER	19
	THEFT 2D FROM BUILDING	10
	THEFT 2D FROM MOTOR VEHICLE	10
	THEFT 2D OBTAIN GOODS FROM COUNTERFEIT/FORGERY/FRAUD	2
	THEFT 2D SHOPLIFTING	14
	THEFT WITH INTENT TO RESELL (Shoplifting)	4
	THEFT-2D (All Other Thefts)	16
	THEFT-2D (From Building)	10
	THEFT-2D (From Motor Vehicle)	3
	THEFT-2D (Motor Vehicle Parts or Accessories)	1
	THEFT-2D (Shoplifting)	18
	TMVWOP-2D	46
	TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN PROPERTY 2D	6
	TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN PROPERTY-2D	9
	VEHICLE PROWLING-2D/From Motor Vehicle	1
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF 2D	65
35	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-2D	83
	RECKLESS BURNING 1D	2
	RECKLESS BURNING-1ST DEG	2
	BURGLAR TOOLS(POSSESS/MAKE)	6
	COMPUTER TRESPASS 2ND	2
	MAKE/HAVE BURGLAR OR AUTO THEFT TOOLS	6
	MAKE/HAVE MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT TOOLS	7
	MAKING OR HAVING BURGLAR OR AUTO THEFT TOOLS	1
	MAKING OR HAVING BURGLAR TOOLS	2
	MAKING OR HAVING VEHICLE PROWLING TOOLS	1
	OLD CODE: THEFT-3D	10
	POSSESSING STOLEN PROPERTY 3D	4
36	POSSESSION OF ANOTHERS IDENTIFICATION	12
	POSSESSION OF STLN PPTY-3D	12
	POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY 3D	3
	POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY-3D	7
	STOLEN PPTY-3D-POSSESS	3
	THEFT	282
	THEFT 3D ALL OTHER	5
	THEFT 3D CITY ALL OTHER	23
	THEFT 3D CITY DINE & DASH	7
	THEFT 3D CITY EMBEZZLEMENT	1
	THEFT 3D CITY FROM BUILDING	12

	THEFT 3D CITY FROM MOTOR VEHICLE	2
	THEFT 3D CITY SHOPLIFTING	364
	THEFT 3D FROM BUILDING	3
	THEFT 3D FROM MOTOR VEHICLE	2
	THEFT 3D SHOPLIFTING	75
	THEFT OF MV FUEL - expired July 1, '93.	2
	THEFT-3D (All Other Thefts)	2
	THEFT-3D (From Building)	4
	THEFT-3D (From Motor Vehicle)	3
	THEFT-3D (Motor Vehicle Parts or Accessories)	1
	THEFT-3D (Shoplifting)	138
	THEFT-CITY (All Other Thefts)	35
	THEFT-CITY (From Building)	34
	THEFT-CITY (From Coin Operated Machine or Device)	1
	THEFT-CITY (From Motor Vehicle)	4
	THEFT-CITY (Shoplifting)	774
	UNLAW POSSESS OF OTHERS ID	2
	VEHICLE PROWLING 2D	40
	VEHICLE PROWLING 2ND	9
	VEHICLE PROWLING-2D/From Motor Vehicle	32
	VEHICLE PROWLING-2D/No Theft	16
	VEHICLE PROWLING-2D/Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts or Accessories	4
	VEHICLE TRESPASS 2D	12
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF	541
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF 3D	70
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF GRAFFITI	6
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF PERSONAL PROP.	68
37	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-3	12
	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-3D	75
	RECKLESS BURNING 2D	11
	RECKLESS BURNING-2ND DEG	7
	GRAFFITI PROHIBITED	5
39	MALICIOUS MISCHIEF-3D UNDER 50	5
	CRIMINAL TRESPASS 1D	395
	CRIMINAL TRESPASS-1ST DEG	22
40	TRESPASS 1	4
	TRESPASS BUILDING 1ST	57
	CRIMINAL TRESPASS 2D	585
	CRIMINAL TRESPASS-2ND DEG	18
	OCCUPY/BUILD TRANSIENT SHELTER	19
	SIT/LIE ON SIDEWALK IN RETAIL ZONE	307
	SITTING LYING ON SIDEWALK IN A DESIGNATED ZONE	58
41	SKYWALKS (PROHIBITED ACTS)	1
	TRESPASS 2	2
	TRESPASS ON BRIDGE OR SKYWALK	3
	TRESPASS PREMISES 2ND	560
	UNLAWFUL BURNING ON PUBLIC PROPERTY	1
	UNLAWFUL CAMPING ON PUBLIC PROPERTY	592
		332

	VEHICLE TRESPASS	10
	CITY RECK ENDANGERMENT	26
42	RECK ENDANGER	1
	RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT	60
	DISORDERLY CONDUCT	329
43	URINATING IN PUBLIC	31
	URINATING IN PUBLIC - CITY	23
	VEHICLE DUI ALCOHOL	47
44	VEHICLE DUI DRUGS	7
45	ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE POLICE VEHICLE	104
	VEH (DUI-FELONY)	5
4.5	VEH (PHYSICAL CONTROL)-FELONY	2
46	VEHICLE PHYSICAL CONTROL ALCOHOL	5
	VEHICLE PHYSICAL CONTROL DRUGS	3
	OLD CODE: VEH(DWUIL/DRUG) NEW	49
	OLD CODE: VEH(PHY/UNIL/DRUG) NEW	7
	VEH(DUI/DRUG)	759
47	VEH (PHY CNTRL UIL/DRUG)	71
47	VEHICLE DUI ALCOHOL	427
	VEHICLE DUI DRUGS	137
	VEHICLE PHYSICAL CONTROL ALCOHOL	55
	VEHICLE PHYSICAL CONTROL DRUGS	59
	CNTL SUB DELIVER/MANF/POSS W INTENT TO DEL	81
	CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES MANF DELIVER POSSESS WITH INTENT	54
50	CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES POSSESS EPHEDRINE INTENT MANF	1
	LEGEND DRUG SELL/DEL/POSS W/INTENT TO SELL/DELIVER	1
	POSS/MANF/DELVR CNTL SUB W/ CNTRFEIT LABEL	1
	CNTL SUB DELIVER/MANF/POSS W INTENT TO DEL	23
	CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES DELIVER OTHER SUBSTANCE	3
	CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES MANF DELIVER POSSESS WITH INTENT	8
51	CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES POSSESSION	872
	POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE	1,008
	PRISNR POSS CNTL SUB 07/23/95	1
	PRISONER POSSESS DRUGS LOCAL JAIL	3
	CNTL SUB (POSS-MIS MARI)  CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES MARIJUANA < 40 GRAMS	13
		16
53	DRUG PARAPHERNALIA POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA	1
	UNLAWFUL INHALATION	13
	VUCSA POSS MJ<40 GRAMS	1
	LIQ (ACT W/O LIC)	1
	LIQUOR FURNISHING TO MINORS	3
54	LIQUOR MINOR POSSESS-CONSUME-ACQUIRE-FURNISH	23
J <del>4</del>	LIQUOR MINOR POSSESS-CONSOME-ACQUIRE-FORMISH	7
	MINOR IN POSSESSION	2
	DUI DRIVER UNDER 21 ALCOHOL OR MARIJUANA	13
55	LIQ VIOLS (MINORS) MIP / GIVE / EXHIBIT EFFCTS	16
33	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
,,	LIQ (ID/CERT CD VIOL)	1

	LIQUOR VIOLATIONS MINORS MIP	15
	MINOR IN POSSESSION OF LIQUOR	2
	APPROACHING EMERGENCY OR WORK ZONES RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT	1
	DRIVING W/O IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE	15
	HIT AND RUN ATTEND PROPERTY DAMAGE	2
	HIT AND RUN ATTENDED VEHICLE	4
	HIT AND RUN PROPERTY DAMAGE	95
	IGNITIION INTERLOCK DR LIC VIOL	4
57	OLD CODE: VEH (HIT/RUN PERSON AT	68
	OPERATING VEHICLE WITH SUSPENDED REGISTRATION	2
	RACING OF VEHICLES ON HIGHWAYS	1
	RECKLESS DRIVING	188
	STREET RACING - replaced/now included in 46.61.500 RECKLESS DRIVING	5
	TRIP PERMIT VIOLATION	97
	TRIP PERMIT VIOLATION-USAGE	23
	ALLOW UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER - DUPLICATE	1
	COMMERCIAL DL LICENSE REQUIRED	2
	FAIL TO STOP WHEN REQUESTED BY OFFICER	7
	FAIL TO TRANSFER TITLE W/I 45 DAYS	162
	FAIL TO TRANSFER TITLE W/IN 45 DAYS	3
	FOR HIRE VEHICLE LICENSE REQUIRED	1
	HIT AND RUN UNATTENDED VEHICLE	57
	HIT AND RUN UNATTENDED-AID/ABET	19
	HIT/RUN UNATTENDED PROPERTY	33
	HIT/RUN UNATTENDED VEHICLE	21
58	INTERFERENCE WITH PEDESTRIAN OR VEHICULAR TRAFFIC	236
	INTERFERING PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC	73
	LEAVE CHILD IN UNATTEND VEH W-MOTOR RUN	2
	MV IGNITION INTERLOCK DRIVE VEH WO	73
	MV PROVIDE FALSE EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY	1
	PEDESTRIAN INTERFERENCE	6
	SALE DELIVERY OR POSSESSION OF LEGEND DRUG	17
	TMPR (FIRE ALM/FIREFGHT EQUP/FLS FIRE ALM)	2
	UNLAWFUL TRANSIT CONDUCT	7
	VEH OPR-REFUSE COMPLY POLICE	19
-	DRIVING W/LIC SUSPEND/REVOKED IN OTHER JURIS	9
	DWLS 2 AID-ABET	1
	DWLS 2ND DEGREE	151
F.C	DWLS 3 AID-ABET	1
59	DWLS 3RD DEGREE	2,543
	OP W/LIC SUSP 2D (SUSP OR REV)	11
	OP W/LIC SUSP-1D (HAB OFF)-8/91	12
	VEH (OP WITH LIC SUSP)	59
	DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE	159
<b>C C</b>	EXPIRED/NO VALID WA LICENSE	2
60	OP W/LIC SUSP 3D	76
	VEH (OPERATE LIC SUSP/REVOKED)	2
62	CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY	1

	ABANDON DEPEN PERSON-2D	1
63	BAIL JUMPING	1
	CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY	2
	ESCAPE FROM COMMUNITY CUSTODY	1
	FAIL TO REGISTER AS SEX OR KIDNAPPING OFFENDER	1
	ABANDONMENT OF DEPENDENT PERSON-3D	1
	DISCLOSING INTIMATE IMAGES	1
	DISTRIBUTION OF INTIMATE IMAGES	1
	ESCAPE 3D	1
	ESCAPE-3D	1
64	INTERFERENCE WITH HEALTH CARE FACILITY NO THREAT	1
	INTERFERENCE WITH HEALTHCARE FACILITIES THREAT TO HARM	4
	OBSCURING THE IDENTITY OF A MACHINE	1
	UNLAWFUL DISCH LASER-2D	1
	UNLAWFUL HARBORING OF MINOR	1
	UNLAWFUL TO DUMP WASTE WITHOUT PERMIT	1
	ABUSE OF 911 REPORTING SYSTEMS	1
	ANIMAL CRUELTY SECOND DEGREE	2
	ANIMAL TRANSPORTING OR CONFINING IN UNSAFE MANNER	1
	ANIMAL (DANGEROUS DOG)	1
	CRIMINAL MISTREATMENT-4D	2
	DOG (POT DANGEROUS) AT LARGE	1
	ESCAPE 3D	1
65	ESCAPE-3RD DEG	2
	FAILURE TO DISPERSE	1
	MAKING OR HAVING VEHICLE PROWLING TOOLS	2
	PUBLIC DISTURBANCE NOISE	8
	RENDERING CRIMINAL ASSISTANCE 3D	1
	TAMPER WITH FIRE ALARM EQUIPMENT OR FALSE ALARM	1
	TAMPERING WITH FIRE ALARM OR FIRE FIGHTING EQUIP FALSE ALARM	1
	UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY (FAIL TO DISPERSE)	1
	FALSE REPORTING	4
	FALSE STATEMENT	32
	FALSE STMT / FALSE REPORTING	63
	MAKING A FALSE STATEMENT TO A PUBLIC SERVANT	60
	MAKING FALSE STATEMENT	8
	OBSTRUCT GOVT-MAKING FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENT TO PUBLIC SERVANT	1
66	OBSTRUCT LE OFF	2
	OBSTRUCTING	94
	OBSTRUCTING A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER	96
	OBSTRUCTING OFFICER	39
	PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION	1
	PUB OFFICER(OBSTRUCT)	12
	RESISTING ARREST	38
	FAIL TO IDENTIFY SELF TO LEO	5
67	FAIL TO OBEY POLICE	3
67	FAILURE TO STOP WHEN REQUESTED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT	9
	PROVIDE FALSE INFORMATION	1

Ì	PUB OFFICER (RESIST ARREST)	2
İ	REFUSE COOPERATE OR GIVE INFO TO OFFICER	6
İ	RESISTING ARREST	38
Ī	USE/DISPLAY FALSE ID	1
	FUGITIVE (OUT OF STATE WARRANT)	199
68	FUGITIVE-ARREST W/O WARRANT	112
İ	FUGITIVE-LOCAL WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED	156
	ALLOW UNAUTHORIZE MINOR TO OPERATE MOTOR VEHICLE	2
İ	ALTER MAKE PLATE ILLEGIBLE/OBSCURED	5
İ	BACK, UNSAFE OR IMPROPER-BACK ON LIMIT ACCESS HGHWY	1
İ	BICYCLE FAIL TO GIVE HAND SIGNALS	3
	BICYCLE LEAVING CROSSWALK	3
	BICYCLE LEAVING CURB CROSSWALK SPEED ZONE	1
	BICYCLE-DEF EQUIP	20
İ	BICYCLE-IMPROPER OPERATION ON RDWY-BIKE PATH	3
Ī	BICYCLE-TRAFFIC LAW VIO WHILE RIDE	1
İ	BICYCLE-UNLAWFUL RIDING ON	1
Ī	BRAKES DEFECTIVE	9
İ	BRAKING EQUIP REQUIRED	28
	BUMPERS EQUIPMENT MISSING OR IMPROPER	1
	CARRY ANIMAL OR PERSON OUTSIDE VEHICLE	1
	CELL PHONE USE WHILE DRIVING	27
	CHILD UNDER 13-BACK SEAT REQUIRED	6
	CMV CELL PHONE USE WHILE DRIVING	46
	COLLISION KNOWINGLY GAVE FALSE INFO	1
	COMM VEH NOT MARKED AS PRESCRIBED	5
	CYCLE (OPERATE W/O ENDORSEMENT)	3
	DEFECT MOTORCYCLE TAIL LGHT/STOPLGHT/ REFLECT	1
69	DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT MISC	3
	DEFECTIVE EXHAUST 1ST OFFENSE	3
	DEFECTIVE LIGHTS	3
	DEFECTIVE WINDSHIELD WIPERS	1
	DISOBEY OFFICER FLAGMAN FIREMAN	1
	DISPLAY OR POSSESS CANCEL, REVOKED OR SUSPENDED DRIVERS LICENSE OR	
	IDENTICARD	2
	DISPLAY PLATE NOT ISSUED BY DOL	1
	DISREGARD TRAFFIC SIGNAL SIGN	243
	DOOR OPEN OR CLOSED ADJACENT TO TRAFFIC	3
	DRIVE ON SIDEWALK	3
	DRIVE WITHOUT TWO HEADLIGHTS	1
	DRIVE WRONG WAY ON FREEWAY-CROSS BARRIER	1
	DRIVE WRONG WAY ON ONE-WAY STREET	26
	DRIVING HIGHWAY TOO FAST FOR CONDITIONS	1
	DRIVING TOO FAST FOR CONDITIONS	3
	EMERGING FROM ALLEY DRIVEWAY OR BUILDING	2
	ENTER INTERSECTION STEADY RED CIRCLE	6
	FOURD HARCAL LIST OF EMEDICANCY FOURD	12
	EQUIP ILLEGAL USE OF EMERGENCY EQUIP	12
	FAIL STOP AT STOP SIGN/INTERSECTION	125

FAIL TO EXERCISE CARE WHILE DRIVING FAIL TO INITIALLY REGISTER VEHICLE FAIL TO KEEP RIGHT EXCEPT WHEN PASSING 1 FAIL TO GEEP RIGHT EXCEPT WHEN PASSING 1 FAIL TO OBEY FLASH RED SIGNAL FAIL TO OBEY LANE CONTR DEVICE 2 FAIL TO OBEY LANE CONTR DEVICE 376 FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE 376 FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICE 426 FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL LEGEND 16 FAIL TO SECURE LOAD 11 FAIL TO SECURE LOAD 11 FAIL TO SIGNAL LOAD 12 FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN 3 FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP AT RONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP AT RONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP PIELD AT INTERSECTION 2 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 3 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP LIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP LIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP LIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP LIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO YIELD FOO MIDEWAY-ALLEY 17 FAIL TO YIELD FOO NIDEWAY-ALLEY 17 FAIL TO YIELD FOO NIDEWAY-ALLEY 17 FAIL TO YIELD FOO NIDEWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD FOO NIDEWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD FOO NIDEWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE 46 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE 57 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE 58 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 59 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THE RIGHT OF WAY 50 FAIL TO YIELD TO THAN MOTOR VEHICLE 50 FAIL	FAIL TO DRIVE ON RIGHT SIDE OF ROAD	17
FAIL TO KEEP RIGHT EXCEPT WHEN PASSING 1 FAIL TO OBEY FLASH RED SIGNAL 3 FAIL TO OBEY FLASH RED SIGNAL 2 FAIL TO OBEY PED CONTRO LEVICE 26 FAIL TO OBEY PED CONTROL DEVICE 376 FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CNTRI DEVICE 376 FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CNTRI DEVICE 376 FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL LEGEND 16 FAIL TO SECURE LOAD 1 FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE 56 FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE 56 FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE 56 FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN 3 FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN 3 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 222 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 222 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 222 FAIL TO STOP PR CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PILED AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 44 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 44 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 44 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 44 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 44 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 44 FAIL TO VIELD FOR ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD FED ON SIDEWALK 148 FAIL TO VIELD TO RIGHT OF WAY FERD MEDIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO VIELD TO RIGHT OF WAY FERD MEDIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO VIELD TO RIGHT OF WAY FERD MEDIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO VIELD TO RANSIT BUS 22 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO REMORECY VEHICLE 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 15 FAIL TO VIELD TO V		1
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FAIL TO OBEY LANE CONTR DEVICE   26   FAIL TO OBEY PED CONTROL DEVICE   376   FAIL TO OBEY PED CONTROL DEVICE   376   FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL LEGEND   16   FAIL TO SECURE LOAD   1   FAIL TO SECURE LOAD   1   FAIL TO SECURE LOAD   1   FAIL TO SIGN/CARRY/DISPLAY VEH REG   19   FAIL TO SIGN/CARRY/DISPLAY VEH REG   65   FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE   65   FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE   65   FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN   3   FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN   3   FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT   1   FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK   22   FAIL TO STOP AT GONE MARK   22   FAIL TO STOP AT RESECTION   249   FAIL TO STOP RC ROSSING   3   FAIL TO STOP RC ROSSING   3   FAIL TO STOP PIELD AT INTERSECTION   249   FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION   4   FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS   3   FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT   143   FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT   143   FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT   144   FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK   148   FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK   148   FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK   148   FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD   45   FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD   45   FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH   1   FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH   1   FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN   348   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   2   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   2   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   2   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   2   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   2   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   FAIL TO YIELD TO TO FIRE APPROACHING INTERSECTION   5   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5   FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS   7   5	FAIL TO KEEP RIGHT EXCEPT WHEN PASSING	1
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FAIL TO SIGN/CARRY/DISPLAY VEH REG FAIL TO SIGNAL FAIL TO SIGNAL FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN  FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP AR SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP RE CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PR CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PR SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP PR SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 3 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 13 FAIL TO VIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY 17 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY 17 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 148 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 148 FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY EMERG VEH 1 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 21 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION 50 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 50 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 50 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 50 FAIL YIELD CLOSE FARS OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY 1 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 1973 FRONTS HOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON 4 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY FOLLOW TOO CLOSE SEAT BELT VIOLATON 4 GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT 1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL 1 IMPROPER HANG (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER LANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 1 IMPROPER SASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL) 3	FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC CONTROL LEGEND	16
FAIL TO SIGNAL FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP RC CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PR CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 2 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 3 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 4 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 5 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 3 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 4 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY FAIL TO YIELD FEO IN CROSSWALK 4 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 4 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 4 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN SIDEWALK 5 FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK 5 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 5 FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH 1 FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH 1 FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY 211 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE 8 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 2 FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION 5 FAIL YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION 5 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 5 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 5 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 5 FAIL YIELD OLOSE 4 FAIL TO YIELD TO REASON OF THE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL 1 IMPROPER LANE USAGE 3 IMPROPE	FAIL TO SECURE LOAD	1
FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN 3 FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP R CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PR CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 2 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 3 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 4 FAIL TO USE ON DRIVEWAY-ALLEY 7 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY 7 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 148 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY 211 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 22 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 22 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 25 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 26 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 27 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 29 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 20 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 20 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 20 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 20 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 20 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 20 FAIL TO YIELD FOT THEN MOTOR VEHICLE 433 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 433 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 433 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY 197 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY 197 FOLLOW NOTO CLOSE 273 FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON 4 GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT 1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL 1 IMPEDER TRAFFIC 3 IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 9 IMPROPER LANE USAGE 313 IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL) 3	FAIL TO SIGN/CARRY/DISPLAY VEH REG	19
FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT 1 FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK 22 FAIL TO STOP RC CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PR CROSSING 3 FAIL TO STOP PIELD AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION 249 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL 2 FAIL TO STOP/YIELD AT INTERSECTION 4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS 3 FAIL TO WAR SAFETY BELT 143 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY 17 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 148 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN SIDEWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN SIDEWALK 24 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD 45 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN 348 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN 348 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 21 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 22 FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 375 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 50 FAIL WIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE 25 FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY 50 FAIL WIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE 16 FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY 50 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 573 FOULDOW TOO CLOSE 573 FOULDOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY 50 FOULDOW SEATH OF THE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 773 FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON 4 GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT 1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL 1MPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 9 IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 9 IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 9 IMPROPER LANE USAGE 313 IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL) 3	FAIL TO SIGNAL	28
FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT  FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK  22  FAIL TO STOP RCROSSING  3  FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2  FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2  FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2  FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3  FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3  FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  143  FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  148  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  45  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  348  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGEV VEHICLE  8  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGEV VEHICLE  8  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  50  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  125  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  433  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  77  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER LANE USAGE	FAIL TO SIGNAL STOP-TURN UNSAFE LANE	65
FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK  22 FAIL TO STOP RR CROSSING  3 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  44 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  4 FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  5 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3 FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  143 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  7 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  148 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  148 FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  148 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  5 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  5 FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  348 FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  1 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  8 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  8 FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  7 FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  50 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50 FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  125 FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  50 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  7 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  7 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  5 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  9 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  5 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  9 FOLLOW WENDERS EAT BELT VIOLATON  4 GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  14 IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  19 IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313 IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3	FAIL TO STOP AT INTERSECTION/STOP SIGN	3
FAIL TO STOP RR CROSSING  FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3 FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  143 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2 FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4 GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3 IMPROPER LANE USAGE	FAIL TO STOP AT NONFUNCTION SIGNAL LIGHT	1
FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION  FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2 FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  2 FAIL TO STOP/YIELD AT INTERSECTION  4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3 FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  348 FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3 IMPROPER LANE USAGE	FAIL TO STOP AT SIGNAL MARK	22
FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL  FAIL TO STOP/YIELD AT INTERSECTION  4 FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3 FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  143 FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION FAIL YIELD SOR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY TOLLOW TOO CLOSE FAIR SOR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY FOLLOW VEHICLE FOO CLOSELY FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY FOLLOW SET OF IRE APPARATUS (500 FT) FOLLOW VEHICLE SEAT BELT VIOLATON GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT TORSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE) IMPROPER LANE USAGE IMPROPER LANE LANG CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3 IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO STOP RR CROSSING	3
FAIL TO STOP/YIELD AT INTERSECTION  FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  3 FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER HARS (100 FT NOTICE)  JEMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  JIMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  JIMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  JASA  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO STOP YIELD AT INTERSECTION	249
FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS  FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  AVA  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOULDWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO STOP YIELD ENTER ARTERIAL	2
FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT  FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  AVABRAGE  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOULDWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO STOP/YIELD AT INTERSECTION	4
FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY  FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO USE CHILD RESTRAINTS	3
FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK  FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  348  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  7  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOULDWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  3  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO WEAR SAFETY BELT	143
FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  348  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  1  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  211  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  8  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  8  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  25  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  433  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  9  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  197  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  273  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  3  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  9  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO YIELD FROM DRIVEWAY-ALLEY	17
FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  348  FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  1  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  211  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  8  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  375  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  25  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  433  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  9  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  197  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  273  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  1MPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  3  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  9  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3	FAIL TO YIELD PED IN CROSSWALK	148
FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN  FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  TOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  TOROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  348  348  348  348  348  348  348  34	FAIL TO YIELD PED ON SIDEWALK	24
FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH  FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOW WEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  3  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY FROM DRIVEWAY PRIVATE RD	45
FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY  FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  8  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  2  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  375  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  50  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  125  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  433  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  9  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  197  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  273  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  3  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  9  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3	FAIL TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY LEFT TURN	348
FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE  FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS  FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  ELARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  JEMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3 STAND TO YIELD TO REMERSELY AND THEFT ALARM USE  JAMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO YIELD STATIONARY EMERG VEH	1
FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS 2 FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION 375 FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION 50 FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE 25 FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY 1 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE 433 FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT) 9 FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY 197 FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE 273 FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON 4 GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT 1 GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL 1MPEDE TRAFFIC 3 IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE 3 IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE) 9 IMPROPER LANE USAGE 313 IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL) 3	FAIL TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY	211
FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  JEMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO YIELD TO EMERGCY VEHICLE	8
FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION  FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  ELARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  MPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3	FAIL TO YIELD TO TRANSIT BUS	2
FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE  FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  1  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL TO YIELD TO VEHICLE APPROACHING INTERSECTION	375
FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE  FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FAIL YIELD AT YIELD SIGN/INTERSECTION	50
FOLLOW TOO CLOSE FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  433  433  433  433  433  433  433  4	FAIL YIELD LEFT TURN MOTOR VEHICLE	25
FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)  FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  273  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  4  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  14  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  3  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  3  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  9  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FLARES OR OTHER WARNING DEVICES REQUIRED TO CARRY	1
FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY  FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3	FOLLOW TOO CLOSE	433
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE  FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  273  273  273  275  4  273  4  273  18  273  19  19  10  10  11  11  12  13  13  13  14  15  16  17  17  17  18  18  18  18  18  18  18	FOLLOW TOO CLOSE TO FIRE APPARATUS (500 FT)	9
FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON  GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  1  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  313  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3	FOLLOW VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY	197
GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT  GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3	FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE	273
GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL  IMPEDE TRAFFIC  IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE  IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)  IMPROPER LANE USAGE  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)  3  IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	FRONT SHOULDER SEAT BELT VIOLATON	4
IMPEDE TRAFFIC3IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE3IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)9IMPROPER LANE USAGE313IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)3	GLAZED/TINTED WINDOWS-MAXIMUM TINT	1
IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE3IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)9IMPROPER LANE USAGE313IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)3	GROSS WEIGHT MONTHLY LICENSE VIOL	14
IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)9IMPROPER LANE USAGE313IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)3	IMPEDE TRAFFIC	3
IMPROPER LANE USAGE313IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)3	IMPROPER HORN, WARNING DEVICES AND THEFT ALARM USE	3
IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL) 3	IMPROPER LANE CHANGE (100 FT NOTICE)	9
	IMPROPER LANE USAGE	313
IMPROPER PASSING ON LEFT SIDE 12	IMPROPER PASSING (TURN, CURVE, BRIDGE, TUNNEL)	3
	IMPROPER PASSING ON LEFT SIDE	12

LAMPS REFLECTORS IMPROPER COLOR	2
LAMPS, DEF TAIL LAMPS	16
LAMPS, DEFECT MULTIPLE BEAM HEADLIGHTS	1
LAMPS, DEFECT TURN SIGNALS-STOP LAMPS	29
LAMPS, DRIVE WO TWO HEADLIGHTS-ADVERSE CONDITIONS	2
LAMPS, FL TO DIM LIGHTS	1
LAMPS, HEADLAMPS REQ	19
LAMPS, LIGHTING EQUIP REQUIRED VIOLATION	4
LAMPS, LIGHTING VIO COLOR-LOCATION, PARK-STOP	1
AMPS, OPERATE VEH WO HEADLGHT WHEN REQ	14
LEAVE UNATTEND VEH ON HGHWY	1
OAD DROPPING/LEAKING	1
OAD/COVER NOT SECURELY FASTENED	2
MATERIAL, SIGN, POSTER COVERING WINDOWS	4
MIRRORS, NO MIRRORS	6
MODIFIED EXHAUST, 1ST OFFENSE	2
MOVE UNSAFE VEH OR VEH W-DEFECT EQUIP	5
MV OVER LEGAL HEIGHT	2
NEGLIGENT DRIVING 2 DEGREE	93
NEGLIGENT DRIVING 2D	1
NO FOR HIRE DRIVER LICENSE	4
NO PASS ZONE	1
NO SPECIAL ENDORSEMENT	1
NO TRANSPORTER'S LICENSE	1
NO VALID OPERATORS LICENSE-2D	140
DBSTRUCT TRAFFIC AT INTERSECTION	1
OPER VEH W/O CRNT/PRPR REG & PLATE	21
OPER/POSSESS VEH W/O REGISTRATION	59
OPERATE VEHICLE ON SHOULDR WHRE NOT PERM	1
DPERATE W-OBSTRUCT VISION	1
DPERATE-MOVE VEH W-DEFECT EQUIP	2
OPERATE/RIDE MOTORCYCLE WITHOUT HELMET	1
DPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF LICENSE RESTRICTION	5
OVER LEGAL LENGTH	2
OVER LICENSED CAPACITY	1
OVERWEIGHT ON AXLE(S)	14
PASS STOPPED SCHOOL BUS	3
PASS, IMPROPER ON LEFT SIDE	4
PASS, IMPROPER ON RIGHT SIDE	4
PASSING VEHICLE STOPPED AT CROSSWALK	2
PED CROSS NOT AT CROSSWALK	23
PED FL COMPLY W-CONTROL	1
PEDESTRIAN LEAVING CURB	13
PEDESTRIAN ON ROADWAY UNLAWFULLY	7
PEDESTRIAN WALKING ON ROADWAY WHERE PROHIBITED	2
PER ELECTRONIC DEVICE WHILE DRIVING	295
POSSESSING OPEN ALCOHOL CONTAINER IN VEHICLE	2
REG OWNER/DRIVER WITH OPEN ALCOHOL CONTAINER IN VEHICLE	1

REQUIRED COMMERICAL MOTOR VEHICLE INSPECTION VIOLATION	6
RIDING ON MOTORCYCLES VIOLATION	1
SAFETY BELT VIOLATION	2
SAFETY BELTS REQUIRED	4
SCHOOL/PLAYGROUND CROSS WALK SPEED 26-30 MPH OVER	1
SCHOOL/PLAYGROUND CROSSWALK SPEED 1-5 MPH OVER	7
SCHOOL/PLAYGROUND CROSSWALK SPEED 6-10 MPH OVER	4
SCHOOL/PLAYGROUND CROSSWALK SPEED 11-15 MPH OVER	5
SECURED LOAD VIOLATION	3
SIGNALS REQUIRED - SAFETY	8
SPEED 1 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	1
SPEED 1 OVER (OVER 40)	1
SPEED 5 MPH OVER (OVER 40)	11
SPEED 5 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	71
SPEED 8 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	3
SPEED 8 OVER (OVER 40)	1
SPEED 9 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	7
SPEED 10 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	76
SPEED 10 OVER (OVER 40)	9
SPEED 11 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	33
SPEED 11 OVER (OVER 40)	1
SPEED 12 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	42
SPEED 12 OVER (OVER 40)	3
SPEED 13 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	44
SPEED 13 OVER (OVER 40)	5
SPEED 14 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	71
SPEED 14 OVER (OVER 40)	3
SPEED 15 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	88
SPEED 15 OVER (OVER 40)	2
SPEED 16 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	60
SPEED 17 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	39
SPEED 17 OVER (OVER 40)	3
SPEED 18 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	42
SPEED 18 OVER (OVER 40)	1
SPEED 19 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	21
SPEED 19 OVER (OVER 40)	1
SPEED 20 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	38
SPEED 20 OVER (OVER 40)	5
SPEED 21 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	18
SPEED 22 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	11
SPEED 23 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	12
SPEED 24 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	6
SPEED 25 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	14
SPEED 25 OVER (OVER 40)	3
SPEED 26 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	4
SPEED 27 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	4
SPEED 28 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	1
SPEED 29 OVER (OVER 40)	1

	SPEED 30 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	3
ļ	SPEED 30 OVER (OVER 40)	1
	SPEED 32 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	3
	SPEED 35 OVER (40 OR UNDER)	2
	SPEED FAIL TO REDUCE SPEED FOR CONDITIONS	9
	SPEED PASSING SLOW MOVING VEHICLES	2
	SPEEDING OVER MAXIMUM LIMIT	4
	SPEEDING TOO FAST FOR CONDITIONS	152
	SPLASH APRONS-FENDERS, NONE ON VEH	1
	STOP-LAMPS AND ELECRTIC TURN SIGNALS REQUIRED	19
	TAIL LAMPS REQUIRED/ DEFECT LICENSE PLATE LAMP	9
	TELEVISION-HEADPHONES, ILLEGAL USE OF	1
	TEXT MESSAGING WHILE DRIVING	2
	TIRES, DEFECT-UNSAFE	4
	TIRES, ILLEGAL USE STUDDED OR NON-PNEUMATIC TIRES	17
	TRAFFIC UNSAFE START FROM PARKED POSITION	2
	TRANSPORTER LICENSE PLATE VIOL	1
	TURN SIGNAL LAMP VIOLATION	1
	TURN, PROHIBIT U TURN	6
	TURN, PROHIBIT-IMPROPER	106
	TWO OR MORE STOP LAMPS REQUIRED	7
	UNATTENDED VEHICLE- MOTOR RUNNING	1
	UNSAFE OR IMPROPER BACKING	40
	VEH (SPEEDING)	1
	VEH DRIVE AGAINST ONE WAY	12
	VEH DRIVE WITH WHEELS OFF ROADWAY	17
	VEH PLATE NOT VALID/IMPROPER ATTACH	26
	VEH WINDSHIELD WIPERS POSTERS	3
	VEH (FTYRW-NON-ARTERIAL)	4
	VEH (LIQ/OPEN CONTAINER)	4
	VIOLATION OF MOTOR CARRIER RULES (EQUIP/LOGBOOK/MED CERT)	1
	WINDSHIELD WIPERS, DEFECT-OBSCURE WINDOWS	2
	YIELD TO PED IN CROSSWALK SPD ZONE	1
	LIQUOR IN THE PARK	1
	OPEN AND CONSUME LIQUOR IN PUBLIC	12
74	OPENING OR CONSUMING LIQUOR IN PUBLIC PLACE	1
	PARK OPEN CONSUME LIQUOR	4
	AMUSEMENT FACILITIES - LIC. REQUIRED	7
	FAILURE TO RESPOND	1
	LITTERING LESS/EQ 1 CU FT-CLASS 3	1
	MARIJUANA IN MOTOR VEHICLE VIOLATION	1
	OPEN AND CONSUME MARIJUANA	2
75	PARK HOURS OF OPERATION	3
	POSSESS TOBACCO PROD/CIGARETTS	1
	PROHIBITED FIREWORKS	1
	SMOKING W/IN 25 FEET	1
	SUBSEQUENT NUISANCE	12
	VIOL FED REGS LOGBOOK/MED CERT	6

76	FL RENEW EXPIRED REG <= 2 MTHS	92
	FL RENEW EXPIRED REG >2 MTHS	563
77	DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLE WITH AN EXPIRED LICENSE WITH VALID IDENTIFICATION	167
	DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT DRIVER LIC ON PERSON	11
	LICENSE NOT IN POSSESSION	1
	VIOLATION OF INSTRUCTION PERMIT	5
78	LIABILITY INSURANCE VIOLATION	247
	OP MOT VEH W/OUT INS	323