# BEFORE THE ETHICS COMMITTEE CITY OF SPOKANE



CITY CLERK'S OFFICE SPOKANE, WA

## STIPULATIONS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS, AND PENALTY

# Concerning the Referral of Possible Ethics Violation by City Council President Ben Stuckart

The City of Spokane Ethics Committee, (the "Committee") and Council President Ben Stuckart ("Ben Stuckart") Stipulate and Agree to the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Penalty:

### **FINDING OF FACT**

- 1. On October 30, 2014 Nancy Isserlis, City Attorney for the City of Spokane filed with the Committee a "Referral of possible ethics violation by City Council President Ben Stuckart". A copy of the referral was also provided to Ben Stuckart.
- 2. The matter was scheduled for a preliminary hearing on November 19, 2014, to determine if the Committee has jurisdiction to hear the matter and whether or not the Referral, on its face, alleges facts that, if true, would substantiate a violation. The Committee unanimously found that both determinations were in the affirmative.
- 3. At the preliminary meeting the Committee reviewed the documents submitted by the City Attorney, reviewed a document dated November 13, 2014 and submitted by Ben Stuckart in response to the October 30, 2014 referral letter from the City Attorney; asked questions and received responses from Assistant City attorney's Mike Piccolo and Erin Jacobson, and Ben Stuckart.
- 4. At the time of the action in question Ben Stuckart was an elected official of the City of Spokane and subject to the provisions of Spokane Municipal Code ("SMC"), Section 01.04.030.
- 5. Ben Stuckart received a confidential email from an Assistant City Attorney, clearly marked "attorney client privileged" on May 5, 2014, and, within minutes, forwarded that email to a third party involved in the litigation discussed in the email in question.
- 6. SMC, Section 01.040.030 Prohibited Conduct, subsection (H) "Disclosure of Confidential Information Prohibited", states, "No City officer or employee shall disclose or use any confidential, privileged or proprietary information gained by reason of his official position for a purpose which is for other than a city purpose or beyond the scope of the officer or employee's authority or responsibility; provided, that nothing shall prohibit the disclosure or use of information which is a matter of public knowledge, or which is available to public on request."
- 7. With respect to the provisions of SMC 01.040.030 (H):
  - a. The email in question was confidential and subject to the attorney client privilege;
  - b. Ben Stuckart did not have the authority to waive or breech that privilege, and
  - c. Disclosure of the document in question is not one, which, without redaction, would have been available to the public upon request.
- 8. There is no evidence of harm to the City resulting from this disclosure and Ben Stuckart had cooperated fully with the Committee and admitted that the disclosure did in fact occur.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

Based upon the finding set forth above, the Committee and Ben Stuckart agree to the following Conclusions:

1. The Committee has jurisdiction to consider this referral.

- 2. That the actions of Ben Stuckart, as set forth in the complaint, and as supported by the information provided at time of the preliminary hearing, , constitute a violation of SMC 01.040030 (H).
- 3. That, pursuant to SMC Section 1.04.040 (G) (3) Section 01.04.060 and Section 2.8 of the "Ethics Committee Policy and Procedure Manual" the Committee and the accused may enter into a stipulation and agree to certain penalties.
- 4. That the Committee and Ben Stuckart have agreed to enter into such a Stipulation and end any further proceeding in this matter.

### **PENALTY**

As penalty for the violation set forth above and pursuant to SMC 01.04.050 (B), Ben Stuckart and the Committee stipulate and agree to the following penalty:

- 1. As a condition of this stipulation Ben Stuckart agrees to not in the future, disclose, forward or in any other way provide confidential or privileged documents or information prohibited by SMC Section 01.04.030 (H); and
- 2. That Ben Stuckart further agrees to pay a fine in the amount of \$250.00 to the City of Spokane.

Stipulated and agreed to on this \_\_\_ day of December, 2014:

Council President Ben Stuckart

Spokane City Ethics Committee by Troy Bruner - Chairperson

Troy Bruner, Chairman
City of Spokane Ethics Committee

Re: Response to October 30, 2014 referral letter from City Attorney Nancy Isserlis.

November 13, 2014

Dear Mr. Bruner:

I am writing to provide information to the Ethics Committee (the "Committee") in response to a letter sent to the Committee by City Attorney Nancy Isserlis and dated October 30, 2014, in an effort to assist the Committee in determining this matter. While I admit that my action in forwarding an email which was labeled as "confidential" was an error in judgment on my part, I do not believe that the referral letter is sufficient under the Committee's criteria to state a violation of the City's Ethics Code. Alternatively, should the Committee find that the referral letter establishes a violation, the Committee should find that the violation alleged was de minimis in nature, and should therefore dismiss this matter.

# 1. The complaint does not state a violation because the content of the email did not contain confidential information.

The crux of the complaint against me is that an email sent by Assistant City Attorney Erin Jacobsen to several individuals, forwarded by me on May 5, 2014, contained "highly confidential" information. The Spokane Municipal Code ("SMC") defines "confidential information" as "specific information, rather than generalized knowledge, that is not available to the general public on request, or information made confidential by law." SMC 01.04.020(I) (emphasis added). When viewed against these definitions, the email I forwarded was not confidential matter, much less "highly confidential."

Unfortunately, the Committee was only furnished a fully redacted version of the email in question, making it impossible for the Committee to determine whether the content of the email was publicly known at that time. Therefore, I am attaching copies of documents, such as press reports, City Council documents, and publicly-available court filings, which contain the same

<sup>2</sup> See Agenda Sheet for City Council Meeting of 05/12/2014 (noting that the repeal ordinance, Ordinance C 35096, was received by the City Clerk on April 30, 2014 for first reading at the City Council's May 12, 2014 meeting) (attached as Exhibit 4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> <u>See</u> "Judge rules against city's expansion of exempt positions," Heidi Groover, The Inlander, April 26, 2014, available at: <a href="http://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2014/04/26/judge-rules-against-citys-expansion-of-exempt-positions">http://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2014/04/26/judge-rules-against-citys-expansion-of-exempt-positions</a> (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (attached as Exhibit 1); David Wasson, "Condon's plan to raise number of fire department appointees halted," The Spokesman-Review, April 29, 2014, available at: <a href="http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/apr/29/condons-plan-to-raise-number-of-fire-department/">http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/apr/29/condons-plan-to-raise-number-of-fire-department/</a> (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (attached as Exhibit 2); Shawn Vestal, "Ruling panning Spokane mayor's fire department shuffle may not reach police," The Spokesman-Review, May 3, 2014, available at: <a href="http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/may/03/shawn-vestal-ruling-panning-spokane-mayors-fire/">http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/may/03/shawn-vestal-ruling-panning-spokane-mayors-fire/</a> (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (attached as Exhibit 3).

kind and tenor of the information contained in the email I forwarded. Simply put, the email I forwarded did not contain information which was not already known to the parties to the litigation or to the public at the time I forwarded the email. The email I forwarded was therefore not confidential information at the time, and was not legal advice, but was instead a compilation and reiteration of information which was publicly available before May 5, 2014. For those reasons, therefore, the email was not entitled to protection as confidential information, and the referral letter does not establish a violation of the Ethics Code.

Rather than containing confidential information, the email I forwarded was merely the reporting from the Mayor to City officials and staff, via a lawyer, of factual information. As we know, merely running factual information through a lawyer's hands does not necessarily clothe that information with confidentiality or attorney-client privilege. In that respect, this situation is like those cases which "evoke an image of 'attorney as messenger,' wherein the contents of a message that otherwise amounts to public information is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The conveyance of public information from an attorney to his client, . . . is not covered by the privilege because there is nothing confidential about the communication." U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 508 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). Because Ms. Jacobson was merely the messenger for factual, and publicly-available, information from the Mayor to other City officials and staff, the email was not confidential information nor was it entitled to the protections of attorney-client privilege.

2. My forwarding of the email did no harm to the City's litigation, negotiation, or bargaining position; any violation of the Ethics Code due to my forwarding of the email was de minimis.

Even if the Committee understands the email's contents to have been confidential information, my release of that publicly-available information to a third party did nothing to endanger the City's litigation, negotiation, or bargaining positions, because it did not tell the Firefighter's Union anything it did not already know.

Nothing in the email I forwarded caused or could have caused the City any particular, substantial, or meaningful harm. As I have pointed out, the email contained information which repeated publicly-stated information, which, by definition, could not cause the City harm by being publicized again. Any harm to the City's litigation, negotiation, or bargaining positions was therefore de minimis in scope and extent.

That said, I recognize that my ill-advised decision to forward an email which was labeled "confidential" may have had a negative effect upon the public's perception of the City and City Officials. This is a serious issue, and one of which all City officials must be mindful. My action in this instance, when viewed against the facts in their totality and the standards by which the Committee is guided, constituted at most a de minimis violation of the Ethics Code.

3. I did not intend to personally benefit or intend to deprive anyone of a legal right or privilege by forwarding the email.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> <u>See</u> Respondent's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4 (attached as Exhibit 5); City of Spokane's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 5-16 (Attached as Exhibit 6).

The Committee should decline to address allegations that I engaged in "official misconduct" as defined by RCW 9A.80.010(1) and SMC 42.23.050. Not only are those areas outside the scope of the Ethics Code, but they are simply unsupported by any facts, whether in evidence or otherwise.

First, there is no allegation, nor are there any facts in evidence or otherwise that I intended to obtain, or actually obtained, any personal benefit by forwarding of the email. And certainly the Committee faces an impossible task if it seeks to ascertaining my intent in forwarding an email, given that it only have before it at this point a fully-redacted document. To be clear: my intent in forwarding the email was to inform the public, not to gain anything personally. By forwarding the email, I obtained no personal benefit, nor did I intend to gain any personal benefit.

Second, there is no allegation, nor are there any facts in evidence to support, that my forwarding of an email was intended to deprive another of his, her, or its legal right or privilege. As stated above, the information contained in the email I forwarded was not confidential — that is, it was publicly available information. Even more to the point, to the extent the information contained in the email I forwarded was attorney-client privileged information rather than merely factual information channeled through an attorney, the Mayor may have waived that privilege himself by making the statements contained in the email to the press before I forwarded the email. Because no aspect of a claim of "official misconduct" is supported, the Committee should decline to address that allegation.

#### Conclusion.

I admit that I made a mistake when I forwarded the email in question here. I have apologized for that mistake publicly on more than one occasion and I do so here again. All City employees and elected and appointed officials must be highly cognizant of the requirements of the Ethics Code in all their dealings, and I am no exception.

The facts of this situation, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of actual and possible harm to the City and the fact that the information contained in an email labeled "confidential" was in fact publicly-available information, leads the Committee to the conclusion that any violation caused by my admittedly ill-advised action is and was de minimis in scope. For that reason, I respectfully request that the Committee dismiss this matter at its earliest opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

Ben Stuckart

City Council President

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Saturday, April 26, 2014

# NEWS / POLITICS Judge rules against city's expansion of exempt positions Posted By Heidi Groover on Sat, Apr 26, 2014 at 11:11 AM

A Superior Court judge has ruled against the city's expansion of positions in the Spokane Fire Department that are exempt from civil service, according to the union representing local firefighters.

The union brought the complaint against the city last summer arguing that increases in positions that are hired by appointment instead of through civil service testing violated state law and the Spokane City Charter. Mayor David Condon has led the push for more exempt positions in the fire, police and parks departments, increasing the total between them from six to 40 exempt positions, although not all have been filled. The changes



Young Kwak photo Mayor David Condon has supported increasing the number of exempt positions in certain city departments.

were approved by the city council last year, though the political balance has since shifted. Condon and leaders of those departments have argued that hiring outside of civil service provides for more flexibility than outdated and rigid civil service testing. But some on the council, like Councilman Jon Snyder and Council President Ben Stuckart, argued exempt positions can encourage nepotism and the administration should instead look to reform the civil service process.

According to Stuckart and City Spokesman Brian Coddington, the judge issued an oral decision Friday. (Stuckart says he expects a written ruling by Monday or Tuesday.) The decision will not directly affect the changes to the parks or police departments, since the case was specifically about the changes to fire positions.

Coddington says he doesn't yet have many details, but offered this in an email to the *Inlander*: "The city is considering an appeal. We worked within the civil service rules and process and believe the City Council had the authority to create departments within the division."

Stuckart says he plans to bring an ordinance forward in coming weeks to overturn the changes to the fire department.

"I've heard that some of the language (the judge) used was pretty harsh and scathing to the city. I hope if we reverse it, that will be a clear enough signal [to the administration] not to appeal," Stuckart says. "[The change] was designed to undermine civil service. Everyone can differ on their opinion of civil service, but the way to change it is not to use words to try to undermine it."

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A sudden boot for the city's planning director has left developers, councilmembers and neighborhood leaders baffled By Heidi Groover

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
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**April 29, 2014 in City** 

# Condon's plan to raise number of fire department appointees halted

David Wasson The Spokesman-Review

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Tags: Civil service David Condon Spokane City Council Spokane Fire Department



Condon (Full-size photo)

Spokane Mayor David Condon's plan to boost the number of political appointees at City Hall has been dealt a potentially major setback.

Superior Court Judge Kathleen O'Connor has sided with city firefighters who challenged the legality of Condon's plan to increase the number of positions in the department that could be filled by mayoral appointment rather than by civil service testing.

"We felt this wasn't good for the city or the citizens,"

firefighter Don Waller, president of the labor union representing Spokane firefighters, said of the mayor's plan, which was approved last year by a divided City Council.

The same reorganization was used to increase the number of positions in the police department that could be filled by appointment as well, though O'Connor's ruling was specific only to the fire department changes. It's unclear whether police unions are contemplating a similar legal challenge.

Condon said today he and the city attorney's office have requested a written ruling from O'Connor and are reviewing their appeal options.

"The reality is we worked within the system," Condon said of the plan. "We believe the City Council has the power to create the departments."

The city charter limits the number of mayoral appointments in each department to two, which are generally reserved for department heads and assistant department heads.

Condon got around the limits by creating a new organizational structure that elevated the police and fire departments to "divisions," with each containing separate departments within them. The new "Fire Division" contained seven separate departments, for example, while the "Police Division" contained six separate departments. It increased the number of potential mayoral appointments by



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14 in the fire division and 12 in the police division.

The fire department was preparing to hire its first additional appointee, a physician who was to serve as a medical adviser on a part-time basis. The police department has filled five of its additional appointments.

Critics described the reorganization as little more than "word games," but the mayor and his backers have argued that greater flexibility is needed to address systemic problems within Spokane's burseucracy and ensure that reforms demanded by voters, particularly within the police force, are carried out. The reorganization was narrowly approved last year with a 4-3 vote when the City Council was controlled by conservatives.

Control of the council has now shifted, however.

Council President Ben Stuckert, who opposed the reorganization last year, already has introduced a proposal to formally scrap the changes at the fire department but leave them intact for the police force.

Stuckart said efforts were made to negotiate a compromise that would have reduced the number of mayoral appointees within the police and fire departments in exchange for getting the fire union to drop its legal challenge, but the mayor's office was uninterested.

Civil service in Spokane was created by voters in 1910. It sets up hiring rules and tests to ensure employees are selected by merit and to prevent cronylsm. Almost all city workers – except those working in the library system and the one or two managers of any department – are part of civil service.

O'Connor's ruling came Friday in response to both sides seeking what's called a summary judgment, with the judge reportedly describing the city's justification for the plan as "ludicrous." The decision halts the plan from being implemented within the fire department unless the city prevails on appeal.

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
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Story

May 3, 2014 in City

# Shawn Vestal: Ruling panning Spokane mayor's fire department shuffle may not reach police

Shawn Vestel The Spokesman-Review

Recommend 4 9

One person's flexibility is another's cronyism.

This is one reason for civil service laws, to protect employees - and, in a broader sense, the whole city - from the whims and caprices of a constantly rotating political leadership handing out favors to the loyal. And that, arguably, is one of the reasons the city can develop scienctic organizational problems that never go away.

A judge ruled last week that Mayor David Condon's flow-chart juggling and organizational redefinitions in the Spokane Fire Department were a "ludicrous" violation of state law. The slappingdown occurred at the summary judgment stage, where only the weakest legal fish die.

In essence, the changes redefined the fire department as a "division," dramatically expanding the number of politically appointed positions rather than positions filled through civil-service screening. The ramifications could be significant in the fire department; the City Council will soon take up a proposal to reverse the reorganization.

Judge Kathleen O'Connor's ruling was specific to the fire department, though a similar approach was applied in the police department ... er, division. A lot of folks assume a union challenge might be forthcoming from there as well. But Lt. Dave McCabe, president of the Spokane Police Lieutenants and Captains Association, made it clear this week that his bargaining unit, at least, doesn't have a beef with the number of political appointees.

"At this point, based on my reading of the (state law) ... the department is in compliance," McCabe said.

The Spokene City Charter limits political appointees to two per department. But state law - which was the basis for O'Connor's ruling - grants as many as eight political appointees in a police department the size of Spokane's. Right now, there are five, and McCabe said there are no plans for more.



Furthermore, he said, his union has "absolutely no problem" with the underlying approach in the department's reorganization: the creation of neighborhood-based precincts to decentralize the department and connect it more strongly to the community. McCabe has also expressed tolerance, in the past, for the frequent shuffling that's happened on Chief Frank Straub's watch.

But McCabe's union and the Police Guild are both looking at other potential ramifications from the department-division metamorphoses. One possible downside that has nothing to do with appointees: It's possible that, if the Police Division remains a collection of separate departments, an officer with seniority in one department could be transferred to another and immediately drop to the bottom of the seniority scale there.

Those concerns would be the more likely basis for a legal challenge, but they wouldn't have to Impinge on the larger structural goals, McCabe said.

"I don't view this as being a controversial issue at all," he said.

For now, the tenor at City Hall and on the City Council seems to be: Follow the ruling in the case of the fire department, ignore it if possible in the case of the police department. Unless someone challenges it specifically there, this strange and illogical combination could well move forward.

There's really no question that the mayor's plan was an end run around Civil Service. The arguments in favor of it make that clear - the administration says it needs flexibility to implement reforms in the departments.

The Spokane firefighters Local 29 sued, and theirs was the legal argument that O'Connor supported lest Friday. The union argued that the state's Civil Service laws are intended to protect the public from cronyism and patronage and from a revolving door between administrations.

The result of these practices was incompetent employees, high rates of employee turnover with each successive administration, and cultures of retaliation and political yes men," the union said in a statement. "The Civil Service system was created to promote the hiring and promotion of the most qualified applicants in a fair and transparent manner and retains the wisdom and experience of long-term workers."

Of course, the wisdom and experience of long-term workers has its flip side, and anyone who's worked in any organization of any size knows what it is: entrenched habits, refusal to change, burnout. There are also the large numbers of convictions and habits that result from conviction and habit: This is the way we've always done it.

Do we want mayors turning over the entire top tier of managers within departments every couple of years? A constant shuffling of political appointees? Of course not.

And yet it's hard to imagine the kind of dramatic cultural change that so many have called for within the city's police division without more flexibility in the leadership ranks. For now, those new distinctions stand. But if a legal lance is raised against it, O'Connor's brusque and definitive ruling leaves little doubt how it would fare.

Shawn Vestal can be reached at (509) 459-5431 or shawnv@spokeaman.com. Follow him on Twitter at @vestal13.

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		Renews #	
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Contact Name/Phone	BEN STUCKART 625-6269	Project #	
Contact E-Mail	AMCDANIEL@SPOKANECITY.ORG	Bid #	
Agenda Item Type	First Reading Ordinance	Requisition #	
Agenda Item Name	0320 REPEAL OF ORDINANCE CREATING FIRE DEPARTMENTS WITHIN FIRE		

# **Agenda Wording**

AN ORDINANCE relating to the establishment of fire departments within the fire division; repealing SMC sections 3.01A.270, 3.01A.275, 3.01A.280, 3.01A.285, 3.01A.290, 3.01A.295 and 3.01A.300.

### Summary (Background)

On April 8, 2013, the City Council approved Ord. No. C-34964 relating to the executive and administrative organization of the City, including the creation of multiple departments within the fire division. The international Association of Fire Fighters local 29 and the Spokane Association of Fire Officers ("Plaintiffs") filed a lawsuit challenging the creation of multiple departments within the fire division.

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# Continuation of Wording, Summary, Budget, and Distribution

## Agenda Wording

# **Summary (Background)**

On April 25, 2014, the Spokane County Superior Court issued a written decision granting the Plaintiffs their motion for summary judgment and ordering that Ord. No. C-34964 is invalid and void as it relates to the fire department because it is in violation of the requirements of state law, Chapter 41.08 RCW. This ordinance will repeal SMC sections 3.01A.270, 3.01A.275, 3.01A.280, 3.01A.285, 3.01A.290, 3.01A.295 and 3.01A.300 so as to remove the seven departments created under the Fire Division consistent with the Court's decision. SMC 3.01A.265, which created the Fire Division with the potential of various departments, will remain in place.

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#### **ORDINANCE NO. C35096**

AN ORDINANCE relating to the establishment of fire departments within the fire division; repealing SMC sections 3.01A.270, 3.01A.275, 3.01A.280, 3.01A.285, 3.01A.290, 3.01A.295 and 3.01A.300.

WHEREAS, on April 8, 2014, the City Council approved Ord. No. C-34964 relating to the executive and administrative organization of the City, including the creation of multiple departments within the fire division; and

WHEREAS, the International Association of Fire Fighters local 29 and the Spokane Association of Fire Officers ("Plaintiffs") filed a lawsuit challenging the creation of multiple departments within the fire division; and

WHEREAS, on April 25, 2014, the Spokane County Superior Court issued a written decision granting the Plaintiffs' their motion for summary judgment and ordering that Ord. No. C-34964 is invalid and void as it relates to the fire department because it is in violation of the requirements of state law, Chapter 41.08 RCW; - - Now, Therefore,

The City of Spokane does ordain:

Section 1. That SMC sections 3.01A.270, 3.01A.275, 3.01A.280, 3.01A.285, 3.01A.290, 3.01A.295 and 3.01A.300 are repealed.

#### 2.01A.270 Fire Communications

The communications department's primary responsibilities are to receive calls through the community's 9-1-1 system and dispatch appropriate resources to the public's request for assistance as well as to communicate with and provide documentation and other support to fire and EMS response agencies and their field units. Includes assuring that facilities, equipment and systems are in place and operational for interoperable communication to occur between the public and responders in order to support the mission of the fire division as well as fulfill the obligations to provide contract dispatching services to other fire agencies.

#### 3.01A.275 Fire Emergency Medical Services

The fire emergency medical services department is responsible for the medical systems necessary to provide quality pre-hospital basic life support and paramedic level critical care. Includes the management and eversight of the 9-1-1 ambulance transport contract as well as participation in the coordination of the overall community emergency medical services system.

#### 3.01A.280 Fire Logistics

The fire logistics department manages and maintains the emergency response fleet of specialized apparatus, equipment, physical buildings and inventory that are in place and necessary to support the fire division's mission.

### 3.04A.285 Fire Operations

The fire operations department primary responsibilities include response to fire, emergency medical services, rescue and other calls for service that typically occur through the community's 9-1-1 system. Consists of personnel and equipment deployed to field operations (stations and apparatus) as well as special operations and emergency incident management.

#### 3.01A.200 - Fire Planning and Information Management

The fire planning and information management department primary responsibilities are to develop and eversee the fire division's information technology plan and systems necessary to support the fire division's mission together with obligations to provide contract dispatching services to other fire agencies. Includes providing all aspects of information technology and information management services through development. purchase, installation and maintenance of routine and critical technological software and interoperable, secure infrastructure.

#### 2.04A 205 Fire Prevention

The fire prevention department primary responsibilities are to manage and oversee the enforcement of the fire code and other applicable standards as well as other efforts to prevent injury and harm from fire and avoidable accidents. Includes the review of plans for new and remodel projects within the City; field inspections to insure compliance with required permits and codes; educational and other collaborative programs to minimize occurrence of fires, accidents and injuries in the community.

#### 3.01A.300 Fire Training

The fire training department primary responsibilities are to lead and manage the training, educational and other systems necessary to assure operational readiness and compliance with governmental standards and regulations. Includes the management PASSED by the City Council on May 19. 2014

Sufficient and eversight of the fire division's safety program.

**Council President** 

Attest:

City Clerk

Mayor

(Returned after Mayoral Signature Deadline) (Returned by Mayor <u>D& & CH . 2014</u>)

MAYORAL DECISION to RETURN UN-SIGNED

Approved as to form:

Assistant City Attorney

Date

07.02 2014



SPOKANE COUNTY CLERK

# SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON, COUNTY OF SPOKANE

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL 29; SPOKANE ASSOCIATION OF FIRE OFFICERS,

Plaintiffs/Petitioners.

CITY OF SPOKANE,

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Defendant/Respondent.

No. 13-2-01969-2

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT



The City of Spokane requests the Court deny Plaintiffs International Association of Fire Fighters Local 29's and Spokane Association of Fire Officers' (collectively hereafter as "Plaintiffs") Motion for Summary Judgment.

The City's Response is supported by the following Memorandum of Authorities, Declaration of Nathaniel Odle in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and forthcoming

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 Nancy L. Isseriis, City Attorney OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 5<sup>th</sup> Floor Municipal Building Spokane, WA 99201-3326 (509) 625-6225 FAX (509) 625-6277

 THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

Reply, the Court's complete file, and any oral argument the Court may choose to entertain.

## I. CONTROVERTING STATEMENT OF FACTS

The format of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts does not easily lend itself to objection and/or rebuttal. To best outline the City's position regarding Plaintiffs' factual recitation, the City identifies the portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts to which it does not object. The City objects to all portions not specifically delineated below and any inferences drawn there from.

The City does not dispute the following:

- 1 In 1991, the citizens of the City of Spokane voted against a proposition to allow the Spokane City Administrator to hire additional exempt positions.
- 2. Spokane City Ordinance C-34964 was signed by Mayor Condon April 22, 2013, and became effective May 22, 2013.
- 3. Ordinance C-34964 enacted Spokane Municipal Code Ch. 3.01A. Relevant to this controversy, SMC 3.01A.265-300 renamed the Fire Department the Fire Division Department (hereafter abbreviated "Fire Division"), re-characterized components of the former Fire Department as "departments" within the newly created Fire Division, and assigned the codified components of the former Fire Department into specific SMC section numbers. Within Title 3, Chapter 01A the following departments were created: .270 Fire Communications, 275 Fire Emergency Medical

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Services, .280 Fire Logistics, .285 Fire Operations, .290 Fire Planning and Information Management, .295 Fire Prevention, and .300 Fire Training.

- 4. SMC Ch. 3.01A renamed the Spokane Police Department the Police Division Department and created departments similar to those discussed herein.
- 5. Prior to Ordinance C-34964 and enactment of SMC Ch. 3.01A, subcategories within the Fire Department were commonly referred to as "divisions." The fire divisions included: communications, emergency medical services, logistics, operations, planning & information management, fire prevention, and training.
- 6. The majority (but not all) of pre-Ordinance (formerly-named) Fire Department employees "fell within the auspices of the city's civil service program." See Pls.' Mot. at p. 7.
- 7. Article IV, § 24 of the Spokane City Charter permits the Mayor to appoint and remove administrative heads.
- 8. Following enactment of Ch. SMC 3.01A, the Mayor of Spokane is authorized to appoint a head and assistant head of the departments identified in SMC 3.01A.270-300.
- 9. Including the Fire Chief and Assistant Fire Chief, the number of positions in the Fire Division to which the City may appoint employees totals sixteen.
- 10. If and when the City appoints a department head or assistant department head within the newly-created Fire Division, the appointed employee will be exempt from the Civil Service System.

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 Nancy L. Isseriis, City Attorney OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 5<sup>th</sup> Floor Municipal Building Spokane, WA 99201-3326 (509) 625-6225 FAX (509) 625-6277

 11. Spokane City Ordinance No. C35062, effective January 1, 2014, adopted the 2014 annual budget of the City of Spokane and "ratifie[d] and confirm[ed] all administrative departments created and established in 2013."

## II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs' lack of standing precludes their suit and warrants denial of their Motion.

The City reasserts its argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the legality of Ordinance C-34964 or SMC Ch. 3.01A. The City's position is briefed in its Motion for Summary Judgment. Supplementing the City's argument are Plaintiffs' recently-received responses to the City's requests for admission. Plaintiffs admit that no member of either union has: 1) been appointed to an exempt position with the City of Spokane; or 2) turned down an appointment to an exempt position. Additionally, Plaintiffs do not allege that a union member was passed over for promotion in favor of a non-union candidate, that the City discriminated against union members or utilized otherwise unlawful hiring processes. Plaintiffs' inability to show present injury to anyone in their membership justifies denying Plaintiffs' Motion on that basis alone.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Requests for Admission Nos. 6 and 7, Declaration of Nathaniel Odle ("Odle Decl.), Ex. C.

<sup>2</sup> See International Ass's of Firefichters AFL CIO 1 and 100 an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See International Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 404 v. City of Walla Walla, 90 Wn.2d 828, 831-832 (1978) (summary judgment was appropriate absent allegation of discrimination or unlawful hiring process).

# B. Neither Ordinance C-34964 nor SMC Ch. 3.01A violates the Spokane City Charter.

Plaintiffs argue that Ordinance C-34964 and Ch. SMC 3.01A violate the Spokane City Charter<sup>3</sup> but, outside of an obvious misreading of Article VI, § 53(A) of the Charter buried in a footnote in Plaintiffs' submittal, Plaintiffs identify no language in the Charter with which the legislation conflicts. Plaintiffs' Motion (and case) is based on what the Charter doesn't say — specifically, the absence of a definition of the word "department." The absence prompts Plaintiffs' attempts to define the term themselves through various extraneous sources. Plaintiffs' exercise is unnecessary as the City has permitted the Mayor and City Council the discretion to define what makes a "department" through the other avenue of municipal governance, City Ordinance. While Plaintiffs feel they are in the best position to assign meaning to words in the City Charter, the City suggests the Court permit the holders of all legislative power under the City Charter - the Mayor and City Council - to continue to define terms through direct legislation. To do otherwise would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

The City of Spokane is governed by the City Charter and Spokane Municipal Code. The Municipal Code is amended via City Ordinance. Plaintiffs make no

See Pls.' Mot, in support of Summary Judgment at 10-12.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Plaintiffs, at least for the purpose of this Motion, abandon their argument that Ordinance C-34964 and SMC 3.01A are, as alleged in their Complaint, arbitrary and capricious. As a result, the City will rest on its argument set forth in its Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing arbitrary and capricious action.

 argument that the Mayor of Spokane or Spokane City Council lacks the authority to propose and define the law of the City of Spokane. Such an argument would be misplaced as, with limited exception, "all power of the City of Spokane is exercised by the mayor and city council." When a majority of the City Council supports an ordinance and it is signed by the Mayor, it becomes law. Similarly, when the Mayor and City Council enact an Ordinance creating or modifying a "department," they conclude that the entity created constitutes a "principle branch or division of [Spokane city] government," a "major and separate administrative segment of the City organization," or more succinctly (and importantly), the City of Spokane's definition of what constitutes a "department." The City has been functioning in this manner for a number of years. In 1890, the City created the Spokane Falls Fire Department via ordinance. More recently, the City created other departments by ordinance, including: Arts Department, Building Services Department, Community Development Department, Historic Preservation Department, Neighborhood Services Department. Planning Services. Real Estate Department. Facilities Department.

<sup>5</sup> See Spokane City Charter at Art. I, § 4.

<sup>\*</sup> Though the City disputes the relevance of any of the definitions of "department" drawn from sources outside the City Charter or SMC, the Spokane Civil Service Commission definition, identified by Plaintiffs at p. 11 and 12 of their Motion, accepts administrative segments created by ordinance. (citing Comm'n Rule II (definition 20)). "Department" is defined as "a major and separate administrative segment of the City organization, the head of which gains operational authority from the Charter or Ordinance and is responsible directly to the Mayor, or those delegated to act in the Mayor's behalf." (emphasis added)

See Ordinances of the City of Spokane p. 260-271, Odle Decl., Ex. A, Pfister Aff., Ex. 1.
 The list provided is only some of the departments created by ordinance and not exhaustive.

Id. at Ex. A, Ex. 2.

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Department.11 Regional Communications Systems Solid Waste Department, 12 Grants Management and Financial Assistance Department, 13 and Capital Management Department. 14 Despite the absence of a definition in the City Charter, the City has been able to define what constitutes a "department," without the assistance of Plaintiffs, since the 19<sup>th</sup> Century.

Plaintiffs also argue that City departments with a small number of employees violate Washington statutory law (RCW 41.08) and the Washington State Constitution. 15 Nowhere in RCW Title 41 does the State legislature place a minimum on the number of employees necessary to make a department. The alleged violation of the state Constitution, on the other hand, is limited in Plaintiffs' Motion to vague references to violation of "general law" and "state supremacy law." 15 Plaintiffs do not explain either argument, hoping the Court will fill in the blanks. None of the authorities cited mention the number of employees required within a "department" or how a limited number of employees may violate the state Constitution. 17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> <u>Id</u>. at Ex. A, Ex. 3.

ld. at Ex. A, Ex. 4.

<sup>12</sup> Id. at Ex. A, Ex. 5.

<sup>13</sup> Id. at Ex. A, Ex. 6. Id. at Ex. A, Ex. 7.

See Pls, Mot. at p. 12 stating cryptically "...if the charter were read to allow two political appointees in literally any unit of government simply because it bears the superficial title of 'department,' the charter would violate 41.08 RCW, the civil service statute." <sup>16</sup> <u>id</u>. at p. 12-13.

Id. citing Wash. Const., Art. XI, § 10 (... "the charter of every city 'shall be subject to and controlled by general law." The question as to which general law the City is violating is left unanswered); and Clallam County Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Bd. Of Clallam County Comm'rs. 925 Wn.2d 844, 849 (1979). Plaintiffs cite the proposition in the Clallam holding "...this case

department to avoid being too small by their definition — they only argue that small departments are *per se* illegal under the Charter. Many City departments have few employees but are nonetheless important and necessary components of the City of Spokane and, according to the City Council and the Mayor, constitute "departments." For example, the following City Departments have fewer than ten employees: <sup>18</sup> City Clerk (6 employees), Police Ombudsman (2), Grants Management (2), Risk Management (1), Employee Benefits (3), Historic Preservation (1), Neighborhood Services (3), and Workers Compensation (4). <sup>19</sup> The City Finance Division has a similar employee distribution to the Fire Division, in that, under the Finance Division umbrella are large Departments (IT and Accounting) and several small Departments (Management Budget (2 employees), Treasury Services (2), and Grants Management(1)). Each Finance department, like the departments in the Fire Division, has a distinct responsibility necessary to proper City functioning. While Plaintiffs apparently prefer to combine responsibilities into single municipal entities, this is not an intuitive separation of power nor how the City's governing bodies have

Plaintiffs omit reference to the number of employees necessary for a

raises an important constitutional question about the supremacy of state law." Id. Continuing the court's thought reveals the context of the statement and that no reference is made to the number of employees necessary to comply with the Washington state definition of "department." "Because a judicial opinion will benefit the public, other branches of government and, in particular, other Home Rule Charter counties, a declaratory judgment to resolve this constitutional question is proper." (internal citations omitted)

18 Again, the list provided represents only some examples and not an exhaustive list.

19 See Dunivant Affidavit, Odle Decl., Ex. B.

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

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 chosen to organize the City's administrate structure, or the Fire Division's 312 employees.

Though the heading of § VI(B) of Plaintiffs' Motion reads "Ordinance C-34964 Violates the City's Charter," Plaintiffs, aside from providing their definition of "department," spend very little time discussing exactly how the Charter has been violated by Ordinance C-34964. In the interests of brevity, to best address the tertiary arguments touched upon by Plaintiffs in § VI(B), the City provides the following:

- i. Plaintiffs allege violation of Washington state law (RCW 41.08 in particular) throughout their analysis. Purported violation of state law is irrelevant to Plaintiffs' premise that Ordinance C-34964 violates the City Charter and confuses the Issues alleged by Plaintiffs. The City separately addresses the merits of Plaintiffs' state law argument below.
- ii. Plaintiffs utilize the Spokane Civil Service Commission's definition of "department" to argue that the departments created within the Fire Division that report to the Assistant Fire Chief instead of the Fire Chief are unlawful.<sup>20</sup> As a mayoral appointed employee, the Assistant Fire Chief, as with the Fire Chief, reports to the Mayor.
- iii. In footnote 11 of Plaintiffs' Motion, Plaintiffs argue that Ordinance C-34964 violates Article VI, § 53(A), of the City Charter. The subject section permits the Civil Service Commission to "classify all positions of the City...except seasonal

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27 28 THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR **SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10** 

20 See Pls.' Mot. at p. 12.

Emphasis added. 22 175 Wash. 687 (1934).

<sup>23</sup> ld. at 688.

positions and the appointed officers mentioned in the Charter.\*21 Pursuant to Spokane City Charter Art. IV, § 24 (also cited and quoted in Plaintiffs' Motion), the Mayor of Spokane has the power to "appoint and remove the administrative heads and assistant administrative heads in each department of the City government." Appointed positions are not "classified" positions and fall outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Plaintiffs, of course, understand the relative merit of this argument which is why the lone discussion of a specific section of the City Charter Ordinance C-34964 allegedly violates is limited to a footnote, six pages into their argument.

Finally, Plaintiffs cite a single Washington case, Larson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of Everett, 22 in support of their argument that the Departments created by Ordinance C-34964 are not actually "departments" under Washington law. The distinction between the Larson case and this matter further illustrates the erroneous nature of Plaintiffs' argument.

In 1932, Roy Larson, sustained actual injury (as distinguished from Plaintiffs' hypothetical injury) when he was terminated from his job as a City of Everett firefighter by the Everett Fire Chief.23 The Everett civil service commission upheld the termination. At the time of Larson's termination, the Everett Fire Department was

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 argued, successfully, that because the Fire Chief was not the "head of the department" (i.e. the head of the Department of Safety) under which Larson was employed, the termination was ineffectual. Distinct from this case, the Everett City Charter defined the term "department" as "a lesser division — a subdivision of one of the three executive and administrative departments of the city." The Court applied the plain language assigned by the City of Everett Charter and agreed with Larson that the Fire Chief was not the head of a department with authority to terminate Larson (the Department of Safety) but instead head of a lesser subdivision.

subsumed within a larger City of Everett entity, the Department of Safety. Larson

The City of Spokane, unlike the City of Everett, does not define "department" in its Charter, instead allowing the Mayor and the City Council the discretion to define the term. On April 8, 2013, when the City Council enacted Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A, it defined the Fire Communications Department, Fire Emergency Medical Services Department, Fire Logistics Department, Fire Operations Department, Fire Planning and Information Management Department, Fire Prevention Department, and Fire Training Department as "departments." When Mayor Condon signed the Ordinance, he, likewise, adopted the definitions. Plaintiffs' Motion takes the impossible position that they are better suited to establish the definition of "department" in the City of Spokane than both the Mayor and City Council. Once Plaintiffs' attempt to usurp the legislative power of the governing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> <u>id</u>. at 697.

 With the exception of the poorly reasoned citation to Art. VI, § 53(A) of the City Charter, with what portion of the Charter the legislation conflicts is left unanswered. Plaintiffs' contentions and allegations are insufficient to carry their burden on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied.

C. Neither Ordinance C-34964 nor SMC 3.01A violate State law but even if they did Plaintiffs are not the proper party to bring forth such a challenge.

bodies of the City is eliminated. Plaintiffs' claim consists of nothing more than the

argument that Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A conflict with the City Charter.

Plaintiffs' argument on this topic is surprisingly economical, particularly based on the number of references to statutory violation found in the preceding sections of their Motion. As an initial matter, municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid, and grants of municipal power are liberally construed.<sup>25</sup> Plaintiffs, as challengers, bear the burden of proving Ordinance C-34984 is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid.<sup>26</sup> Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden.

First, RCW 41.08.010, cited repeatedly throughout Plaintiffs' Motion, states RCW 41.08 is inapplicable to "cities and towns which at the present time have provided for civil service in the fire department...which said local charter or regulations substantially accomplish the purpose of the statute." Washington cities

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> <u>Heinsma v. City of Vancouver</u>, 114 Wn.2d 556, 561 (2001) (*citing* <u>City of Bothell v.</u> <u>Gutschmidt</u>, 78 Wn. App. 654, 659-660 (1995)).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Emphasis added.

are permitted flexibility and discretion in handling their civil service system - strict adherence to the state civil service prototype is not required. <sup>28</sup> It is undisputed that the City has a civil service system serving the Fire Division and all departments. All members of the Fire Division represented by Plaintiffs' unions are covered by the Spokane civil service system. Yet, Plaintiffs argue that a civil service system which provides protection for every one of their members somehow fails to "substantially comply" with state law. Plaintiffs' argument that at some point in the future, a member of their unions *may* become exempt from the Civil Service System overlooks RCW 41.08.010's "present time" requirement. Nowhere in the statute is future noncompliance anticipated as a basis for challenge. The Spokane Civil Service System is in substantial compliance with state law.

The second apparent reason for Plaintiffs' concision is the language of RCW 41.08.140. Entitled "Enforcement by civil action – Legal Counsel," RCW 41.08.140 states:

"it shall be the duty of the commission<sup>29</sup> to begin and conduct all civil suits which may be necessary for the proper enforcement of this chapter and of the rules of the commission. The commission shall be represented in such suits by the chief legal officer of the city, but said commission may in any case be represented by special counsel appointed by it."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See <u>Local 404 v. City of Walla Walla,</u> supra, 90 Wn.2d at 831-832; see also <u>Police Guild v.</u> <u>City of Seattle,</u> 151 Wn.2d 823, 832 (2003).

<sup>&</sup>quot;Commission" is defined by RCW 41.08.220 to mean "the civil service commission herein created."

To the extent suit is necessary to challenge a possible conflict with state civil service laws, it is the duty of the Spokane Civil Service Commission to bring all challenges. Prior to filing, Plaintiffs' approached the Spokane Civil Service Commission, which declined to bring suit. A reoccurring theme of this suit, Plaintiffs, pursuant to RCW 41.08.140, are not the proper parties to challenge the constitutionality of Ordinance C-34964 and SMC 3.01A. The City fully incorporates this argument as a basis for the grant of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiffs' arguments as to statutory violation are misleading, without merit, and should not be given additional consideration. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or their entitlement to summary judgment. Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied.

## III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs fall to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied.

DATED this 1975 day of April, 2014.

Nathaniel Odle, WSBA #39602

Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant

## **DECLARATION OF SERVICE**

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that on the \_\_\_\_\_day of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing "THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT," to be delivered to the parties below in the manner noted:

David A. Bricklin
Claudia M. Newman
Bricklin & Newman, LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3303
Seattle, WA 98154
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

[] VIA FACSIMILE
[] VIA U.S. MAIL
[] VIA OVERNIGHT SERVICE
[] VIA EMAIL BY AGREEMENT

Sheila Hansen City Attorney's Office 808 W. Spokane Falls Blvd.

Spokane, WA 99201-3326

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15 Nancy L. Isseriis, City Attorney OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 5<sup>th</sup> Floor Municipal Building Spokane, WA 99201-3326 (509) 625-6225 FAX (509) 625-8277 SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON, COUNTY OF SPOKANE

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL 29; SPOKANE ASSOCIATION OF FIRE OFFICERS,

No. 13-2-01969-2

Plaintiffs/Petitioners.

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CITY OF SPOKANE.

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Defendant/Respondent.

The City of Spokane submits this Reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs International Association of Fire Fighters Local 29's and Spokane Association of Fire Officers' (collectively hereafter as "Plaintiffs") Complaint. Plaintiffs do not address the City's argument requesting dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim of arbitrary and capricious action. The City requests this claim be dismissed. As to Plaintiffs remaining claims, Plaintiffs allege standing without injury; conflict with the Spokane City Charter without citation; and violation of state law despite being the

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

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improper parties to bring such a challenge, failing to sue a necessary party, and generally without meeting their burden of proof. Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

The City's Reply is supported by the following Memorandum of Authorities, all pleadings in support of the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and in response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court's complete file, and any oral argument the Court may choose to entertain.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the City attempted to explain aspects of the City's personnel system pertinent to Plaintiffs and this suit. As is clear from Plaintiffs' Response, additional clarification is needed. The following prefatory comment is offered to clarify issues consistent with Plaintiffs' stated concerns.

The challenged legislation, Ordinance C-34964 which enacted Spokane Municipal Code Ch. 3.01A, for purposes relevant to this suit, provides the Mayor of Spokane the option to appoint employees to two positions, a department head and assistant department head, for seven departments within the Spokane Fire Division Department (hereafter "Fire Division"). Before the Ordinance in question, only the Fire Chief and Assistant Fire Chief were Mayoral appointees and exempt from the Spokane Civil Service System. If an individual is appointed to a position within the City, the employee is exempt from the civil service. Therefore, the terminology is an "exempt" employee versus a "commissioned" employee, which is an employee within

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

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the civil service system. Many City employees (for example, Assistant City attorneys) are exempt employees.

The power to appoint City department heads and assistant heads is outlined in the Spokane City Charter at Article IV, § 24. Per Article IV, § 24, the Mayor has the power to

"appoint and remove administrative heads and assistant department heads in each department of the city government, provided the appointment of an administrative head shall be subject to the approval of the city council and, further provided, that the head and assistant head of any department shall not be deprived by any such removal of any standing under the civil service provisions of this Charter which employee may have had before appointment as head or assistant head of a department."

All three clauses of this section of the Charter are relevant to this litigation.

Beginning with the first clause, the Mayor "has the power to appoint and remove administrative heads..." Contrasted with the second and third clauses the term "shall," which creates a mandatory duty, is absent. While the Mayor has the power to fill Fire Division department head and assistant department head openings through appointment, he does not have the obligation.

The second clause of Art. IV, § 24 provides that the "appointment of an administrative head shall be subject to the approval of the city council." Plaintiffs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Eugster v. City of Spokane, 118 Wn. App. 383, 407 (App. 2003); see also State ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Clausen, 95 Wn. 214, 224 (1917) (the legislature has the constitutional 'power' of taxation, it thereby has the 'discretion' to say what burdens of taxation shall be borne by whom.); State v. Mountain Timber Co, 75 Wash. 581, 589 (1913) (the state Constitution gives the police power to the legislature. "Large discretion was necessarily vested in legislature when exercising police power.").

point to no City Council action approving the appointment of member of Plaintiffs' union to a department head or assistant department head. The City likewise makes no such reference because there has been no such appointment since enactment of the SMC Ch. 3.01A.

The third clause of Art. IV, § 24, states that following the appointment of an exempt employee "the head and assistant head of any department shall not be deprived by any such removal of any standing under the civil service provisions of this Charter which employee may have had before appointment as head or assistant head of a department." So, if a member of Plaintiffs' unions (or any other classified employee) is appointed to an exempt position within the City, and later vacates the exempt position (through a voluntary decision or termination), the employee retains all civil service rights he/she had prior to the appointment. Argument that civil service protections vanish completely after appointment is inaccurate.

The City hopes this comment resolves confusion, for example this sentence in Plaintiffs' Response - "pursuant to the Charter, the top two positions in each of the new "departments" is exempt — and have been since the ordinance became effective five days after it was adopted.<sup>n3</sup> The Mayor has not exercised his power to appoint a member of Plaintiffs' union to an exempt position.<sup>4</sup> The Spokane City Council has not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Pls.' Response to the City's Mot. for Summ. J. (Plaintiffs' Response") at p. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Since the filing of the City's Motion and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion, the City has begun a search for an Assistant Director of Integrated Medical Service (the assistant department head of the EMS department). Though this position is being hired through Human Resources as an exempt employee, the City continues to maintain that each opening will be filled on a case-

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

service system. In the future, if a union member is appointed to an exempt position and subsequently leaves that exempt position, the employee is entitled to return to his/her former civil service position. That return is because the City Charter protects civil service employees who take exempt positions with the City.

## II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

been asked to approve the appointment of a member of Plaintiffs' union to an exempt

position. Thus, no member of Plaintiffs' unions is exempt from the Spokane civil

## A. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit.

Plaintiffs make two substantive arguments in favor of invalidating Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A – violation of the Spokane City Charter and violation of state law, specifically RCW 41.08. Plaintiffs' standing argument does not bolster either claim. Even if Plaintiffs are correct and they have standing to challenge Ordinance C-34964 or SMC Ch. 3.01A, they still fail to present a genuine issue of fact supportive of a finding that they have met their burden of proof and established they are entitled to declaratory relief. With that in mind, Plaintiffs are without standing to challenge the subject legislation.

Plaintiffs offer no argument directly opposing the City's assertion that they lack standing to pursue their Petition for Constitutional Writ of Review, instead asserting

by-case basis utilizing mayoral appointment when appropriate or civil service when appropriate, depending upon the needs of the Fire Division. Further, there is no indication that a member of Plaintiffs' union will fill the opening. If the opening is filled by a member of Plaintiffs' union, all safeguards (collective bargaining, the protections of Art. IV, § 24 of the City Charter) will remain in place.

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

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standing under Washington's Declaratory Judgment Act.<sup>5</sup> The City therefore requests the Court apply the test for a justiciable controversy in the context of a declaratory judgment set forth in its Motion.<sup>6</sup> The test is as follows: 1) an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, domant, hypothetical, speculative or moot argument; 2) between parties having genulne and opposing interests; 3) which involves direct and substantial interests, as opposed to potential, theoretical, abstract, or academic; and 4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive.<sup>7</sup> Applying the test (referred henceforth as "Ripley") to Plaintiffs' claimed present and future harms illustrates the absence of standing.

1. <u>Fear of future appointment of union members to exempt positions does not constitute "actual, concrete harm" and is insufficient to confer standing.</u>

In their Complaint Plaintiffs allege "Ordinance [C-34964] will eliminate civil service protections for twelve positions that currently are covered by civil service." Use of the word "will," as opposed to "has" or another past tense verb, explains that the alleged harm is to occur in the future. The time of occurrence is unspecified.

See Pls.' Resp. at p. 4 ("this case was brought pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act"), p. 6.

Plaintiffs at p. 4 of their Response adopt this test as determinative.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wn.2d 811, 814-815 (1973); standing test applied in To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 144 Wn.2d 403, 411-412 (2001) and Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash. 2d 402, 411-412 (1994).

<sup>8</sup> See Pls.' Compl. at ¶ 3.23.

THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6

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<sup>12</sup> <u>Id</u>. at 13:7-15:17

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13 <u>ld</u>. THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY **JUDGMENT - 7** 

appointed to an exempt position within the Fire Division. Plaintiffs concede this point.<sup>8</sup> Plaintiffs' Response including the declaration of union members do not oppose the City's position that every member of Plaintiffs' unions remains within the Spokane civil service system. 10 It is therefore undisputed that the City has not "eliminated" or impacted civil service protections for any of Plaintiffs' members.

As stated many times previously, no member of Plaintiffs' unions has been

Applying prong one of the Ripley test, "possible, dormant, hypothetical, [or] speculative" injury is directly excluded as a basis for demonstrating standing. With the above facts in mind. Plaintiffs' fear of future appointment is nothing more than a series of "ifs." If a department head or assistant department head position comes open, a member of Plaintiffs' unions may apply. If that member is qualified for the position, the City may choose to place the employee in the position through Mayoral appointment. 11 If the City Council approves the hire, the City is then required to bargain the hire with Plaintiffs' unions. 12 If Plaintiffs' unions object to the appointment, the City cannot go through with the hiring. 13 Then, finally, if all of the following occur, the union member would be exempt from civil service. Though discounted by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Pls.' responses to the City's requests for admission attached as Exhibit C to counsel's declaration submitted in support of City's Response to Plaintiffs' Mot. for Summ. J. (hereafter as "City's Response"); see also D. Waller depo. at 15:14-16, attached hereto as Exhibit B to Odle Decl., filed herewith.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See E. Jacobson affidavit at ¶ 13 (Ex. B to counsel's declaration in support of Mot. Summ. J.); see also H. Lowe affidavit at ¶ 14 (Ex. C to counsel's declaration.); see also D. Waller depo, at 32:10-14 (every member of Local 29 is covered by the Civil Service system) Odle Decl., Ex. B.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See § I, supra. See also E. Jacobson depo. at p. 8:24-9:6, Odle Decl., Ex. C.

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THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

Plaintiffs, the City also has the option of filling open department head or assistant head positions, as it did with assistant department head Lorena Markham, through civil service. While it is possible that a member of Plaintiffs' union could be appointed to an exempt position in the future, Plaintiffs' argument consists of no more than speculation and hypothetical scenarios. Plaintiffs' contention of concrete, present injury arising from the City's ability to appoint employees to leadership positions is a fallacy.

Plaintiffs also fail prong three of the <u>Ripley</u> test which precludes standing on claims alleging violation of "potential, theoretical, abstract, or academic" interests. While civil service enrollment may very well qualify as a direct and substantial interest, as is undisputed, every member of Plaintiffs' unions remains within the civil service system. Therefore, the analysis is whether Plaintiffs' members have a direct and substantial interest in not being appointed to an exempt position. As this has not occurred and there are no plans for it to occur, the threat is no more than "potential, theoretical, abstract, or academic."

If a union member is chosen for appointment to an exempt position, and the appointment is made by the Mayor and approved by the City Council, and bargained with the union, a newly-minted exempt employee is created. If that were to happen,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Plaintiffs argue that the City's option to hire through civil service is both a legal and factual fiction. The argument is largely focused on things other than Ms. Markham's hire. The point remains, the lone assistant department head position filled after the enactment of SMC Ch. 3.01A was accomplished through the civil service system. It is the City's position that this is at least a "shred" of evidence (Pis.' Resp. at 18) that future hirings can and will be accomplished through civil service.

Plaintiffs' members have yet another safeguard of their civil service rights. As set forth above, Art. IV, § 24 of the City Charter provides that any appointee "shall not be deprived by any such removal of any standing under the civil service provisions of this Charter which employee may have had before appointment as head or assistant head of a department." The appointed employee, for lack of a better phrase, checks his/her civil service rights at the door when stepping into their new role as an exempt employee. If the union employee resigns from his/her exempt position, or even if terminated, the employee reclaims the full gambit of civil service rights upon exit from the exempt position. This scenario, as applied by the City, is summarized by Civil Service Chief Examiner Glenn Kibbey in a document entitled "Indefinite Leave of Absence from the Classified Service," attached as Exhibit A to counsel's declaration filed herewith.

Contrasted with Plaintiffs' citation to <u>Clailam County Deputy Sheriff's Guild v.</u>

<u>Bd. of Clailam County Comm'rs.</u>, 15 where the local (non-civil service) personnel system conflicted with state civil service guidelines, all members of Plaintiffs' unions are presently enrolled and protected by the Spokane civil service system. No member of Plaintiffs' unions is exempt from civil service, they cannot say when or if they will become exempt, and, if they are appointed to an exempt position in the future, they will retain all civil service rights following their tenure as an exempt employee. Washington courts have repeatedly refused to find a justiciable controversy where

15 601 P.2d 943 (1979).

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the event at Issue has not yet occurred or remains a matter of speculation.<sup>16</sup> And while courts acknowledge a complaint for declaratory judgment provides a procedure "peculiarly well suited to the judicial determination of controversies concerning constitutional rights and...the constitutionality of legislative action," decisions have "resolutely maintained that no decisions should be made under the Act absent a 'justiciable controversy.'"<sup>17</sup>

Plaintiffs cannot articulate actual and concrete injury and do not meet the test for standing under applicable case law. They therefore fail to present a justiciable controversy and their claims for future harm related to possible exempt hirings should be dismissed.

2. Plaintiffs' allegation of impaired bumping rights is speculative and, as such, insufficient to confer standing.

Plaintiffs' argument on this subject finds conflict at page 9 of their Response "there are several ways in which the creation of new, smaller departments impairs
employment opportunities. Perhaps the plainest example is when layoffs arise." No

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> To-Ro, supra, 144 Wn.2d at 412; see, e.g., Diversified Indus, Dev. Corp., supra, 82 Wn.2d at 815 (where minor child's tort claim against lessor remained "an unpredictable contingency," the matter was "not ripe for declaratory relief"); Port of Seattle v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n. 92 Wn.2d 789, 806 (1979) (where issue of Port's future actions on certain contract rights "appear[ed] to be founded on a hypothetical factual situation," declaratory judgment was inappropriate); DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 102 Wn.2d 327, 331 (1984) (where party who was neither pregnant nor terminally ill challenged statute nullifying health care directive of pregnant or terminally ill patient, cause was not "ripe" for declaratory judgment); Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 460 (1986) (where railroad had not abandoned right-of-way and county had expressed no intent to acquire it, property owners' challenge to statutes permitting recreational public use of rights of way was "premature.").

<sup>17</sup> To-Ro, supra, 144 Wn.2d at 417.

fire fighter has been laid off since 2004.<sup>16</sup> No bumping rights have been utilized.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, though premised as a present injury, Plaintiffs concede this is argument is yet another exercise in speculation.

Plaintiffs' recitation of "bumping" rights is more or less accurate.<sup>20</sup> A senior employee faced with a potential lay-off may "bump" back to a previously held position, displacing a less senior employee. The less senior employee can bump back to an even lesser senior employee, and so on. The least senior employee then may be subject to layoff. Union bargaining can impact bumping rights and will take place prior to any lay-off.<sup>21</sup> As applied in the past, employee bumping rights were limited to an employee's particular City department. Plaintiffs' argument focuses on the hypothetical fact pattern of what may happen if lay-offs take place in a department within the Fire Division with few employees.

Plaintiffs concur that, fortunately, no member of the Fire Division has been laid off for a long time, prior to the recession, and certainly not since Ordinance C-34964 went into effect. Plaintiffs do not point to the possibility of City downsizing in the near future, or even the distant future. Until layoffs occur, bumping rights are dormant,

<sup>18</sup> See D. Haward [sic] depo. at p. 15:17-22, attached to Odle Decl., Ex. D.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> D. Haworth depo. at 16:16-19, Odle Decl., Ex. D; D. Waller depo. 17:8-10 Odle Decl., Ex.

B.

20 Plaintiffs have previously made similar statements regarding Ordinance C-34964's alleged impairment of "return rights." Return rights apply to employees who have been laid off, as opposed to those facing a layoff. As Plaintiffs' do not raise this issue herein, the City refrains from further argument on the subject.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See G. Kibbey depo at p. 39:10-24, Odle Decl., Ex. E; see also D. Waller depo. at 38:20-25, Odle Decl., Ex. B.

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Decl., Ex. D.

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24 122 Wn.2d 371, 858 P.2d 245 (1993). THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY **JUDGMENT - 12** 

concerns through use of a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU").<sup>22</sup> The MOU was circulated to all unions serving the City's employees. Per the MOU, the City agreed to treat departments within a division as a single entity for bumping purposes. Every union signed the MOU, with the exception of Plaintiffs' unions.<sup>23</sup> Plaintiffs admit the MOU would have addressed their bumping issues but opted to ignore their members' apparent concerns. Plaintiffs cannot now argue that their own failure to act in their members' best interests provide them with a basis to sue.

existing in theory only. Though speculative, the City offered to allay Plaintiffs'

Additionally, increased likelihood of harm is not "injury" for standing purposes: In Yakima County (West Valley) Fire Protection District No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 24 homeowners outside the city limits signed agreements binding them to support a future annexation. The homeowners and the local fire district later sought a declaratory judgment nullifying the agreements. Though the court found that the agreements increased the likelihood of annexation, the fire department's complaint was dismissed for lack of standing. The court reasoned that the homeowners' annexation agreements did not directly affect the fire district because those agreements did not ensure annexation. They provided only 66 percent of the necessary 75 percent of the property value required for annexation, and a successful annexation petition would remain susceptible to invalidation through governmental

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See D. Waller depo. at p. 33:7-24, Odle Decl., Ex. B; D Haworth depo. at 27:7-24, Odle See E. Jacobson depo. at 20:5-16, Odle Decl., Ex. C.

review. Thus, although the agreements increased the likelihood of annexation, the fire district could not satisfy the justiclability requirement of a direct and substantial interest in the dispute.

The dispute over bumping rights involves dormant concerns which are hypothetical and speculative in nature. The interests purportedly impacted by Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A are potential, theoretical, abstract, and academic. Just as in Yakima County where the fire district's injury was dependent on the intervening prospect of annexation, Plaintiffs alleged impairment of bumping rights is dependent on the intervening prospect of future City budget cuts resulting in lay-offs. Plaintiffs were offered the opportunity to treat all departments as a single entitle but refused. Plaintiffs therefore fail the Ripley test and their allegations of infringement of bumping rights are insufficient to satisfy standing requirements.

3. <u>Plaintiffs' allegations of present harm are insufficient to conferstanding.</u>

In addition to future injury, Plaintiffs' Response attempts to survive the City's Motion by manufacturing "immediate" injury purportedly experienced by their members. Plaintiffs argue the following: the inability to vote on a change to the City Charter, impairment of employment rights, and violation of the City's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with Plaintiffs' unions. None of the new allegations is sufficient to establish standing.

a. The City did not amend the City Charter.

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As to the first allegation of present harm, the Inability to vote on a change to the City Charter, Plaintiffs cite portions of Art. XIV, § 125 of the City Charter which provides that the City Charter may only "be amended by a majority vote of the electorate of the City." Plaintiffs' citation is accurate – their argument is not.

From Complaint until Response, Plaintiffs argued that the City violated terms of the Charter when it enacted Ordinance C-34964. Here, Plaintiffs' argument changes course and for the first time takes the position that the City actually amended the Charter. When the Charter was purportedly amended, Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to vote on the amendment. There are several problems with this argument, the most glaring being the City did not amend the Charter. Even if the argument is the City, through Ordinance C-34964, implicitly amended the Charter, such an argument is unfounded. As discussed in depth in prior pleadings, the Charter allows for two exempt appointments per City department. The Charter places no limitation on the number of City departments the Mayor and the City Council can create or the minimum number of employees within a department.

The City did not amend the Charter. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege that the City amended the Charter. As the Charter was not amended, Plaintiffs were deprived of no rights. History lesson aside, this argument does nothing to address Plaintiffs' lack of standing.

b. Plaintiffs' member's employment rights have not been impacted by the subject legislation.

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This argument is similar to Plaintiffs' bumping rights argument addressed in § II(A)(2), supra. Plaintiffs argue the Ordinance makes certain positions within the Fire Division "less attractive" and support this argument through the declarations of two union members (McCann and Golladay). The declarations highlight the hypothetical nature of this argument. Both McCann and Golladay remain employed by the City, are protected by civil service, mention no impending lay-offs impacting their positions, and have not had to utilize bumping rights since the enactment of Ordinance C-34964. Their alleged harm is that the language of SMC Ch. 3.01A caused them to turn down jobs within the Fire Division. Mr. McCann cites "unforeseen consequences down the road" as the basis to decline a job transfer. Unforeseen circumstances do not qualify as actual, concrete injury sufficient to generate standing.

Both Golladay and McCann turned down jobs they, apparently, did not want. Neither had any inherent right to the jobs they refused. The City has no obligation to ensure jobs remain attractive to union members. The lone case cited by Plaintiffs allowed standing under the Administrative Procedures Act and is completely distinguishable from the subject matter.<sup>25</sup> Unjustified fears of possible future lay-off

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Plaintiffs cite Wash. Fed'n of State Employees, AFL-CIO v. Higher Ed. Personnel Bd., 87 Wn.2d 823 (1976) for the proposition that the union had standing to challenge regulations concerning seniority and layoff procedures. The Administrative Procedures Act has its own section on standing, inapplicable to this matter. See RCW 34.04.070(1). Under the administrative procedures act, it must be shown that "it appears that the rule, or its threatened application...immediately threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner."

based on hypothetical fact patterns do not confer standing under <u>Ripley</u>. Plaintiffs have not been harmed and do not have standing to challenge the subject legislation.

c. The City's purported violation of the CBA is a separate matter without relevance to this proceeding.

Plaintiffs allege Ordinance C-34964 undermines the terms of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City and Plaintiffs' unions. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege violation of the CBA. Further, this is not the proper forum to adjudicate a violation of the CBA. This argument is without merit.

# B. Neither Ordinance C-34964 nor SMC Ch. 3.01A violates the Spokane City Charter

Plaintiffs devote only a short section of their Response to the merits of their claimed violation of the City Charter and RCW 41.08, apparently resting on the argument contained in their Motion for Summary Judgment. As has been the case throughout, Plaintiffs intertwine elements of their claim of Charter violation with their claim of state law violation. In fact, in their Response to the City's Motion the arguments are presented under a single heading with Plaintiffs drawing from both sources of law in hopes of confusing the issues and surviving the City's Motion. Evaluating each on its own merit demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact remains, Plaintiffs have not and cannot demonstrate that Ordinance C-34964 or SMC Ch. 3.01A violate the City Charter.

Plaintiffs broadly assert Charter violation but, outside of a footnote reference to Art. VI, § 53(A), provide no direct citation. Plaintiffs' position is the legislation simply

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violates the Charter - no support necessary. The fact is neither Ordinance C-34964 nor SMC Ch. 3.01A violate any portion of the Charter.

Spending any time on Plaintiffs' argument regarding Art. VI, § 53(A) is too much time. As mentioned in the City's Response, this argument appears only in a footnote, deep in Plaintiffs' analysis, following pages and pages of argument pertaining to some alleged Charter violation. The identified section outlines the powers and duties of the Civil Service Commission. Plaintiffs' argument is that once a position is classified by civil service, it can never be appointed. Exempt positions, including heads and assistant heads of departments within the Fire Division, are not "classified" — they are not civil service position. They have never been classified. This is the Plaintiffs' major point of contention with the subject legislation, that the City can appoint exempt employees outside civil service. This argument is completely meritless but since it's the lone portion of the Charter Plaintiffs identify as violated by Ordinance C-34964, the City addresses it separately.

Plaintiffs' lengthlest argument revolves around the Charter's absence of a definition of the word "department." Plaintiffs step into the shoes of the City legislative branch and tell the Court how they think the term is defined and that small departments are illegal for a variety of reasons. The City has shown a consistent ability to define what constitutes a "department" through ordinance. Many City departments have a small number of employees but significant responsibility. The

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Spokane Mayor and City Council are capably tasked with defining what makes a "department" within the City of Spokane and did so through Ordinance C-34964.

Plaintiffs may not like how the term "department" is defined but that does not make Ordinance C-34964 or SMC Ch. 3.01A illegal. Plaintiffs' arguments in support of a Charter violation are unfounded and fail to present a genuine issue of material fact. As Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of proof, the City requests their allegation of Charter violation be dismissed with prejudice.

#### C. Neither Ordinance C-34964 nor SMC Ch. 3,01A violates state law

As with the City's argument regarding Plaintiffs' assertions of Charter violation, the City's position as to Plaintiffs' allegations of state law violation by Ordinance C-34984 is largely briefed in the City's Motion and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion. The City summarizes its position below.<sup>26</sup>

Plaintiffs argue that after Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A were enacted the Spokane civil service system no longer "substantially accomplish[es]" the purpose of the state civil service law. This argument is misplaced for two reasons: first, RCW 41.08.010 requires that cities which, at the present time, have provided for civil service in the fire department "substantially accomplish the purpose of the statute." It is undisputed that the City of Spokane has a civil service system serving all firefighters within Plaintiffs' unions. Any impact of the Ordinance upon non-union

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Though Plaintiffs' are "confused" by the City's position that Plaintiffs' have not met their burden of proof that state law prohibits multiple entities to fight fires, the City rests on the argument set forth in its Motion for Summary Judgment.

firefighters (such as Deputy Chief Bob Hanna, referenced at p. 17 of Plaintiffs' Response) is irrelevant to this suit as they are not parties. Plaintiffs' argument that a civil service system in which all of their members are enrolled and protected does not substantially accomplish the goals of the state civil service system is absurd.

Second, RCW 41.08.140 specifically makes it the duty of a local civil service commission to institute any and all civil suits "necessary for the property enforcement of this chapter and the rules of the commission." Plaintiffs approached the Spokane Civil Service Commission before initiating suit and the Commission declined to bring suit.<sup>27</sup> Plaintiffs are not the proper parties to prosecute this matter.

Finally, prior to their Response, Plaintiffs claims were brought in the dual capacity of a Petition for Constitutional Writ of Review and as a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. In their Response to the City's Motion, Plaintiffs offer no opposition regarding the validity of their Petition for Constitutional Writ of Review instead arguing only the portion of their claim brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (RCW 7.24). They apparently overlook the requirements of RCW 7.24.110. While this omission was arguably harmless when their claims were still housed in a Writ of Constitutional Review, their failure to sustain this aspect of their claim warrants dismissal of their Complaint.

Entitled "Parties -- City as party -- Attorney general to be served, when," RCW 7.24.110 states in its entirety:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See Kibbey depo. at 39:17-40:3, Odle Decl., Ex. E.

When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.<sup>28</sup>

Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare municipal Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A invalid. Per RCW 7.24.110, the attorney general is a necessary party to proceedings for declaratory judgment as to constitutionality of municipal ordinance.<sup>29</sup> The requirement that the attorney general be served is jurisdictional.<sup>30</sup> When an indispensible party is not served, an action for declaratory judgment is subject to dismissal.<sup>31</sup> The City requests the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' claims based on their failure to join the attorney general, an indispensible party.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs fall to establish standing to challenge Ordinance C-34964 and SMC Ch. 3.01A. Future harm without a showing of direct, substantial, significant injury is insufficient. Further, Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of proof and establish that the subject legislation conflicts with the Spokane City Charter or Washington state civil service law. For these reasons, the City requests the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' claims in their entirety.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Parr v. Citv of Seattle, 197 Wash. 53, 84 P.2d 375 (1938).

<sup>30</sup> Westford v. Chamberlain, 52 Wn.2d 497, 326 P.2d 741 (1958).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See <u>Manlove v. Johnson</u>, 198 Wash. 280, 88 P.2d 397 (1939); <u>Langlie v. United Fireman's Ins. Co.</u>, 40 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Wash. 1941).

Finally, the City requests the court dismiss Plaintiffs' claims regarding alleged arbitrary and capricious action as the City's argument was not addressed in Plaintiffs' Response.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_\_day of April, 2014.

Nathaniel Odle, WSBA #39602 Assistant City Attorney Attorney for Defendant

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#### **DECLARATION OF SERVICE**

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that on the Aday of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing "THE CITY OF SPOKANE'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT," to be delivered to the parties below in the manner noted:

David A. Bricklin
Claudia M. Newman
Bricklin & Newman, LLP
1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3303
Seattle, WA 98154
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

[] VIA FACSIMILE [] VIA U.S. MAIL

[] VIA OVERNIGHT SERVICE
VIA EMAIL BY AGREEMENT

Shella Hansen City Attorney's Office 808 W. Spokane Falls Blvd. Spokane, WA 99201-3326

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HUNT M. WHALEY

October 30, 2014

Troy Bruner, Chair City of Spokane Ethics Committee RECEIVED

OCT 3 0 2014

CITY CLERK'S OFFICE SPOKANE, WA

Re: Referral of possible ethics violation by City Council President Ben Stuckart

Dear Mr. Bruner:

I am referring what I believe to be a violation of the Code of Ethics for the City of Spokane to you for investigation and disposition.

# Summary:

Council President Stuckart received a highly confidential email regarding a pending matter in litigation, clearly marked "attorney client privileged" and forwarded the email to the opposing party at his personal email address.

# Background:

This matter came to my attention inadvertently during the course of an investigation performed by me at the request of Don Waller, President of Local 29 of the International Association of Firefighters. Mr. Waller's August 18, 2014 letter which requested investigation into a potential violation of the Spokane Municipal Code involving a budget transfer is attached hereto (exhibits not included). My August 26, 2014 response to Mr. Waller, and a letter from Local 29's counsel, SaNni Lemonidis, regarding the issue are also attached.

To properly investigate Mr. Waller's claims, I requested that the City's IT department collect relevant emails relating to the issue. Through my review of the results compiled by IT, I discovered an email dated May 5, 2014 from Spokane City Council President Ben Stuckart to Mr. Waller. Council President Stuckart's email to Mr. Waller consisted of a forwarded copy of an email drafted by an attorney in my office, Assistant City Attorney Erin Jacobson. Ms. Jacobson's email, addressed to the Mayor of Spokane and all members of the Spokane City Council (including Mr. Stuckart), was clearly marked "attorney client privileged" in the subject line and contained highly confidential

Troy Bruner October 15, 2014 Page 2

information about pending litigation, specifically, the course of conduct the City would be undertaking with respect to a law suit brought against the City by Mr. Waller's organization, Local 29. Within twenty minutes of receipt of Ms. Jacobson's email, Council President Stuckart forwarded the email, in its entirety, to Mr. Waller at his personal email address. I believe Mr. Stuckart was aware he was forwarding confidential information to the party opposing the City in pending litigation. These email messages are attached in redacted form.

## Analysis:

The Spokane City Charter and Municipal Code vest in the City Attorney the authority and duty to act as the City's legal advisor. While work is regularly performed at the request of individual elected officials or departments, the client of the City Attorney is the City of Spokane. Under these principles, when the City Attorney provides confidential written advice to the Mayor or the Council, only the Mayor or the Council may waive any attorney-client privilege on behalf of the City. No other person, including the official aides or staff members, may waive the privilege without authorization from the recipient of the confidential correspondence. Where confidential written advice or information is provided to an official department or body, for example the Spokane City Council, only the body – not individual members – can agree to waive the attorney-client privilege.

Here, the Council President provided confidential information from the City Attorney's Office to the plaintiff in a law suit pending against the City of Spokane. In doing so, he violated the attorney-client privilege held by Spokane City Council. There was no vote to waive the privilege and, thus, no authority. Further, since Mr. Stuckart emailed Ms. Jacobson's confidential legal advice to the personal email address of Mr. Waller, it is unknown at this time if the information was further disseminated.

The Spokane Code of Ethics prohibits disclosure of confidential or privileged information gained by reason of a public official's position. The local prohibition mirrors the mandate of Washington State law. See RCW 42.23.070 ("No municipal officer may disclose confidential information gained by reason of the officer's position, nor may the officer otherwise use such information for his or her personal gain or benefit"). Disclosure of privileged or confidential information gained through official channels constitutes "official misconduct" under both State and Spokane municipal law. 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See also Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(a) (A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents).
<sup>2</sup> SMC 01.04.030(H).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> RCW 9A.80.010 (1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege: (a) He or she intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or (b) He or she intentionally refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him or her by law. (2) Official misconduct is a gross misdemeanor. See also RCW 42.23.050 (Any officer violating the provisions of this chapter is liable to the municipality of which he or she is an officer for a

Troy Bruner October 15, 2014 Page 3

### Next Steps.

I believe I have a professional ethical obligation to my client and employer, the City of Spokane, to disclose what I believe to be an instance of official misconduct.<sup>5</sup> I met with Mr. Stuckart this afternoon to advise him that I am sending this letter. I will cooperate with any subsequent investigation. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely.

Nancy L. Isserlis

Spokane City Attorney

cc: Ben Stuckart, Council President

penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars, in addition to such other civil or criminal liability or penalty as may otherwise by imposed upon the officer by law. In addition to all other penalties, civil or criminal, the violation by any officer of the provisions of this chapter may be grounds for forfeiture of his or her office.)

<sup>4</sup> SMC Section 10.07.132(A) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege, he intentionally: (1) commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or (2) refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law. (B) Official misconduct is a gross misdemeanor (RCW 9A.80.010).

See RPC 1.13(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

DON WALLER President

JOHN GOODMAN Vice President

THAD FRATER Secretary-Treasurer



IAFF- LOCAL 29 911 E. Baldwin Spokane, WA 99207-2512

BUS 509-484-5598 FAX 509-484-3752 www.local29.org iaffl29@gmail.com

# **International Association of Fire Fighters**

August 18, 2014

Office of the City Prosecuting Attorney 909 West Mallon Avenue Spokane, Washington 99201-2129 cityprosecutor@spokanecity.org **RECEIVED** 

AUG 1 9 2014

OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR

Re:

Complaint Regarding Spokane Municipal Code Violation Prohibited Intrafund Budget Transfer; SMC 07.09.010

Dear City Prosecuting Attorney:

My name is Don Waller and I am the president of the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 29, in Spokane. I am writing this complaint to inform you that Local 29 has identified an apparent violation of Spokane Municipal Code Section 07.09.010, governing "Intrafund Budget Transfers." Under SMC 01.05.030, an investigation and written finding should follow when a written complaint, like this one, is submitted to a Code Enforcement Officer. SMC 01.05.020(B)(4) ("the code enforcement officer is ... a city prosecutor."); SMC 01.05.030(A) ("If the alleged violation came to the officer's attention by way of a written complaint, and, after investigation, a code violation is not found, the officer should inform the complainant of the finding.") Attached to this written complaint are documents that Local 29 hopes will aid in your investigation.

This violation is unusual in that it does not involve the ordinary matters of unkempt property, obstructions, zoning issues, and the like. Instead, it involves a failure to proceed through the required democratic channels specified in the Spokane Municipal Code, constituting, in my opinion, a more serious issue of governance than the usual gamut of SMC violations.

SMC Title 7, Chapter 9 sets forth minimum requirements for any transfer of City budget funds from one departmental fund to another. Put differently, it draws a line between the authority of the Executive to spend the budget and the authority of the City Council to allocate the budget. SMC 07.09.010 reads: "Intrafund budget transfers may be made during the current fiscal year by order of the mayor ... Provided, however, that the following transfers shall be approved by ordinance passed by the vote of one more than the majority of all members of the city council." SMC 07.09.010(A) (emphasis added). This obligation is not discretionary, as evidenced by the use of mandatory language, i.e., "shall." See id. The first type of intrafund transfer for which City Council approval is mandatory is: "The creation or abolishment of employee positions." SMC 07.09.010(A)(1). This subsection is the focus of Local 29's complaint.

Subsections (a) and (b) then set forth just two scenarios in which City Council approval is not required for the creation or abolishment of employee positions. <u>Id</u>. ("except for:"). The first exception applies to

"classified employee positions which are created or abolished solely for the purpose of downgrading a specific position in order to hire at a lower level of classification." SMC 07.09.010(A)(1)(a) (emphasis added). The second exception applies to "progressive promotions, certification advancements or position reclassifications of classified employees governed by civil service rules or bargaining unit contracts." SMC 07.09.010(A)(1)(b) (emphasis added).

These sections can only be read to permit intrafund transfers for the creation or abolishment of employee positions, and without City Council approval, *if* those positions are *classified* employee positions, i.e., the position is already subject to and governed by civil service rules. An intrafund transfer to create an employee position outside the civil service system simply cannot occur under SMC 07.09.010 without City Council approval.

As the attached exhibits show, an Assistant Director of Integrated Medical Services ("Assistant Director") position was created and filled by appointment on April 10, 2014. (Ex. 1; Ex. 2) The job description for this new, exempt position was created outside the Civil Service Commission's classification plan. (Ex. 3; Ex. 4) There was no existing or dormant position of "Assistant Director of Integrated Medical Services." I expect that your investigation will show that the budget assets used to fund this position were obtained by intrafund transfer, specifically the transfer listed on the last line of the "Intrafund Budget Transfer Report" for April 2014. (Ex. 5) ("Deputy Fire Chief" is a position that was budgeted for but never filled) It appears the assets to fund the Assistant Director position were obtained in part via transfer from the EMS Fund: "I'll need to move EMS Fund money over ..." (Ex. 6) Ordinarily, these intrafund transfers are authorized by emergency budget ordinance ("EBO") through the City Council. See (Ex. 7) Similar authorization by the City Council was required for this transfer, under SMC 07.09.010, but was never obtained. In addition, SMC 07.08.113(B) limits how EMS funds may be expended. The City's transfer of funds without City Council approval and in violation of SMC 07.09.010 is suspect because it circumvents the representative body of the City Council. I expect that your office will investigate this apparent violation and look forward to hearing from you about the results of your investigation.

In the event that a Code Enforcement Officer finds a violation, the officer must "attempt to secure voluntary correction by contracting the responsible person(s), explaining the violation and requesting correction before issuing a notice of violation or notice of infraction." SMC 01.05.030(B). I believe this is the appropriate course of action here. However, even if your office does not decide to issue a notice of violation/infraction, this complaint constitutes a request for your office to take action on behalf of the taxpayers of the City of Spokane. In the absence of statutory authorization to bring private suit, Washington recognizes taxpayer standing to challenge the acts of public officers once a request has been made to a proper public official, here, a Code Enforcement Officer, and that request has been refused or "would have been useless." Farris v. Munro, 99 Wn.2d 326, 329 (1983).

Please contact me to confirm receipt of this complaint. I look forward to hearing from you shortly.

Jan the

Sincerely,

Don Waller



OFFICE OF THE C.\_. ATTORNEY 808 W. SPOKANE FALLS BIVD. SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 99201-3326 509.625.6225 509.625.6277 FAX

NANCY L. ISSERLIS CITY ATTORNEY I DAYFON

PAT J. DALTON
SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY

#### Assistant City Attorneys

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JAMES A. RICHMAN
ELIZABETH L. SCHOEDEL
TIMOTHY E. SZAMBELAN
HUNT M. WHALEY

August 26, 2014

Don Waller IAFF – Local 29 911 East Baldwin Spokane, WA 99207

Re:

Complaint Regarding Spokane Municipal Code Violation

Your letter dated August 18. 2014 to Office of the Prosecuting Attorney

#### Dear Don:

Justin Bingham, the City Prosecutor, received your letter on August 19 and forwarded it to me for response.

Initially, please let me clarify that Code Enforcement Officers under the Spokane Municipal Code have limited roles and responsibilities under the SMC with respect to matters specifically delineated under SMC. Code Enforcement Officers do not have the authority to enforce all provisions of the SMC. The City Prosecutors office has the responsibility to prosecute misdemeanors inside the City limits and to adjudicate certain civil infractions over which it has jurisdiction.

With that clarification in mind, it does not appear that any of the concerns you have raised in your letter could be handled in the City Prosecutor's office because there has been no allegation of a crime committed under the SMC, nor any civil infraction reported by a Code Enforcement Officer that would fall under the Prosecutor's jurisdiction. A violation of SMC 07.09.010 is not linked to or referenced in the SMC to acts prosecuted by the City Prosecutor's office.

The City Code Enforcement Officers have a *limited* commission granted by the Spokane Police Department. Title Seven of the Spokane Municipal Code is not part of the Code Enforcement Officers limited commission. Code Enforcement Officers investigate various land use, building and zoning violations. The Code Enforcement Department is not involved with any financial or budgetary functions for the City of Spokane.

Don Waller August 26, 2014 Page 2

The issues you raise in your letter are certainly worthy of further investigation, but I am not able to respond to your request that my office take legal action on behalf of the taxpayers of the City of Spokane at this time. The ethics of my profession and the Rules of Civil Procedure in the State of Washington prevent me from filing suit without performing the necessary due diligence required.

As you requested, I will be taking this matter under advisement and asking for further investigation into the matters that you have raised. I am working on how best to handle that.

Sincerely,

Nancy L. Isserlis City Attorney

cc. Justin Bingham

## Jacobson, Erin

From:

Stuckart, Ben

Sent:

Monday, May 05, 2014 14:35

To:

Subject:

FW: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED Appeal Decision

Ben Stuckart City of Spokane City Council President (509)625-6258

From: Jacobson, Erin

Sent: Monday, May 05, 2014 2:15 PM

To: Allen, Michael; Fagan, Mike; Mumm, Candace; Salvatori, Steve; Snyder, Jon; Stuckart, Ben; Waldref, Amber

Cc: Condon, David; Sanders, Theresa; Isserlis, Nancy; Odle, Nathaniel; Williams, Bobby; Schaeffer, Brian; Lowe, Heather

Subject: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED Appeal Decision

#### Council Members,



<u>Confidential & Provinged Legal Motorials</u>
INC Disclosure Authorized Wahout Express Consent of Chenius & City #1. They



Erin A. Jacobson | Assistant City Attorney office 509.625.6889 | cell 509.710.8028







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#### Imus, Roxanne


From: Sent:

Imus, Roxanne

Thursday, October 30, 2014 10:59 AM

To:

Imus, Roxanne



Ben Stuckart City of Spokane City Council President (509)625-6258

From: Jacobson, Erin

Sent: Monday, May 05, 2014 2:15 PM

To: Allen, Michael; Fagan, Mike; Mumm, Candace; Salvatori, Steve; Snyder, Jon; Stuckart, Ben; Waldref, Amber

Cc: Condon, David; Sanders, Theresa; Isserlis, Nancy; Odle, Nathaniel; Williams, Bobby; Schaeffer, Brian; Lowe, Heather

Subject: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED Appeal Decision

Council Members,

